{"title":"Justice and hope: Essays, lectures and other writings By RaimondGaita, ScottStephens (Ed.), Melbourne, Vic.: Melbourne University Press. 2023. xvii +582 pp. £30. ISBN 9780522880236","authors":"Steven Tudor","doi":"10.1111/phin.12432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12432","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141503274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Logic diagrams have seen a resurgence in their application in a range of fields, including logic, biology, media science, computer science and philosophy. Consequently, understanding the history and philosophy of these diagrams has become crucial. As many current diagrammatic systems in logic are based on ideas that originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, it is important to consider what motivated the use of logic diagrams in the past and whether these reasons are still valid today. This paper proposes that transcendental philosophy was a key inspiration for the development of logic diagrams and that such diagrams can be employed in transcendental arguments, even after the linguistic turn.
{"title":"Transcendental philosophy and logic diagrams","authors":"Jens Lemanski","doi":"10.1111/phin.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12418","url":null,"abstract":"Logic diagrams have seen a resurgence in their application in a range of fields, including logic, biology, media science, computer science and philosophy. Consequently, understanding the history and philosophy of these diagrams has become crucial. As many current diagrammatic systems in logic are based on ideas that originated in the 18th and 19th centuries, it is important to consider what motivated the use of logic diagrams in the past and whether these reasons are still valid today. This paper proposes that transcendental philosophy was a key inspiration for the development of logic diagrams and that such diagrams can be employed in transcendental arguments, even after the linguistic turn.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"160 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140167831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In his 1939 Cambridge Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein proclaims that he is not out to persuade anyone to change their opinions. I seek to further our understanding of this point by investigating an exchange between Wittgenstein and Turing on contradictions. In defending the claim that contradictory calculi are mathematically defective, Turing suggests that applying such a calculus would lead to disasters such as bridges falling down. In the ensuing discussion, it can seem as if Wittgenstein challenges Turing's claim that such disasters would occur. I argue that this is not what Wittgenstein is doing. Rather, he is scrutinizing the meaning and philosophical import of Turing's claim—showing how Turing is wavering between making an empirical prediction and a logical observation, and that it is only through this wavering that Turing can believe that he has provided a proper explanation of why contradictory calculi are mathematically defective.
{"title":"Not a difference of opinion: Wittgenstein and Turing on contradictions in mathematics","authors":"Wim Vanrie","doi":"10.1111/phin.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12417","url":null,"abstract":"In his 1939 Cambridge Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein proclaims that he is not out to persuade anyone to change their opinions. I seek to further our understanding of this point by investigating an exchange between Wittgenstein and Turing on contradictions. In defending the claim that contradictory calculi are mathematically defective, Turing suggests that applying such a calculus would lead to disasters such as bridges falling down. In the ensuing discussion, it can seem as if Wittgenstein challenges Turing's claim that such disasters would occur. I argue that this is not what Wittgenstein is doing. Rather, he is scrutinizing the meaning and philosophical import of Turing's claim—showing how Turing is wavering between making an empirical prediction and a logical observation, and that it is only through this wavering that Turing can believe that he has provided a proper explanation of why contradictory calculi are mathematically defective.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140037751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this essay, I investigate the longstanding philosophical problem of whether we have control over our actions in a deterministic world. In working through a range of everyday situations in which this problem could arise, I come to the realisation that determinism has no bearing on whether we have control over our actions, because having control over our actions and determinism only make sense under different aspects.
{"title":"On having control over our actions","authors":"Doug Hardman","doi":"10.1111/phin.12415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12415","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I investigate the longstanding philosophical problem of whether we have control over our actions in a deterministic world. In working through a range of everyday situations in which this problem could arise, I come to the realisation that determinism has no bearing on whether we have control over our actions, because having control over our actions and determinism only make sense under different aspects.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139773082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pierre Hadot is best known as a historian of ancient philosophy and for advocating the relevance of ancient thinking for contemporary lives. What is less well known is that he was one of the first French philosophers to take a serious interest in the work of Wittgenstein, publishing between 1959 and 1962 two essays on the Tractatus and two on the Philosophical Investigations, since republished as Wittgenstein et les limites de langage (Paris: J. Vrin, 2010). Only two of these essays are available (and not widely) in English translation. Part of my goal is to argue that they deserve the attention of anglophone readers. My focus here is on Hadot's remarks about the Philosophical Investigations. Hadot argues that this work produces a self-defeating paradox because it claims that we can speak intelligibly only within a language-game, but Wittgenstein, like the philosophers he criticises, tries to transcend language-games in the presentation of his views. Despite this criticism, Hadot is inspired by Wittgenstein's discussion of the multiplicity of language-games to argue that the texts of ancient philosophy are not part of the same language-game as those of modern philosophy and must be approached as ‘spiritual exercises’, rather than as bodies of doctrine or theory. Wittgenstein is thus a key inspiration for Hadot's historiographical method. I argue that Hadot is too impressed by a faulty analogy between the Tractatus and the Investigations and that he gives a problematically reductive interpretation of Wittgenstein's talk of language-games and implausibly attributes to Wittgenstein a reverence for ‘the ordinary’ that supposedly takes the place of his earlier wonder at the existence of the world. Many commentators since Hadot have made similar errors, so his case remains instructive. I conclude by suggesting, nonetheless, that something like Hadot's proposals about historiographical method may be justified by a better reading of the Investigations.
皮埃尔-哈多以古代哲学史家和倡导古代思想与当代生活的相关性而闻名。但鲜为人知的是，他是最早认真研究维特根斯坦著作的法国哲学家之一，在 1959 年至 1962 年间发表了两篇关于《论语》的论文和两篇关于《哲学探究》的论文，后被重新出版为《维特根斯坦与语言的局限》（Wittgenstein et les limites de langage）（巴黎：J. Vrin 出版社，2010 年）。这些文章中只有两篇有英译本（而且译本不多）。我的部分目标是论证它们值得英语读者的关注。我这里的重点是哈多特关于《哲学研究》的评论。哈多特认为，这部著作产生了一个自相矛盾的悖论，因为它声称我们只能在语言游戏中进行有意义的对话，但维特根斯坦却像他所批评的哲学家一样，在阐述自己的观点时试图超越语言游戏。尽管有这样的批评，哈多特还是从维特根斯坦关于语言游戏多重性的讨论中得到启发，认为古代哲学文本与现代哲学文本不属于同一种语言游戏，必须将其视为 "精神练习"，而不是教义或理论体系。因此，维特根斯坦是哈多史学方法的重要灵感来源。我认为，哈多特对《理论篇》和《研究篇》之间的错误类比印象太深，他对维特根斯坦关于语言游戏的论述作了有问题的还原性解释，并难以置信地将对 "普通 "的崇敬归于维特根斯坦，而这种崇敬据说取代了他早先对世界存在的惊叹。哈多特之后的许多评论家都犯过类似的错误，因此他的案例仍然具有启发性。尽管如此，我最后还是要指出，通过更好地解读《考察》，哈多特关于史学方法的某些提议可能是合理的。
{"title":"Hadot's later Wittgenstein: A critique","authors":"Michael Hymers","doi":"10.1111/phin.12414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12414","url":null,"abstract":"Pierre Hadot is best known as a historian of ancient philosophy and for advocating the relevance of ancient thinking for contemporary lives. What is less well known is that he was one of the first French philosophers to take a serious interest in the work of Wittgenstein, publishing between 1959 and 1962 two essays on the <i>Tractatus</i> and two on the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>, since republished as <i>Wittgenstein et les limites de langage</i> (Paris: J. Vrin, 2010). Only two of these essays are available (and not widely) in English translation. Part of my goal is to argue that they deserve the attention of anglophone readers. My focus here is on Hadot's remarks about the <i>Philosophical Investigations</i>. Hadot argues that this work produces a self-defeating paradox because it claims that we can speak intelligibly only within a language-game, but Wittgenstein, like the philosophers he criticises, tries to transcend language-games in the presentation of his views. Despite this criticism, Hadot is inspired by Wittgenstein's discussion of the multiplicity of language-games to argue that the texts of ancient philosophy are not part of the same language-game as those of modern philosophy and must be approached as ‘spiritual exercises’, rather than as bodies of doctrine or theory. Wittgenstein is thus a key inspiration for Hadot's historiographical method. I argue that Hadot is too impressed by a faulty analogy between the <i>Tractatus</i> and the <i>Investigations</i> and that he gives a problematically reductive interpretation of Wittgenstein's talk of language-games and implausibly attributes to Wittgenstein a reverence for ‘the ordinary’ that supposedly takes the place of his earlier wonder at the existence of the world. Many commentators since Hadot have made similar errors, so his case remains instructive. I conclude by suggesting, nonetheless, that something like Hadot's proposals about historiographical method may be justified by a better reading of the <i>Investigations</i>.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139374556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The conditions involved in the applicability of mathematics in science are the subject of ongoing debates. One of the best-received approaches is the inferential account, which involves structural mappings and pragmatic considerations in a three-step model. According to the inferential account, these pragmatic considerations happen in the immersion and interpretation stages, but not during derivation (symbol-pushing in a mathematical formalism). In this work, I draw inspiration from the later Wittgenstein and make the case that the applicability of mathematics also rests on pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level. I make the further case that pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level may substitute pragmatic considerations in the other two stages, thus showing how they are holistically interrelated. I illustrate these two points with the solution of a simple geometrical problem.
{"title":"The role of pragmatic considerations during mathematical derivation in the applicability of mathematics","authors":"José Antonio Pérez-Escobar","doi":"10.1111/phin.12412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12412","url":null,"abstract":"The conditions involved in the applicability of mathematics in science are the subject of ongoing debates. One of the best-received approaches is the inferential account, which involves structural mappings and pragmatic considerations in a three-step model. According to the inferential account, these pragmatic considerations happen in the immersion and interpretation stages, but not during derivation (symbol-pushing in a mathematical formalism). In this work, I draw inspiration from the later Wittgenstein and make the case that the applicability of mathematics also rests on pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level. I make the further case that pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level may substitute pragmatic considerations in the other two stages, thus showing how they are holistically interrelated. I illustrate these two points with the solution of a simple geometrical problem.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138826609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a reply to ‘Defending Wittgenstein’, Piotr Dehnel's critique of my article, ‘Defending Wittgenstein's Remarks on Cantor from Putnam’. I first show that my position is much more in agreement with Felix Mühlhölzer than Dehnel takes it to be, and that his criticism of me is nothing more than a failure to recognize this. I then show how Dehnel incorrectly reads Wittgenstein as rejecting set theory as false. It is an overemphasis on and a much too narrow picture of ‘applicability’ which leads him to this view. Finally, I conclude by rejecting Dehnel's view that Wittgenstein was a finitist about mathematics.
这是对皮奥特-德内尔（Piotr Dehnel）对我的文章《从普特南那里捍卫维特根斯坦关于康托的评论》（Defending Wittgenstein's Remarks on Cantor from Putnam）的评论《捍卫维特根斯坦》（Defending Wittgenstein）的答复。我首先说明，我的立场与德内尔所认为的费利克斯-米尔霍尔泽（Felix Mühlhölzer）的立场更为一致，而他对我的批评只不过是没有认识到这一点而已。然后，我将说明德内尔是如何错误地将维特根斯坦解读为否定集合论是错误的。正是对 "适用性 "的过分强调和过于狭隘的理解导致了他的这种观点。最后，我反对德内尔关于维特根斯坦是数学有限论者的观点。
{"title":"A Response to Dehnel's ‘Defending Wittgenstein’","authors":"Samuel J. Wheeler","doi":"10.1111/phin.12413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12413","url":null,"abstract":"This is a reply to ‘Defending Wittgenstein’, Piotr Dehnel's critique of my article, ‘Defending Wittgenstein's Remarks on Cantor from Putnam’. I first show that my position is much more in agreement with Felix Mühlhölzer than Dehnel takes it to be, and that his criticism of me is nothing more than a failure to recognize this. I then show how Dehnel incorrectly reads Wittgenstein as rejecting set theory as false. It is an overemphasis on and a much too narrow picture of ‘applicability’ which leads him to this view. Finally, I conclude by rejecting Dehnel's view that Wittgenstein was a finitist about mathematics.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"134 13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138826614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophical InvestigationsEarly View BOOK REVIEW Wittgenstein's liberatory philosophy: Thinking through his philosophical investigationsBy Rupert Read, New York and London: Routledge. 2021. xvii +386 pp. £104 HB, £31.19 PB Katherine Morris, Corresponding Author Katherine Morris [email protected] Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UKSearch for more papers by this author Katherine Morris, Corresponding Author Katherine Morris [email protected] Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UKSearch for more papers by this author First published: 06 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12411Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation
哲学研究早期书评维特根斯坦的解放哲学:通过他的哲学研究思考鲁珀特·里德，纽约和伦敦:劳特利奇出版社，2021。凯瑟琳·莫里斯，通讯作者凯瑟琳·莫里斯[email protected]牛津大学曼斯菲尔德学院，牛津，英国搜索作者凯瑟琳·莫里斯的更多论文，通讯作者凯瑟琳·莫里斯[email protected]牛津大学曼斯菲尔德学院，牛津，英国搜索作者的更多论文首次发表:2023年11月6日https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12411Read全文taboutpdf ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare给予accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并勾选下面的复选框共享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享onemailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信早期视图在线版本记录前纳入问题相关信息
{"title":"Wittgenstein's liberatory philosophy: Thinking through his philosophical investigationsBy RupertRead, New York and London: Routledge. 2021. xvii +386 pp. £104 <scp>HB</scp>, £31.19 <scp>PB</scp>","authors":"Katherine Morris","doi":"10.1111/phin.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12411","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophical InvestigationsEarly View BOOK REVIEW Wittgenstein's liberatory philosophy: Thinking through his philosophical investigationsBy Rupert Read, New York and London: Routledge. 2021. xvii +386 pp. £104 HB, £31.19 PB Katherine Morris, Corresponding Author Katherine Morris [email protected] Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UKSearch for more papers by this author Katherine Morris, Corresponding Author Katherine Morris [email protected] Mansfield College, Oxford University, Oxford, UKSearch for more papers by this author First published: 06 November 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12411Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"28 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The influence of Heinrich Hertz's The Principles of Mechanics on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus has been studied for decades, but it has never become a mainstream topic in the Wittgensteinian literature. This paper focusses on Tractarian notions of objects, elementary facts and elementary sentences and discusses their similarities with Hertz's concepts of mass, its constituents and their mechanistic images. As the paper demonstrates, the Hertzian context provides some fruitful interpretational leads concerning several controversial ideas endorsed by early Wittgenstein, namely propositional analysis, logical independence of elementary facts, logical independence of elementary sentences, and modalities.
{"title":"Hertz's legacy in Tractarian metaphysics<sup>1</sup>","authors":"Martin Schmidt","doi":"10.1111/phin.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12410","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The influence of Heinrich Hertz's The Principles of Mechanics on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus has been studied for decades, but it has never become a mainstream topic in the Wittgensteinian literature. This paper focusses on Tractarian notions of objects, elementary facts and elementary sentences and discusses their similarities with Hertz's concepts of mass, its constituents and their mechanistic images. As the paper demonstrates, the Hertzian context provides some fruitful interpretational leads concerning several controversial ideas endorsed by early Wittgenstein, namely propositional analysis, logical independence of elementary facts, logical independence of elementary sentences, and modalities.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135344263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this discussion I argue that Peter Sullivan is wrong to suggest that Wittgenstein's position in the Philosophical Investigations involves a commitment to transcendental idealism. I show that Sullivan's interpretation involves holding that transcendental idealism was employed by Wittgenstein in the attempt to combat a Platonist mythology. I show, through a detailed appraisal of Wittgenstein's discussion of samples, that Wittgenstein's approach to Platonism does not involve any such employment of transcendental idealism. I conclude that there is no such motivation as Sullivan finds in Wittgenstein for endorsing transcendental idealism, and that we ought not, therefore, ascribe to him such a view.
{"title":"Reply to Sullivan: Idealism and limits","authors":"Oliver Thomas Spinney","doi":"10.1111/phin.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12407","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this discussion I argue that Peter Sullivan is wrong to suggest that Wittgenstein's position in the Philosophical Investigations involves a commitment to transcendental idealism. I show that Sullivan's interpretation involves holding that transcendental idealism was employed by Wittgenstein in the attempt to combat a Platonist mythology. I show, through a detailed appraisal of Wittgenstein's discussion of samples, that Wittgenstein's approach to Platonism does not involve any such employment of transcendental idealism. I conclude that there is no such motivation as Sullivan finds in Wittgenstein for endorsing transcendental idealism, and that we ought not, therefore, ascribe to him such a view.","PeriodicalId":47112,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136062050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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