Abstract The power of conference committees is well documented and studied by scholars of the US Congress. But little is known about politics of bicameral agreement within state legislatures. Leveraging variation across states, I explore the conditions under which legislative leaders prefer formal bicameral conference negotiations to informal talks to reach final legislative agreements. Deploying an original dataset of state legislative decisions between 2005 and 2018, I find that ideologically cohesive majority parties favor the use of conferences, disproportionately relying on them to reconcile bicameral differences on salient measures. Majority parties, however, refrain from going to conference in those assemblies that empower the minority party to select its preferred conferees. The interaction of chamber rules and partisan dynamics thus shapes the contours of legislative agreements in systematic ways across the states.
{"title":"The Politics of Bicameral Agreement: Why and When Do State Lawmakers Go to Conference?","authors":"Colin Emrich","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The power of conference committees is well documented and studied by scholars of the US Congress. But little is known about politics of bicameral agreement within state legislatures. Leveraging variation across states, I explore the conditions under which legislative leaders prefer formal bicameral conference negotiations to informal talks to reach final legislative agreements. Deploying an original dataset of state legislative decisions between 2005 and 2018, I find that ideologically cohesive majority parties favor the use of conferences, disproportionately relying on them to reconcile bicameral differences on salient measures. Majority parties, however, refrain from going to conference in those assemblies that empower the minority party to select its preferred conferees. The interaction of chamber rules and partisan dynamics thus shapes the contours of legislative agreements in systematic ways across the states.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"289 - 319"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49612791","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This work explores the ways that federalism exacerbates gender inequality among women by explaining the adoption of domestic violence laws across different states in the context of policy diffusion. Using an original dataset of domestic violence firearm law (DVFL) enactments across all 50 states in the United States from 1990 to 2017, we analyze the circumstances under which states will adopt these laws. Using a set of political and demographic indicators as independent variables, we find evidence that state and federal factors influence policy adoption. In particular, the number of gun-related homicides, partisan control of the legislature, citizen ideology, federal policy, and election years each influence the likelihood of DVFL enactments. We find support for the effects of vertical policy diffusion on initial enactment of federal laws in this domain, but not for reauthorizations, which raises important questions about the continuous influence of the federal government on state policies.
{"title":"Federalism, Policy Diffusion, and Gender Equality: Explaining Variation in State Domestic Violence Firearm Laws 1990–2017","authors":"W. Schiller, Kaitlin N. Sidorsky","doi":"10.1017/spq.2021.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2021.35","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This work explores the ways that federalism exacerbates gender inequality among women by explaining the adoption of domestic violence laws across different states in the context of policy diffusion. Using an original dataset of domestic violence firearm law (DVFL) enactments across all 50 states in the United States from 1990 to 2017, we analyze the circumstances under which states will adopt these laws. Using a set of political and demographic indicators as independent variables, we find evidence that state and federal factors influence policy adoption. In particular, the number of gun-related homicides, partisan control of the legislature, citizen ideology, federal policy, and election years each influence the likelihood of DVFL enactments. We find support for the effects of vertical policy diffusion on initial enactment of federal laws in this domain, but not for reauthorizations, which raises important questions about the continuous influence of the federal government on state policies.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"247 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42788699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Representation frequently links state politics to policy. Current research, however, overlooks the interplay between bureaucratic and legislative representation and how local representation may be influenced by state policy environments. There is also a need to test current theories of state politics and policy, driven by the study of US federalism, in different national contexts to indicate how general such theories might be and to provide new insights into the study of US politics and policy. This article studies how gender representation and local policy implementation interacts with state environment factors to affect representation outcomes in K–12 education across 28 states in India. The research points to the generalizability of current theories of representation and state politics across national federal contexts, the conditional nature of the influence of bureaucratic representation on state policy implementation, and the need to better understand the interdependence of representation across political institutions.
{"title":"Gender and the State Politics of Policy Implementation in Education: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and Legislative Representation in India","authors":"K. Meier, Anita Dhillon","doi":"10.1017/spq.2021.30","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2021.30","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Representation frequently links state politics to policy. Current research, however, overlooks the interplay between bureaucratic and legislative representation and how local representation may be influenced by state policy environments. There is also a need to test current theories of state politics and policy, driven by the study of US federalism, in different national contexts to indicate how general such theories might be and to provide new insights into the study of US politics and policy. This article studies how gender representation and local policy implementation interacts with state environment factors to affect representation outcomes in K–12 education across 28 states in India. The research points to the generalizability of current theories of representation and state politics across national federal contexts, the conditional nature of the influence of bureaucratic representation on state policy implementation, and the need to better understand the interdependence of representation across political institutions.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"33 8","pages":"344 - 370"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41265000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many important traits of state legislatures vary across chambers within a state. Yet according to existing typologies in the comparative study of bicameralism, the 49 bicameral American state legislatures would be deemed quite homogeneous. To resolve this disjuncture, I identify a novel dimension of bicameralism that distinguishes among state legislatures by capturing the extent to which the two chambers serve as meaningfully different venues for influence. Based on this framework, I develop an index of bicameral “distinctiveness” rooted in three traits that speak to policy influence across chambers: the ratio of seats, bipartisan representation, and constituency dissimilarity. This measure reveals sizable variation across states and a conspicuous geographic pattern, with considerably greater bicameral distinctiveness in the Eastern United States. In turn, I assess the construct validity of this measure, showing how patterns of second chamber bill amendment vary systematically with the level of bicameral distinctiveness.
{"title":"Bicameral Distinctiveness in American State Legislatures","authors":"Todd Makse","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.3","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many important traits of state legislatures vary across chambers within a state. Yet according to existing typologies in the comparative study of bicameralism, the 49 bicameral American state legislatures would be deemed quite homogeneous. To resolve this disjuncture, I identify a novel dimension of bicameralism that distinguishes among state legislatures by capturing the extent to which the two chambers serve as meaningfully different venues for influence. Based on this framework, I develop an index of bicameral “distinctiveness” rooted in three traits that speak to policy influence across chambers: the ratio of seats, bipartisan representation, and constituency dissimilarity. This measure reveals sizable variation across states and a conspicuous geographic pattern, with considerably greater bicameral distinctiveness in the Eastern United States. In turn, I assess the construct validity of this measure, showing how patterns of second chamber bill amendment vary systematically with the level of bicameral distinctiveness.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"270 - 288"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46570873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Janine A. Parry, Andrew J. Dowdle, Abigail B. Long, Jessica R. Kloss
Abstract Thousands of studies have examined party competition in the American states, finding significant consequences for voter turnout, policy adoptions, and more. Long-term patterns of party control have received less attention. Here, we reexamine the operationalization of party competition. We then update Klarner’s state partisan balance data to include state house and senate composition and gubernatorial vote share since the 1930s, adding—in light of the nationalization of American politics—presidential vote share and the proportion of Democrats in each state’s congressional delegation. After establishing a threshold for one-party dominance, we examine the frequency and duration of subnational party monopolies, highlighting regional variations in the relationship between the state and national measures and applying the index to voter turnout. Our analysis reveals that extended periods of one-party dominance – currently on the uptick – are the rule, not the exception, in the American states and are a phenomenon ripe for further exploration.
{"title":"The Rule, Not the Exception: One-Party Monopolies in the American States","authors":"Janine A. Parry, Andrew J. Dowdle, Abigail B. Long, Jessica R. Kloss","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Thousands of studies have examined party competition in the American states, finding significant consequences for voter turnout, policy adoptions, and more. Long-term patterns of party control have received less attention. Here, we reexamine the operationalization of party competition. We then update Klarner’s state partisan balance data to include state house and senate composition and gubernatorial vote share since the 1930s, adding—in light of the nationalization of American politics—presidential vote share and the proportion of Democrats in each state’s congressional delegation. After establishing a threshold for one-party dominance, we examine the frequency and duration of subnational party monopolies, highlighting regional variations in the relationship between the state and national measures and applying the index to voter turnout. Our analysis reveals that extended periods of one-party dominance – currently on the uptick – are the rule, not the exception, in the American states and are a phenomenon ripe for further exploration.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"226 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44229284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Scholars posit that groups play an important role in the legislative process and legislator decision making, but find these questions difficult to empirically study due to the private information exchanges. This article exploits a legislative reporting institution to explore group involvement in policy making. In the California state legislature, extra-legislative individuals or organizations that write legislation and secure a legislator to author the bill may be listed as sponsors. Data come from California bill analyses and extend from 1993 to 2014. This group tactic is frequently used: 40% of bills introduced and over 60% of bills that become law list an extra-legislative sponsor. Group sponsorship is significantly related to passage, even after matching on a number of covariates. Legislators use fewer group bills and substitute out of group bills as they gain experience. Group input serves as an integral part of a legislative portfolio and the agenda-setting stage of legislative decision making.
{"title":"Groups as Lawmakers: Group Bills in a US State Legislature","authors":"M. Kroeger","doi":"10.1017/spq.2021.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2021.36","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Scholars posit that groups play an important role in the legislative process and legislator decision making, but find these questions difficult to empirically study due to the private information exchanges. This article exploits a legislative reporting institution to explore group involvement in policy making. In the California state legislature, extra-legislative individuals or organizations that write legislation and secure a legislator to author the bill may be listed as sponsors. Data come from California bill analyses and extend from 1993 to 2014. This group tactic is frequently used: 40% of bills introduced and over 60% of bills that become law list an extra-legislative sponsor. Group sponsorship is significantly related to passage, even after matching on a number of covariates. Legislators use fewer group bills and substitute out of group bills as they gain experience. Group input serves as an integral part of a legislative portfolio and the agenda-setting stage of legislative decision making.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"204 - 225"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46131916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines how the racial composition of newsrooms and that of the news audiences influence campaign coverage of candidates. Using observational data compiled from multiple sources for analyses, our findings suggest that candidate trait coverage is influenced by what we term racial congruence at two levels. First, when the number of non-white journalists increases in newsroom, white candidates are more likely to receive positive trait coverage than non-white candidates, which is likely compounded by multiple constraints racial minority journalists face in the newsroom. This racial congruence phenomenon is also present in areas with large non-white adult populations. The larger this population, the higher is favorable news coverage for non-white candidates compared to white candidates. The race of candidates, journalists, and audiences does not have a combined effect on news coverage, indicating that the effects of more diverse newsroom members are not necessarily driven by market incentives.
{"title":"Is More Better? Effects of Newsroom and Audience Diversity on Trait Coverage of Minority Candidates","authors":"Mingxiao Sui, Newly Paul","doi":"10.1017/spq.2021.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2021.31","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines how the racial composition of newsrooms and that of the news audiences influence campaign coverage of candidates. Using observational data compiled from multiple sources for analyses, our findings suggest that candidate trait coverage is influenced by what we term racial congruence at two levels. First, when the number of non-white journalists increases in newsroom, white candidates are more likely to receive positive trait coverage than non-white candidates, which is likely compounded by multiple constraints racial minority journalists face in the newsroom. This racial congruence phenomenon is also present in areas with large non-white adult populations. The larger this population, the higher is favorable news coverage for non-white candidates compared to white candidates. The race of candidates, journalists, and audiences does not have a combined effect on news coverage, indicating that the effects of more diverse newsroom members are not necessarily driven by market incentives.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"181 - 203"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46206366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I examine the relationship between labor unions and voter turnout in the American states. Though it is well known that unions increase turnout directly, we know less about their indirect effects. Moreover, the indirect effects may consist of nonmember mobilization and aggregate strength. To examine the direct and indirect mechanisms, I analyze both state-level panel data and individual-level data with a multilevel approach. First, my panel analysis shows that unions are positively associated with turnout as expected. Yet, the association is observed only in midterm elections, but not in presidential elections. Second, more importantly, my individual-level analysis suggests that indirect nonmember mobilization and indirect aggregate strength are positively related to turnout, while direct member mobilization is not. The findings imply that the direct effects are limited and, thus, that decreasing levels of voter turnout due to recently declining union membership come primarily from indirect mobilization rather than direct mobilization.
{"title":"Labor Unions and Voter Turnout in the American States: Direct Versus Indirect Mobilization","authors":"Gidong Kim","doi":"10.1017/spq.2021.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2021.33","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I examine the relationship between labor unions and voter turnout in the American states. Though it is well known that unions increase turnout directly, we know less about their indirect effects. Moreover, the indirect effects may consist of nonmember mobilization and aggregate strength. To examine the direct and indirect mechanisms, I analyze both state-level panel data and individual-level data with a multilevel approach. First, my panel analysis shows that unions are positively associated with turnout as expected. Yet, the association is observed only in midterm elections, but not in presidential elections. Second, more importantly, my individual-level analysis suggests that indirect nonmember mobilization and indirect aggregate strength are positively related to turnout, while direct member mobilization is not. The findings imply that the direct effects are limited and, thus, that decreasing levels of voter turnout due to recently declining union membership come primarily from indirect mobilization rather than direct mobilization.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"161 - 180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46026875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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