Julia Payson, Andreu Casas, Jonathan Nagler, Richard Bonneau, Joshua A. Tucker
Abstract State governments are tasked with making important policy decisions in the United States. How do state legislators use their public communications—particularly social media—to engage with policy debates? Due to previous data limitations, we lack systematic information about whether and how state legislators publicly discuss policy and how this behavior varies across contexts. Using Twitter data and state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques, we introduce a method to study state legislator policy priorities and apply the method to 15 US states in 2018. We show that we are able to accurately capture the policy issues discussed by state legislators with substantially more accuracy than existing methods. We then present initial findings that validate the method and speak to debates in the literature. The paper concludes by discussing promising avenues for future state politics research using this new approach.
{"title":"Using Social Media Data to Reveal Patterns of Policy Engagement in State Legislatures","authors":"Julia Payson, Andreu Casas, Jonathan Nagler, Richard Bonneau, Joshua A. Tucker","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract State governments are tasked with making important policy decisions in the United States. How do state legislators use their public communications—particularly social media—to engage with policy debates? Due to previous data limitations, we lack systematic information about whether and how state legislators publicly discuss policy and how this behavior varies across contexts. Using Twitter data and state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques, we introduce a method to study state legislator policy priorities and apply the method to 15 US states in 2018. We show that we are able to accurately capture the policy issues discussed by state legislators with substantially more accuracy than existing methods. We then present initial findings that validate the method and speak to debates in the literature. The paper concludes by discussing promising avenues for future state politics research using this new approach.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"371 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41847322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This study uses prediction market data from the nation’s historical election betting markets to measure electoral competition in the American states during the era before the advent of scientific polling. Betting odds data capture ex ante expectations of electoral closeness in the aggregate, and as such improve upon existing measures of competition based on election returns data. Situated in an analysis of the 1896 presidential election and its associated realignment, I argue that the market odds data show that people were able to anticipate the realignment and that expectations on the outcome in the states influenced voter turnout. Findings show that a month ahead of the election betting markets accurately forecast a McKinley victory in most states. This study further demonstrates that the market predictions identify those states where electoral competition would increase or decline that year and the consequences of these expected partisanship shifts on turnout. In places where the anticipation was for a close race voter expectations account for a turnout increase of as much as 6%. Participation dropped by 1%–6% in states perceived as becoming electorally uncompetitive. The results support the conversion and dealignment theories from the realignment literature.
{"title":"How the American Public Perceived Electoral Competition in the States during the Pre-poll Era: A Prediction Market Data Analysis of the 1896 Presidential Election","authors":"Vanessa M. Perez","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.14","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study uses prediction market data from the nation’s historical election betting markets to measure electoral competition in the American states during the era before the advent of scientific polling. Betting odds data capture ex ante expectations of electoral closeness in the aggregate, and as such improve upon existing measures of competition based on election returns data. Situated in an analysis of the 1896 presidential election and its associated realignment, I argue that the market odds data show that people were able to anticipate the realignment and that expectations on the outcome in the states influenced voter turnout. Findings show that a month ahead of the election betting markets accurately forecast a McKinley victory in most states. This study further demonstrates that the market predictions identify those states where electoral competition would increase or decline that year and the consequences of these expected partisanship shifts on turnout. In places where the anticipation was for a close race voter expectations account for a turnout increase of as much as 6%. Participation dropped by 1%–6% in states perceived as becoming electorally uncompetitive. The results support the conversion and dealignment theories from the realignment literature.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"23 1","pages":"48 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49474220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Theories that explain the power of legislative leaders have been developed for the U.S. Congress and lower chambers of state legislatures, but they have not been tested for state senates, even though senate leaders can be quite influential. Following Mooney (2013a), I develop a new numerical index score measuring the formal power of the top chamber-elected leader of each state senate from 1995 through 2010. I then use the data to test various hypotheses explaining variation in the power of legislative leaders. The results uncover partial evidence for conditional party government theory, but only for senates that elect their own president. When the lieutenant governor serves as senate president, senators do not perceive their top chamber-elected leader as an officer able to best carry out their ideological, electoral, or policy objectives. This underscores crucial differences between senate chambers that elect their own presidents and those that do not.
{"title":"Measuring and Explaining the Power of State Senate Leadership","authors":"Matthew N. Green","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Theories that explain the power of legislative leaders have been developed for the U.S. Congress and lower chambers of state legislatures, but they have not been tested for state senates, even though senate leaders can be quite influential. Following Mooney (2013a), I develop a new numerical index score measuring the formal power of the top chamber-elected leader of each state senate from 1995 through 2010. I then use the data to test various hypotheses explaining variation in the power of legislative leaders. The results uncover partial evidence for conditional party government theory, but only for senates that elect their own president. When the lieutenant governor serves as senate president, senators do not perceive their top chamber-elected leader as an officer able to best carry out their ideological, electoral, or policy objectives. This underscores crucial differences between senate chambers that elect their own presidents and those that do not.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"463 - 482"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49621817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Do attempts to level the financial playing field lead more candidates to run for office? In theory, public financing should increase competition, presumably because additional funding from taxpayers motivates more challengers to run for office. I provide a novel test of this logic with data on all candidates running for state legislature across all US states between 1976 and 2018. The results suggest that public financing exerts a generally positive effect on the total number of candidates running for state legislative office and specifically increases the number of candidates running in elections for every additional year after the passage of public financing. This effect is amplified in states that offer greater amounts of public funds. I conclude that the availability of public financing can be an equalizing force in elections, and that state legislative elections continue to experience increased competition in the years after the introduction of public financing.
{"title":"Does Public Financing Motivate Electoral Challengers?","authors":"Abigail Mancinelli","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.12","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do attempts to level the financial playing field lead more candidates to run for office? In theory, public financing should increase competition, presumably because additional funding from taxpayers motivates more challengers to run for office. I provide a novel test of this logic with data on all candidates running for state legislature across all US states between 1976 and 2018. The results suggest that public financing exerts a generally positive effect on the total number of candidates running for state legislative office and specifically increases the number of candidates running in elections for every additional year after the passage of public financing. This effect is amplified in states that offer greater amounts of public funds. I conclude that the availability of public financing can be an equalizing force in elections, and that state legislative elections continue to experience increased competition in the years after the introduction of public financing.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"438 - 462"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47113904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Do policymakers learn from the policy experiences of other governments, and if so, what do they learn? A long-established normative claim suggests that intergovernmental learning can and should occur among the US states, which serve as “laboratories of democracy” for the nation. We put this claim to a tough test, comparing the influences on the diffusion of instrumental Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws with that of more symbolic abortion regulation, from 1993 to 2016. We find evidence of substantive intergovernmental learning in policy diffusion even for abortion regulation—but only for instrumental abortion regulation. On symbolic abortion policy, states appear to learn mainly political lessons. Furthermore, proponents and opponents appear to learn different lessons in these diffusions, with loss aversion motivating opponents especially highly. Our results suggest that policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of the differences among policies’ goals and act strategically in pursuit of those goals.
{"title":"Substantive and Political Learning among the US States: Abortion Policy Diffusion, 1993–2016","authors":"Isaac Pollert, C. Mooney","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.7","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do policymakers learn from the policy experiences of other governments, and if so, what do they learn? A long-established normative claim suggests that intergovernmental learning can and should occur among the US states, which serve as “laboratories of democracy” for the nation. We put this claim to a tough test, comparing the influences on the diffusion of instrumental Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws with that of more symbolic abortion regulation, from 1993 to 2016. We find evidence of substantive intergovernmental learning in policy diffusion even for abortion regulation—but only for instrumental abortion regulation. On symbolic abortion policy, states appear to learn mainly political lessons. Furthermore, proponents and opponents appear to learn different lessons in these diffusions, with loss aversion motivating opponents especially highly. Our results suggest that policymakers have a sophisticated understanding of the differences among policies’ goals and act strategically in pursuit of those goals.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"320 - 343"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47917927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The examination of the interaction between the institutions in American state politics has long suffered from a dearth of data. This is the case despite the importance of understanding the separation of powers in the states and the specific effects on policy making and policy outcomes. In this article, I introduce a new, original dataset of court-curbing introductions by state legislators. The data include information on more than 1,200 state legislative bills that would restrict the power of the courts. In this article, I provide descriptive statistics for the data, employ the data to test hypotheses, and explain how this data may be used in future scholarly research on the interactions between state legislators and state courts.
{"title":"New Data on Court Curbing by State Legislatures","authors":"Meghan E. Leonard","doi":"10.1017/spq.2022.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/spq.2022.8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The examination of the interaction between the institutions in American state politics has long suffered from a dearth of data. This is the case despite the importance of understanding the separation of powers in the states and the specific effects on policy making and policy outcomes. In this article, I introduce a new, original dataset of court-curbing introductions by state legislators. The data include information on more than 1,200 state legislative bills that would restrict the power of the courts. In this article, I provide descriptive statistics for the data, employ the data to test hypotheses, and explain how this data may be used in future scholarly research on the interactions between state legislators and state courts.","PeriodicalId":47181,"journal":{"name":"State Politics & Policy Quarterly","volume":"22 1","pages":"483 - 500"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47475257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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