Despite the substantial body of research on compulsory voting's (CV) relationship with turnout, much remains unknown about the role of different types of CV rules, their enforcement, and their ability to prevent the secular turnout decline observed around the world. Moreover, existing studies that leverage changes to CV laws are limited to a single country. We assemble rich new data on voter turnout and electoral legislation that, we believe, include the most accurate and extensive cross-national measure of CV to date. We test three theoretically derived hypotheses: that CV enforcement matters for participation; that enforcement's effect is conditioned by state capacity; and that, only when CV is enforced, will it mitigate voter turnout's post-1970 tendency to decline. We find support for each. We also find that the nature of sanctions for non-voting is irrelevant for participation.
{"title":"Is compulsory voting a solution to low and declining turnout? Cross-national evidence since 1945","authors":"Filip Kostelka, Shane P. Singh, A. Blais","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.57","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.57","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Despite the substantial body of research on compulsory voting's (CV) relationship with turnout, much remains unknown about the role of different types of CV rules, their enforcement, and their ability to prevent the secular turnout decline observed around the world. Moreover, existing studies that leverage changes to CV laws are limited to a single country. We assemble rich new data on voter turnout and electoral legislation that, we believe, include the most accurate and extensive cross-national measure of CV to date. We test three theoretically derived hypotheses: that CV enforcement matters for participation; that enforcement's effect is conditioned by state capacity; and that, only when CV is enforced, will it mitigate voter turnout's post-1970 tendency to decline. We find support for each. We also find that the nature of sanctions for non-voting is irrelevant for participation.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43142330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How does public diplomacy shape global public opinion? In this note, we theorize that positive public diplomacy that emphasizes aid and friendship works, while negative messages that criticize international rivals are ineffective. We conduct an experiment, to our knowledge the first of its kind, that randomly exposes Indian citizens to real Twitter messages from Chinese diplomats. We find that positive messages emphasizing aid and friendship improve perceptions of China, even in times of escalating violent conflict. However, messages from so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomats that harshly criticize the United States are ineffective and can backfire in times of crisis. We argue public diplomacy can be a useful tool for global powers, but that domestic political pressures have pushed some diplomats, like China's Wolf Warriors, toward nationalist messages that do not appeal to foreign audiences.
{"title":"When does public diplomacy work? Evidence from China's “wolf warrior” diplomats","authors":"Daniel C. Mattingly, J. Sundquist","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.41","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How does public diplomacy shape global public opinion? In this note, we theorize that positive public diplomacy that emphasizes aid and friendship works, while negative messages that criticize international rivals are ineffective. We conduct an experiment, to our knowledge the first of its kind, that randomly exposes Indian citizens to real Twitter messages from Chinese diplomats. We find that positive messages emphasizing aid and friendship improve perceptions of China, even in times of escalating violent conflict. However, messages from so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomats that harshly criticize the United States are ineffective and can backfire in times of crisis. We argue public diplomacy can be a useful tool for global powers, but that domestic political pressures have pushed some diplomats, like China's Wolf Warriors, toward nationalist messages that do not appeal to foreign audiences.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43387717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What allows autocratic political elites to coordinate with each other and check dictators? Earlier work assumes that elite coordination becomes easier as dictators share more power. I argue that, even when power-sharing is pervasive, a lack of cohesiveness can rob regime members of their influence over dictators. Conflicting interests can leave seemingly powerful elites unable to agree on when or how to challenge the dictator. I develop a measure of elite collective action based on this framework. It documents not only how much power elites have, but also the obstacles they would need to resolve to work together. In doing so, it better describes the relationship between autocrats and their ruling coalition, and its added nuance allows it to recover findings that current measures miss. By paying closer attention to the cohesion of autocratic elites, this paper explains why some dictators can rule tyrannically without retribution, and why weaker elites can still constrain powerful autocrats.
{"title":"Can't coalesce, can't constrain: redefining elite influence in non-democracies","authors":"José Kaire","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.44","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.44","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What allows autocratic political elites to coordinate with each other and check dictators? Earlier work assumes that elite coordination becomes easier as dictators share more power. I argue that, even when power-sharing is pervasive, a lack of cohesiveness can rob regime members of their influence over dictators. Conflicting interests can leave seemingly powerful elites unable to agree on when or how to challenge the dictator. I develop a measure of elite collective action based on this framework. It documents not only how much power elites have, but also the obstacles they would need to resolve to work together. In doing so, it better describes the relationship between autocrats and their ruling coalition, and its added nuance allows it to recover findings that current measures miss. By paying closer attention to the cohesion of autocratic elites, this paper explains why some dictators can rule tyrannically without retribution, and why weaker elites can still constrain powerful autocrats.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49306712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic and health crises have profound political consequences for public support for social policy, historically setting in motion a massive expansion of governmental programs. Is demand for social protection likely to increase among citizens exposed to risk in an era in which populist messages are prominent? We show that this depends critically on the precise targets that populists evoke as enemies of the people. We distinguish between two types of political rhetoric deployed by populist politicians in their claims to represent the authentic people—one opposing the authority of domestic elites, including technocrats, and one attacking foreigners. We examine the extent to which each rhetorical strategy reduces or enhances popular demand for social policies by randomly exposing Americans to these frames as part of a public opinion survey conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic. Our results show that the two messages have different consequences for support for redistribution among respondents exposed to risk: populist anti-foreign rhetoric that blames foreign countries for the onset of the pandemic increases demand for expansion of social protection compared to populist anti-elite rhetoric.
{"title":"Risk and demand for social protection in an era of populism","authors":"Kate Baldwin, Isabela Mares","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.43","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.43","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Economic and health crises have profound political consequences for public support for social policy, historically setting in motion a massive expansion of governmental programs. Is demand for social protection likely to increase among citizens exposed to risk in an era in which populist messages are prominent? We show that this depends critically on the precise targets that populists evoke as enemies of the people. We distinguish between two types of political rhetoric deployed by populist politicians in their claims to represent the authentic people—one opposing the authority of domestic elites, including technocrats, and one attacking foreigners. We examine the extent to which each rhetorical strategy reduces or enhances popular demand for social policies by randomly exposing Americans to these frames as part of a public opinion survey conducted during the Covid-19 pandemic. Our results show that the two messages have different consequences for support for redistribution among respondents exposed to risk: populist anti-foreign rhetoric that blames foreign countries for the onset of the pandemic increases demand for expansion of social protection compared to populist anti-elite rhetoric.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47107207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Governments can grant political concessions to induce quasi-voluntary compliance with taxation, yet empirical evidence probing the taxation–representation connection remains inconclusive. We contend that this association remains valid but it is primarily confined to business elites in nondemocratic regimes because the same wealth that exposes them to state predation also incentivizes them to endorse tax policies that offer greater political representation. We test our argument by evaluating preferences for hypothetical tax reforms in separate samples of business elites and ordinary citizens in China. We find that business elites show stronger preference than nonelites for tax policies that include advances in political representation. We explore various mechanisms for our results and find support for government credibility, tax ownership, and tax salience considerations.
{"title":"Do gains in political representation sweeten tax reform in China? It depends on who you ask","authors":"Jay C. Kao, Xiaobo Lü, Didac Queralt","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.58","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Governments can grant political concessions to induce quasi-voluntary compliance with taxation, yet empirical evidence probing the taxation–representation connection remains inconclusive. We contend that this association remains valid but it is primarily confined to business elites in nondemocratic regimes because the same wealth that exposes them to state predation also incentivizes them to endorse tax policies that offer greater political representation. We test our argument by evaluating preferences for hypothetical tax reforms in separate samples of business elites and ordinary citizens in China. We find that business elites show stronger preference than nonelites for tax policies that include advances in political representation. We explore various mechanisms for our results and find support for government credibility, tax ownership, and tax salience considerations.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46503630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How do politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We propose that new politicians minimize political risks by favoring politically important actors: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they adjust their behavior as they establish personal ties with private businesses. Using firm-level subsidies data after the 2008 stimulus in China, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly larger proportion of subsidies to SOEs relative to private firms. The effect attenuates as new governors learn about local conditions and establish connections with private firms. We find suggestive evidence that governors who adopt such a strategy are more likely to be promoted. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the state always favors state-owned firms, we show that SOEs benefit from the stimulus package only in the short-run.
{"title":"Stimulated political decisions: local leadership turnover and firm subsidies in China","authors":"Yue Hou, Siyao Li","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.52","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.52","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do politicians distribute government resources in regimes with no electoral considerations? We propose that new politicians minimize political risks by favoring politically important actors: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but they adjust their behavior as they establish personal ties with private businesses. Using firm-level subsidies data after the 2008 stimulus in China, we find that new provincial governors, immediately after taking office, distribute a significantly larger proportion of subsidies to SOEs relative to private firms. The effect attenuates as new governors learn about local conditions and establish connections with private firms. We find suggestive evidence that governors who adopt such a strategy are more likely to be promoted. Contrary to conventional wisdom that the state always favors state-owned firms, we show that SOEs benefit from the stimulus package only in the short-run.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49012025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-25DOI: 10.1186/s13058-022-01569-1
Tian Du, Lu Pan, Chengyou Zheng, Keming Chen, Yuanzhong Yang, Jiewei Chen, Xue Chao, Mei Li, Jiabin Lu, Rongzhen Luo, Jinhui Zhang, Yu Wu, Jiehua He, Dongping Jiang, Peng Sun
Background: Metastatic breast carcinoma is commonly considered during differential diagnosis when metastatic disease is detected in females. In addition to the tumor morphology and documented clinical history, sensitive and specific immunohistochemical (IHC) markers such as GCDFP-15, mammaglobin, and GATA3 are helpful for determining breast origin. However, these markers are reported to show lower sensitivity in certain subtypes, such as triple-negative breast cancer (TNBC).
Materials and methods: Using bioinformatics analyses, we identified a potential diagnostic panel to determine breast origin: matrix Gla protein (MGP), transcriptional repressor GATA binding 1 (TRPS1), and GATA-binding protein 3 (GATA3). We compared MGP, TRPS1, and GATA3 expression in different subtypes of breast carcinoma of (n = 1201) using IHC. As a newly identified marker, MGP expression was also evaluated in solid tumors (n = 2384) and normal tissues (n = 1351) from different organs.
Results: MGP and TRPS1 had comparable positive expression in HER2-positive (91.2% vs. 92.0%, p = 0.79) and TNBC subtypes (87.3% vs. 91.2%, p = 0.18). GATA3 expression was lower than MGP (p < 0.001) or TRPS1 (p < 0.001), especially in HER2-positive (77.0%, p < 0.001) and TNBC (43.3%, p < 0.001) subtypes. TRPS1 had the highest positivity rate (97.9%) in metaplastic TNBCs, followed by MGP (88.6%), while only 47.1% of metaplastic TNBCs were positive for GATA3. When using MGP, GATA3, and TRPS1 as a novel IHC panel, 93.0% of breast carcinomas were positive for at least two markers, and only 9 cases were negative for all three markers. MGP was detected in 36 cases (3.0%) that were negative for both GATA3 and TRPS1. MGP showed mild-to-moderate positive expression in normal hepatocytes, renal tubules, as well as 31.1% (99/318) of hepatocellular carcinomas. Rare cases (0.6-5%) had focal MGP expression in renal, ovarian, lung, urothelial, and cholangiocarcinomas.
Conclusions: Our findings suggest that MGP is a newly identified sensitive IHC marker to support breast origin. MGP, TRPS1, and GATA3 could be applied as a reliable diagnostic panel to determine breast origin in clinical practice.
{"title":"Matrix Gla protein (MGP), GATA3, and TRPS1: a novel diagnostic panel to determine breast origin.","authors":"Tian Du, Lu Pan, Chengyou Zheng, Keming Chen, Yuanzhong Yang, Jiewei Chen, Xue Chao, Mei Li, Jiabin Lu, Rongzhen Luo, Jinhui Zhang, Yu Wu, Jiehua He, Dongping Jiang, Peng Sun","doi":"10.1186/s13058-022-01569-1","DOIUrl":"10.1186/s13058-022-01569-1","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Metastatic breast carcinoma is commonly considered during differential diagnosis when metastatic disease is detected in females. In addition to the tumor morphology and documented clinical history, sensitive and specific immunohistochemical (IHC) markers such as GCDFP-15, mammaglobin, and GATA3 are helpful for determining breast origin. However, these markers are reported to show lower sensitivity in certain subtypes, such as triple-negative breast cancer (TNBC).</p><p><strong>Materials and methods: </strong>Using bioinformatics analyses, we identified a potential diagnostic panel to determine breast origin: matrix Gla protein (MGP), transcriptional repressor GATA binding 1 (TRPS1), and GATA-binding protein 3 (GATA3). We compared MGP, TRPS1, and GATA3 expression in different subtypes of breast carcinoma of (n = 1201) using IHC. As a newly identified marker, MGP expression was also evaluated in solid tumors (n = 2384) and normal tissues (n = 1351) from different organs.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>MGP and TRPS1 had comparable positive expression in HER2-positive (91.2% vs. 92.0%, p = 0.79) and TNBC subtypes (87.3% vs. 91.2%, p = 0.18). GATA3 expression was lower than MGP (p < 0.001) or TRPS1 (p < 0.001), especially in HER2-positive (77.0%, p < 0.001) and TNBC (43.3%, p < 0.001) subtypes. TRPS1 had the highest positivity rate (97.9%) in metaplastic TNBCs, followed by MGP (88.6%), while only 47.1% of metaplastic TNBCs were positive for GATA3. When using MGP, GATA3, and TRPS1 as a novel IHC panel, 93.0% of breast carcinomas were positive for at least two markers, and only 9 cases were negative for all three markers. MGP was detected in 36 cases (3.0%) that were negative for both GATA3 and TRPS1. MGP showed mild-to-moderate positive expression in normal hepatocytes, renal tubules, as well as 31.1% (99/318) of hepatocellular carcinomas. Rare cases (0.6-5%) had focal MGP expression in renal, ovarian, lung, urothelial, and cholangiocarcinomas.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>Our findings suggest that MGP is a newly identified sensitive IHC marker to support breast origin. MGP, TRPS1, and GATA3 could be applied as a reliable diagnostic panel to determine breast origin in clinical practice.</p>","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":"9 1","pages":"70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9598034/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79082674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are the electoral consequences of urban riots? We argue that riots highlight the economic and social problems suffered by those who participate, inducing potential electoral allies to mobilize. These allies can then punish local incumbents at the ballot box. We test this hypothesis with fine-grained geographic data that capture how exposure to the 2011 London riots changed vote choices in the subsequent 2012 mayoral election. We find that physical proximity to both riot locations and the homes of rioters raised turnout and reduced the vote for the incumbent Conservative mayor. These results are partly driven by a change in the turnout and vote choices of white residents. This provides support for the view that riots can help shift votes against incumbents who oppose the implied policy goals of rioters.
{"title":"How urban riots influence political behavior: vote choices after the 2011 London riots","authors":"Gabriel Leon-Ablan, P. John","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.49","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 What are the electoral consequences of urban riots? We argue that riots highlight the economic and social problems suffered by those who participate, inducing potential electoral allies to mobilize. These allies can then punish local incumbents at the ballot box. We test this hypothesis with fine-grained geographic data that capture how exposure to the 2011 London riots changed vote choices in the subsequent 2012 mayoral election. We find that physical proximity to both riot locations and the homes of rioters raised turnout and reduced the vote for the incumbent Conservative mayor. These results are partly driven by a change in the turnout and vote choices of white residents. This provides support for the view that riots can help shift votes against incumbents who oppose the implied policy goals of rioters.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49463010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why do high-income earners support higher levels of income redistribution in some countries than in others? I argue that differences in the social insurance design have consequences for fairness considerations and that this matters for preference formation. Flat-rate systems provide social benefits in equal amounts to everyone in need, while earnings-related systems provide benefits in relation to previous earnings. In the case of income loss, earnings-related systems maintain unfair income differences, while flat-rate systems equalize unfair income differences between the rich and the poor. Cross-national patterns reveal that support for redistribution among the rich is higher in income-maintaining welfare states. For a strict test of my fairness argument, I conduct a laboratory experiment and show that participants reduce inequality more if given endowment differences are maintained in the case of loss.
{"title":"Explaining support for redistribution: social insurance systems and fairness","authors":"Verena Fetscher","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.48","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why do high-income earners support higher levels of income redistribution in some countries than in others? I argue that differences in the social insurance design have consequences for fairness considerations and that this matters for preference formation. Flat-rate systems provide social benefits in equal amounts to everyone in need, while earnings-related systems provide benefits in relation to previous earnings. In the case of income loss, earnings-related systems maintain unfair income differences, while flat-rate systems equalize unfair income differences between the rich and the poor. Cross-national patterns reveal that support for redistribution among the rich is higher in income-maintaining welfare states. For a strict test of my fairness argument, I conduct a laboratory experiment and show that participants reduce inequality more if given endowment differences are maintained in the case of loss.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45159872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many democracies with high levels of corruption are also characterized by low levels of women's political representation. Do women candidates in democracies with high levels of corruption face overt voter discrimination? Do gender dynamics that are unique to highly corrupt, democratic contexts influence citizens’ willingness to vote for women? We answer these questions using two separate sets of experiments conducted in Ukraine: two vignette experiments and a conjoint analysis. In line with existing cross-sectional research on Ukraine, our experiments reveal little evidence of direct voter bias against women candidates. Our conjoint analysis also offers novel insights into the preferences of Ukrainian voters, showing that both men and women voters place a great deal of value in anti-corruption platforms, but voters are just as likely to support women and men candidates who say they will fight corruption. Our analysis suggests that women's political underrepresentation in highly corrupt contexts is driven more by barriers that prevent women from winning party nominations and running for office in the first place, rather than overt discrimination at the polls.
{"title":"Explaining women's political underrepresentation in democracies with high levels of corruption","authors":"Aaron Erlich, Edana Beauvais","doi":"10.1017/psrm.2022.46","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2022.46","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many democracies with high levels of corruption are also characterized by low levels of women's political representation. Do women candidates in democracies with high levels of corruption face overt voter discrimination? Do gender dynamics that are unique to highly corrupt, democratic contexts influence citizens’ willingness to vote for women? We answer these questions using two separate sets of experiments conducted in Ukraine: two vignette experiments and a conjoint analysis. In line with existing cross-sectional research on Ukraine, our experiments reveal little evidence of direct voter bias against women candidates. Our conjoint analysis also offers novel insights into the preferences of Ukrainian voters, showing that both men and women voters place a great deal of value in anti-corruption platforms, but voters are just as likely to support women and men candidates who say they will fight corruption. Our analysis suggests that women's political underrepresentation in highly corrupt contexts is driven more by barriers that prevent women from winning party nominations and running for office in the first place, rather than overt discrimination at the polls.","PeriodicalId":47311,"journal":{"name":"Political Science Research and Methods","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43888849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：