Defence and Peace Economics最新文献

{"title":"No, Punitive House Demolition Does Not Reduce Suicide Bombing: Revisiting Evidence from the Second Intifada","authors":"Belal Fallah","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2289000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2289000","url":null,"abstract":"Punitive house demolitions were intensified by the Israeli government during the Second Intifada with the intent of curbing suicide bombings. Using econometric analysis, Benmelech et al. (2015) sug...","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138523938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cross-Check on Combat Aircraft Data","authors":"Alsu Saitova, Robert Beeres","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2288429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2288429","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents our findings based on a systematic analysis of eight renowned data sources on combat aircraft data. Focusing on national combat aircraft fleets, we first investigate similaritie...","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138523935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Does the Russian-Ukrainian War Rock Stock and Commodity Markets? Fresh Insights from Joint Network-Connectedness Analysis","authors":"Amine Ben Amar, Néjib Hachicha, Hichem Rezgui, Shawkat Hammoudeh","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2277031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2277031","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe outbreak of the war in Ukraine has had a profound and far-reaching impact on the global economy, with notable repercussions observed in stock markets, and particularly pronounced effects evident in commodities markets. This paper examines the connectedness network among 27 NATO stock markets, Russian stock market and a set of three commodity indices (energy, precious metals, and agricultural commodities) over the period 2017-2023. The empirical strategy consists of time and time-frequency connectedness metrics. The empirical results reveal that the connectedness structure has shifted during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Moreover, hit by a series of Western sanctions, Russia’s stock market appears to be the most isolated of the considered markets during the war period. Furthermore, the energy, agricultural and precious metals commodities seem to be efficient hedging instruments for investors in the stock markets of the NATO countries during the war period.KEYWORDS: NATO stock marketsRussian stock marketcommodity marketsRussian-Ukrainian warJEL CLASSIFICATION: C01D53F51Q02 Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The choice of the investigated NATO countries was subject to the availability of comprehensive data sets.2. The first case was officially reported to the country office of the World Health Organization in China on December 31, 2019. Hence, we have selected January 1, 2020 as the starting point for the COVID period, aligning with the initial documentation of the outbreak.3. Tian et al. (Citation2023) present a compelling analysis regarding the impacts of the conflict in Ukraine.4. It is not possible to use the methodology of Barunik and Krehlik (Citation2018) because the war period is rather short and also it is not possible to decompose the total effect on different frequency bands corresponding to the short- and long-term.5. The Diebold and Yilmaz (Citation2012) allows to compute the connectedness level while overcoming the inadequacies of potentially order-dependent outcomes due to the Cholesky factorization in the original work by Diebold and Yilmaz (Citation2009).6. We refer interested readers to Jacomy et al. (Citation2014) for more details about the anatomy of ForceAtlas2 algorithm.7. For more details on government sanctions and measures taken by major corporations and organisations around the world against Russia, we refer interested readers to https://graphics.reuters.com/UKRAINE-CRISIS/SANCTIONS/byvrjenzmve/8. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we performed additional analyses by manipulating the lengths of the rolling windows (150 and 300 days) and forecast horizons (25, 50, and 100 days ahead). Interestingly, we consistently observed that the total time-varying connectedness indices displayed similar temporal patterns, irrespective of the chosen window length or forecast horizon. While these specific results were not included in this article, the authors a","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135038480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Collective Action and Intra-Group Conflict: An Experiment","authors":"Chizhe Cheng, Cary Deck, Wonjong Kim","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2280336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2280336","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn many situations, two rivals find themselves facing a common threat necessitating cooperation. Such alliances are uneasy as the parties anticipate eventually competing against each other in the future. Recent theoretical work shows that both standalone and joint contribution strategies, as well as a hybrid of the two, can emerge in equilibrium where the former strategy is characterized by one of the rivals contributing enough to eliminate the common threat, while the latter is characterized by rivals providing half the necessary effort to eliminate the common threat. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we show that player behavior is best described by the hybrid strategy. However, none of these predictions closely describes the observed behavior, which is better described as following a proportionate rule.KEYWORDS: Blotto budgetsIntra-group conflictCollective actionAll-pay auctionLaboratory experimentsJEL CLASSIFICATION: C90D72D74 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.Notes1. Evans-Cowley (Citation2005) provides a guide to using zoning ordinances to limit the impact of big box stores.2. See Sheremeta (Citation2018) for a general review of experimental results in group contests.3. Deck et al. (Citation2015) also considers endogenous alliance formation in a Tullock contest. In their setting, an opportunistic attacker observes the strategic decision to form an alliance or not of its potential targets. Theoretically, they show an alliance can increase the expected payoff of the defenders even as it increases the probability of a successful attack because it avoids an arms race between the potential targets. Behaviorally, Deck et al. (Citation2015) find that alliances do increase the expected payoff for defenders but do not increase the probability of a successful attack as defense investment does not drop as much as predicted when an alliance is formed.4. The ‘common threat’ is not a separate player in the game because it is not modeled as having a strategic decision.5. The total number of periods in the hour long sessions is based on the speed of play in a pilot session. Phase 1 involves twice as many periods as Phase 2 due to it being the primary focus of the experiment and to allow for learning in that environment.6. Given the distribution of allotments, the joint equilibrium is unique when b is less than 67.7. If b is in the interval (100, 200) then there is no Standalone equilibrium given the distribution of allotments.8. One observation in which a subject with an allotment of 91 contributed 91 is not shown in the figure due to the scale.9. Appendix B contains plots of individual level behavior in the first half of Phase 1, the second half of Phase 1, and Phase 2.10. One subject chose not to report being male or female. Of the others, 42% were male. For testing risk attitude and cognitive reflection, the sample was split as evenly as possible given the discrete nature of the responses.1","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135091907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Transmission of Fiscal News Shock: Evidence from Defense Spending","authors":"Jamil Sayeed, Deen Islam","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2269520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2269520","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper proposes a novel fiscal news shock transmission channel from the US to Canada. The US and Canada have a long history of strong political and economic ties. This high degree of economic and political interdependence between Canada and the US makes the Canadian economy sensitive to policy changes in the US. We demonstrate that a fiscal news shock originating from a significant increase in US defense spending can directly transmit to Canada through enhanced defense spending in Canada. We construct a transmission model containing the defense spending news variable to assess the transmission of a fiscal news shock through this novel channel. Our findings suggest that news about increased US defense spending induces Canadian defense spending to rise. Consequently, this increased defense spending has a positive impact on the Canadian GDP. The estimated international fiscal multiplier for Canada is 0.11. We coin a novel fiscal multiplier labeled as the international defense multiplier, which quantifies the response of defense spending of a country due to a change in defense spending in another country.KEYWORDS: Fiscal policynews shockdefense spendingdefense multipliershock transmissionJEL CLASSIFICATION: E62F4H56 AcknowledgmentsThe useful comments and constructive suggestions by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. There are some limitations of the Granger causality test. Especially in a bivariate model like ours, it may be problematic if both variables are driven by a common third process with different lags. The Granger causality tests are designed to handle pairs of variables and may produce misleading results when the true relationship involves three or more variables. However, this test is used in this paper only to motivate the investigation of the transmission of the defense spending news shock rather than the surprise shock from the US to Canada.2. Some of the variables (such as the narrative series of tax change from Romer and Romer (2010), tax changes series from Mertens and Ravn (2012), and the data on excess returns of military contractors) that are used to extract the US defense spending news shock are available until 2007. Therefore, the US defense spending news shock series cannot be extended after 2007 and as a result, we have to limit the sample of this study to 2007.","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135883178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Military Expenditures on Economic Growth: A New Instrumental Variables Approach","authors":"Luqman Saeed","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2259651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2259651","url":null,"abstract":"Endogeneity problems have plagued efforts to estimate the impact of military expenditures on economic growth. This paper addresses this problem with two instruments for military expenditures: the value of arms imports during periods of peace and the number of neighboring states suffering interstate violence. While positively correlated with military expenditures, the value of arms imports is unlikely to be determined by economic growth because of the time lag which exists, which in many cases runs into several years, between the placement of purchase orders for these arms and their delivery. The number of neighboring states suffering interstate violence captures regional ‘political uncertainty’, which spurs military spending without capturing the actual scale of domestic political violence which may directly affect economic growth. Several diagnostic tests show that both these instruments are highly correlated with military expenditures and fulfill overidentification restrictions. The results from empirical analyses of panel data on 133 countries during the 1960-2012 period indicate that an increase in military expenditure/GDP of 1 percentage point reduces economic growth by 1.10 percentage points. These results are robust to the application of 2SLS, LIML, and GMM estimators.","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"When Military Interventions Decrease Military Power Evidence from the French Case","authors":"Josselin Droff, Julien Malizard, Olivier Schmitt","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2263722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2263722","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTMilitary interventions create dilemmas for military organizations which must balance security-related tasks (such as peacekeeping or crisis management operations) and defense-related tasks involving deterrence and the preparation for high-intensity operations. This article specifically examines the trade-off between security and defense tasks through an original analysis of the impact of the intensification of the French armed forces’ operational tempo on the overall availability of military equipment. We argue that the intensification of military interventions generates gaps in a country’s military capabilities. More precisely, an excessive operational tempo, understood as an unsustainable level of deployment given regeneration capabilities, can reduce the ability of military organizations to generate operationally effective forces. Through an original methodological approach, using a multilevel econometric model that estimates a specific dimension of military power applied to the French case, this article contributes to the literature on the strategic utility of military interventions by examining their structural impact on the armed forces.KEYWORDS: Military interventionsoperational tempoavailabilitymultilevel modelsJEL CODE: H59D29D74 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Notably, this analysis does not consider the costs associated with internal operations such as Sentinelle (since 2015) or Vigipirate. We argue that the cost of such operation is relatively smaller than that of military interventions : in 2015, the Sentinelle operation cost approximately EUR 170 million (and approximatively the same amount in 2016). In addition, such operations mainly imply land forces and their specific training. Before that, these operations cost less than EUR 10 million.2. In such a curve, divided into three parts, the first part is a decreasing failure rate (infant mortality with low availability rate of equipment); the second part is a constant failure rate (availability rates of equipment reaches a plateau); and the third part is an increasing failure rate (wear-out failures with again, low availability rates).3. Notably, this includes all the military personnel deployed outside domestic soil, including the military deployed in permanent foreign bases (e.g. Pacific bases in the US case or foreign bases for France, including bases in foreign former colonies). Contrary to other studies that focused only on combat operations, we consider that prepositioned forces can be considered a form of deployment, notably because in the French case, they very often serve as support, supply and logistic nodes for combat operations. Moreover, they also serve as first responders in case of unforeseen geopolitical crises, as illustrated by the role of the French base in Djibouti to conduct emergency evacuation operations in Chad in 2023 (Opération Sagittaire), and maintain a high level of readiness, with substa","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135425354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Unemployment and Military Labour Supply: A Study on Belgian Data for the Period 2005-2020","authors":"Pieter Balcaen, C. Du Bois","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2252653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2252653","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48695257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Within Ethnic Population Inequality and within Self-Determination Movement Violence","authors":"Brandon Ives","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2247509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2247509","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46663637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Analysis of the Economic Effects of Defence Spending in Spain: A Re-Examination Through Dynamic ARDL Simulations and Kernel-Based Regularized Least Squares","authors":"O. Dimitraki, Kyriakos Emmanouilidis","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2023.2245698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2023.2245698","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48461926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}