Studies in Comparative International Development最新文献

Development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are found to be important actors in numerous studies, although their role is examined primarily from the recipient side. Focusing on the influence of development NGOs inside donor states originating from their transnational networks, I consider the high informational status of NGOs and their dedication to helping the poor as affording them the political leverage to acquire aid allocations from donor governments. I examine this idea through three distinct aid flows—countries, sectors, and delivery channels—that correspond to the NGOs’ primary concerns. The results show that the greater the increase in the domestic influence of the development NGO community, the larger the increase in aid spending not only allocated to the least-developed countries (LDCs) but also channeled through private actors in donors based on neoliberal doctrine. The expected positive relationship was also found between NGOs’ influence and increases in developmental-purpose aid with potential correlations with trade-purpose aid controlled.

A key challenge for integrating new transnational regulations into a semi-periphery country is creating institutional capacities for effective dissemination and monitoring of the standards and for upgrading a broad base of firms to implement and benefit from them. Instilled by NAFTA, Mexico embraced transnational food value chains, yet the results were rather mixed, as the vast majority of producers cannot implement new standards and participate. New rules and practices are not adopted on a tabula rasa but layered on prior socio-political institutions that are raw materials for new collaboration and blockage. We argue that improvements in both regulatory institutions and firm capabilities are driven by the creation of public–private learning communities, which in turn are shaped by prior institutional legacies at the public–private divide. The ability of producers to undertake organizational experiments with one another and key public actors is greatly constrained by the legacies of corporatism. Refashioned producer associations could initiate with certain local public institutions regulatory and technological upgrading for a limited number of firms, which became gatekeepers for certification.

In the semi-peripheral-dependent market economies (DME) of East Central Europe (ECE), foreign investors are major contributors to economic growth and tend to establish low value-added operations. At the same time, they enjoy superior bargaining power over central governments. The domination of FDI constrains domestic agency in shaping economic outcomes, thereby locking DMEs into the semi-periphery. Moving to the sub-national level, this paper challenges these views by arguing that there is considerably more scope for local development agency in DMEs than the comparative political economy literature suggests. Moreover, FDI-led upgrading, defined as multinational companies engaging in high value-added activities, can take place at the local level even without the direct involvement of the state. The paper draws on fieldwork conducted in two formerly declining industrial cities in ECE (Cluj and Gdańsk) that have recently emerged as knowledge-intensive hubs targeted by high value-added FDI. The paper shows that FDI-led upgrading in Gdańsk occurred with the active contribution and cooperation of both local private and public economic actors, whereas in Cluj, upgrading took place with the contribution of local universities and through the forging of business links between foreign capital and local firms established by expatriates and local engineers.

Although it is well known that large-scale bioenergy expansion erodes different environmental, social, and economic dimensions of sustainable development, in countries like Brazil, bioenergy is institutionalized as a flagship climate strategy aimed to cut down CO₂ emissions in transport. These trade-offs have serious implications for climate change governance and sustainable development; however, conventional approaches have not yet properly explained this seeming paradox. This article addresses this gap from a critical development pathways approach to bioenergy as a maladaptive strategy in Brazil. I propose an analytical framework to observe how different ideas, interests, and institutions interplay in the historical institutionalization of bioenergy as a climate strategy. The analysis shows that bioenergy institutionalization has been driven by the endemic economic crisis in the sugar sector and governmental interests associated with security and developmental imperatives. The unsustainable co-evolution of development pathways and bioenergy, marked by deforestation, land colonization, and agricultural expansion, has narrowed the adaptation space in agriculture, gearing current climate policy towards path-dependent maladaptive strategies like bioenergy. Paradoxically, framing bioenergy as a climate strategy has been useful to justify more expansive policies in favor of the sugarcane industry, and to greenwash the Brazilian climate policy in the international arena of climate governance.

What determines the ability of firms based in New Advanced Economies to generate innovation in the transition to electric vehicles (EVs)? Under what conditions are they more likely to break with their established pattern as fast followers to create innovation that is new to the world? To address these questions, we introduce a meso-level framework focused on the organization of global production networks. The framework examines three aspects of such networks: the position of the firm within the network, the number of lead firms, and the links between lead firms and suppliers. We illustrate the explanatory power of our framework through the cases of South Korea and Spain, the two New Advanced Economies with the largest automotive sectors. We characterize Korea’s production network as a unipolar, captive structure and Spain’s as part of an EU-wide multipolar, modular production network. We argue that contrary to common perceptions, Korea’s structure delayed the transition to EV’s and strengthened Korea’s role as a fast follower. Meanwhile, Spain’s embeddedness in the EU production network offered significant opportunities for turnkey suppliers to generate novel innovation despite the absence of a domestic lead firm.

Scholars of economic development in the Global South and of industrial policy in the Global North are increasingly advocating top-down policies by a strong, activist state to promote growth and innovation. Instead, we argue there is much to learn from firm-centered approaches about how the main economic decision-makers, namely, firms, engage with the constraints and opportunities that they face. This is particularly important in the semi-periphery, where public authorities do not always have the capacity, resources, and political support required to play the activist developmental role suggested in the literature. This introduction to the special issue develops the concept of the semi-periphery, showing that it can foster knowledge exchange across the North–South divide and promote innovation in analyses of the dynamics of economic development. It also presents the multilevel perspective through which the special issue accounts for cases where firms were able to overcome semi-peripheral constraints. We argue that carving out economic opportunities in the semi-periphery often requires the activation of the initiative of local firms, which form alliances with other actors from the private, public, and non-profit sectors. Rather than producing economic innovation directly, macro-institutions facilitate those efforts by providing a governance architecture that makes it easier for firms to form alliances and innovate.

Semi-peripheral economies are reliant on foreign capital for innovation and upgrading into higher-value-added economic activities. This characteristic of dependent development is coupled with unreliable government support for domestic businesses, resulting in fragmented state-business ties. How then did a local electrical vehicle (EV) battery startup InoBat manage to build an upgrading alliance in Slovakia and capitalise on the accelerating automotive shift to electromobility despite these barriers being present in the semi-peripheral economy of Slovakia? By developing a network-based analytical approach and using the unlikely case study of InoBat, this paper argues that developmental entrepreneurship, the mobilisation of private sector resources by venture capital or a large domestic firm, and support by private-public institutions were key determinants for the emergence of the InoBat upgrading alliance. The findings underline that local firms can also be the drivers of upgrading efforts even in the absence of consistent government support and the heavy presence of large transnational corporations.

Recent technological changes have created new opportunities for small- and medium-sized firms in the semi-periphery to enter digital markets. At the same time, the need to connect startups with the diverse range of actors and resources which sustain an entrepreneurial ecosystem poses a formidable challenge to regions which have historically suffered from disarticulation. The literature suggests that regions aspiring to support technology startups could benefit from bridging organizations or “entrepreneurial ecosystem incubators” (EEIs) to build civic capital. Comparing two successful EEIs in Toronto and Waterloo, Canada, we find that their organizational structure, specifically the composition of their board, shaped connectivity in important ways. Whereas Communitech, an entrepreneur-led EEI in Waterloo, relied heavily on horizontal, peer-to-peer mentoring among entrepreneurs, MaRS, led by established firms and civic leaders, linked startups to external capital, customers, and other resources within a limited number of industry verticals. Both EEIs supported local startup activity, but they fostered different patterns of collaboration and high-technology competition. This analysis suggests that regional leaders in laggard regions may face a tradeoff in how they support technology startups and nurture entrepreneurial ecosystems.

How do voters in ethnically polarized settings evaluate coethnic candidates in an environment of hybrid provision of public goods, especially where such hybrid provision includes links to criminal actors? In numerous urban settings around the world, local public goods provision involves a complex mix of private vendors, state services, and criminal actors. This paper explores how voters in Karachi, Pakistan evaluate candidates making distinct claims to water provision. We present findings from a survey experiment of over 2000 Karachi residents surveyed in 2021–2022. We find that while voters generally prefer coethnic candidates regardless of their ability to provide water, a non-coethnic candidate’s access to the state water bureaucracy can decrease the coethnic advantage and increase the credibility of a non-coethnic candidate. This is particularly the case among voters least satisfied with their water supply and most reliant on private sources of water. However, contrary to literature that finds that criminality can signal competence or the likelihood of goods and services being directed to coethnics, ties to the illegal water mafia do not offer either coethnic or non-coethnic candidates any additional advantage.

What is the relationship between counterinsurgency and institution-building? When do wartime institutions persist once conflict has ended? Classic theories examine how war spurs new institutions within the central state, while extensive research on rebel governance examines how insurgent actors forge new rules to garner civilian compliance and cement control. However, the legacies of armed conflict for state institutions in the theater of war remain relatively neglected. We theorize the process of local counterinsurgent institution-building and the drivers of institutional endurance following counterinsurgency. By analyzing two local counterinsurgent institutions in Nicaragua and a shadow case drawn from Indonesia, we find that while state leaders may generate new institutional arrangements to elicit information and garner resources, institutional persistence is driven by local reappropriation as communities pursue their own postwar governance and development goals. Overall, this paper contributes a new understanding for the divergent postwar paths of local institutions generated amid counterinsurgency.