On 30 March 2023, the European Court of Justice ruled for the first time on the interpretation of Article 88 GDPR, which gives Member States the power to provide for more specific rules on employee data processing. In response to a request from the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden ( Hauptpersonalrat der Lehrerinnen ) concerning the live streaming of video classes, the CJEU found the German law regulating personal data processing in the employment context to be incompatible with the GDPR. This note examines the far‐reaching implications of the ruling, not least given that similar provisions have been enacted at the state and federal levels in Germany as well as in several other Member States. It further identifies guidelines for the appropriate use of Article 88. Notably, national laws making use of Article 88 GDPR must provide normative content that is distinct from, but compatible with, the GDPR.
2023年3月30日，欧洲法院首次就GDPR第88条的解释作出裁决，该条款赋予成员国在雇员数据处理方面提供更具体规则的权力。在回应威斯巴登行政法院(Hauptpersonalrat der lehrelinnen)关于视频课程直播的请求时，欧洲法院认为，德国关于就业背景下个人数据处理的法律与GDPR不相容。本文考察了该裁决的深远影响，尤其是考虑到德国以及其他几个成员国在州和联邦一级颁布了类似的规定。它进一步确定了适当使用第88条的准则。值得注意的是，利用GDPR第88条的国家法律必须提供与GDPR不同但兼容的规范性内容。
{"title":"<i>Hauptpersonalrat der Lehrerinnen</i>: Article 88 GDPR and the Interplay between EU and Member State Employee Data Protection Rules","authors":"Halefom H. Abraha","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12849","url":null,"abstract":"On 30 March 2023, the European Court of Justice ruled for the first time on the interpretation of Article 88 GDPR, which gives Member States the power to provide for more specific rules on employee data processing. In response to a request from the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden ( Hauptpersonalrat der Lehrerinnen ) concerning the live streaming of video classes, the CJEU found the German law regulating personal data processing in the employment context to be incompatible with the GDPR. This note examines the far‐reaching implications of the ruling, not least given that similar provisions have been enacted at the state and federal levels in Germany as well as in several other Member States. It further identifies guidelines for the appropriate use of Article 88. Notably, national laws making use of Article 88 GDPR must provide normative content that is distinct from, but compatible with, the GDPR.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Irish judges have tended to ‘jealously guard’ the judicial power, vested as it is by Article 34.1 of the Constitution in the courts alone. And they have jealously guarded their control over the articulation of public law norms. It is they who get to decide what counts as fair procedure in this or that non‐judicial body – not the non‐judicial actors operating at the coalface. But in Zalewski v Workplace Relations Commission a majority of the Supreme Court has signaled a shift away from the rigid judicial ‘centralism’ that has prevailed for a century in the Irish legal system. The judges have departed from the formulaic approach to assessing what counts as judicial power, preferring instead a purposive approach more in line with comparator countries. They have revived a ‘saver’ provision of the Constitution (Article 37.1) expressly providing for ‘the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature’ by bodies other than courts. And they have indicated that courts and lawyers do not have a monopoly on authority in respect of public law norms. Things remain in flux, however, because there are conflicting messages in the majority judgment in respect of this more ‘pluralist’ conception of public law.
{"title":"<i>Zalewski</i> and the Future of Irish Public Law","authors":"Tom Hickey","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12847","url":null,"abstract":"Irish judges have tended to ‘jealously guard’ the judicial power, vested as it is by Article 34.1 of the Constitution in the courts alone. And they have jealously guarded their control over the articulation of public law norms. It is they who get to decide what counts as fair procedure in this or that non‐judicial body – not the non‐judicial actors operating at the coalface. But in Zalewski v Workplace Relations Commission a majority of the Supreme Court has signaled a shift away from the rigid judicial ‘centralism’ that has prevailed for a century in the Irish legal system. The judges have departed from the formulaic approach to assessing what counts as judicial power, preferring instead a purposive approach more in line with comparator countries. They have revived a ‘saver’ provision of the Constitution (Article 37.1) expressly providing for ‘the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature’ by bodies other than courts. And they have indicated that courts and lawyers do not have a monopoly on authority in respect of public law norms. Things remain in flux, however, because there are conflicting messages in the majority judgment in respect of this more ‘pluralist’ conception of public law.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135778655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article suggests that lawyers and judges may not understand the effects of their rules and procedures upon the production of evidence and its evaluation in criminal trials and appeals. Focusing on case studies involving the opinions of police officers and other investigators, as well as experts, it explains how applicable rules, procedures and safeguards did not produce, and appear incapable of producing, the effects claimed by courts. Drawing on scientific research – on cognitive bias and voice and face comparison – the article demonstrates how judges have enabled investigators to express their biased and speculative opinions, treated investigators’ opinions as expert (or special) without evidence of validity or ability, and encouraged jurors to make their own voice and face comparisons in the highly suggestive context of the accusatorial criminal trial. Courts have placed great reliance on trial safeguards, such as cross‐examination and judicial directions, trivialised the difficulty of voice and image comparisons and overlooked the likelihood that juror interpretations will be incurably biased, and that the same evidence will be unwittingly counted more than once.
{"title":"Trial by Cognitive Ordeal: Irrational Approaches to the Opinions of Investigators, Trial Integrity and Proof","authors":"Gary Edmond","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12848","url":null,"abstract":"This article suggests that lawyers and judges may not understand the effects of their rules and procedures upon the production of evidence and its evaluation in criminal trials and appeals. Focusing on case studies involving the opinions of police officers and other investigators, as well as experts, it explains how applicable rules, procedures and safeguards did not produce, and appear incapable of producing, the effects claimed by courts. Drawing on scientific research – on cognitive bias and voice and face comparison – the article demonstrates how judges have enabled investigators to express their biased and speculative opinions, treated investigators’ opinions as expert (or special) without evidence of validity or ability, and encouraged jurors to make their own voice and face comparisons in the highly suggestive context of the accusatorial criminal trial. Courts have placed great reliance on trial safeguards, such as cross‐examination and judicial directions, trivialised the difficulty of voice and image comparisons and overlooked the likelihood that juror interpretations will be incurably biased, and that the same evidence will be unwittingly counted more than once.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Machine learning algorithms present substantial promise for more effective decision‐making by administrative agencies. However, some of these algorithms are inscrutable, namely, they produce predictions that humans cannot understand or explain. This trait is in tension with the emphasis on reason‐giving in administrative law. The article explores this tension, advancing two interrelated arguments. First, providing adequate reasons is a significant facet of respecting individuals’ agency. Incorporating inscrutable algorithmic predictions into administrative decision‐making compromises this normative ideal. Second, as a long‐term concern, the use of inscrutable algorithms by administrative agencies may generate systemic effects by gradually reducing the realm of the humanly explainable in public life, a phenomenon Max Weber termed ‘re‐enchantment’. As a result, the use of inscrutable machine learning algorithms might trigger a special kind of re‐enchantment, making us comprehend less rather than more of shared human experience, and consequently altering the way we understand the administrative state and experience public life.
{"title":"Machine Learning and the Re‐Enchantment of the Administrative State","authors":"Eden Sarid, Omri Ben‐Zvi","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12843","url":null,"abstract":"Machine learning algorithms present substantial promise for more effective decision‐making by administrative agencies. However, some of these algorithms are inscrutable, namely, they produce predictions that humans cannot understand or explain. This trait is in tension with the emphasis on reason‐giving in administrative law. The article explores this tension, advancing two interrelated arguments. First, providing adequate reasons is a significant facet of respecting individuals’ agency. Incorporating inscrutable algorithmic predictions into administrative decision‐making compromises this normative ideal. Second, as a long‐term concern, the use of inscrutable algorithms by administrative agencies may generate systemic effects by gradually reducing the realm of the humanly explainable in public life, a phenomenon Max Weber termed ‘re‐enchantment’. As a result, the use of inscrutable machine learning algorithms might trigger a special kind of re‐enchantment, making us comprehend less rather than more of shared human experience, and consequently altering the way we understand the administrative state and experience public life.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135197918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is an emerging political consensus in the UK that greater devolution of spending powers will bring benefits in terms of reducing economic disparities between regions, enhancing social cohesion, and improving the economy's prospects for productivity, growth and the transition to net zero. The Subsidy Control Act 2022 is thought to be key to achieving this by providing public authorities with greater flexibility in how they make spending decisions than was previously the case under EU State aid rules. This paper examines whether the new regime does indeed make it easier for awarding bodies to grant beneficial subsidies. It concludes that the regime risks placing obligations on public authorities that are considerably more onerous than EU State aid rules and there is a need to significantly increase the scope of streamlined routes which provide legal certainty to beneficial spending decisions.
{"title":"Will the New UK Subsidy Control Regime Help ‘Level Up’ the Economy?","authors":"Andreas Stephan","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12835","url":null,"abstract":"There is an emerging political consensus in the UK that greater devolution of spending powers will bring benefits in terms of reducing economic disparities between regions, enhancing social cohesion, and improving the economy's prospects for productivity, growth and the transition to net zero. The Subsidy Control Act 2022 is thought to be key to achieving this by providing public authorities with greater flexibility in how they make spending decisions than was previously the case under EU State aid rules. This paper examines whether the new regime does indeed make it easier for awarding bodies to grant beneficial subsidies. It concludes that the regime risks placing obligations on public authorities that are considerably more onerous than EU State aid rules and there is a need to significantly increase the scope of streamlined routes which provide legal certainty to beneficial spending decisions.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135483342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In common law, sentencing is chiefly concerned with the duration of a sentence and rarely engages in the conditions under which the sentence is served. Recently, courts in Canada and England and Wales have started to recognise the relevance of certain prison conditions when deciding sentences. These approaches, however, have lacked conceptual clarity and consistency. Building on communicative theories of punishment, this article proposes a novel framework based on ‘state responsibility/blame’ and dynamic censure to justify the relevance of considering the qualitative conditions of imprisonment at sentencing as well as during the administration of the sentence. This framework is coupled by a typology of unjustified harmful carceral conditions that can be considered relevant evidence. This expanded purview of sentencing will offer greater legitimacy of punishment by strengthening communicative practices of punishment that include dynamic censure, including censuring the state for additional and unjustified state‐created harms.
{"title":"Communicating Censure: The Relevance of Conditions of Imprisonment at Sentencing and During the Administration of the Sentence","authors":"Marie Manikis, Audrey Matheson","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12845","url":null,"abstract":"In common law, sentencing is chiefly concerned with the duration of a sentence and rarely engages in the conditions under which the sentence is served. Recently, courts in Canada and England and Wales have started to recognise the relevance of certain prison conditions when deciding sentences. These approaches, however, have lacked conceptual clarity and consistency. Building on communicative theories of punishment, this article proposes a novel framework based on ‘state responsibility/blame’ and dynamic censure to justify the relevance of considering the qualitative conditions of imprisonment at sentencing as well as during the administration of the sentence. This framework is coupled by a typology of unjustified harmful carceral conditions that can be considered relevant evidence. This expanded purview of sentencing will offer greater legitimacy of punishment by strengthening communicative practices of punishment that include dynamic censure, including censuring the state for additional and unjustified state‐created harms.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135591228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What are the aims and functions of criminal law? This question has recently been much debated. Unfortunately, however, the debate is difficult to assess, as what it means to call something an aim or function of criminal law remains unclear. This article therefore does two things. First, it examines what these competing claims about criminal law's aims and functions might mean. Most plausibly, it is argued, they refer to one of three sets of things that criminal law does: those that justify its retention or use, that it is aimed at doing, or that explain its existence or persistence. Second, the article examines how convincing these claims are when thus understood. It argues that, in each of the senses identified, criminal law has numerous aims and functions – more than all sides in the debate allow.
{"title":"The Aims and Functions of Criminal Law","authors":"Andrew Cornford","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12846","url":null,"abstract":"What are the aims and functions of criminal law? This question has recently been much debated. Unfortunately, however, the debate is difficult to assess, as what it means to call something an aim or function of criminal law remains unclear. This article therefore does two things. First, it examines what these competing claims about criminal law's aims and functions might mean. Most plausibly, it is argued, they refer to one of three sets of things that criminal law does: those that justify its retention or use, that it is aimed at doing, or that explain its existence or persistence. Second, the article examines how convincing these claims are when thus understood. It argues that, in each of the senses identified, criminal law has numerous aims and functions – more than all sides in the debate allow.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135738596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article proposes a way to reframe the English foreign act of State doctrine. The doctrine is an established rule of English common law but its contours and application remain ill‐defined, despite the Supreme Court's restatement in Belhaj v Straw . The doctrine in its current form emerges from the accretion of precedents over some 350 years, but still lacks a unifying framework bringing its different strands together. This article argues that English courts should reframe the doctrine by reference to the distinction between elements of a rule that are embedded in its definition, called ‘limitations’, and elements of a rule that exist separately from it, called ‘exceptions’. This distinction has been developed in legal philosophy to classify the elements of wrongs as definitional elements, constitutive of liability, and defences, defeating liability. Reframed according to this distinction, the English foreign act of State doctrine can be streamlined into one, single rule, instead of the three rules set out in Belhaj v Straw . This reframing has implications for the doctrine's characterisation as one of justiciability, abstention or restraint, and its compatibility with the duty to do justice, including under the European Convention on Human Rights.
本文提出了一种重构英国对外国家行为原则的思路。该原则是英国普通法的既定规则，但其轮廓和应用仍然不明确，尽管最高法院在Belhaj诉Straw案中重述了这一原则。目前这种形式的学说是在350多年来不断积累的先例中形成的，但仍然缺乏一个统一的框架，将不同的学说结合在一起。本文认为，英国法院应该通过参考规则定义中嵌入的要素(称为“限制”)与规则独立存在的要素(称为“例外”)之间的区别来重新构建原则。这种区别在法律哲学中得到了发展，将错误要素分为定义要素、构成责任要素和抗辩要素、击败责任要素。根据这一区别，英国的外国国家行为学说可以简化为一个单一的规则，而不是在Belhaj v Straw中规定的三个规则。这种重构对该学说的可诉性、弃权或克制的特征及其与包括《欧洲人权公约》在内的公正义务的兼容性产生了影响。
{"title":"Reframing the English Foreign Act of State Doctrine","authors":"Massimo Lando","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12842","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12842","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes a way to reframe the English foreign act of State doctrine. The doctrine is an established rule of English common law but its contours and application remain ill‐defined, despite the Supreme Court's restatement in Belhaj v Straw . The doctrine in its current form emerges from the accretion of precedents over some 350 years, but still lacks a unifying framework bringing its different strands together. This article argues that English courts should reframe the doctrine by reference to the distinction between elements of a rule that are embedded in its definition, called ‘limitations’, and elements of a rule that exist separately from it, called ‘exceptions’. This distinction has been developed in legal philosophy to classify the elements of wrongs as definitional elements, constitutive of liability, and defences, defeating liability. Reframed according to this distinction, the English foreign act of State doctrine can be streamlined into one, single rule, instead of the three rules set out in Belhaj v Straw . This reframing has implications for the doctrine's characterisation as one of justiciability, abstention or restraint, and its compatibility with the duty to do justice, including under the European Convention on Human Rights.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article criticises the government's rejection of proposals by the Prison Reform Trust that would have extended self‐defence in householder cases to victims/survivors of domestic abuse. The authors argue that the Prison Reform Trust proposals should be enacted, and further supported by novel complementary reform of the option to retreat, and the exclusion of intoxicated mistaken belief in self‐defence claims. Specifically, the authors advance a statutory rebuttable presumption regarding the option to retreat in cases involving domestic abuse, namely, an assumption that the victim/survivor was not realistically able to retreat safely, unless it is proven otherwise. The authors also examine the appropriateness of the policy decision to exclude intoxicated mistaken belief in all self‐defence cases and advocate for its removal. It should be replaced with a requirement that all mistaken beliefs must be reasonable regardless of the presence of intoxication. Procedural recommendations are also advanced, including amendment of the Crown Court Compendium to include judicial directions on self‐defence which adopt a social entrapment approach in domestic abuse cases, and supported by the admissibility of non‐medical expert evidence on the nature and impact of coercive control.
{"title":"A New Self‐defence Framework for Domestic Abuse Survivors Who Use Violent Resistance in Response","authors":"Vanessa Bettinson, Nicola Wake","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12837","url":null,"abstract":"This article criticises the government's rejection of proposals by the Prison Reform Trust that would have extended self‐defence in householder cases to victims/survivors of domestic abuse. The authors argue that the Prison Reform Trust proposals should be enacted, and further supported by novel complementary reform of the option to retreat, and the exclusion of intoxicated mistaken belief in self‐defence claims. Specifically, the authors advance a statutory rebuttable presumption regarding the option to retreat in cases involving domestic abuse, namely, an assumption that the victim/survivor was not realistically able to retreat safely, unless it is proven otherwise. The authors also examine the appropriateness of the policy decision to exclude intoxicated mistaken belief in all self‐defence cases and advocate for its removal. It should be replaced with a requirement that all mistaken beliefs must be reasonable regardless of the presence of intoxication. Procedural recommendations are also advanced, including amendment of the Crown Court Compendium to include judicial directions on self‐defence which adopt a social entrapment approach in domestic abuse cases, and supported by the admissibility of non‐medical expert evidence on the nature and impact of coercive control.","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135193948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Modern Law ReviewEarly View BOOK REVIEW Mary Synge, The University-Charity: Challenging Perceptions in Higher Education, 2023, xix + 504 pp, hb £120. John Picton, Corresponding Author John Picton [email protected] Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester. Correspondence: John Picton, Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author John Picton, Corresponding Author John Picton [email protected] Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester. Correspondence: John Picton, Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 27 September 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12841 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation
《现代法律评论》早期书评玛丽·辛格:《大学-慈善:高等教育中的挑战观念》，2023年，第19期，504页，hb£120。约翰·皮克顿，通讯作者约翰·皮克顿[email protected]曼彻斯特大学财产与信托读者。通信:约翰·皮克顿，读者在财产和信托，曼彻斯特大学电子邮件:[Email protected]搜索更多的论文作者约翰·皮克顿，通讯作者约翰·皮克顿[Email protected]读者在财产和信托，曼彻斯特大学。通信:约翰·皮克顿，读者在财产和信托，曼彻斯特大学电子邮件:[Email protected]搜索作者的更多论文首次发表:2023年9月27日https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12841阅读全文taboutpdf ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack引文ShareShare给accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare全文accessShare请查看我们的使用条款和条件，并在下面的复选框共享文章的全文版本。我已经阅读并接受了Wiley在线图书馆使用共享链接的条款和条件，请使用下面的链接与您的朋友和同事分享本文的全文版本。学习更多的知识。复制URL共享链接共享一个emailfacebooktwitterlinkedinreddit微信本文无摘要在包含问题之前的早期视图在线记录版本相关信息
{"title":"MarySynge, The University‐Charity: Challenging Perceptions in Higher Education, 2023, xix + 504 pp, hb £120.","authors":"John Picton","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12841","url":null,"abstract":"The Modern Law ReviewEarly View BOOK REVIEW Mary Synge, The University-Charity: Challenging Perceptions in Higher Education, 2023, xix + 504 pp, hb £120. John Picton, Corresponding Author John Picton [email protected] Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester. Correspondence: John Picton, Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author John Picton, Corresponding Author John Picton [email protected] Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester. Correspondence: John Picton, Reader in Property and Trusts, University of Manchester Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 27 September 2023 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12841 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Early ViewOnline Version of Record before inclusion in an issue RelatedInformation","PeriodicalId":47530,"journal":{"name":"Modern Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135536671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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