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Theory and Decision最新文献

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Meta-Inductive Probability Aggregation 元归纳概率聚合
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-05-20 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09933-z
Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Gerhard Schurz
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引用次数: 0
Voluntary play increases cooperation in the presence of punishment: a lab in the field experiment 在有惩罚的情况下,自愿的游戏会增加合作:野外实验中的实验室
4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-05-13 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09929-9
Francesca Pancotto, Simone Righi, Károly Takács
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引用次数: 4
On the Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes 论埃尔斯伯格悖论与马奇纳悖论
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-05-12 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09935-x
K. Sharpe
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引用次数: 0
The precautionary principle when project implementation capacity is congestible 项目执行能力较低时的预防原则
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-05-11 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09934-y
A. Heyes, S. Kapur
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引用次数: 0
An experimental investigation of social risk preferences for health. 健康社会风险偏好的实验研究。
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-04-27 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09928-w
Arthur E Attema, Olivier L'Haridon, Gijs van de Kuilen

In this paper, we use the risk apportionment technique of Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007) to study higher order risk preferences for others' health as well as ex-ante and ex-post inequality preferences for social risky distributions, and their interaction. In an experiment on a sample of university students acting as impartial spectators, we observe risk aversion towards social health losses and a dislike of ex-ante inequality. In addition, evidence for ex-post inequality seeking is much weaker than evidence for ex-ante inequality aversion. Because ex-ante inequality aversion is unrelated to risk aversion, we conclude that simple forms of utilitarianism are not relevant for individual judgment of social risk over health. Last, our investigation of precautionary distribution, which would occur when one particular group in the society suffers from background health risk, shows substantial polarization of preferences.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11238-023-09928-w.

在本文中,我们使用Eeckhoudt、Rey和Schlesinger(2007)的风险分配技术来研究对他人健康的高阶风险偏好,以及对社会风险分布的事前和事后不平等偏好及其相互作用。在一项以大学生为样本的实验中,我们观察到了对社会健康损失的风险厌恶和对事前不平等的厌恶。此外,事后不平等寻求的证据比事前厌恶不平等的证据要弱得多。由于事前的不平等厌恶与风险厌恶无关,我们得出结论,简单形式的功利主义与个人对社会风险而非健康的判断无关。最后,我们对预防性分布的调查显示,当社会中的一个特定群体遭受背景健康风险时,会发生这种情况,这表明偏好存在很大的两极分化。补充信息:在线版本包含补充材料,可访问10.1007/s11238-023-9928-w。
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引用次数: 0
The Nash bargaining solution: sometimes more utilitarian, sometimes more egalitarian 纳什议价方案:有时更功利,有时更平等
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-04-24 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09930-2
Shiran Rachmilevitch
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引用次数: 0
Socially interdependent risk taking. 社会上相互依存的风险承担。
IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09927-x
Alexandros Karakostas, Giles Morgan, Daniel John Zizzo

We report the results of an experiment on how individual risk taking clusters together when subjects are informed of peers' previous risk taking decisions. Subjects are asked how much of their endowment they wish to allocate in a lottery in which there is a 50% chance the amount they invest will be tripled and a 50% chance their investment will be lost. We use a 2 × 2 factorial design varying: (i) whether the subjects initially observed high or low investment social anchors, (ii) whether information about the investment decisions of other subjects in their social group is provided. We find strong evidence that individuals' risk taking decisions are malleable to that of their peers, which in turn leads to social clustering of risk taking. Social anchors shape initial risk taking, with mean investment then converging to a high level across treatments.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11238-023-09927-x.

我们报告了一项实验的结果,该实验研究了当受试者被告知同伴先前的风险决策时,个体风险承担如何聚集在一起。受试者被问及他们希望在彩票中分配多少捐赠,在彩票中,他们的投资额有50%的机会增加两倍,投资损失有50%的可能性。我们使用2 × 2因子设计变化:(i)受试者最初是观察到高投资还是低投资的社会锚,(ii)是否提供了关于其社会群体中其他受试者投资决策的信息。我们发现强有力的证据表明,个人的风险承担决策对同龄人的风险承担具有可塑性,这反过来又导致了风险承担的社会集群。社会锚决定了最初的风险承担,平均投资随后在治疗中达到较高水平。补充信息:在线版本包含补充材料,请访问10.1007/s11238-023-9927-x。
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引用次数: 0
Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism 约束概率串行机制的公理化特征
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-28 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09925-z
Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan
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引用次数: 0
Reasonable doubt 合理怀疑
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-03-22 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09926-y
Liqun Liu
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引用次数: 0
Games with possibly naive present-biased players 游戏中可能有天真的、有偏见的玩家
IF 0.8 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2023-02-17 DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09924-0
M. Haan, D. Hauck
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引用次数: 2
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