Pub Date : 2023-08-30DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x
A. Vikram
{"title":"Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values","authors":"A. Vikram","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48893103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-21DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z
Tamás Solymosi
Abstract We characterize the assignment games which admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) in terms of efficiently verifiable structural properties of the nonnegative matrix that induces the game. We prove that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if the positive elements of the underlying nonnegative matrix form orthogonal submatrices of three special types. In game theoretic terms it means that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if it contains either a veto player or a dominant veto mixed pair, or the game is a composition of these two types of special assignment games. We also show that in PMAS-admissible assignment games all core allocations can be extended to a PMAS, and the nucleolus coincides with the tau-value.
{"title":"Assignment games with population monotonic allocation schemes","authors":"Tamás Solymosi","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01477-z","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We characterize the assignment games which admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS) in terms of efficiently verifiable structural properties of the nonnegative matrix that induces the game. We prove that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if the positive elements of the underlying nonnegative matrix form orthogonal submatrices of three special types. In game theoretic terms it means that an assignment game is PMAS-admissible if and only if it contains either a veto player or a dominant veto mixed pair, or the game is a composition of these two types of special assignment games. We also show that in PMAS-admissible assignment games all core allocations can be extended to a PMAS, and the nucleolus coincides with the tau-value.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135817868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-11DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01482-2
Martin Lackner, Jan Maly
Abstract Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a (smaller) set of best or most suitable alternatives. Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards or in recommender systems to display featured objects. In this paper, we analyze shortlisting methods that are based on approval data, a common type of preferences. Furthermore, we assume that the size of the shortlist, i.e., the number of best or most suitable alternatives, is not fixed but determined by the shortlisting method. We axiomatically analyze established and new shortlisting methods and complement this analysis with an experimental evaluation based on synthetic and real-world data. Our results lead to recommendations which shortlisting methods to use, depending on the desired properties.
{"title":"Approval-based shortlisting","authors":"Martin Lackner, Jan Maly","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01482-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01482-2","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a (smaller) set of best or most suitable alternatives. Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards or in recommender systems to display featured objects. In this paper, we analyze shortlisting methods that are based on approval data, a common type of preferences. Furthermore, we assume that the size of the shortlist, i.e., the number of best or most suitable alternatives, is not fixed but determined by the shortlisting method. We axiomatically analyze established and new shortlisting methods and complement this analysis with an experimental evaluation based on synthetic and real-world data. Our results lead to recommendations which shortlisting methods to use, depending on the desired properties.","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135396949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-06DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01480-4
Kenneth S. Chan, V. Lei, Filip Veselý
{"title":"Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study","authors":"Kenneth S. Chan, V. Lei, Filip Veselý","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01480-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01480-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46862409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-28DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01478-y
Gustav Alexandrie
{"title":"Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity","authors":"Gustav Alexandrie","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01478-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01478-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"919 - 936"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46735883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-25DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01475-1
Gunhaeng Lee
{"title":"Tailored recommendations on a matching platform","authors":"Gunhaeng Lee","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01475-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01475-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"883 - 917"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46623355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-19DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01473-3
S. Pellegrino, A. Vernizzi
{"title":"On measuring axiom violations due to each tax instrument applied in a real-world personal income tax","authors":"S. Pellegrino, A. Vernizzi","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01473-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01473-3","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"853 - 882"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43492649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-15DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01472-4
W. Bossert, Susumu Cato, Kohei Kamaga
{"title":"Independent, neutral, and monotonic collective choice: the role of Suzumura consistency","authors":"W. Bossert, Susumu Cato, Kohei Kamaga","doi":"10.1007/s00355-023-01472-4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01472-4","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47663,"journal":{"name":"Social Choice and Welfare","volume":"61 1","pages":"835 - 852"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45032527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：