Legislative Studies Quarterly最新文献

Political parties are essential for structuring parliamentary decision-making in democracies. However, in some countries, as many as 10% of legislators experience spells outside of parliamentary party groups. This paper sheds light on this important group of independent politicians by analyzing whether and when they join existing or new party groups. We argue that the electoral motivations of members of parliament (MPs) affect their incentives for reaffiliation. We capture electoral motivations with two factors: the personal vote of legislators and membership in minor parties that do not have their own parliamentary groups. We test this argument using a novel dataset covering over 800 spells of independence and 500 entries into party groups in three Central and Eastern European countries (Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) since the early 2000s. We find that independents affiliated with a minor party are more likely to form a new party group, while MPs with a significant personal vote or those not affiliated with a minor party are more prone to join an existing party group.

How does the emergence of new political competition alter established party behavior? In this article, I analyze how major parties in the United States adjust their agendas in response to new third-party competition. By analyzing state party platforms using text as data, I show that the emergence of Green Party competition prompts a re-prioritization of environmental issues within the Democratic platform. Unlike previous literature in the United States focused on adaptation in issue positions or ideology, I demonstrate that adaptation occurs in the salience an issue is given. This happens when a third party strategically contests close elections; the ideologically similar major party will re-focus on the new third party's policy priorities. This article highlights the role that third parties play in shaping the agendas of major parties, underscores the continued importance of party adaptation in maintaining the two-party system in American politics, and illustrates the influence that electorally marginalized interests can exert on major parties.

While inter-party conflicts and polarization are central for understanding policymaking, salient intra-party conflicts remain. We explore one lens into these conflicts—interest groups scoring votes at odds with party leaders. We examine how often and under what conditions party-aligned interest groups oppose the positions of party leadership and whether this disagreement is associated with heightened intra-party conflict. We find that disagreement is more common for the majority party compared to the minority party and, for both parties, disagreement is associated with reduced voting cohesion. We also identify salient differences between Democrats and Republicans during this time period. Disagreement on scored votes shines a valuable light into the competing pressures on both parties and interest groups, including those to govern and message. Although interest groups and aligned party leaders often agree on policy, both face a complex constellation of incentives and can make different tradeoffs on specific votes.

Members of Congress run for office with a variety of goals they hope to achieve if elected. How members go about achieving these goals is constrained by numerous institutional factors. Yet there exist two areas in which members are afforded broad discretion: the allocation of their time and budget. In this paper, I assess the personal qualities and institutional circumstances that motivate members' budgetary decisions, and take an important step further to evaluate the consequences of such choices. I find that members who spend a greater proportion of their budget are more effective lawmakers than those who do not spend their full budgets. Further, I demonstrate that members who invest more in legislative staff have the highest rates of legislative productivity. Members make strategic choices in how they divide their budget. This paper demonstrates that investing in skilled staff is a wise strategy for members desiring legislative success.

Despite Congress' Article I powers, challenges within and outside of Congress prevent lawmakers from influencing policy outcomes. Legislators confront obstacles when trying to pass bills, and legislation is often not implemented as intended. What strategies do lawmakers have for controlling policy outcomes? We argue that legislators use formal and informal means to influence policy, but that they choose an instrument that exploits their comparative advantage in Congress. Authority over legislative functions and access to stages of the legislative process influence lawmakers' strategy. We merge two datasets to measure the statutory tools drafted into legislation and House members' informal interactions with agencies between 2005 and 2012, drawing on nearly 14,000 bills and 65,000 contacts. Our findings contribute to theories of delegation and oversight—by focusing on the allocation of authority among individual legislators rather than transitory interbranch political explanations—and advance our understanding of the distribution of power in Congress.

How do incumbents in the US Congress turn federally funded district projects into electoral gains? Clarifying the connection between federal spending and congressional elections is critical for understanding the institution, as distributive benefits are theorized to enhance representation and facilitate broader policymaking. Extant studies argue that members of Congress use credit claiming for distributive benefits to cultivate an impression of influence, portraying themselves as uniquely capable of securing projects for their constituents. I develop a targeted theory of congressional distributive politics and argue that public support is granted to legislators for securing the right distributive benefits rather than securing the most distributive benefits. Using two survey experiments to explore constituent demand for different types of spending, I find robust evidence that legislators' ability to meet constituent demand shapes the effectiveness of their credit claims. I also find unexpected partisan convergence in the public's spending priorities and responsiveness to congressional credit claiming. This research advances the literature on congressional representation and offers a more complete account of the politics around congressional spending.