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Information technology adoption and the growth of nonemployer businesses 信息技术的采用与非雇主企业的增长
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12601
Younjun Kim, Eric Thompson

The growth of nonemployer businesses as a share of the working-age population has been little studied relative to the decline of employer business rate in the United States. We show that local labor markets specializing in routine task-intensive jobs have experienced a higher adoption of information technology as well as the growth of nonemployer businesses primarily through increasing self-employment in nonroutine manual task-intensive jobs that are less frequently outsourced to business service firms.

在美国,相对于雇主企业率的下降,非雇主企业在劳动适龄人口中所占比例的增长却鲜有研究。我们的研究表明,当地专门从事常规任务密集型工作的劳动力市场对信息技术的采用率较高,而非雇主企业的增长主要是通过增加非日常手工任务密集型工作的自雇人数实现的,这些工作较少外包给商业服务公司。
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引用次数: 0
Content moderation and advertising in social media platforms 社交媒体平台的内容管理和广告
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12602
Leonardo Madio, Martin Quinn

We study the incentive of an ad-funded social media platform to curb the presence of unsafe content that entails reputational risk to advertisers. We identify conditions for the platform not to moderate unsafe content and demonstrate how the optimal moderation policy depends on the risk the advertisers face. The platform is likely to undermoderate unsafe content relative to the socially desirable level when both advertisers and users have congruent preferences for unsafe content and to overmoderate unsafe content when advertisers have conflicting preferences for unsafe content. Finally, to mitigate negative externalities generated by unsafe content, we study the implications of a policy that mandates binding content moderation to online platforms and how the introduction of taxes on social media activity and social media platform competition can distort the platform's moderation strategies.

我们研究了由广告资助的社交媒体平台抑制不安全内容的激励机制,因为不安全内容会给广告商带来声誉风险。我们确定了平台不节制不安全内容的条件,并证明了最优节制政策如何取决于广告商面临的风险。当广告商和用户对不安全内容的偏好一致时,平台可能会对不安全内容进行相对于社会期望水平的低度审核,而当广告商对不安全内容的偏好冲突时,平台可能会对不安全内容进行过度审核。最后,为了减轻不安全内容产生的负外部性,我们研究了强制要求网络平台对内容进行约束性节制的政策的影响,以及对社交媒体活动征税和社交媒体平台竞争会如何扭曲平台的节制策略。
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引用次数: 0
Reassessing the impact of health IT: Hidden costs and consequences of vendor heterogeneity 重新评估医疗信息技术的影响:供应商异质性的隐性成本和后果
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-06-20 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12600
Jianjing Lin, Mary K. Olson

The government has invested more than $24.8 billion to incentivize the adoption of health information technology in hospitals; however, there is little evidence showing that these investments produced the expected efficiencies, such as cost savings and improved quality of care. We examine whether vendor heterogeneity can help explain this puzzle. Our results show that the effects of electronic medical record (EMR) adoption on hospital costs and quality vary substantially by vendor. Only certain EMR vendors lead to cost savings (ranging between 3.1% and 4.7%) or quality of care improvements (lowering rates of adverse drug events from 0.38 to 1.68 percentage points) for adopting hospitals, while the adoption of other EMR vendors leads to either cost increases, quality of care reductions, or no significant effects. Our results suggest that both quality improvement and cost savings may be improved by a more strategic choice of vendor. The variability in EMR effectiveness by vendor also implies that there was a hidden cost of the government's program to incentivize the adoption of EMRs in hospitals.

政府已投资超过 248 亿美元来激励医院采用医疗信息技术;然而,几乎没有证据表明这些投资产生了预期的效率,如节约成本和提高医疗质量。我们研究了供应商的异质性是否有助于解释这一难题。我们的研究结果表明,采用电子病历(EMR)对医院成本和质量的影响因供应商的不同而大相径庭。只有某些电子病历供应商能为采用电子病历的医院节约成本(介于 3.1% 和 4.7% 之间)或提高医疗质量(降低药品不良事件发生率 0.38 至 1.68 个百分点),而采用其他电子病历供应商则会导致成本增加、医疗质量下降或无显著效果。我们的研究结果表明,更具战略性地选择供应商可以提高质量和节约成本。不同供应商在 EMR 效果上的差异也意味着,政府激励医院采用 EMR 的计划存在隐性成本。
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引用次数: 0
Information campaigns and ecolabels by environmental NGOs: Effective strategies to eliminate environmentally harmful components? 非政府环保组织的宣传活动和生态标签:消除有害环境成分的有效战略?
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-05-29 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12595
Dorothée Brécard, Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline

Environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are increasingly using strategies to encourage firms to eliminate product components (e.g., palm oil) that are harmful to the environment (e.g., rainforests) or to replace them with NGO-certified sustainable components. Under what conditions do NGOs' information and ecolabeling strategies succeed in eliminating certain harmful components when these components contribute to the intrinsic quality of a product? The paper addresses these questions using a model of two-dimensional vertical product differentiation in a market with consumers either informed or uninformed about the environmental quality of products and two firms that initially offer a product with the harmful component and a harmful component-free product. We show that the information campaign plays a crucial and effective role in improving environmental quality, although the optimal share of informed consumers for the NGO is large but not always 100%. Ecolabeling cannot replace the information campaign. It is only a complementary tool to an intensive information campaign. Used together, they can succeed in triggering the substitution of the certified sustainable component for the harmful one.

非政府环保组织(NGO)越来越多地采用各种策略,鼓励企业消除产品中对环境(如热带雨林)有害的成分(如棕榈油),或用非政府组织认证的可持续成分取而代之。如果某些有害成分有助于提高产品的内在质量,那么在什么条件下非政府组织的信息和生态标签战略能够成功地消除这些成分呢?本文通过一个二维纵向产品差异化模型来探讨这些问题,在这个模型中,消费者对产品的环境质量要么知情,要么不知情,而两家公司最初提供的产品分别含有有害成分和不含有害成分。我们的研究表明,尽管非政府组织的最佳知情消费者比例很大,但并不总是 100%,因此信息宣传在提高环境质量方面发挥着至关重要的有效作用。生态标签不能取代宣传活动。它只是强化宣传活动的补充工具。两者结合使用,可以成功地促使人们用经过认证的可持续成分取代有害成分。
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引用次数: 0
Sticky price for declining risk? Business strategies with “behavioral” customers in the hotel industry 风险下降,价格坚挺?酒店业 "行为 "顾客的经营策略
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12593
Nicola Lacetera, Claudio A. Piga, Lorenzo Zirulia

Using data from about 25 million hotel room postings in four countries, we document that rather than decreasing to zero as the likelihood of cancellation declines, the difference between the prices for refundable and nonrefundable reservations remains positive at roughly 10%–15% of the full price. A model where travelers have different willingness to pay and some of them overestimate the probability to cancel their trip explains these price-setting patterns more consistently than alternative interpretations. We denote these business strategies as naiveté-based price discrimination. Our data and theory, therefore, show that this form of apparent inertial behavior of companies regarding a major strategic variable can be an intentional managerial choice. We demonstrate, finally, that this profit-enhancing commitment to limited flexibility may also benefit customers in some cases, by expanding the reach of the market. Thus, strategies that rely on cognitive biases on the demand side may not necessarily exploit consumers.

通过使用四个国家约 2500 万条酒店客房信息的数据,我们发现,可退款预订和不可退款预订的价格差不仅没有随着取消可能性的降低而降至零,反而保持在全价的 10%-15% 左右。如果旅行者的支付意愿不同,其中一些人高估了取消旅行的可能性,那么这个模型就能比其他解释更一致地解释这些价格制定模式。我们将这些商业策略称为基于天真的价格歧视。因此,我们的数据和理论表明,企业在主要战略变量上的这种明显惯性行为可能是一种有意的管理选择。最后,我们还证明,在某些情况下,这种对有限灵活性的盈利承诺也可能通过扩大市场范围而使客户受益。因此,依赖需求方认知偏差的战略并不一定会剥削消费者。
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引用次数: 0
Misspecified profit functions and full-cost pricing 不规范的利润函数和全成本定价
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-05-23 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12594
Philippe Choné, Laurent Linnemer

We study the behavior of a firm that consistently maximizes a misspecified profit function as the misspecification error remains undetected in equilibrium. Our framework encompasses a price-taking firm and a cost-taking firm, which respectively take the unit price and the unit cost as given. At the stable equilibrium for the cost-taking firm, the price increases with the level of fixed costs, a phenomenon known as full-cost pricing. We show that the equilibrium price may be lower than the rational price and can be reached by a tatônnement process. We also describe a stochastic version of that process in a dynamic setting with random costs and Bayesian learning. Finally, we endogenize the cost curve. When technology duplication is possible, the cost-taking firm and the rational firm end up producing the same level of output.

我们研究的是一家公司的行为,该公司能在均衡状态下持续最大化被误判的利润函数,因为误判错误一直未被发现。我们的框架包括价格获取型企业和成本获取型企业,它们分别将单位价格和单位成本视为给定值。在成本承担企业的稳定均衡状态下,价格会随着固定成本的增加而增加,这种现象被称为全成本定价。我们的研究表明,均衡价格可能低于理性价格,并且可以通过一个 "tatônnement "过程达到。我们还描述了在随机成本和贝叶斯学习的动态环境下该过程的随机版本。最后,我们将成本曲线内生化。当技术复制成为可能时,承担成本的企业和理性企业最终会生产出相同水平的产品。
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引用次数: 0
Patent eligibility after Alice: Evidence from USPTO patent examination 爱丽丝之后的专利资格:来自美国专利商标局专利审查的证据
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-04-11 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12592
Jesse Frumkin, Nicholas A. Pairolero, Asrat Tesfayesus, Andrew A. Toole

In a series of decisions over the last decade, the Supreme Court of the United States altered the classes of inventions that are eligible for patent protection—a body of law called subject matter eligibility. One of the more contentious of these decisions, Alice Corp. versus CLS Bank International (Alice), questioned the patentability of a broad class of inventions involving abstract ideas, particularly in digital technologies. Exploiting a quasinatural experiment, we find that the Alice decision reduced favorable patent eligibility decisions by 31% and significantly and persistently increased legal uncertainty in patent examination by 26% for a broad set of technologies. Our analysis quantifies how legal decisions can limit patent protection and highlights the need for further research on how greater legal uncertainty affects upstream investments supporting invention and downstream innovations fueling growth.

在过去十年的一系列判决中,美国最高法院改变了有资格获得专利保护的发明类别--这套法律被称为主体资格。其中一项争议较大的判决,即爱丽丝公司诉 CLS 银行国际公司案(Alice Corp. versus CLS Bank International,简称 Alice 案),对涉及抽象概念的一大类发明,尤其是数字技术发明的专利性提出了质疑。利用准自然实验,我们发现爱丽丝案的判决使有利的专利资格判决减少了 31%,并使专利审查中的法律不确定性显著且持续地增加了 26%,涉及的技术范围很广。我们的分析量化了法律决定如何限制专利保护,并强调有必要进一步研究更大的法律不确定性如何影响支持发明的上游投资和促进增长的下游创新。
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引用次数: 0
Learning-by-doing and contract choice 边干边学与合同选择
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-04-02 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12589
Katja Greer

This study examines vertical agreements that occur when suppliers experience learning-by-doing, which makes them more productive over time and poses a competitive threat to their rivals. Consequently, a dominant supplier arranges payments that reference the rival good. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing that the dominant supplier chooses specific contracts to reap optimal benefit from its rival's efficiency gains. These contracts restrict the rival, harm consumers, and reduce welfare when the rival is exceptionally efficient or expects significant improvements through learning-by-doing. Therefore, this study emphasizes the significance of foreseeable innovations and their implications in antitrust proceedings.

本研究探讨了供应商在边干边学的过程中达成的纵向协议,随着时间的推移,供应商的生产效率会不断提高,并对竞争对手构成竞争威胁。因此,占支配地位的供应商会参照竞争对手的产品安排付款。本研究表明,主导供应商会选择特定的合同,以从对手的效率提升中获得最佳利益,从而为现有文献做出贡献。当对手效率极高或期望通过边干边学获得显著改善时,这些合同会限制对手、损害消费者利益并降低福利。因此,本研究强调了可预见的创新及其在反垄断诉讼中的意义。
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引用次数: 0
Politics and entry deterrence: Evidence from China's industrial land market 政治与进入威慑:来自中国工业用地市场的证据
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-22 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12591
Chunyang Wang

This paper examines one million land transactions and firm census data sets to determine the effect of market concentration on entry deterrence in China from 2006 to 2013. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index leads to a one standard deviation decrease in local government-designated industrial land sales to nonlocal firms and to a 2.9 standard deviation increase in land cost. Further evidence suggests that firms with high market power lobby their local governments to deter the entry of nonlocal firms.

本文研究了 2006 年至 2013 年中国一百万宗土地交易和企业普查数据集,以确定市场集中度对企业进入阻遏的影响。我们发现,赫芬达尔-赫希曼指数每增加一个标准差,地方政府向非本地企业出让的工业用地就会减少一个标准差,土地成本就会增加 2.9 个标准差。进一步的证据表明,市场支配力强的企业会游说当地政府阻止非本地企业的进入。
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引用次数: 0
“For the public benefit”: Data policy in platform markets "为了公众利益":平台市场的数据政策
IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Pub Date : 2024-03-22 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12588
Sarit Markovich, Yaron Yehezkel

We consider the public-good aspect of platform's data collection on users. Data have commercial benefits to the platform, personal benefits to the user, and public benefits to other users. We ask who should decide which data the platform commercializes. We find that the answer depends on the type of heterogeneity in the disutility of data commercialization. When heterogeneity is across users (data items) and the public benefit of data is high (low), it is welfare enhancing to let the platform (users) control the data. Furthermore, dynamic data accumulation strengthens our results.

我们考虑平台收集用户数据的公益性。数据对平台有商业利益,对用户有个人利益,对其他用户有公共利益。我们要问,由谁来决定平台商业化哪些数据?我们发现,答案取决于数据商业化效用的异质性类型。当用户(数据项)之间存在异质性,且数据的公共利益较高(较低)时,让平台(用户)控制数据可提高福利。此外,动态数据积累也加强了我们的结果。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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