Prior research shows that ghost ticking, or documenting audit work not actually performed, is a persistent threat to audit quality. We examine whether requiring self-references in audit workpapers (i.e., "I" performed the test) can effectively curtail ghost ticking, compared to other workpaper language that can be used in practice. We also design and test an alternative to tick marks (symbol-based notation commonly used in workpapers to describe the results of audit procedures), in which auditors select the same description of the procedure performed, but from a pre-populated drop-down list. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that using both self-references and descriptions (as opposed to tick marks) jointly reduces ghost ticking, compared to when only one (or neither) of these are used. Overall, we demonstrate how two simple and easily implementable changes to language and tick marks can significantly curtail ghost ticking and therefore reduce its threat to audit quality.
{"title":"How Simple Changes to Language and Tick Marks Can Curtail the Ghost Ticking of Audit Procedures","authors":"Jessica L. Buchanan, M. D. Piercey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3720928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3720928","url":null,"abstract":"Prior research shows that ghost ticking, or documenting audit work not actually performed, is a persistent threat to audit quality. We examine whether requiring self-references in audit workpapers (i.e., \"I\" performed the test) can effectively curtail ghost ticking, compared to other workpaper language that can be used in practice. We also design and test an alternative to tick marks (symbol-based notation commonly used in workpapers to describe the results of audit procedures), in which auditors select the same description of the procedure performed, but from a pre-populated drop-down list. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that using both self-references and descriptions (as opposed to tick marks) jointly reduces ghost ticking, compared to when only one (or neither) of these are used. Overall, we demonstrate how two simple and easily implementable changes to language and tick marks can significantly curtail ghost ticking and therefore reduce its threat to audit quality.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"38 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86906129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I investigate the impact that adherence to the Institute of Internal Auditors' Core Principles has on the likelihood that an internal auditor's effectiveness is threatened through pressure to modify valid audit findings. I use responses from the Institute of Internal Auditors' 2015 Common Body of Knowledge Practitioner Survey to show that higher adherence to the Core Principles by both internal audit staff and CAEs is associated with a lower likelihood of being pressured to modify audit findings. I also explore which of the ten Core Principles are dominant in explaining these associations to inform the future development of the internal audit profession. Finally, I investigate the sources of pressure to modify audit findings and explore the effect the Core Principles have in mitigating pressure from each source. My findings are relevant to the Institute of Internal Auditors, internal audit practitioners, and academics interested in internal audit or corporate governance.
{"title":"Adherence to the Internal Audit Core Principles and Threats to Internal Audit Function Effectiveness","authors":"Christopher G. Calvin","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-19-072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-19-072","url":null,"abstract":"I investigate the impact that adherence to the Institute of Internal Auditors' Core Principles has on the likelihood that an internal auditor's effectiveness is threatened through pressure to modify valid audit findings. I use responses from the Institute of Internal Auditors' 2015 Common Body of Knowledge Practitioner Survey to show that higher adherence to the Core Principles by both internal audit staff and CAEs is associated with a lower likelihood of being pressured to modify audit findings. I also explore which of the ten Core Principles are dominant in explaining these associations to inform the future development of the internal audit profession. Finally, I investigate the sources of pressure to modify audit findings and explore the effect the Core Principles have in mitigating pressure from each source. My findings are relevant to the Institute of Internal Auditors, internal audit practitioners, and academics interested in internal audit or corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80636279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document that non-income-increasing (NII) misreporting is important to investors and then investigate whether auditors respond to and prevent different types of NII misstatements. We categorize NII misstatements into those whose correction adversely (i.e., unfavorably) affect financial reports and those whose correction positively (i.e., favorably) affect financial reports. We find that audit fees are positively associated with unfavorable NII misstatements, but not with favorable NII misstatements. We examine whether auditors prevent quarterly misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements and find that auditors are less likely to prevent both favorable and unfavorable NII quarterly report misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements, with the audit efficacy being lower for favorable NII misstatements. In sum, our research indicates that auditors do attempt to constrain NII misreporting with greater effort expended on unfavorable NII misstatements. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources. JEL Classifications: M49.
{"title":"Auditor Responses to and Prevention of Non-Income-Increasing Misreporting: Evidence from Audit Fees and Restatements","authors":"Jeffrey A. Pittman, Yuping Zhao","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-18-115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-18-115","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We document that non-income-increasing (NII) misreporting is important to investors and then investigate whether auditors respond to and prevent different types of NII misstatements. We categorize NII misstatements into those whose correction adversely (i.e., unfavorably) affect financial reports and those whose correction positively (i.e., favorably) affect financial reports. We find that audit fees are positively associated with unfavorable NII misstatements, but not with favorable NII misstatements. We examine whether auditors prevent quarterly misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements and find that auditors are less likely to prevent both favorable and unfavorable NII quarterly report misstatements from resulting in annual report misstatements, with the audit efficacy being lower for favorable NII misstatements. In sum, our research indicates that auditors do attempt to constrain NII misreporting with greater effort expended on unfavorable NII misstatements.\u0000 Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M49.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86497389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study experimentally tests the joint effects of mandatory partner rotation and PCAOB inspections on audit effort. Using a sample comprised primarily of audit partners, I find that experienced auditors plan lower effort prior to mandatory partner rotation and higher effort when PCAOB inspection risk is high relative to low. Thus, the net effect of anticipating mandatory partner rotation and high PCAOB inspection risk is no change in effort. Partners also reallocate effort away from planning and testing activities prior to rotation, consistent with a disincentive to invest in outgoing clients, while both partner rotation and high PCAOB inspection risk cause partners to spend more effort on documentation. Supplemental evidence about the spillover effects of mandatory partner rotation and PCAOB inspection risk on non-targeted clients is inconsistent with shirking behavior. Results are of interest to legislators, regulators, and auditors during the ongoing debate about the effects of current regulations. Data Availability: Contact the author.
{"title":"The Joint Effects of Partner Rotation and PCAOB Inspections on Audit Effort","authors":"Amanda Winn","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-18-121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-18-121","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study experimentally tests the joint effects of mandatory partner rotation and PCAOB inspections on audit effort. Using a sample comprised primarily of audit partners, I find that experienced auditors plan lower effort prior to mandatory partner rotation and higher effort when PCAOB inspection risk is high relative to low. Thus, the net effect of anticipating mandatory partner rotation and high PCAOB inspection risk is no change in effort. Partners also reallocate effort away from planning and testing activities prior to rotation, consistent with a disincentive to invest in outgoing clients, while both partner rotation and high PCAOB inspection risk cause partners to spend more effort on documentation. Supplemental evidence about the spillover effects of mandatory partner rotation and PCAOB inspection risk on non-targeted clients is inconsistent with shirking behavior. Results are of interest to legislators, regulators, and auditors during the ongoing debate about the effects of current regulations.\u0000 Data Availability: Contact the author.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89888071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Audit guidance requires auditors to assess management's competence with respect to internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) based on the recommendations of COSO's integrated framework. The omission bias theory suggests that after internal control failures, auditors may assess managers' competence in a manner inconsistent with these requirements. Results from four experiments using 313 experienced audit and accounting professionals support this concern and a means of mitigating it. I find that auditors view the manager to be most competent when prior to the failure in the key control the manager did nothing to prevent the failure versus reinforced the key control. I do not find this effect when auditors had shared their concerns about the key control with the manager prior to the control's failure. My results also show that auditors incorporate their competence judgments about management into evaluations of the ICFR, as required by the audit guidance.
{"title":"Auditor Evaluation of Manager's Competence After a Failure in Internal Control","authors":"Eldar M. Maksymov","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-18-036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-18-036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Audit guidance requires auditors to assess management's competence with respect to internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) based on the recommendations of COSO's integrated framework. The omission bias theory suggests that after internal control failures, auditors may assess managers' competence in a manner inconsistent with these requirements. Results from four experiments using 313 experienced audit and accounting professionals support this concern and a means of mitigating it. I find that auditors view the manager to be most competent when prior to the failure in the key control the manager did nothing to prevent the failure versus reinforced the key control. I do not find this effect when auditors had shared their concerns about the key control with the manager prior to the control's failure. My results also show that auditors incorporate their competence judgments about management into evaluations of the ICFR, as required by the audit guidance.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"421 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76326219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this study is to examine whether investor sentiment influences clients' propensity to engage in audit opinion shopping. Using the opinion shopping framework of Lennox (2000), we document that internal control opinion shopping is more prevalent when investor sentiment is high. This effect is concentrated among firms with low institutional ownership. We also find that clients are more likely to undertake downward switches (i.e., Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditor) when sentiment is high. Additional tests reveal that clients who engage in opinion shopping during high sentiment periods have a higher risk of material restatements and higher audit fees. As well, the market-penalty associated with opinion shopping is reduced when sentiment is high. Overall, the results suggest that firms' opinion shopping behavior during high sentiment periods is more prevalent and opportunistic. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.
{"title":"Investor Sentiment and Audit Opinion Shopping","authors":"Keval Amin, Dan Eshleman, Peng Guo","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-2019-523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-2019-523","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The purpose of this study is to examine whether investor sentiment influences clients' propensity to engage in audit opinion shopping. Using the opinion shopping framework of Lennox (2000), we document that internal control opinion shopping is more prevalent when investor sentiment is high. This effect is concentrated among firms with low institutional ownership. We also find that clients are more likely to undertake downward switches (i.e., Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditor) when sentiment is high. Additional tests reveal that clients who engage in opinion shopping during high sentiment periods have a higher risk of material restatements and higher audit fees. As well, the market-penalty associated with opinion shopping is reduced when sentiment is high. Overall, the results suggest that firms' opinion shopping behavior during high sentiment periods is more prevalent and opportunistic.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"58 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76676919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using data for listed firms in China, where two auditors sign the audit report, we examine whether the diversity of signing auditors’ characteristics affects audit quality. We find a positive association between diversity and audit quality, consistent with the notion that diversity facilitates team performance. Further analyses show there is a stronger association between cognitive, rather than demographic, diversity of signing auditors and audit quality. Our results are robust to the inclusion of client firm and engagement auditor fixed effects. Cross-sectional results indicate stronger effects of the cognitive diversity of signing auditors on audit quality in complex, opaque, less important clients or firms without industry specialist auditors. Findings from our study suggest that audit firms should allocate staff to audit teams in a manner that results in cognitively diverse audit teams because such teams are more likely to deliver high quality audits.
{"title":"Diversity of Signing Auditors and Audit Quality","authors":"Chang He, C. Li, G. Monroe, Yi Si","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-19-068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-19-068","url":null,"abstract":"Using data for listed firms in China, where two auditors sign the audit report, we examine whether the diversity of signing auditors’ characteristics affects audit quality. We find a positive association between diversity and audit quality, consistent with the notion that diversity facilitates team performance. Further analyses show there is a stronger association between cognitive, rather than demographic, diversity of signing auditors and audit quality. Our results are robust to the inclusion of client firm and engagement auditor fixed effects. Cross-sectional results indicate stronger effects of the cognitive diversity of signing auditors on audit quality in complex, opaque, less important clients or firms without industry specialist auditors. Findings from our study suggest that audit firms should allocate staff to audit teams in a manner that results in cognitively diverse audit teams because such teams are more likely to deliver high quality audits.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88403548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier (“inspection year” audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag (“non-inspection year” audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process. Data Availability: All data are from publicly available sources. JEL Classifications: M42.
{"title":"The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits","authors":"Lawrence J. Abbott, William L. Buslepp","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-18-150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-18-150","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier (“inspection year” audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag (“non-inspection year” audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.\u0000 Data Availability: All data are from publicly available sources.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M42.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76978944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab, Willie. E. Gist, F. Gul, Mazlina Norzila Mat Zain
This study examines the relationship between outsourced internal audits, nonaudit services, and audit fees. We use Malaysian data to show that client firms that outsource their internal auditing function (IAF) are associated with lower external audit fees than those with in-house IAF. Moreover, this negative relationship is significantly stronger for firms that purchase greater amounts of nonaudit services (NAS) from the auditor. The results suggest that an auditor who provides NAS to a client and thus earns additional overall revenue is willing to accept lower audit fees provided a high audit quality can be achieved through reliance on outsourced IAF. JEL Classifications: M42.
{"title":"Internal Auditing Outsourcing, Nonaudit Services, and Audit Fees","authors":"Effiezal Aswadi Abdul Wahab, Willie. E. Gist, F. Gul, Mazlina Norzila Mat Zain","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-17-044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-17-044","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study examines the relationship between outsourced internal audits, nonaudit services, and audit fees. We use Malaysian data to show that client firms that outsource their internal auditing function (IAF) are associated with lower external audit fees than those with in-house IAF. Moreover, this negative relationship is significantly stronger for firms that purchase greater amounts of nonaudit services (NAS) from the auditor. The results suggest that an auditor who provides NAS to a client and thus earns additional overall revenue is willing to accept lower audit fees provided a high audit quality can be achieved through reliance on outsourced IAF.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M42.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89183368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ting‐Chiao Huang, Chen Chen, S. Kaplan, Yi‐Hung Lin
We examine whether increases in co-working experience between the lead and concurring audit partners affect engagement audit quality and audit efficiency. We define co-working experience as the lead and concurring audit partners having worked together in these roles on previous audit engagements for clients other than the focal client. A priori, increases in co-working experience could increase or decrease audit quality, but are expected to increase audit efficiency. Using data from Taiwan, where the identities of lead and concurring audit partners are known, we find that co-working experience is positively associated with audit quality and audit efficiency. Further, the effects of co-working experience on audit quality and audit efficiency are more pronounced when co-working experience is more intensive, the two partners are more accessible to each other, the audit firm is less experienced with the client or less knowledgeable about the client's industry, or client audit risks are higher. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M4; M42.
{"title":"Audit Partners' Co-Working Experience and Audit Outcomes","authors":"Ting‐Chiao Huang, Chen Chen, S. Kaplan, Yi‐Hung Lin","doi":"10.2308/AJPT-18-163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-18-163","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We examine whether increases in co-working experience between the lead and concurring audit partners affect engagement audit quality and audit efficiency. We define co-working experience as the lead and concurring audit partners having worked together in these roles on previous audit engagements for clients other than the focal client. A priori, increases in co-working experience could increase or decrease audit quality, but are expected to increase audit efficiency. Using data from Taiwan, where the identities of lead and concurring audit partners are known, we find that co-working experience is positively associated with audit quality and audit efficiency. Further, the effects of co-working experience on audit quality and audit efficiency are more pronounced when co-working experience is more intensive, the two partners are more accessible to each other, the audit firm is less experienced with the client or less knowledgeable about the client's industry, or client audit risks are higher.\u0000 Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.\u0000 JEL Classifications: M4; M42.","PeriodicalId":48142,"journal":{"name":"Auditing-A Journal of Practice & Theory","volume":"20 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.8,"publicationDate":"2021-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85423937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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