Political Behavior最新文献

This study examines the various patterns of political participation among Latinos, Blacks and Asians Americans. To assess these patterns of political participation among these three groups, I employ the Collaborative Multiracial Post-election Survey (CMPS) 2016. I use two key measures: one is the original measure of linked fate and the other is immigrant linked fate, both which are available in the CMPS. This allows for a comparison of two measures of linked fate on political participation across racial and ethnic groups. To test the impact of linked fate on political participation, I present several negative binomial regressions. The results show that the original measure of linked fate is a strong predictor for political participation for Latinos and Blacks but does not predict political participation for Asians. The measure for immigrant linked fate predicts political participation for Latinos and Blacks but not for Asians. The results suggest that participating in politics to represent the interests of their racial or ethnic group is very important for Latinos and Blacks. Additionally, participating in politics to represent the interests of immigrants is also strongly pronounced among Blacks and Latinos and shows a motivation for these two groups to engage in politics.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-023-09861-2.

Americans of all political stripes abstractly support most of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, such as free expression. Yet, we argue that attitudes regarding the basic mechanics of civil liberties-e.g., from whom they are protections-are divided across partisan lines. Because of elite rhetoric, we hypothesize that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to perceive rights violations, often by non-government entities (generally incapable of violations), and that they will perceive rights as under threat with greater frequency. Using a survey containing unique questions about rights, we first demonstrate that a large majority of the mass public has fixed preference structures regarding rights, suggesting that attitudes about liberties are not merely error-ridden, top-of-the-head assessments. These preference structures differ for Democrats and Republicans. Next, we find support for our theory that attitudes regarding rights, from whom they are protective, and their level of protectiveness are asymmetric across partisanship. Beyond implications for citizens' democratic capacities, our results also highlight potential concerns about the influence of partisan bias in demands on leaders regarding rights protection.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-023-09860-3.

Debates over trade liberalization vs. protectionism have becoming increasingly relevant as the world moves through a contentious era of economic globalization. This is particularly true in the United States, where an elite consensus on the merits of free trade has fractured in recent years. While we know a good deal about the economic and cultural determinants of trade opinion, we know little about how attitudes toward government may matter. Here, I address this oversight by examining the relationship between political trust and trade support. I do this with cross-sectional and panel data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES), and a survey experiment fielded through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Overall, I find that there is a positive and substantively significant relationship between political trust and mass support for free and open "pro-trade" policies. I attribute this to greater citizen confidence that government will pursue trade deals in the national interest and mitigate any perceived risks associated with free trade. These findings help us to better understand the determinants of public opinion toward trade policy and underscore the consequences of political trust.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-023-09858-x.

The link between childhood mental health difficulties such as conduct problems and adult political abstention has been overlooked despite early mental health difficulties potentially resulting in political self-marginalisation. Using the1970s British Cohort Study, we estimate developmental trajectories of conduct problems (i.e., from 5 to 16 years). Logistic regression, linear probability models, and propensity score matching were then conducted to test the association between trajectory group membership and voter turnout at 30, 42, and 46 years of age. Three distinct trajectories of conduct problems were identified: a normative (n = 11,871; reference group), moderate-chronic (n = 3433), and elevated-chronic (n = 250) group. Results revealed an association between conduct problems and decreased turnout. In particular the elevated-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 52.2%, 52.0%, and 45.7%, as compared to the normative group at 30, 42, and 46 years respectively. The moderate-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 24.7% as compared to the normative group at age 30 only. Matched results and linear probability models substantiated findings, suggesting (1) the importance of considering childhood factors when examining antecedents of lifelong voting behaviour, and (2) the political self-marginalisation of people with chronic childhood conduct problems more than 3 decades later.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09852-9.

While affective polarization has been shown to have serious social consequences, there is little evidence regarding its effects on political attitudes and behavior such as policy preferences, voting, or political information accrual. This paper provides evidence that affective polarization impacts misinformation belief, arguing that citizens with higher levels of affective polarization are more likely to believe in-party-congruent misinformation and less likely to believe out-party-congruent misinformation. The argument is supported by data from the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, which speaks to the generalizability of the relationship. Additionally, a survey experiment provides evidence that the relationship is causal. The results hold among Democrats and Republicans and are independent of the effects of partisan strength and ideological extremity. Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it, implying that education will not solve the issue. The results speak to the need for work on reducing affective polarization.