Political Behavior最新文献

Debates over trade liberalization vs. protectionism have becoming increasingly relevant as the world moves through a contentious era of economic globalization. This is particularly true in the United States, where an elite consensus on the merits of free trade has fractured in recent years. While we know a good deal about the economic and cultural determinants of trade opinion, we know little about how attitudes toward government may matter. Here, I address this oversight by examining the relationship between political trust and trade support. I do this with cross-sectional and panel data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES), and a survey experiment fielded through Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Overall, I find that there is a positive and substantively significant relationship between political trust and mass support for free and open "pro-trade" policies. I attribute this to greater citizen confidence that government will pursue trade deals in the national interest and mitigate any perceived risks associated with free trade. These findings help us to better understand the determinants of public opinion toward trade policy and underscore the consequences of political trust.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-023-09858-x.

The link between childhood mental health difficulties such as conduct problems and adult political abstention has been overlooked despite early mental health difficulties potentially resulting in political self-marginalisation. Using the1970s British Cohort Study, we estimate developmental trajectories of conduct problems (i.e., from 5 to 16 years). Logistic regression, linear probability models, and propensity score matching were then conducted to test the association between trajectory group membership and voter turnout at 30, 42, and 46 years of age. Three distinct trajectories of conduct problems were identified: a normative (n = 11,871; reference group), moderate-chronic (n = 3433), and elevated-chronic (n = 250) group. Results revealed an association between conduct problems and decreased turnout. In particular the elevated-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 52.2%, 52.0%, and 45.7%, as compared to the normative group at 30, 42, and 46 years respectively. The moderate-chronic group had a decreased odds of voting of 24.7% as compared to the normative group at age 30 only. Matched results and linear probability models substantiated findings, suggesting (1) the importance of considering childhood factors when examining antecedents of lifelong voting behaviour, and (2) the political self-marginalisation of people with chronic childhood conduct problems more than 3 decades later.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09852-9.

While affective polarization has been shown to have serious social consequences, there is little evidence regarding its effects on political attitudes and behavior such as policy preferences, voting, or political information accrual. This paper provides evidence that affective polarization impacts misinformation belief, arguing that citizens with higher levels of affective polarization are more likely to believe in-party-congruent misinformation and less likely to believe out-party-congruent misinformation. The argument is supported by data from the ANES 2020 Social Media Study and the ANES 2020 Time Series Study, which speaks to the generalizability of the relationship. Additionally, a survey experiment provides evidence that the relationship is causal. The results hold among Democrats and Republicans and are independent of the effects of partisan strength and ideological extremity. Furthermore, the relationship between affective polarization and misinformation belief is exacerbated by political sophistication rather than tempered by it, implying that education will not solve the issue. The results speak to the need for work on reducing affective polarization.

This paper investigates if individuals' negative assessments of the future drive micro-level reluctance for international cooperation and reciprocal behavior, a core principle of multilateralism. To test our theoretical expectations, we field online survey experiments on a sample of over 3000 respondents in the US and Turkey in October-November 2020. The experimental results show that on average, individuals are fairly sensitive to target countries' policy actions and are inclined to reciprocate when contemplating whether to increase contributions to UN or consent to bilateral trade liberalization. Yet, further analyses concur that individual inclinations to reciprocate are substantially moderated by their future expectations. Specifically, individuals who are more pessimistic about their material prospects remain fairly indifferent to the positive actions of other countries, but are more likely to penalize negative foreign policy actions by reciprocating in kind.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-023-09857-y.

The political participation literature has documented a long-term trend of the normalization of noninstitutional participation that is often equated with the conventionalization of engagement in protest politics. Less is known on the extent to which noninstitutional forms are differentiated by their mobilization context. Population surveys find it difficult to contextualize individual engagement, and on-site surveys point to effects that are hard to generalize. This study fills this gap by emphasizing differentiation and distinguishing participation according to the issue of engagement. It introduces a conceptual distinction between political insiders and outsiders, defined based on the extent to which they are embedded in the organizational landscape of the dominant cleavage dimension. Using an original survey conducted in Germany during the Covid-19 crisis, the analysis demonstrates that general-population surveys are fit to examine issue-specific participation patterns. The results expose an insider and outsider divide, captured by the effect of attitudinal and behavioral indicators, and demonstrates that the two groups are equally likely to participate in noninstitutional forms. However, insiders engage on the established issues of climate and anti-racism, whereas outsiders engage on the new issues of Covid-19 related economic assistance and civil liberties restrictions. In addition, dynamic models reveal that noninstitutional participation is rooted in volatile issue preferences. Overall, the paper argues that participation during the Covid-19 crisis has furthered the trend towards a differentiated protest arena.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09846-7.