International Economic Review最新文献

Asset pricing and climate policy are analyzed in a global economy where consumption goods are produced by both a green and a carbon-intensive sector. Given that the economy is initially heavily dependent on carbon-intensive capital, the desire to diversify assets complements the attempt to mitigate economic damages from climate change. In the longer run, however, a trade-off between diversification and climate action emerges. We derive the optimal carbon price and the equilibrium risk-free rate, and risk premia. Climate disasters significantly decrease the risk-free rate but increase risk premia on financial assets, especially if no climate policy is implemented.

We use China's growth experience as a laboratory to study how reductions in administrative and regulatory entry barriers contribute to growth. We develop a model of endogenous productivity and market structure with heterogeneous firms and frictional entry and calibrate it to Chinese manufacturing firms. We show that the reduction of entry barriers brings about 1.05 percentage points of productivity growth over the 1990–2004 period, accounting for 18.3% of the productivity growth in the 2004–7 period. A decomposition exercise shows that entry mainly affects growth through promoting a more competitive market structure, which more than offsets the negative Schumpeterian effect.

We analyze a patent race between two firms choosing between an established and an innovative method. The unique Markov-perfect equilibrium coincides with the cartel solution if and only if firms have the same ability of leveraging a good innovative method or there is no patent protection. Otherwise, equilibrium efforts are clustered too much in the innovative method, as compared to the cartel benchmark. The expected time to a breakthrough is minimized at an interior patent strength. Thus, a decrease in R&D productivity can go hand-in-hand with a concentration of research efforts in riskier areas and stronger patent protections.

This article provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that, in spite of countervailing incentives on incumbents and entrants, prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative overall innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and conditions under which it is zero. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.

Households in emerging markets hold significant amounts of dollar deposits whereas firms have significant amount of dollar debt. Motivated by perceived dangers, policymakers consider regulations to limit dollarization. I draw attention to an important benefit of dollarization: it serves as an insurance arrangement in which firms provide income insurance. Emerging market exchange rates tend to depreciate in recessions so that households prefer holding deposits denominated in dollars. They effectively starve local financial markets of local currency; raising local interest rates over USD rates and causing entrepreneurs to borrow in dollars. This premium is the price paid by households for insurance.

We study trade disruptions at different stages of development in a two-country, three-sector model of Spain and United Kingdom from 1850 to 2000. The impact of trade disruptions depends on trade openness and the productivity gap between countries. A trade collapse today (more openness, less gap) comparable to the Inter-War Trade Collapse (IWTC) decreases the capital stock threefold (12% instead of 4%) and lifetime consumption fourfold (1.58% instead of 0.37%). Capital accumulation amplifies the cost of trade disruptions. The IWTC promoted Spanish industrialization, while the opposite would be true today.