Pub Date : 2024-05-23DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500117
Kirti, Tina Verma, Amit Kumar
{"title":"A note on \"A methodology for solving bimatrix games under 2-tuple linguistic environment\"","authors":"Kirti, Tina Verma, Amit Kumar","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500117","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"22 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141106522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-05-23DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500099
Abdulla Azamov, Bahrom Samatov, Ulmasjon Soyibboev
{"title":"The game with a \"life-line\" for simple harmonic motions of objects","authors":"Abdulla Azamov, Bahrom Samatov, Ulmasjon Soyibboev","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500099","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"25 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141107377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Matching in networks: Structure of the set of stable allocations","authors":"Alejandra Garces, Alejandro Neme, Eliana Pepa Risma","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500105","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"59 38","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141102808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-24DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924400085
S. Le Ménec
The concept of swarm comes from the biological world. Drones gather in groups of 100 or even 1000 to fly like a flock of birds, called swarms. Swarm systems satisfy several assumptions such as decentralized controls, local information and simple platforms. Swarm systems have attractive properties such as resilience, scalability, and ease of development and implementation. Swarm techniques can perform simple tasks such as moving in a coordinated direction. The flocking behavior of a group of animals that converge by local interactions toward the same heading is an example of simple consensus for decentralized dynamic systems. However, the notion of decentralized control based on local information suffers from taking into account the overall behavior of the group. For example, in a complex environment, a swarm will adapt to the presence of obstacles and congestion reactively, whereas we would like more anticipatory control. The objective of this paper is to propose a solution based on Mean Field Game (MFG) concepts to integrate macro-level knowledge at the micro-level in decentralized flocking.
{"title":"Swarm Guidance Based on Mean Field Game Concepts","authors":"S. Le Ménec","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924400085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924400085","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of swarm comes from the biological world. Drones gather in groups of 100 or even 1000 to fly like a flock of birds, called swarms. Swarm systems satisfy several assumptions such as decentralized controls, local information and simple platforms. Swarm systems have attractive properties such as resilience, scalability, and ease of development and implementation. Swarm techniques can perform simple tasks such as moving in a coordinated direction. The flocking behavior of a group of animals that converge by local interactions toward the same heading is an example of simple consensus for decentralized dynamic systems. However, the notion of decentralized control based on local information suffers from taking into account the overall behavior of the group. For example, in a complex environment, a swarm will adapt to the presence of obstacles and congestion reactively, whereas we would like more anticipatory control. The objective of this paper is to propose a solution based on Mean Field Game (MFG) concepts to integrate macro-level knowledge at the micro-level in decentralized flocking.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"22 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140660231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-11DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500087
Régis Y. Chenavaz, Stanko Dimitrov, Shoude Li
{"title":"Ecological Economics and Dynamic Games: A Systematic Literature Review","authors":"Régis Y. Chenavaz, Stanko Dimitrov, Shoude Li","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500087","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"2 4","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140715144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-10DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924400012
Jean-Pierre Aubin, Pierre-Cyril Aubin-Frankowski, Vladimir Lozève
Why use a viabilistic approach to model economy? Because it is urgent to re-assess the modeling of the business cycle that integrates dynamic money creation and that has at its core the notion of constraints. The purpose of this paper is thus to propose an evolutionary economic model using a mathematical framework derived from set-valued analysis, differential inclusions and viability theory. As this approach is dynamical, the model will not use two concepts on which neo-classical economics are built i.e., (1) the existence of static repeated equilibria, (2) the optimization by an economic agent of a utility function. Furthermore, we will not use any self-organization process or “invisible hand”, as in our viabilist framework the economic viability will be maintained by explicit choices of the economic agents and of the lender of last resort over the budgetary and monetary rules to apply. Indeed, even simple constraints on the second-derivative of the means of payments already induce four-phased business cycles. Coupling these constraints over the creation of means of payment with economic evolutions of prices and commodities through a budgetary constraint allows for a single formalism, tackling jointly the question of the viability of economic and monetary evolutions.
{"title":"Reintroducing Time, Money and Constraints: Viability to Bridge the Economic and Monetary Theories","authors":"Jean-Pierre Aubin, Pierre-Cyril Aubin-Frankowski, Vladimir Lozève","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924400012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924400012","url":null,"abstract":"Why use a viabilistic approach to model economy? Because it is urgent to re-assess the modeling of the business cycle that integrates dynamic money creation and that has at its core the notion of constraints. The purpose of this paper is thus to propose an evolutionary economic model using a mathematical framework derived from set-valued analysis, differential inclusions and viability theory. As this approach is dynamical, the model will not use two concepts on which neo-classical economics are built i.e., (1) the existence of static repeated equilibria, (2) the optimization by an economic agent of a utility function. Furthermore, we will not use any self-organization process or “invisible hand”, as in our viabilist framework the economic viability will be maintained by explicit choices of the economic agents and of the lender of last resort over the budgetary and monetary rules to apply. Indeed, even simple constraints on the second-derivative of the means of payments already induce four-phased business cycles. Coupling these constraints over the creation of means of payment with economic evolutions of prices and commodities through a budgetary constraint allows for a single formalism, tackling jointly the question of the viability of economic and monetary evolutions.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"762 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140719127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-10DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924400103
Leon Petrosyan, Anna Tur
Differential games with additive payoffs are considered. A new approach to constructing the characteristic function for such games is defined. Properties of optimality principles such as the core and the Shapley value constructed by applying the new characteristic function are studied. The solutions obtained are demonstrated by means of an example.
{"title":"Differential Games with Additive Payoffs","authors":"Leon Petrosyan, Anna Tur","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924400103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924400103","url":null,"abstract":"Differential games with additive payoffs are considered. A new approach to constructing the characteristic function for such games is defined. Properties of optimality principles such as the core and the Shapley value constructed by applying the new characteristic function are studied. The solutions obtained are demonstrated by means of an example.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"2010 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140718787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-04-05DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500075
Sanchari Ganguly, Pritha Das, Manoranjan Maiti
{"title":"Effects of imprecise cognitive biases and free-riding on the pricing decisions of dual-channel supply chain members","authors":"Sanchari Ganguly, Pritha Das, Manoranjan Maiti","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500075","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"4 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140738440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-28DOI: 10.1142/s021919892440005x
Francesco Caruso, Maria Carmela Ceparano, Jacqueline Morgan
Identifying a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of a two-player Stackelberg game could be not a manageable task, especially when the players have a continuum of actions and the follower’s best reply correspondence is not single-valued. Aim of the paper is to investigate the issue of construction of SPNEs in Stackelberg games by exploiting perturbations of both the action sets and the payoff functions of the leader and the follower. To achieve the goal, since the limit of SPNEs of perturbed games is not necessarily an SPNE of the original game even for classical perturbations, we prove under nonrestrictive convergence conditions how to produce an SPNE starting from a sequence of SPNEs of general perturbed games. This result allows to describe a procedure to find SPNEs that can accommodate various types of perturbations. More precisely, under mild assumptions on the data of the original game, we show that a large class of perturbed games (including, for example, perturbation approaches relying on the Tikhonov and entropic regularizations or motivated by altruistic and antagonistic behaviors) satisfies the convergence conditions for constructing an SPNE. The specific SPNE selections associated to such a class, together with their possible behavioral interpretations, are discussed and an illustrative example is provided.
{"title":"On Construction of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Stackelberg Games","authors":"Francesco Caruso, Maria Carmela Ceparano, Jacqueline Morgan","doi":"10.1142/s021919892440005x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892440005x","url":null,"abstract":"Identifying a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of a two-player Stackelberg game could be not a manageable task, especially when the players have a continuum of actions and the follower’s best reply correspondence is not single-valued. Aim of the paper is to investigate the issue of construction of SPNEs in Stackelberg games by exploiting perturbations of both the action sets and the payoff functions of the leader and the follower. To achieve the goal, since the limit of SPNEs of perturbed games is not necessarily an SPNE of the original game even for classical perturbations, we prove under nonrestrictive convergence conditions how to produce an SPNE starting from a sequence of SPNEs of general perturbed games. This result allows to describe a procedure to find SPNEs that can accommodate various types of perturbations. More precisely, under mild assumptions on the data of the original game, we show that a large class of perturbed games (including, for example, perturbation approaches relying on the Tikhonov and entropic regularizations or motivated by altruistic and antagonistic behaviors) satisfies the convergence conditions for constructing an SPNE. The specific SPNE selections associated to such a class, together with their possible behavioral interpretations, are discussed and an illustrative example is provided.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"132 40","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140369860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-22DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924400073
Alain Jean-Marie, M. Tidball
In this paper, we consider a singular control optimization problem which generalizes the Gordon–Schaefer model. A population of individuals with endogenous growth is harvested by two independent agents, and their joint profit is maximized. We show that adding a second control to the standard model greatly complicates the standard solution, which is a Most Rapid Approach. We prove that no solution where both controls are singular can exist. Using numerical experiments, we exhibit situations where the optimal steady state corresponds to one of the controls singular, and the other one is equal to one of its specific bounds. In some cases, the optimal path resembles the one-control solution, but with an additional threshold on the population beyond which both controls must be used. However, in other cases, the optimal control has more switching points and is not monotonous. We even exhibit cases where the optimal policy admits two steady states.
{"title":"Multiple Exploitation of a Renewable Resource — Optimal Solution of a Deterministic Singular Control Model","authors":"Alain Jean-Marie, M. Tidball","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924400073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924400073","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we consider a singular control optimization problem which generalizes the Gordon–Schaefer model. A population of individuals with endogenous growth is harvested by two independent agents, and their joint profit is maximized. We show that adding a second control to the standard model greatly complicates the standard solution, which is a Most Rapid Approach. We prove that no solution where both controls are singular can exist. Using numerical experiments, we exhibit situations where the optimal steady state corresponds to one of the controls singular, and the other one is equal to one of its specific bounds. In some cases, the optimal path resembles the one-control solution, but with an additional threshold on the population beyond which both controls must be used. However, in other cases, the optimal control has more switching points and is not monotonous. We even exhibit cases where the optimal policy admits two steady states.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":" 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140387208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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