Pub Date : 2024-03-22DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924400024
Tamer Başar
Terms like inducement, incentivization, persuasion, and to some extent enticement, are used in our daily lives to describe situations where one individual (decision maker, or entity) acts in a way to influence the decision-making process of another individual or individuals, where the outcome could benefit all involved or only the one who has initiated the process. Such influence could be exerted in two different ways (though variations do exist): via a direct input by the influencer into the utility or reward (or loss) of the receiving party, or by controlling (and possibly crafting) the information flow to the latter, in an attempt to shape beliefs at the receiving end (as in spread of disinformation). Both scenarios (and those that fall in between) could be analyzed within a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, with a precise notion of equilibrium, which this paper addresses. The focus will naturally be on soft inducement (incentivization, persuasion) policies, rather than hard enforcement (such as threat) ones which are not that interesting or practical. This overview paper introduces some explicit models that lead to appealing such policies. It also includes a discussion on the impact of various factors, such as population size and uncertainty in modeling, on the resulting equilibria, and identify several challenges that lie ahead.
{"title":"Inducement of Desired Behavior via Soft Policies","authors":"Tamer Başar","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924400024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924400024","url":null,"abstract":"Terms like inducement, incentivization, persuasion, and to some extent enticement, are used in our daily lives to describe situations where one individual (decision maker, or entity) acts in a way to influence the decision-making process of another individual or individuals, where the outcome could benefit all involved or only the one who has initiated the process. Such influence could be exerted in two different ways (though variations do exist): via a direct input by the influencer into the utility or reward (or loss) of the receiving party, or by controlling (and possibly crafting) the information flow to the latter, in an attempt to shape beliefs at the receiving end (as in spread of disinformation). Both scenarios (and those that fall in between) could be analyzed within a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic framework, with a precise notion of equilibrium, which this paper addresses. The focus will naturally be on soft inducement (incentivization, persuasion) policies, rather than hard enforcement (such as threat) ones which are not that interesting or practical. This overview paper introduces some explicit models that lead to appealing such policies. It also includes a discussion on the impact of various factors, such as population size and uncertainty in modeling, on the resulting equilibria, and identify several challenges that lie ahead.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":" 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140387684","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-22DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500063
Eduardo Zuniga Leyton
{"title":"Criminals can be leaders:An endogenous timing approach to Security Games","authors":"Eduardo Zuniga Leyton","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500063","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":" 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140219284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-16DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924400097
E. Parilina, Stefan Wrzaczek, G. Zaccour
We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic model of oligopolistic competition, with uncertain supply. The firms (retailers) make their decisions on quantities (sales) and orders of goods from a nonstrategic manufacturer taking into account uncertainty in demand parameters and available supply capacity. The retailers need to satisfy the joint available supply capacity constraint. The model is described as a game played over an event tree with given transition probabilities. We find a normalized equilibrium for the game with coupling constraints. The two-step procedure to find this equilibrium is described. We provide the necessary conditions of the equilibrium and examine different scenarios of uncertainties in the model by numerical simulations.
{"title":"Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition with Uncertainty and Supply Disruption Effects","authors":"E. Parilina, Stefan Wrzaczek, G. Zaccour","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924400097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924400097","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic model of oligopolistic competition, with uncertain supply. The firms (retailers) make their decisions on quantities (sales) and orders of goods from a nonstrategic manufacturer taking into account uncertainty in demand parameters and available supply capacity. The retailers need to satisfy the joint available supply capacity constraint. The model is described as a game played over an event tree with given transition probabilities. We find a normalized equilibrium for the game with coupling constraints. The two-step procedure to find this equilibrium is described. We provide the necessary conditions of the equilibrium and examine different scenarios of uncertainties in the model by numerical simulations.","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140236414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-03-14DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500051
Prasenjit Mondal
{"title":"A Note on Zero-Sum Two-Person Undiscounted One Player Control Semi-Markov Games","authors":"Prasenjit Mondal","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500051","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"14 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140244393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-26DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500026
Luis Garcia-Perez, Juan Grau-Climent, J. C. Losada, Ramón Alonso-Sanz
{"title":"On the Hotelling game with close players","authors":"Luis Garcia-Perez, Juan Grau-Climent, J. C. Losada, Ramón Alonso-Sanz","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"58 28","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139594468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-19DOI: 10.1142/s0219198924500014
Monika Bisht, Ismat Beg, Shivam Rawat
{"title":"A new method to solve matrix game with interval payoffs and its MATLAB Code","authors":"Monika Bisht, Ismat Beg, Shivam Rawat","doi":"10.1142/s0219198924500014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198924500014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":502686,"journal":{"name":"International Game Theory Review","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139524941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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