Pub Date : 2024-03-16DOI: 10.1177/00031224241232599
Oliver Schilke, Gabriel Rossman
When people want to conduct a transaction, but doing so would be morally disreputable, they can obfuscate the fact that they are engaging in an exchange while still arranging for a set of transfers that are effectively equivalent to an exchange. Obfuscation through structures such as gift-giving and brokerage is pervasive across a wide range of disreputable exchanges, such as bribery and sex work. In this article, we develop a theoretical account that sheds light on when actors are more versus less likely to obfuscate. Specifically, we report a series of experiments addressing the effect of trust on the decision to engage in obfuscated disreputable exchange. We find that actors obfuscate more often with exchange partners high in loyalty-based trustworthiness, with expected reciprocity and moral discomfort mediating this effect. However, the effect is highly contingent on the type of trust; trust facilitates obfuscation when it is loyalty-based, but this effect flips when trust is ethics-based. Our findings not only offer insights into the important role of relational context in shaping moral understandings and choices about disreputable exchange, but they also contribute to scholarship on trust by demonstrating that distinct forms of trust can have diametrically opposed effects.
{"title":"Honor among Crooks: The Role of Trust in Obfuscated Disreputable Exchange","authors":"Oliver Schilke, Gabriel Rossman","doi":"10.1177/00031224241232599","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224241232599","url":null,"abstract":"When people want to conduct a transaction, but doing so would be morally disreputable, they can obfuscate the fact that they are engaging in an exchange while still arranging for a set of transfers that are effectively equivalent to an exchange. Obfuscation through structures such as gift-giving and brokerage is pervasive across a wide range of disreputable exchanges, such as bribery and sex work. In this article, we develop a theoretical account that sheds light on when actors are more versus less likely to obfuscate. Specifically, we report a series of experiments addressing the effect of trust on the decision to engage in obfuscated disreputable exchange. We find that actors obfuscate more often with exchange partners high in loyalty-based trustworthiness, with expected reciprocity and moral discomfort mediating this effect. However, the effect is highly contingent on the type of trust; trust facilitates obfuscation when it is loyalty-based, but this effect flips when trust is ethics-based. Our findings not only offer insights into the important role of relational context in shaping moral understandings and choices about disreputable exchange, but they also contribute to scholarship on trust by demonstrating that distinct forms of trust can have diametrically opposed effects.","PeriodicalId":504789,"journal":{"name":"American Sociological Review","volume":"19 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140236266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-21DOI: 10.1177/00031224231221561
Casey P. Homan
Competition between social units has long been central to sociological theories of change. Understanding it has become particularly important in the sociology of religion with the theory of religious economies, a market model of religious change. Existing empirical tests of the theory are limited by (1) ambiguity regarding which religious groups are expected to compete with which other groups, and/or (2) a neglect of the local level (competition among congregations). Using an original compilation of the life histories of religious congregations in Manhattan from 1949 to 1999, I conduct event-history analyses that avoid those limitations. The chief results are the following: (1) the more congregations there were near a given congregation that were theologically dissimilar to that congregation, the less likely that congregation was to advertise; (2) when there was an increase over time in the number of nearby congregations that were theologically similar to the focal congregation, that congregation became more likely to advertise; and (3) when there was an increase over time in the number of nearby congregations that were theologically dissimilar to the focal congregation, that congregation became less likely to advertise. Implications for the study of religion include modifications of religious-economies theory; broader implications speak to understanding the social units that compete and what drives competition.
{"title":"Understanding Competition in Social Space: Religious Congregations in Manhattan, 1949 to 1999","authors":"Casey P. Homan","doi":"10.1177/00031224231221561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224231221561","url":null,"abstract":"Competition between social units has long been central to sociological theories of change. Understanding it has become particularly important in the sociology of religion with the theory of religious economies, a market model of religious change. Existing empirical tests of the theory are limited by (1) ambiguity regarding which religious groups are expected to compete with which other groups, and/or (2) a neglect of the local level (competition among congregations). Using an original compilation of the life histories of religious congregations in Manhattan from 1949 to 1999, I conduct event-history analyses that avoid those limitations. The chief results are the following: (1) the more congregations there were near a given congregation that were theologically dissimilar to that congregation, the less likely that congregation was to advertise; (2) when there was an increase over time in the number of nearby congregations that were theologically similar to the focal congregation, that congregation became more likely to advertise; and (3) when there was an increase over time in the number of nearby congregations that were theologically dissimilar to the focal congregation, that congregation became less likely to advertise. Implications for the study of religion include modifications of religious-economies theory; broader implications speak to understanding the social units that compete and what drives competition.","PeriodicalId":504789,"journal":{"name":"American Sociological Review","volume":"13 15","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139610035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-18DOI: 10.1177/00031224231222725
David A. Cort, Laurel Smith-Doerr, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Jennifer L. Garfield-Abrams, Joanna Riccitelli
{"title":"Editors’ Note, 2024 to 2026: Looking to W.E.B. Du Bois","authors":"David A. Cort, Laurel Smith-Doerr, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Jennifer L. Garfield-Abrams, Joanna Riccitelli","doi":"10.1177/00031224231222725","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224231222725","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":504789,"journal":{"name":"American Sociological Review","volume":"116 26","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139616432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2024-01-18DOI: 10.1177/00031224231221741
Adam Reich
A long sociological tradition has examined how state coercion undergirds the “free market” for labor. In the contemporary prison, however, there are signs this relationship has been turned on its head. Whereas in the past, state coercion helped prisons generate profit for private markets, today market ideas are increasingly used within prisons to facilitate state control. I draw on an analysis of seven waves of the Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities, as well as 61 interviews with state prison administrators, prison industry advocates, and formerly incarcerated people. Although the market for the products of prison labor has declined, and incarcerated people, on average, are working less than ever before, inequality in the distribution of work and rewards for this work has sharpened. This changing structure of prison labor is associated with a changing understanding of it. Prison administrators, and to some extent incarcerated people themselves, use market ideas to explain the new organization of prison labor and justify people’s places within it. This organization and these ideas solve managerial problems within the prison and are suggestive of parallels between prison and social welfare policy in the contemporary era.
{"title":"From Hard Labor to Market Discipline: The Political Economy of Prison Work, 1974 to 2022","authors":"Adam Reich","doi":"10.1177/00031224231221741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224231221741","url":null,"abstract":"A long sociological tradition has examined how state coercion undergirds the “free market” for labor. In the contemporary prison, however, there are signs this relationship has been turned on its head. Whereas in the past, state coercion helped prisons generate profit for private markets, today market ideas are increasingly used within prisons to facilitate state control. I draw on an analysis of seven waves of the Survey of Inmates in State Correctional Facilities, as well as 61 interviews with state prison administrators, prison industry advocates, and formerly incarcerated people. Although the market for the products of prison labor has declined, and incarcerated people, on average, are working less than ever before, inequality in the distribution of work and rewards for this work has sharpened. This changing structure of prison labor is associated with a changing understanding of it. Prison administrators, and to some extent incarcerated people themselves, use market ideas to explain the new organization of prison labor and justify people’s places within it. This organization and these ideas solve managerial problems within the prison and are suggestive of parallels between prison and social welfare policy in the contemporary era.","PeriodicalId":504789,"journal":{"name":"American Sociological Review","volume":"111 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139614126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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