: The goal of mapping psychological functions to brain structures has a venerable history. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, this elusive goal regained vigor and became the main purpose of cognitive neuroscience. Unfortunately, as the field continues to develop, the ideal of finding one-to-one mappings from psychological functions to brain areas looks increasingly unrealistic. In the past few years, however, many cognitive neuroscientists have advocated for mining large sets of neuroimaging data in order to find the elusive one-to-one mapping. One recent strategy, proposed by Genon and colleagues (2018), constitutes one of the most concrete proposals for discovering the mappings from brain regions to cognitive functions by using big-data repositories of neuroimaging results. In this paper we offer several challenges for their proposal and argue that big-data approaches to finding one-to-one mappings between brain regions and cognitive functions suffer from significant difficulties of their own.
{"title":"The mirage of big-data phrenology","authors":"Felipe De Brigard, Bryce Gessell","doi":"10.1086/732152","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732152","url":null,"abstract":": The goal of mapping psychological functions to brain structures has a venerable history. With the advent of neuroimaging techniques, this elusive goal regained vigor and became the main purpose of cognitive neuroscience. Unfortunately, as the field continues to develop, the ideal of finding one-to-one mappings from psychological functions to brain areas looks increasingly unrealistic. In the past few years, however, many cognitive neuroscientists have advocated for mining large sets of neuroimaging data in order to find the elusive one-to-one mapping. One recent strategy, proposed by Genon and colleagues (2018), constitutes one of the most concrete proposals for discovering the mappings from brain regions to cognitive functions by using big-data repositories of neuroimaging results. In this paper we offer several challenges for their proposal and argue that big-data approaches to finding one-to-one mappings between brain regions and cognitive functions suffer from significant difficulties of their own.","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141664249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Dynamical Perspective on the Direction of Time","authors":"K. Salimkhani","doi":"10.1086/732154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/732154","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141664654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cultural Evolution, Niche Construction and Ecological Inheritance","authors":"Kim Sterelny","doi":"10.1086/731500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/731500","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141113226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Categorical Solution to the Grue Paradox","authors":"Tatsuya Yoshii, Jun Otsuka","doi":"10.1086/731314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/731314","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140992344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A classic objection to Humeanism about scientific laws is that Humeans cannot makesenseofthe counterfactualinvariance ofthelaws. Forexample,iftherewere‘noth-ingintheentirehistoryoftheuniverseexceptasingleelectron’(Lange,2009,p. 55)then, intuitively, the laws would still be the same. But classic Humean views don’t seem to get such results. Some influential modern Humean views, particularly Dorst (2020), Loew & Jaag (2019), and Bhogal (2020), have argued that the Humean can, in fact, make sense of counterfactual invariance. Against this, Marc Lange (2022) has recently argued that modern Humean approaches are unsatisfactory. His conclusion that ‘this is the kind of evidence on which research programmes…should be judged’ (p. 27) suggests that he takes this to be (close to) a fatal problem for Humeanism. In this discussion note I defend the Humean – in particular, the view of Bhogal (2020)–againstLange. ThekeyideaisthattheHumeanshouldthinkoftheirreduction of the laws to the Humean mosaic as closely related to other views where we reduce one domain to another but still allow that the higher-level domain can be ‘autonomous’ of the lower-level in some respects – like, for example, the view that the special sciences reduce to physics but can still can work autonomously of physics.
{"title":"Necessities Overboard: A Reply to Lange","authors":"H. Bhogal","doi":"10.1086/730892","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/730892","url":null,"abstract":"A classic objection to Humeanism about scientific laws is that Humeans cannot makesenseofthe counterfactualinvariance ofthelaws. Forexample,iftherewere‘noth-ingintheentirehistoryoftheuniverseexceptasingleelectron’(Lange,2009,p. 55)then, intuitively, the laws would still be the same. But classic Humean views don’t seem to get such results. Some influential modern Humean views, particularly Dorst (2020), Loew & Jaag (2019), and Bhogal (2020), have argued that the Humean can, in fact, make sense of counterfactual invariance. Against this, Marc Lange (2022) has recently argued that modern Humean approaches are unsatisfactory. His conclusion that ‘this is the kind of evidence on which research programmes…should be judged’ (p. 27) suggests that he takes this to be (close to) a fatal problem for Humeanism. In this discussion note I defend the Humean – in particular, the view of Bhogal (2020)–againstLange. ThekeyideaisthattheHumeanshouldthinkoftheirreduction of the laws to the Humean mosaic as closely related to other views where we reduce one domain to another but still allow that the higher-level domain can be ‘autonomous’ of the lower-level in some respects – like, for example, the view that the special sciences reduce to physics but can still can work autonomously of physics.","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140685931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A recent flurry of work has addressed the question whether Maxwell gravitation and Newton-Cartan theory are theoretically equivalent. This paper defends the view that there are plausible interpretations of Newton-Cartan theory on which the answer to the above question is “yes”. Along the way, I seek to clarify what is at issue in this debate. In particular, I argue that whether Maxwell gravitation and Newton-Cartan theory are equivalent has nothing to do with counterfactuals about unactualised matter, contra the appearance of previous discussions in the literature. Nor does it have anything to do with spacetime and dynamical symmetries, pace recent claims by Jacobs (2023). Instead, it depends on some rather subtle questions concerning how facts about the geodesics of a connection acquire physical significance, and the distinction between dynamical and kinematic possibility.
{"title":"Are Maxwell Gravitation and Newton-Cartan Theory Theoretically Equivalent?","authors":"Eleanor March","doi":"10.1086/730863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/730863","url":null,"abstract":"A recent flurry of work has addressed the question whether Maxwell gravitation and Newton-Cartan theory are theoretically equivalent. This paper defends the view that there are plausible interpretations of Newton-Cartan theory on which the answer to the above question is “yes”. Along the way, I seek to clarify what is at issue in this debate. In particular, I argue that whether Maxwell gravitation and Newton-Cartan theory are equivalent has nothing to do with counterfactuals about unactualised matter, contra the appearance of previous discussions in the literature. Nor does it have anything to do with spacetime and dynamical symmetries, pace recent claims by Jacobs (2023). Instead, it depends on some rather subtle questions concerning how facts about the geodesics of a connection acquire physical significance, and the distinction between dynamical and kinematic possibility.","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140699415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Worldly Infrastructure of Causation","authors":"Naftali Weinberger, P. Williams, J. Woodward","doi":"10.1086/730698","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/730698","url":null,"abstract":",","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140755440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Breaking the language barrier: conceptual representation without a language-like format","authors":"Iwan Williams","doi":"10.1086/730611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/730611","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140373790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"SUSY, Spin-Statistics, and all that... On the contrast between Spin-Statistics and Wigner’s Theorem","authors":"Marco Sanchioni, Enrico Cinti","doi":"10.1086/730610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/730610","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140377326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Validity Drifts in Psychiatric Research","authors":"Matthias Michel","doi":"10.1086/730534","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/730534","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":509962,"journal":{"name":"The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140374483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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