Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion最新文献

To illuminate the often-reported higher levels of meaning in life by those who believe in God relative to atheists, we examined the extent to which their global meaning (i.e., the beliefs, goals, and values that underlie subjective sense of meaning in life) differed. Study 1 (undergraduate sample of 100 atheists and 447 theists) found that theists endorsed higher levels of beliefs reflecting a more meaningful world (e.g., goodness, control, justice) while atheists endorsed higher beliefs in randomness. Further, atheists found less meaning from almost every source examined (e.g., achievement, self-acceptance). Results of Study 2 (87 atheists and 164 theists in a national U.S. online sample) produced similar results and also found theists more strongly endorsed many values that can facilitate a sense of meaning (e.g., traditionalism, security). Collectively, these results identify multiple divergences in global meaning between atheists and theists that may account for atheists’ lower meaning in life.

The goal of this study was to assess the relationship between non-theistic parental sanctification and well-being among parents, and whether parents’ primary images of God (authoritative, benevolent, critical, and distant) modified this relationship among American parents. Drawing on nationally representative data from the 2014 Baylor Religion Survey (N = 1078), our cross-sectional results suggest that non-theistic sanctification was linked to greater overall happiness and satisfaction in the parental role. We also found consistent evidence that the relationship between non-theistic parental sanctification and greater happiness and parental satisfaction was stronger for individuals with either an authoritative or benevolent God image, and weaker among those with parents with a distant God image. The study of sanctification in conjunction with images of the divine offers one fruitful approach to understanding both the benefits and risks of integrating religion/spirituality into daily life.

Following the killing of George Floyd, some congregations more fully entered the conversation on race. Although sometimes reinforcing institutional racism, many religious traditions also have tools for conflict resolution, repentance, and reconciliation. Given this ambivalence, how do congregations engage questions of racial justice, and how is this engagement influenced by race and religious tradition? Our answers come through multimethod data collected over 2 years: (a) Surveys of 2,293 congregants from 35 diverse congregations find that race relations is the issue they most want their place of worship to address, while revealing exhaustion among some Black members; (b) 90 sermons from 15 congregations reveal how clergy talked about race in the weeks after Floyd's murder depended largely on the race of the congregation; and (c) 21 clergy interviews illustrate differences in how clergy use religion to engage race. These diverse data reveal key differences, based on race and religious tradition.

Accommodating new religious communities has become a central issue in Western Europe. However, the role of religious identification in shaping intergroup relations still needs to be better understood. This study addresses this gap by analyzing the factors influencing public support for the accommodation of religious diversity, drawing on two statistically representative surveys conducted in Catalonia, Spain. The results revealed that religious identification moderates the relationship between the perception that religions other than Catholicism threaten society's way of life and the level of support for accommodating religious diversity. Contrary to initial assumptions, practicing Catholics were more supportive of religious accommodation than nonpracticing Catholics and nonbelievers, regardless of the level of threat they perceived. Moreover, cross-group friendships mitigated the negative impact of perceived threat on support for religious accommodation, particularly among nonbelievers. Overall, the findings underscore the importance of cross-group friendships in fostering more inclusive societies and provide valuable insights for religious governance.

Conventional wisdom holds and previous research confirms that for a political candidate, atheism is anathema. But the United States is becoming a more secular nation. Does secularization mean that atheists are acceptable to some Americans, specifically Democrats and voters with low religiosity? Can concerns about atheists be assuaged by appealing to the superordinate identity of “patriotic American”? Drawing on four survey experiments, we find that Democrats are more supportive of an atheist, Republicans less—producing a null effect overall. Furthermore, voters’ reactions to an atheist are not driven by the office, but are shaped by both their partisanship and religiosity. Voters’ negative attitudes are partially assuaged by framing an atheist as a patriotic war hero. As the secular population grows in the United States, it seems likely that atheists will emerge as candidates for elected office. Our data suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, atheist candidates are potentially electable.

This study examines the relationship between Christian nationalism—a political theology and cultural framework that seeks to amalgamate the Christian faith and a country's political life and privilege Christianity in the public square over other faith traditions—and attacks against religious minorities in the United States. Some Christian nationalists believe that it is justifiable to undertake violent actions in order to realize the goals of Christian nationalism. We theorize that the political empowerment of Christian nationalist ideology in the form of politicians expressing Christian nationalist sentiments corresponds to physical attacks on religious minorities carried out by self-professing Christians. We test this theory using a cross-sectional, time-series analysis of antiminority violence in the United States. The results provide robust support for our theory.

Studies assessing the relationship between religiosity and sexual behaviors in youth are limited by their use of single-aspect measures of religiosity, assumption of linearity, and focus on coital behaviors. This study assessed how multidimensional latent profiles of religiosity were associated both with sexual risk behaviors and noncoital sex. Data were gathered using a national sample of emerging adults in Croatia (N = 1,210; M_age = 21.74, 48.0 percent female). Latent profile analysis provided a three-profile model as the most robust solution, differentiating among the low, moderate, and high religiosity groups. The gradient pattern (differences among all profiles) was observed only in the association between religiosity and the frequency of masturbation and experiencing oral sex. The relationship between religiosity and other sexual behaviors either was nonlinear or not found. Overall, religiosity was associated with a more limited sexual repertoire. Its protective effect in sexual risk taking was small but relevant for the most religious youth.

This study asserts that the secularization theory has the potential to offer insights into the processes of social change experienced by faith groups outside the modern West. The study focuses on the transformation undergone by Alevi groups in Turkey, who are now experiencing a more modern way of life compared to their past. In this qualitative study, data collection was conducted through semistructured interviews during field studies in the cities of Çorum (Turk Alevis) and Tunceli/Dersim (Zaza/Kurd Alevis). Based on the interview findings, the study concludes that the new Alevi generation leads a more modern and at the same time more secular daily life compared to their parents. Therefore, the main assertion of this research is that the classical secularization theory has the potential to provide valuable insights not only for modern societies where Christianity is dominant but also for understanding the transformations occurring within Alevi communities in Turkey.

Migration is a prevalent social concern in the Middle East/North Africa. In addition to emigration, the countries struggle to incorporate immigrant and transiting populations. This article examines the influence of ethnodoxy—the linking of Arab and Muslim identity—on public opinion on immigrants and migration in the MENA region. Using original surveys of Egyptian and Moroccan Muslims from February and May–June 2023, it shows the more ethnodoxic respondents are, the more likely they are to hold anti-immigrant views. These results are consistent with the principle that social identity complexity encourages tolerance and change acceptance. Thus, this study contributes to the growing literature on comparative race and ethnic politics and to the understanding of religion's role in political attitude formation.