Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion最新文献

When misinformation is rampant, “fake news” is rising, and conspiracy theories are widespread, social scientists have a vested interest in understanding who is most susceptible to these false narratives and why. Recent research suggests Christians are especially susceptible to belief in conspiracy theories in the United States, but scholars have yet to ascertain the role of religiopolitical identities and epistomological approaches, specifically Christian nationalism and biblical literalism, in generalized conspiracy thinking. Because Christian nationalists sense that the nation is under cultural threat and biblical literalism provides an alternative (often anti-elite) source of information, we predict that both will amplify conspiracy thinking. We find that Christian nationalism and biblical literalism independently predict conspiracy thinking, but that the effect of Christian nationalism increases with literalism. Our results point to the contingent effects of Christian nationalism and the need for the religious variables in understanding conspiracy thinking.

We use the 2020/2021 National Politics Study to examine two central questions: 1. How do religious beliefs and clergy sermons about race associate with support for Black Lives Matter (BLM) and racial justice work? And 2. Is the relationship between religion and BLM-related attitudes and activism similar or different across race groups? We found the following: In the months following the summer of 2020 protests in response to George Floyd's murder, African, Hispanic, and White American worship goers who heard sermons about race and policing were more likely than were their co-ethnics to approve of BLM and to engage in racial justice work. Identifying with the religious left and believing that social justice is a core part of one's religaious beliefs is also associated with these groups approving of BLM and engaging in racial justice work. That said, race matters. These forms of religion tend to maintain stronger relationships with White BLM-related attitudes and activism than they do for African Americans and Hispanics.

Prior research tends to find a positive relationship between religiosity and political participation. Explanations of this relationship have focused mostly on religiosity-generated organizational resources (e.g., civic skills), while paying less attention to psychological resources. We simultaneously examined different aspects of religiosity (belief, behavior, and belonging) and political participation (electoral and nonelectoral) in a structural equation model with two psychological resources as mediators: (1) “transcendent accountability”—seeing oneself as responsible to God or a higher power for one's impact on other people and the environment, and (2) “religiopolitical awareness”—perceiving the influence of one's religion and/or spirituality on one's political views and activities. Results from analyzing survey data from a US representative sample showed that transcendent accountability and religiopolitical awareness, whether together or awareness only, mediated positive relationships between religiosity (belief, private and public behaviors, and membership) and political participation (voting and other political activity), highlighting key psychological motivators of political participation.

Emerging research shows the COVID-19 pandemic has made substantial changes to the religious climate of several nations. Surprisingly, China, the outbreak center of the pandemic, has been scarcely researched. Our study investigates how the COVID-19 pandemic has evoked new religious disaster responses and provided psychological coping mechanisms during the pandemic. We also explore how the pandemic explains surprising rates of religiosity in China. Scholars have long proposed that religious resurgence in China has been a result of individuals seeking stability in turbulent times. We bridge parallel Literatures in these areas and treat the pandemic as a natural experiment for evaluating religious behavior over time as conditioned by heightened risk perception. Utilizing a difference-in-differences estimation strategy with panel data, our study reveals that the pandemic has led to a significant increase in religiosity in China, particularly in religious areas most affected by the pandemic. We propose that even in a highly regulative religious environment, with most of its population being religiously unaffiliated, religion is a significant resource for coping in China. We take an innovative approach to demonstrate this by utilizing online search data. Our research speaks to the sociology of religion, the social psychology of risk perception, and makes application to emerging research on the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.

Investigating both the causes and initial triggers for disaffiliation from Orthodox Judaism is an important part of understanding the complex lived experiences of exiters. This study documents an extensive number of causes for leaving Orthodox Judaism, as well as initial triggers, a less-often investigated, yet important component of disaffiliation. Using an online survey, over 700 open-ended responses were collected from 303 participants who self-identified as having grown up practicing Orthodox Judaism but had since stopped practicing. Content analysis was used to organize responses, resulting in distinct categories that fit into two themes: intellectual and social-emotional, the former more often reported by males and the latter by females. The most commonly reported causes and initial triggers, respectively, were issues with the community and lack of belief in Torah and Orthodoxy. Our results give voice to exiters by documenting nuanced accounts of the full disaffiliation journey, beginning with the initial trigger.

Given popular religiosity, the presence of religious parties, and the politicization of religious issues, it is highly likely that politicians with varying levels of personal religiosity are active in politics. Yet, our knowledge of how politicians’ religiosity influences their political choices is still limited, particularly for developing countries. In this paper, I use data from a survey experiment fielded to Pakistani politicians in 2018 to study whether and how politicians’ personal religiosity influences their political risk preferences. Scholars debate whether religiosity is correlated with higher or lower risk aversion among citizens; however, no study has examined this relationship among politicians. I find that higher religiosity systematically predicts which politicians are more risk-averse and highly religious politicians’ decisions under uncertainty are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and prospect theory. These findings suggest that in contrast to existing assumptions of elite decision-making, politicians’ religiosity systematically influences their risk preferences and choices.

Since 2016, Americans’ attitudes toward Russia and Vladimir Putin have shifted, with Republicans becoming far more supportive of both. And though condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 remains bipartisan, many Christian-right leaders still support Putin and Russia. What undergirds this support? Drawing on three national data sets, we theorize Americans’ warmth toward Putin and Russia is reinforced by an ideology that seeks to institutionalize America's mythical Anglo Protestant ethno-culture—Christian nationalism. Though we propose Christian nationalism's relationship with Russia is more contingent on Russia's geopolitical activity vis-à-vis the United States, we theorize that Christian nationalism consistently predicts Putin support due to his authoritarian ethno-nationalism. April 2018 data show those who affirm America's Christian heritage in the past and/or present are more likely to view Putin and Russia favorably and Russia as our ally. March 2021 data also reveal a linear positive association between Christian nationalism and favorability toward Putin. And March 2022 data reveal a linear positive association between Christian nationalism and admiring Putin's leadership. They also show a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with viewing Russia as a threat. Paradoxically, Christian nationalism may warm Americans toward foreign authoritarians like Putin even when it compels Americans to perceive their nations as threats.

Recent scholarship has conceptualized morality in terms of multidimensional, intuitive traits that influence what people regard as right or wrong. Ample literature shows that religious factors are closely related to moral traits. However, little research has explored links between religious upbringing and adult moral outcomes. This study uses longitudinal data from the National Study of Youth and Religion to examine how diverse forms of religious socialization in adolescence are related to two well-validated social-scientific conceptions of morality in young adulthood: Haidt's moral foundations and Schwartz’ values typology. Using regression analyses and Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (LMG) decomposition methods, I show that different aspects of religious upbringing are linked to the development of both moral foundations and values. Religious factors play a stronger role than either sociodemographics or parent political ideology in predicting young adult moral characteristics. Results highlight the centrality of religious upbringing to the state and trajectory of the population-level moral structure.

How does a major external shock that potentially threatens the community and the individual impact religiosity in the context of ongoing secularization? Do individuals in a rich and secularized society such as Germany react to potential community-level (sociotropic) and individual-level (egotropic) threat with heightened religiosity? We estimate multilevel regression models to investigate the impact of sociotropic and egotropic existential security threats associated with the COVID-19 pandemic on individuals’ religiosity. Our data come from a rolling cross-sectional online survey conducted in Germany among 7,500 respondents across 13 waves in 2020. Our findings suggest that a global health pandemic such as COVID-19 increases individuals’ perception of existential and economic threat, which, in turn, leads to an increase in religiosity. However, this relationship is only true for egotropic existential security threat but not for sociotropic threat. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.

Motivation significantly influences students’ learning outcomes. Changing their learning motivation improves their performance. This study used an exploratory sequential mixed methods approach, with the participation of 140 adolescents attending retreats at three Zen monasteries belonging to the Truc Lam (Bamboo Forest) Zen sect, to examine how they changed their motivation, what made them change, and how the change improved their learning outcomes. The study also evaluated the effect of gender and age on changes in motivation. The results indicated that many teenagers had changed from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation thanks to Dharma lessons, teacher support, and leisure activities. Compared to students who maintained their extrinsic motivation unchanged, they had better learning outcomes. Age, but not gender, had a considerable effect on changes in teenagers’ motivation. These findings provide more evidence for extending Buddhist education and conducting further research on young Buddhist learners’ motivation in various contexts.