Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion最新文献

Investigating both the causes and initial triggers for disaffiliation from Orthodox Judaism is an important part of understanding the complex lived experiences of exiters. This study documents an extensive number of causes for leaving Orthodox Judaism, as well as initial triggers, a less-often investigated, yet important component of disaffiliation. Using an online survey, over 700 open-ended responses were collected from 303 participants who self-identified as having grown up practicing Orthodox Judaism but had since stopped practicing. Content analysis was used to organize responses, resulting in distinct categories that fit into two themes: intellectual and social-emotional, the former more often reported by males and the latter by females. The most commonly reported causes and initial triggers, respectively, were issues with the community and lack of belief in Torah and Orthodoxy. Our results give voice to exiters by documenting nuanced accounts of the full disaffiliation journey, beginning with the initial trigger.

Given popular religiosity, the presence of religious parties, and the politicization of religious issues, it is highly likely that politicians with varying levels of personal religiosity are active in politics. Yet, our knowledge of how politicians’ religiosity influences their political choices is still limited, particularly for developing countries. In this paper, I use data from a survey experiment fielded to Pakistani politicians in 2018 to study whether and how politicians’ personal religiosity influences their political risk preferences. Scholars debate whether religiosity is correlated with higher or lower risk aversion among citizens; however, no study has examined this relationship among politicians. I find that higher religiosity systematically predicts which politicians are more risk-averse and highly religious politicians’ decisions under uncertainty are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and prospect theory. These findings suggest that in contrast to existing assumptions of elite decision-making, politicians’ religiosity systematically influences their risk preferences and choices.

Since 2016, Americans’ attitudes toward Russia and Vladimir Putin have shifted, with Republicans becoming far more supportive of both. And though condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 remains bipartisan, many Christian-right leaders still support Putin and Russia. What undergirds this support? Drawing on three national data sets, we theorize Americans’ warmth toward Putin and Russia is reinforced by an ideology that seeks to institutionalize America's mythical Anglo Protestant ethno-culture—Christian nationalism. Though we propose Christian nationalism's relationship with Russia is more contingent on Russia's geopolitical activity vis-à-vis the United States, we theorize that Christian nationalism consistently predicts Putin support due to his authoritarian ethno-nationalism. April 2018 data show those who affirm America's Christian heritage in the past and/or present are more likely to view Putin and Russia favorably and Russia as our ally. March 2021 data also reveal a linear positive association between Christian nationalism and favorability toward Putin. And March 2022 data reveal a linear positive association between Christian nationalism and admiring Putin's leadership. They also show a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with viewing Russia as a threat. Paradoxically, Christian nationalism may warm Americans toward foreign authoritarians like Putin even when it compels Americans to perceive their nations as threats.

Recent scholarship has conceptualized morality in terms of multidimensional, intuitive traits that influence what people regard as right or wrong. Ample literature shows that religious factors are closely related to moral traits. However, little research has explored links between religious upbringing and adult moral outcomes. This study uses longitudinal data from the National Study of Youth and Religion to examine how diverse forms of religious socialization in adolescence are related to two well-validated social-scientific conceptions of morality in young adulthood: Haidt's moral foundations and Schwartz’ values typology. Using regression analyses and Lindeman, Merenda, and Gold (LMG) decomposition methods, I show that different aspects of religious upbringing are linked to the development of both moral foundations and values. Religious factors play a stronger role than either sociodemographics or parent political ideology in predicting young adult moral characteristics. Results highlight the centrality of religious upbringing to the state and trajectory of the population-level moral structure.

How does a major external shock that potentially threatens the community and the individual impact religiosity in the context of ongoing secularization? Do individuals in a rich and secularized society such as Germany react to potential community-level (sociotropic) and individual-level (egotropic) threat with heightened religiosity? We estimate multilevel regression models to investigate the impact of sociotropic and egotropic existential security threats associated with the COVID-19 pandemic on individuals’ religiosity. Our data come from a rolling cross-sectional online survey conducted in Germany among 7,500 respondents across 13 waves in 2020. Our findings suggest that a global health pandemic such as COVID-19 increases individuals’ perception of existential and economic threat, which, in turn, leads to an increase in religiosity. However, this relationship is only true for egotropic existential security threat but not for sociotropic threat. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.

Motivation significantly influences students’ learning outcomes. Changing their learning motivation improves their performance. This study used an exploratory sequential mixed methods approach, with the participation of 140 adolescents attending retreats at three Zen monasteries belonging to the Truc Lam (Bamboo Forest) Zen sect, to examine how they changed their motivation, what made them change, and how the change improved their learning outcomes. The study also evaluated the effect of gender and age on changes in motivation. The results indicated that many teenagers had changed from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation thanks to Dharma lessons, teacher support, and leisure activities. Compared to students who maintained their extrinsic motivation unchanged, they had better learning outcomes. Age, but not gender, had a considerable effect on changes in teenagers’ motivation. These findings provide more evidence for extending Buddhist education and conducting further research on young Buddhist learners’ motivation in various contexts.

We examine how local religions influence derivative usage in the hedge fund industry. Measuring religiosity by the ratio of religious adherents in the county of a U.S. hedge fund headquarters, we find that religiosity is negatively related to the probability of hedge funds using derivatives for speculative purposes. In contrast, funds in regions with higher ratios of Catholics to Protestants are more likely to engage in speculation-based trading of derivatives. Finally, we show that the effects of local religion are more pronounced if the hedge fund size is small. Overall, our study highlights the significant role of local religion in shaping the purpose of hedge fund derivative usage.

Arbaeen event is the most significant religious tourism event for Shiites. Using the social interpretation approach, this study explores the context for Iranian Shiite participation and understanding of the Arbaeen event. The research methodology is qualitative. Data were collected using ethnography methods and analyzed by grounded theory. According to the results, the inefficiency of the internal decision-making system as a result of the government and its administrative system facing a variety of crises in various political, economic, social, and cultural arenas, as well as social inequality, contribute to this event's attendance. A feeling of religious discrimination and a lack of rights for the participants leads to this inequality. The meaning reconstruction of the pilgrims’ experience and perception serves as a channel for social participation and solidarity, cultural change, and a bridge between stakeholders and officials. The core category also refers to the Arbaeen event as an alternative to existing bottlenecks.

Social scientists have long been interested in how intergroup contact or elite messaging can reduce or eliminate racial biases. To better understand the role of religious elites in these political questions, we show how a church location's income and racial characteristics interact with racial and economic ideologies to shape the political content of sermons. Testing our theories through both quantitative and qualitative analysis of an original data set of more than 102,000 sermons from more than 5200 pastors, we show that contact is only effective as a means of decreasing prejudice to the extent that actors—in our case, pastors—are ideologically capable of reconciling their potential role in economic inequality. White Evangelical pastors rarely preach about issues of poverty or racial justice overall, but the context of the preaching matters. We find that the greater the share of Black population there is in a church community, the less likely White Evangelical pastors are to mention issues of poverty or racial justice, and when they do mention it, they hold to ideological commitments that avoid blaming systems for racialized economic inequality.

Previous findings indicate that smartphone use can decrease life satisfaction and can negatively impact religious or spiritual goals. But since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, smartphones have become significantly more positive and useful. Smartphones have helped people move on with their lives, especially due to the myriad benefits they offer. Users can “virtually” spend time with family and friends (i.e., social) and can order groceries, read the news, attend to religious and spiritual needs, and entertain themselves (i.e., process) without venturing out. In the theoretical framework of uses and gratifications, we explored the impact that smartphone use can have on the subjective well-being of Jews and Christians, respectively, in countries with the highest smartphone penetration: Israel and the United States. Furthermore, we introduced religiosity and spirituality, which have surged during the pandemic, as mediators in the proposed model. In the United States, social and process smartphone use enhanced subjective well-being through religiosity (vs. spirituality). In Israel, the process use enhanced subjective well-being through spirituality (vs. religiosity). Theoretical implications are discussed.