Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

We investigate the equilibrium interest rate charges on non-recourse and recourse loans secured by stock. In such loans, the client retains the option to prepay and recover the collateral stock. We adopt a structural model of the firm where debt levels, with endogenous bankruptcy, affect equity dynamics. Complicating matters, the link between total equity and the price of a share of stock that forms the collateral depends on the extent of dilutions and buybacks that occur. For levered firms, due to dilution in bad states of nature, stock prices typically fall faster than equity values; and for firms that engage in buybacks in good states of nature, stock prices will rise faster than equity values. Banks that ignore these features underestimate the equilibrium interest rate charge on stock-based loans. We provide an analysis of individual stock-based loans and their portfolio characteristics, the latter of which can be used by banks to ascertain capital requirements.

This paper studies the efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies where the expansion of investment is facilitated by securitization. We show that the use of securitization is generally associated with constrained inefficient aggregate investment, thereby potentially justifying regulatory intervention in markets for securitized assets. We examine the effectiveness of two real-world policy instruments to address this inefficiency: ex-ante capital / leverage requirements, as well as skin-in-the game (retention) requirements. We find that leverage/capital restrictions can increase welfare in our environment, but that forcing originators to hold additional skin-in-the game is not welfare improving.

The rapid increase in U.S. house prices during the 2001–2006 period was accompanied by a historically rapid expansion of bank assets. We exploit cross-regional variation in local housing booms to study how housing demand shocks affected the growth of the banking sector. We estimate the effect of housing demand shocks that are orthogonal to observed non-housing demand shocks and credit supply shocks in each bank’s market area. We employ several instrumental variables that plausibly identify variation in local housing demand that is exogenous to local banks. We find that the housing boom had a large effect on bank asset growth—the cross-regional elasticity of bank growth with respect to housing demand shocks is around 0.6. The regional elasticity estimate suggests that housing demand shocks can potentially account for a large fraction of the growth of the banking sector during this period.

We analyze reductions in bank credit using a natural experiment where unprecedented flooding in Pakistan differentially affected banks that were more exposed to the floods. Using a unique data set that covers the universe of consumer loans in Pakistan and this exogenous shock to bank funding, we find two key results. First, following an increase in their funding costs, banks disproportionately reduce credit to borrowers with little education, little credit history, and seasonal occupations. Second, the credit reduction is not compensated by relatively more lending by less-affected banks. The empirical evidence suggests that a reduction in bank monitoring incentives caused the large relative decreases in lending to these borrowers.

We assess the effects of board gender quota laws using a sample of banks from 39 countries. We document an increase in both stand-alone and systemic risk post-quota among banks that did not meet the quota pre-reform; the effect is stronger for banks in countries with a smaller pool of women in finance and low gender equality. We find that the propagation of poor governance practices by overlapping female directors and deterioration in the information environment post quota are likely channels driving the results. The evidence is consistent with some banks “gaming” the reform by strategically appointing insiders, which weakens the board's monitoring function. Our results have policy implications and suggest that supply-side factors are key determinants of the outcome of mandated quotas.

Evidence suggests that asset pledgeability, debt complexity, and control rights of dispersed debt influence financial distress resolution. We model how courts’ imperfect verifiability of assets and valuable control of misaligned creditors shape firms’ debt structure and create coordination problems that determine distress outcomes and financing. A key result is that an increase in verifiability allows financially constrained firms to fund projects by pledging more assets to misaligned creditors, making contract renegotiation in distress times more difficult and increasing the probability of bankruptcy. Since equity receives less in the event of distress, constrained firms choose riskier projects with higher returns. Consistent with our model, bankruptcy filings increase after the U.S. Supreme Court decision imposing a “market test” to assess the value of stockholders’ interest in debtor proposals. The effect is stronger for firms with low asset verifiability. These firms also experienced an increase in recovery rates, debt capacity, and risk-taking. Our findings suggest that reforms improving the verifiability of assets substantially impact credit access. However, our results also point out that improving asset verifiability may be insufficient for constrained firms with aligned creditors. Therefore, complementary reforms that facilitate firms’ access to creditors from different market segments may be necessary.

We examine the role of private unlimited deposit insurance as a complement to federal deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a crisis. We find that banks whose deposits are federally and privately fully insured obtain more deposits and expand lending, in contrast to banks whose deposits are only federally insured. We also document that privately insured banks remain prudent in the loan origination process during the subprime crisis. Our results offer novel insights into depositor and bank behavior in the presence of multiple deposit insurance schemes with differential design features. They also illustrate how private sector solutions incentivize prudent bank behavior to strengthen the financial safety net.

We evaluate how the liquidity coverage rule affects US banks’ opacity and funding liquidity risk. Banks subject to the rule become significantly more opaque and funding liquidity risk increases by $245 million per quarter. Higher funding liquidity risk is more pronounced among banks that are subject to the rule’s more stringent liquidity buffers, and systemically riskier banks. Rising opacity reflects an increase in banks’ holdings of complex assets whose value is difficult to communicate to investors. The evidence highlights the unintended consequences of liquidity regulation and is consistent with theoretical models’ predictions of a trade-off between liquidity buffers and bank opacity that exacerbates funding liquidity risk.

We study whether bank bailouts affect CEO turnover and its subsequent impact on bank risk. Exploiting the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of 2008, we find that TARP funds temporarily decreased the likelihood of bank CEO turnover during the crisis (2008–2010) but significantly increased CEO changes afterwards. Our results show that replacing TARP CEOs reduced individual bank's risk as well as the bank's contributions to the systemic risk. Finally, we find that TARP CEO turnover was mainly driven by a decrease in the bank's political capital. Overall we provide evidence that bank bailouts have important implications for banks’ risk-taking and systemic risk, insofar as bailouts affect bank CEO turnover.

The rise of investments professionally managed with a socially responsible mandate has generated growing interest in environmental and social ratings. However, it is not clear how informative these ratings are or whether they are distorted by greenwashing. Based on the ratings of the leading provider, I offer the first evidence linking greenwashing to ratings inflation. Better ratings do not predict less future corporate bad behavior. This is of concern because it undermines the signaling value of these ratings. To understand these results, I develop a model where the rating agency may underinvest in greenwashing detection while firms have incentives to window dress and engage in greenwashing. Finally, controlling for greenwashing improves ratings predictive quality.