Journal of Financial Intermediation最新文献

This paper introduces collateral rehypothecation, a widespread practice in derivatives, swaps, and repo markets, in a general equilibrium model with default. Rehypothecation frees up collateral because it allows lenders to resell or repledge assets pledged by borrowers. The risk that lenders will not return the asset, however, limits gains from rehypothecation. Still, when markets are contractually incomplete or decentralized, rehypothecation can achieve a superior use of scarce collateral. These results have implications for the repo market and suggest that limits to rehypothecation can cause price fragmentation.

Do targeted macroprudential measures impact non-targeted sectors too? We investigate the compositional changes in the supply of credit by Swiss banks, exploiting their differential exposure to the activation in 2013 of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) which targeted banks’ exposure to residential mortgages. We find that the additional capital requirements resulting from the activation of the CCyB are associated with higher growth in banks’ commercial lending. While banks are lending more to all types of businesses, the new macroprudential policy benefits smaller and riskier businesses the most. However, the interest rates and other costs of obtaining credit for these firms rise as well.

Social relationship and business connections create implicit benefits between borrowers and lenders. We model how implicit benefits and repayment enforcement costs influence credit allocation, cost, and renegotiation. The optimal solution illustrates that financing with implicit benefits may achieve lower financing costs, higher managerial effort, and better outcomes for both borrowers and lenders. This result is consistent with the continuing expansion of alternative financing despite formal financial intermediation, the rise of corporate insider debt, and joint ownership of debt and equity. The growing size and complexity of projects and changes in community relationships can explain expansion of financing with standard intermediation.

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference.

We show that banks expand mortgage lending in the home states of Senate Banking Committee chairs, and the effect is more pronounced in counties where the incumbent senator faces a competitive re-election race. Banks strategically target politically active borrowers. Consequently, banks’ profitability increases after favoring the incumbent politicians’ constituents, but they suffer a deterioration in mortgage asset quality in the long run. Our findings imply that political power could distort private capital allocation beyond conventional political contribution channels.

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.

We survey more than 200 private equity (PE) managers from firms with $1.9 trillion of assets under management (AUM) about their portfolio performance, decision-making and activities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given that PE managers have significant incentives to maximize value, their actions during the pandemic should indicate what they perceive as being important for both the preservation and creation of value. PE managers believe that 40% of their portfolio companies are moderately negatively affected and 10% are very negatively affected by the pandemic. The private equity managers—both investment and operating partners—are actively engaged in the operations, governance, and financing in all of their current portfolio companies. These activities are more intensively pursued in those companies that have been more severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, they expect the performance of their existing funds to decline. They are more pessimistic about that decline than the venture capitalists (VCs) surveyed in Gompers et al. (2021). Despite the pandemic, private equity managers are seeking new investments. Rather than focusing on cost cutting, PE investors place a much greater weight on revenue growth for value creation. Relative to the 2012 survey results reported in Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), they appear to give a larger equity stake to management teams and target somewhat lower returns.

Using firm-level data for 42 countries over 1991-2016, we show that the extent to which credit flows to relatively risker firms—which we label riskiness of credit allocation—is a distinct dimension of the credit cycle that helps predict downside risks to GDP growth and financial stress episodes, one to three years ahead, even after controlling for the magnitude of credit expansions and for financial conditions. The riskiness of credit allocation is both a measure of corporate vulnerability and of investor sentiment, but its predictive power does not simply come from its relation to these correlates of future financial stress.

The size and the leverage of financial market investors and the elasticity of demand of unlevered investors define MinMaSS, the smallest market size that can support a given degree of leverage. The financial system’s potential for financial crises can be measured by the stability ratio, the ratio of total market size to MinMaSS. We use that financial stability metric to gauge the buildup of vulnerability in the run-up to the 1998 Long-Term Capital Management crisis and argue that policymakers could have detected the potential for the crisis.

Liquidity shocks transmitted through interbank connections contributed to bank distress during the Great Depression. New data on interbank connections reveal that banks were vulnerable to closures of their correspondents and their respondents. Further, banks were less responsive to network liquidity risk in their management of cash and capital buffers after the Federal Reserve was established, suggesting that banks expected the Fed to reduce that risk. The Fed's presence weakened incentives for the most systemically important banks to maintain capital and cash buffers against liquidity risk, and thereby likely contributed to the banking system's vulnerability to contagion during the Depression.