Conceptual debates about proportionality and its moral and political force need to be placed in historical and institutional context. Conceptual, moral, political, and practical questions about proportionality are inextricably linked. This insight should lead us away from the dominant conception of proportionality as a moral precept and toward a political conception of proportionality that is inevitably shaped by prevailing conceptions of what proportionality is for and, in modern democracies, is grounded in democratic practices and the institutional structures of democratic states. This insight has important implications for the prevailing disciplinary division of labor, calling into question the tendency to separate conceptual and philosophical from social theories of punishment. It is important to try to understand the conditions under which stable constraints on the state’s power to punish, and accountability mechanisms adequate to guaranteeing the fittingness of punishment by reference to democratically endorsed standards—which seem to be the key animating concerns of contemporary appeals to proportionality—are most likely to be realized, and conversely where they are likely to be most under threat. This is both an important issue in itself, and a case study in the interaction between concept and context.
{"title":"Getting Proportionality in Perspective: Philosophy, History, and Institutions","authors":"N. Lacey","doi":"10.1086/715030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/715030","url":null,"abstract":"Conceptual debates about proportionality and its moral and political force need to be placed in historical and institutional context. Conceptual, moral, political, and practical questions about proportionality are inextricably linked. This insight should lead us away from the dominant conception of proportionality as a moral precept and toward a political conception of proportionality that is inevitably shaped by prevailing conceptions of what proportionality is for and, in modern democracies, is grounded in democratic practices and the institutional structures of democratic states. This insight has important implications for the prevailing disciplinary division of labor, calling into question the tendency to separate conceptual and philosophical from social theories of punishment. It is important to try to understand the conditions under which stable constraints on the state’s power to punish, and accountability mechanisms adequate to guaranteeing the fittingness of punishment by reference to democratically endorsed standards—which seem to be the key animating concerns of contemporary appeals to proportionality—are most likely to be realized, and conversely where they are likely to be most under threat. This is both an important issue in itself, and a case study in the interaction between concept and context.","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"50 1","pages":"77 - 114"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49448993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Criminal justice is afflicted with enforcement swamping crises. Is a bigger criminal justice system the only answer? Are there better ways to scale up prevention and justice? Literatures on four system-capacity crises, selected for how different they are, show that there are collective efficacy strategies that can move from institution to institution to scale up justice and prevention. Substance abuse, corporate crime, war crime, and gendered violence are problems that the criminal justice system pretends to solve but barely touches. To subdue system-capacity crises, community participation in crime control must grow to become more than just an adjunct to state enforcement and in a way that transforms democratic citizenship. Gifts of scaled-up volunteerism are needed, but institutional responsibility for collective efficacy is more critical than individualized responsibility for self-efficacy. To tackle system capacity deficits, businesses, armies, schools, and social movements that include feminism, LGBTIQ rights, Indigenous rights, environmentalism, and restorative justice can be empowered to mobilize collective efficacy for domination reduction. A long march through societies’ institutions led by such movements can achieve macro transformation in the scale of justice and prevention. Concrete collective efficacy strategies can be developed.
{"title":"Scaling Up Crime Prevention and Justice","authors":"J. Braithwaite","doi":"10.1086/716093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/716093","url":null,"abstract":"Criminal justice is afflicted with enforcement swamping crises. Is a bigger criminal justice system the only answer? Are there better ways to scale up prevention and justice? Literatures on four system-capacity crises, selected for how different they are, show that there are collective efficacy strategies that can move from institution to institution to scale up justice and prevention. Substance abuse, corporate crime, war crime, and gendered violence are problems that the criminal justice system pretends to solve but barely touches. To subdue system-capacity crises, community participation in crime control must grow to become more than just an adjunct to state enforcement and in a way that transforms democratic citizenship. Gifts of scaled-up volunteerism are needed, but institutional responsibility for collective efficacy is more critical than individualized responsibility for self-efficacy. To tackle system capacity deficits, businesses, armies, schools, and social movements that include feminism, LGBTIQ rights, Indigenous rights, environmentalism, and restorative justice can be empowered to mobilize collective efficacy for domination reduction. A long march through societies’ institutions led by such movements can achieve macro transformation in the scale of justice and prevention. Concrete collective efficacy strategies can be developed.","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"50 1","pages":"247 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48214284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Index","authors":"","doi":"10.1086/711074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/711074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/711074","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42937809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Organized Crime: Less Than Meets the Eye","authors":"P. Reuter, M. Tonry","doi":"10.1086/709447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/709447","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"49 1","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/709447","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44423133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Italian mafias—Cosa Nostra, Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta—are long-lived, resilient organizations that have evolved to adapt to environmental changes. They have different organizational models. While Cosa Nostra (in the past) and ‘Ndrangheta are characterized by a unitary, vertical structure and higher-level coordination bodies, Camorra has a plurality of organizational models; the majority of clans maintain a structure that is fluid, polycentric, and conflictual. In general, mafias with a vertical organizational order have greater control over conflict, and greater capacity to resist state power. The ‘Ndrangheta has become the richest and most powerful of the three, replacing Cosa Nostra in international drug trafficking. It is able to reproduce its organizational structures and business model in new territories in Italy and elsewhere. In contrast, owing to unprecedented law enforcement efforts in recent decades, Cosa Nostra is weaker, down but not out. Camorra continues to be the most violent mafia, committing more homicides than the other two combined. Consistent with their adaptive capacity, mafias in new areas of expansion are treated as novel agents that can provide extralegal services and business opportunities. They are sought out by entrepreneurs, white-collar professionals, and local politicians to solve problems such as debt collection, labor unrest, and disputes with suppliers.
{"title":"Italian Organized Crime since 1950","authors":"M. Catino","doi":"10.1086/707319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/707319","url":null,"abstract":"Italian mafias—Cosa Nostra, Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta—are long-lived, resilient organizations that have evolved to adapt to environmental changes. They have different organizational models. While Cosa Nostra (in the past) and ‘Ndrangheta are characterized by a unitary, vertical structure and higher-level coordination bodies, Camorra has a plurality of organizational models; the majority of clans maintain a structure that is fluid, polycentric, and conflictual. In general, mafias with a vertical organizational order have greater control over conflict, and greater capacity to resist state power. The ‘Ndrangheta has become the richest and most powerful of the three, replacing Cosa Nostra in international drug trafficking. It is able to reproduce its organizational structures and business model in new territories in Italy and elsewhere. In contrast, owing to unprecedented law enforcement efforts in recent decades, Cosa Nostra is weaker, down but not out. Camorra continues to be the most violent mafia, committing more homicides than the other two combined. Consistent with their adaptive capacity, mafias in new areas of expansion are treated as novel agents that can provide extralegal services and business opportunities. They are sought out by entrepreneurs, white-collar professionals, and local politicians to solve problems such as debt collection, labor unrest, and disputes with suppliers.","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"49 1","pages":"69 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/707319","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44320321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Five organizations exemplify organized crime organizations, or “mafias”: the American and Sicilian Cosa Nostras, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, Chinese triads, and Japanese yakuza. Newer syndicates have emerged that are often called organized crime organizations but most importantly differ from the exemplars. Drug trafficking syndicates in Colombia and Mexico are large, wealthy, and extraordinarily violent but have proven fragile in the face of aggressive law enforcement, do not have fully formalized internal structures or elaborate cultures, and only occasionally attempt to exercise political power or provide dispute settlement services in the criminal world. The Primeiro Comando da Capital in Sao Paulo, originally a prisoner self-protection group, comes closer. It has a formalized internal structure and an elaborate culture that permit it partly to control drug markets and provide an alternative justice system in parts of Brazil. Rio de Janeiro’s Commando Vermelho, also originally prison-based and now extensively involved in drug trafficking, has some mafia-like characteristics. Other criminal syndicates are better thought of as “candidate criminal organizations” because they are not fully consolidated (e.g., the Neapolitan camorra), are not fully criminalized (e.g., Hells Angels), or aim mainly at political subversion and have only subsidiary involvement in profit-making crimes (e.g., the Colombian FARC).
有五个组织是有组织犯罪组织或“黑手党”的典型代表:美国和西西里的Cosa Nostras、卡拉布里亚的Ndrangheta、中国的三合会和日本的yakuza。新的辛迪加出现了，它们通常被称为有组织犯罪组织，但最重要的是，它们不同于这些典型组织。哥伦比亚和墨西哥的贩毒集团规模庞大、富有且极其暴力，但事实证明，它们在强有力的执法面前是脆弱的，没有完全正式的内部结构或复杂的文化，只是偶尔试图在犯罪世界中行使政治权力或提供解决争端的服务。圣保罗的Primeiro Comando da Capital最初是一个囚犯自我保护组织，现在更接近了。它有一个正式的内部结构和复杂的文化，这使它能够在一定程度上控制毒品市场，并在巴西部分地区提供另一种司法体系。巴西里约热内卢的Vermelho突击队最初也是以监狱为基地，现在广泛参与毒品走私，有一些类似黑手党的特征。其他犯罪集团最好被认为是“候选犯罪组织”，因为它们没有完全巩固(例如，那不勒斯的卡莫拉)，没有完全被定为犯罪(例如，地狱天使)，或者主要以政治颠覆为目标，只辅助参与牟利犯罪(例如，哥伦比亚的哥伦比亚革命武装力量)。
{"title":"How Similar Are Modern Criminal Syndicates to Traditional Mafias?","authors":"P. Reuter, L. Paoli","doi":"10.1086/708869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/708869","url":null,"abstract":"Five organizations exemplify organized crime organizations, or “mafias”: the American and Sicilian Cosa Nostras, the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta, Chinese triads, and Japanese yakuza. Newer syndicates have emerged that are often called organized crime organizations but most importantly differ from the exemplars. Drug trafficking syndicates in Colombia and Mexico are large, wealthy, and extraordinarily violent but have proven fragile in the face of aggressive law enforcement, do not have fully formalized internal structures or elaborate cultures, and only occasionally attempt to exercise political power or provide dispute settlement services in the criminal world. The Primeiro Comando da Capital in Sao Paulo, originally a prisoner self-protection group, comes closer. It has a formalized internal structure and an elaborate culture that permit it partly to control drug markets and provide an alternative justice system in parts of Brazil. Rio de Janeiro’s Commando Vermelho, also originally prison-based and now extensively involved in drug trafficking, has some mafia-like characteristics. Other criminal syndicates are better thought of as “candidate criminal organizations” because they are not fully consolidated (e.g., the Neapolitan camorra), are not fully criminalized (e.g., Hells Angels), or aim mainly at political subversion and have only subsidiary involvement in profit-making crimes (e.g., the Colombian FARC).","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"49 1","pages":"223 - 287"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/708869","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46000666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Italian American Cosa Nostra crime families are the longest-lived and most successful organized crime organizations in US history, achieving their pinnacle of power in the 1970s and 1980s. The families seized opportunities during the early twentieth-century labor wars and under national alcohol prohibition from 1919 to 1933. Control of labor unions gave them power to determine the companies that could operate in various sectors and enabled them to establish employer cartels that rigged bids and fixed prices, and provided opportunity to exploit pension and welfare funds. The racketeers were urban power brokers. The families also profited from gambling, illicit drugs, loan-sharking, prostitution, and pornography, and they extorted protection payments from other black marketeers. For decades they faced little risk from law enforcement. FBI Director Hoover denied the existence of a national organized crime threat. Local police were corrupted. After Hoover’s death, the FBI made eradicating organized crime a top priority. Relentless law enforcement coincided with socioeconomic and political changes that greatly weakened the Cosa Nostra families.
{"title":"The Rise and Fall of Organized Crime in the United States","authors":"J. Jacobs","doi":"10.1086/706895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/706895","url":null,"abstract":"The Italian American Cosa Nostra crime families are the longest-lived and most successful organized crime organizations in US history, achieving their pinnacle of power in the 1970s and 1980s. The families seized opportunities during the early twentieth-century labor wars and under national alcohol prohibition from 1919 to 1933. Control of labor unions gave them power to determine the companies that could operate in various sectors and enabled them to establish employer cartels that rigged bids and fixed prices, and provided opportunity to exploit pension and welfare funds. The racketeers were urban power brokers. The families also profited from gambling, illicit drugs, loan-sharking, prostitution, and pornography, and they extorted protection payments from other black marketeers. For decades they faced little risk from law enforcement. FBI Director Hoover denied the existence of a national organized crime threat. Local police were corrupted. After Hoover’s death, the FBI made eradicating organized crime a top priority. Relentless law enforcement coincided with socioeconomic and political changes that greatly weakened the Cosa Nostra families.","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"49 1","pages":"17 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/706895","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48514394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Human smuggling is a form of illegal trade in which the commodity is an assisted illegal entry into a country. While this is hardly a new phenomenon, evidence points to increased involvement of smugglers in facilitating these journeys. This has been linked to the hardening of entry policies in developed countries. Smuggling markets tend to possess low barriers to entry and remarkably similar organizational arrangements in all the main smuggling routes in the world: no monopolies and small, localized, and rudimentary hierarchies. There are clear separations between migrant smugglers and their protectors and between migrant smugglers and drug traffickers. The limited empirical evidence suggests that, rather than being involved in other unrelated criminal activities, smugglers often run small-scale legitimate businesses. There is very little evidence of direct involvement of traditional mafia-like organizations. Finally, smugglers, often in competition to attract migrants, have developed diverse strategies to foster transactions, including investing in their reputations, offering warranties, and bringing in third-party escrow services. Recent developments in information technology have facilitated use of social media and the internet.
{"title":"Human Smuggling: Structure and Mechanisms","authors":"Paolo Campana","doi":"10.1086/708663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/708663","url":null,"abstract":"Human smuggling is a form of illegal trade in which the commodity is an assisted illegal entry into a country. While this is hardly a new phenomenon, evidence points to increased involvement of smugglers in facilitating these journeys. This has been linked to the hardening of entry policies in developed countries. Smuggling markets tend to possess low barriers to entry and remarkably similar organizational arrangements in all the main smuggling routes in the world: no monopolies and small, localized, and rudimentary hierarchies. There are clear separations between migrant smugglers and their protectors and between migrant smugglers and drug traffickers. The limited empirical evidence suggests that, rather than being involved in other unrelated criminal activities, smugglers often run small-scale legitimate businesses. There is very little evidence of direct involvement of traditional mafia-like organizations. Finally, smugglers, often in competition to attract migrants, have developed diverse strategies to foster transactions, including investing in their reputations, offering warranties, and bringing in third-party escrow services. Recent developments in information technology have facilitated use of social media and the internet.","PeriodicalId":51456,"journal":{"name":"Crime and Justice-A Review of Research","volume":"49 1","pages":"471 - 519"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/708663","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44354712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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