Cornell Law Review最新文献

This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector's long history of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass for products in health care are typically small process steps and isolated components that can be assigned a billing code, even if they do little to help patients. Instead of further entrenching weakly competitive parties engaged in artificial commerce, antitrust enforcers and regulators should work together to promote the sale of fully assembled products and services that can be warranted to consumers for performance and safety. As better products emerge through innovation and market entry, competition may finally succeed at lowering medical costs, increasing access to treatment, and improving quality of care.

The ability of government to "nudge" with information mandates, or merely to inform consumers of risks, is circumscribed by First Amendment interests that have been poorly articulated. New graphic cigarette warning labels supplied courts with the first opportunity to assess the informational interests attending novel forms of product disclosures. The D.C. Circuit enjoined them as unconstitutional, compelled by a narrative that the graphic labels converted government from objective informer to ideological persuader, shouting its warning to manipulate consumer decisions. This interpretation will leave little room for graphic disclosure and is already being used to challenge textual disclosure requirements (such as county-of-origin labeling) as unconstitutional. Graphic warning and the increasing reliance on regulation-by-disclosure present new free speech quandaries related to consumer autonomy, state normativity, and speaker liberty. This Article examines the distinct goals of product disclosure requirements and how those goals may serve to vindicate, or to frustrate, listener interests. I argue that many disclosures, and especially warnings, are necessarily both normative and informative, expressing value along with fact. It is not the existence of a norm that raises constitutional concern but rather the insistence on a controversial norm. Turning to the means of disclosure, this Article examines how emotional and graphic communication might change the constitutional calculus. Using autonomy theory and the communications research on speech processing, I conclude that disclosures do not bypass reason simply by reaching for the heart. If large graphic labels are unconstitutional, it will be because of undue burden on the speaker, not because they are emotionally powerful. This Article makes the following distinct contributions to the compelled commercial speech literature: critiques the leading precedent, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, from a consumer autonomy standpoint; brings to bear empirical communications research on questions of facticity and rationality in emotional and graphic communications; and teases apart and distinguishes among various free speech dangers and contributions of commercial disclosure mandates with a view towards informing policy, law, and research.