Abstract I argue that legitimacy discourses serve a gatekeeping function. They give practitioners telic standards for riding herd on social practices, ensuring that minimally acceptable versions of the practice are implemented. Such a function is a necessary part of implementing formalized social practices, especially including law. This gatekeeping account shows that political philosophers have misunderstood legitimacy. It is not secondary to justice and only necessary because we cannot agree about justice; instead, it is a necessary feature of actual human social practices, which must be implemented via practitioners’ discretion in changing contexts.
{"title":"The Concept of Legitimacy","authors":"N. Adams","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.35","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I argue that legitimacy discourses serve a gatekeeping function. They give practitioners telic standards for riding herd on social practices, ensuring that minimally acceptable versions of the practice are implemented. Such a function is a necessary part of implementing formalized social practices, especially including law. This gatekeeping account shows that political philosophers have misunderstood legitimacy. It is not secondary to justice and only necessary because we cannot agree about justice; instead, it is a necessary feature of actual human social practices, which must be implemented via practitioners’ discretion in changing contexts.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"381 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45436486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract It is natural to think that social groups are concrete material particulars, but this view faces an important objection. Suppose the chess club and nature club have the same members. Intuitively, these are different clubs even though they have a common material basis. Some philosophers take these intuitions to show that the materialist view must be abandoned. I propose an alternative explanation. Social groups are concrete material particulars, but there is a psychological explanation of nonidentity intuitions. Social groups appear coincident but nonidentical because they are perceived to be governed by conflicting social norms.
{"title":"Social Groups Are Concrete Material Particulars","authors":"K. Richardson","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.32","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.32","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is natural to think that social groups are concrete material particulars, but this view faces an important objection. Suppose the chess club and nature club have the same members. Intuitively, these are different clubs even though they have a common material basis. Some philosophers take these intuitions to show that the materialist view must be abandoned. I propose an alternative explanation. Social groups are concrete material particulars, but there is a psychological explanation of nonidentity intuitions. Social groups appear coincident but nonidentical because they are perceived to be governed by conflicting social norms.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"468 - 483"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45057428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract There is now a significant body of literature on consequentialist ethics that propose satisficing instead of maximizing accounts. Even though epistemology recently witnessed a widespread discussion of teleological and consequentialist theories, a satisficing account is surprisingly not developed yet. The aim of this paper is to do just that. The rough idea is that epistemic rules are justified if and only if they satisfice the epistemic good, i.e., reach some threshold of epistemic value (which varies with practical context), and believing is justified if and only if it follows said rules. I argue that this alternative to the implicitly established way of thinking in maximizing terms has significant advantages. First, maximizing epistemic value can be unreasonably demanding; second, a satisficing theory can make finding reasonable rules for belief formation and sustenance much more accessible; and third, a satisficing approach is a better alternative to both general subjectivist and maximizing objectivist attempts to spell out epistemic blame.
{"title":"A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification","authors":"Raimund Pils","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.38","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There is now a significant body of literature on consequentialist ethics that propose satisficing instead of maximizing accounts. Even though epistemology recently witnessed a widespread discussion of teleological and consequentialist theories, a satisficing account is surprisingly not developed yet. The aim of this paper is to do just that. The rough idea is that epistemic rules are justified if and only if they satisfice the epistemic good, i.e., reach some threshold of epistemic value (which varies with practical context), and believing is justified if and only if it follows said rules. I argue that this alternative to the implicitly established way of thinking in maximizing terms has significant advantages. First, maximizing epistemic value can be unreasonably demanding; second, a satisficing theory can make finding reasonable rules for belief formation and sustenance much more accessible; and third, a satisficing approach is a better alternative to both general subjectivist and maximizing objectivist attempts to spell out epistemic blame.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"450 - 467"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41533804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So, we begin with what we regard as a plausible theory of faith according to which, in slogan form, faith is resilient reliance. Next, we turn to contemporary theories of trust. They are not of one voice. Still, we can use them to indicate ways in which trust and faith might both differ from and resemble each other. This is what we do. Along the way, we evaluate substantive issues related to these possible differences and similarities.
{"title":"How Does Trust Relate to Faith?","authors":"Daniel J. McKaughan, Daniel Howard-Snyder","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.34","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.34","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So, we begin with what we regard as a plausible theory of faith according to which, in slogan form, faith is resilient reliance. Next, we turn to contemporary theories of trust. They are not of one voice. Still, we can use them to indicate ways in which trust and faith might both differ from and resemble each other. This is what we do. Along the way, we evaluate substantive issues related to these possible differences and similarities.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"411 - 427"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46501769","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper argues for the existence of a certain type of defeater for one’s belief that P—the presence of social incentives not to share evidence against P. Such pressure makes it relatively likely that there is unpossessed evidence that would provide defeaters for P because it makes it likely that the evidence we have is a lopsided subset. This offers, I suggest, a rational reconstruction of a core strand of argument in Mill’s On Liberty. A consequence of the argument is that on morally and politically laden issues in particular, a high degree of doxastic openness might be appropriate.
{"title":"The Epistemic Significance of Social Pressure","authors":"Hrishikesh Joshi","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.39","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.39","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper argues for the existence of a certain type of defeater for one’s belief that P—the presence of social incentives not to share evidence against P. Such pressure makes it relatively likely that there is unpossessed evidence that would provide defeaters for P because it makes it likely that the evidence we have is a lopsided subset. This offers, I suggest, a rational reconstruction of a core strand of argument in Mill’s On Liberty. A consequence of the argument is that on morally and politically laden issues in particular, a high degree of doxastic openness might be appropriate.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"396 - 410"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42714645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A century ago historian of science George Sarton argued that “science is our greatest treasure, but it needs to be humanized or it will do more harm than good” (1924). The systematic cultivation of an “historical spirit,” a philosophical appreciation of the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry, and a recognition that science is irreducibly a “collective enterprise” was, on Sarton’s account, crucial to the humanizing mission he advocated. These elements of Sarton’s program are more relevant than ever as philosophers of science articulate research programs that take seriously the contextual factors, situated interests, and historical contingencies that shape the sciences we study. I trace the trajectory of a long-term philosophical engagement with archaeology that illustrates a succession of ways in which social, cultural, and political values configure inquiry, culminating in a program of collaborative research that raises the question of what role philosophers can usefully play when the challenges of humanizing scientific practice have centrally to do with navigating entrenched asymmetries of power.
{"title":"Humanizing Science and Philosophy of Science: George Sarton, Contextualist Philosophies of Science, and the Indigenous/Science Project","authors":"Alison Wylie","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.33","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.33","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A century ago historian of science George Sarton argued that “science is our greatest treasure, but it needs to be humanized or it will do more harm than good” (1924). The systematic cultivation of an “historical spirit,” a philosophical appreciation of the dynamic nature of scientific inquiry, and a recognition that science is irreducibly a “collective enterprise” was, on Sarton’s account, crucial to the humanizing mission he advocated. These elements of Sarton’s program are more relevant than ever as philosophers of science articulate research programs that take seriously the contextual factors, situated interests, and historical contingencies that shape the sciences we study. I trace the trajectory of a long-term philosophical engagement with archaeology that illustrates a succession of ways in which social, cultural, and political values configure inquiry, culminating in a program of collaborative research that raises the question of what role philosophers can usefully play when the challenges of humanizing scientific practice have centrally to do with navigating entrenched asymmetries of power.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"256 - 278"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44066041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Philosophical work on science and values has come to engage with the concerns of society and of stakeholders affected by science and policy, leading to socially relevant philosophy of science and socially engaged philosophy of science. This special issue showcases instances of socially relevant philosophy of science, featuring contributions on a diversity of topics by Janet Kourany, Andrew Schroeder, Alison Wylie, Kristen Intemann, Joyce Havstad, Justin Biddle, Kevin Elliott, and Ingo Brigandt.
关于科学和价值的哲学工作已经开始涉及社会以及受科学和政策影响的利益相关者的关注，从而导致社会相关的科学哲学和社会参与的科学哲学。本期特刊展示了与社会相关的科学哲学实例，包括Janet Kourany, Andrew Schroeder, Alison Wylie, Kristen Intemann, Joyce Havstad, Justin Biddle, Kevin Elliott和Ingo Brigandt对各种主题的贡献。
{"title":"Engaging with Science, Values, and Society: Introduction","authors":"Ingo Brigandt","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.37","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.37","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Philosophical work on science and values has come to engage with the concerns of society and of stakeholders affected by science and policy, leading to socially relevant philosophy of science and socially engaged philosophy of science. This special issue showcases instances of socially relevant philosophy of science, featuring contributions on a diversity of topics by Janet Kourany, Andrew Schroeder, Alison Wylie, Kristen Intemann, Joyce Havstad, Justin Biddle, Kevin Elliott, and Ingo Brigandt.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"223 - 226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44783766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-29eCollection Date: 2022-01-01DOI: 10.25259/CMAS_03_02_2021
Sharmila Pimple, Gauravi Mishra
Cervical cancer remains a major public health problem, ranking as the fourth most common cause of cancer incidence and mortality in women worldwide. Wide variations in cervical cancer incidence and mortality were observed with highest incidence rates in Sub Saharan Africa and with 85% of deaths occurring in developing regions of the world. Non-existent or inadequate screening in public health care settings and limited access to the standard treatment options explains the large geographic variation in cervical cancer rates. Persistent infection with high-risk Human papillomavirus (HPV) types is the major risk factor for cervical cancer. High parity, long-term use of oral contraceptive pills, tobacco consumption, co-infection with other sexually transmitted agents, lifestyle factors such as multiple sexual partners, younger age at first sexual intercourse, immunosuppression, and diet have been identified as the co-factors most likely to influence the risk of acquisition of HPV infection and its further progress to cervical carcinogenesis. Differential screening rates and changes in epidemiological patterns have contributed to decreasing trends in cervical cancer in some developed regions of the world. Lower rates were also observed in North Africa and the Middle East, which may be attributed to cultural norms and conservative sexual behaviors. Across world regions, HPV prevalence was highest in women younger than 35 years of age, declining to a plateau in middle age and showed significant association between national age standardized incidence rates and corresponding estimates of HPV prevalence. The five most common HPV types in HPV-positive women worldwide were HPV16, HPV18, HPV31, HPV58, and HPV52, representing 50% of all HPV infections with HPV-16 and HPV-18 infections accounting for about 70% of the total infection burden. Tracking changing trends in the cervical cancer epidemiological patterns including HPV genotypes will immensely contribute toward effective prevention and control measures for cervical cancer elimination.
{"title":"Cancer cervix: Epidemiology and disease burden.","authors":"Sharmila Pimple, Gauravi Mishra","doi":"10.25259/CMAS_03_02_2021","DOIUrl":"10.25259/CMAS_03_02_2021","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Cervical cancer remains a major public health problem, ranking as the fourth most common cause of cancer incidence and mortality in women worldwide. Wide variations in cervical cancer incidence and mortality were observed with highest incidence rates in Sub Saharan Africa and with 85% of deaths occurring in developing regions of the world. Non-existent or inadequate screening in public health care settings and limited access to the standard treatment options explains the large geographic variation in cervical cancer rates. Persistent infection with high-risk Human papillomavirus (HPV) types is the major risk factor for cervical cancer. High parity, long-term use of oral contraceptive pills, tobacco consumption, co-infection with other sexually transmitted agents, lifestyle factors such as multiple sexual partners, younger age at first sexual intercourse, immunosuppression, and diet have been identified as the co-factors most likely to influence the risk of acquisition of HPV infection and its further progress to cervical carcinogenesis. Differential screening rates and changes in epidemiological patterns have contributed to decreasing trends in cervical cancer in some developed regions of the world. Lower rates were also observed in North Africa and the Middle East, which may be attributed to cultural norms and conservative sexual behaviors. Across world regions, HPV prevalence was highest in women younger than 35 years of age, declining to a plateau in middle age and showed significant association between national age standardized incidence rates and corresponding estimates of HPV prevalence. The five most common HPV types in HPV-positive women worldwide were HPV16, HPV18, HPV31, HPV58, and HPV52, representing 50% of all HPV infections with HPV-16 and HPV-18 infections accounting for about 70% of the total infection burden. Tracking changing trends in the cervical cancer epidemiological patterns including HPV genotypes will immensely contribute toward effective prevention and control measures for cervical cancer elimination.</p>","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"18 1","pages":"21"},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2022-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9063649/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81049743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Subjectivism about wellbeing rests on the idea that what is good for a person must ‘fit’ her, ‘resonate’ with her, not be ‘alien’ to her, etc. This idea has been called the ‘beating heart’ of subjectivism. In this article, I present the No-Beating-Heart Challenge for subjectivism, which holds that there is no satisfactory statement of this idea. I proceed by first identifying three criteria that any statement of the idea must meet if it is to provide support for subjectivism: Distinctness, Exclusiveness, and Explicitness. I then argue that no statement of this idea meets these criteria.
{"title":"Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?","authors":"Peter Königs","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.26","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Subjectivism about wellbeing rests on the idea that what is good for a person must ‘fit’ her, ‘resonate’ with her, not be ‘alien’ to her, etc. This idea has been called the ‘beating heart’ of subjectivism. In this article, I present the No-Beating-Heart Challenge for subjectivism, which holds that there is no satisfactory statement of this idea. I proceed by first identifying three criteria that any statement of the idea must meet if it is to provide support for subjectivism: Distinctness, Exclusiveness, and Explicitness. I then argue that no statement of this idea meets these criteria.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"165 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42083488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I point to two problems engendered by two assumptions that Hume makes. The first is his nominalism: the view that all ideas are fully determinate with respect to all the aspects that are represented in them. The second, perhaps hitherto unnoticed, is that names denote ideas. I propose some solutions, aiming to find one that is Humean.
{"title":"A Neglected Aspect of Hume’s Nominalism","authors":"Ruth Weintraub","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.31","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I point to two problems engendered by two assumptions that Hume makes. The first is his nominalism: the view that all ideas are fully determinate with respect to all the aspects that are represented in them. The second, perhaps hitherto unnoticed, is that names denote ideas. I propose some solutions, aiming to find one that is Humean.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"197 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44345920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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