Abstract I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that $ phi $ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that $ phi $ , but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’
{"title":"Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle","authors":"Simon Wimmer","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.16","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I develop a challenge to reductive views of knowing that $ phi $ that appeal to what I call a gradable property. Such appeal allows for properties that are intrinsically very similar to the property of knowing that $ phi $ , but differ significantly in their normative significance. This violates the independently plausible claim Pautz (2017) labels the ‘small difference principle.’","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"777 - 788"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42993007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract ‘Reductive Evidentialism’ seeks to explain away all ‘structural’ requirements of rationality—including norms of logical coherence—in terms of ‘substantive’ norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain its central tenet that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal nonpermissivism).
{"title":"Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic","authors":"Nader Shoaibi","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.23","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract ‘Reductive Evidentialism’ seeks to explain away all ‘structural’ requirements of rationality—including norms of logical coherence—in terms of ‘substantive’ norms of rationality, i.e., responsiveness to evidence. While this view constitutes a novel take on the source of the normativity of logic, I argue that it faces serious difficulties. My argument, in a nutshell, is that on the assumption that individuals with the same evidence can have different rational responses (interpersonal permissivism), the view lacks the resources to maintain its central tenet that an individual’s body of evidence cannot make it rationally permissible for the individual to believe logical inconsistencies (intrapersonal nonpermissivism).","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"843 - 852"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48924733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at all from its ground? By investigating the opposing responses of two of Leibniz’s most influential immediate successors, Christian Wolff and Christian Crusius, we find no easy way to remain in rationalist paradise.
{"title":"In Leibniz’s Wake: Rationalist Paradise Lost","authors":"Joe Stratmann","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.41","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at all from its ground? By investigating the opposing responses of two of Leibniz’s most influential immediate successors, Christian Wolff and Christian Crusius, we find no easy way to remain in rationalist paradise.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"517 - 539"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42764230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many philosophers now see meaning in life as a key evaluative category that stands alongside well-being and moral goodness. Our lives are assessed not only by how well they go for us and how morally good they are, but also by their meaningfulness. In this article, I raise a challenge to this view. Theories of meaning in life closely resemble theories of well-being, and there is a suspicion that the former collapse into the latter. I develop this challenge showing that it is formidable. I then answer it by offering a novel account of what meaning in life is and how it differs from well-being. The account I offer is able to resist the strongest form of the challenge while also having much intuitive appeal.
{"title":"Well-Being and Meaning in Life","authors":"M. Hammerton","doi":"10.1017/can.2023.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many philosophers now see meaning in life as a key evaluative category that stands alongside well-being and moral goodness. Our lives are assessed not only by how well they go for us and how morally good they are, but also by their meaningfulness. In this article, I raise a challenge to this view. Theories of meaning in life closely resemble theories of well-being, and there is a suspicion that the former collapse into the latter. I develop this challenge showing that it is formidable. I then answer it by offering a novel account of what meaning in life is and how it differs from well-being. The account I offer is able to resist the strongest form of the challenge while also having much intuitive appeal.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"573 - 587"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42465375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously “holds objects together as well as apart” such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity.’ I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)
{"title":"Lotze on Comparison and the Unity of Consciousness","authors":"M. Textor","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.48","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.48","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hermann Lotze argued that the fact that consciousness simultaneously “holds objects together as well as apart” such that they can be compared implies (a) that there is a simple thinker and (b) that consciousness is an ‘indivisible unity.’ I offer a reconstruction and evaluation of Lotze’s Argument from Comparison. I contend that it does not deliver (a) but makes a good case for (b). I will relate Lotze’s argument to the contemporary debate between “top-down” and “bottom-up” views of the unity of consciousness and locate it in its historical context. (Kant and Herbart figure prominently here.)","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"556 - 572"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49496658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract I defend a new account of constitutive essence on which an entity’s constitutively essential properties are its most fundamental, nontrivial necessary properties. I argue that this account accommodates the Finean counterexamples to classic modalism about essence, provides an independently plausible account of constitutive essence, and does not run into clear counterexamples. I conclude that this theory provides a promising way forward for attempts to produce an adequate nonprimitivist, modalist account of essence. As both triviality and fundamentality in the account are understood in terms of grounding, the theory also potentially has important implications for the relation between essence and grounding.
{"title":"Essence, Triviality, and Fundamentality","authors":"Ashley Coates","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.40","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.40","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I defend a new account of constitutive essence on which an entity’s constitutively essential properties are its most fundamental, nontrivial necessary properties. I argue that this account accommodates the Finean counterexamples to classic modalism about essence, provides an independently plausible account of constitutive essence, and does not run into clear counterexamples. I conclude that this theory provides a promising way forward for attempts to produce an adequate nonprimitivist, modalist account of essence. As both triviality and fundamentality in the account are understood in terms of grounding, the theory also potentially has important implications for the relation between essence and grounding.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"502 - 516"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45427992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. As long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.
{"title":"Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances","authors":"dmitri gallow","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.36","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.36","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference principle says that your credences should be aligned with the chances. My thesis is that if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles are incompatible. Anti-Humeans think that it is possible for the actual frequencies to depart from the chances. As long as you recognise possibilities like this, you cannot both spread your credences evenly and defer to the chances. I discuss some weaker forms of indifference which will allow anti-Humeans to defer to the chances.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"485 - 501"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41991341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf.
{"title":"Acting on Behalf of Another","authors":"Alexander Edlich, Jonas Vandieken","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.47","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.47","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"540 - 555"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42869426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this issue we publish memorial notices about two of the CJP’s founders, Terence Penelhum and Kai Nielsen. In addition to conveying their personal qualities and professional accomplishments, each of them vividly reminds one that it is owing largely to the supererogatory efforts of some of us, that the infrastructure is in place to help all of us thrive as philosophers. We here at the CJP are, of course, very grateful to Professors Nielsen and Penelhum for their efforts, with others, in founding this Journal. But I think that all philosophers should be grateful, not only for their efforts but for all similar below-the-radar efforts that our fellow philosophers around the world make every day. For me this especially includes our 17 Executive Editors, our Editorial Assistant, and the several hundred philosophers who help us each year with referee reports. It is impressive and humbling to see such conscientious effort put into the continued thriving of our community.
{"title":"Editor’s Introduction","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.21","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this issue we publish memorial notices about two of the CJP’s founders, Terence Penelhum and Kai Nielsen. In addition to conveying their personal qualities and professional accomplishments, each of them vividly reminds one that it is owing largely to the supererogatory efforts of some of us, that the infrastructure is in place to help all of us thrive as philosophers. We here at the <span>CJP</span> are, of course, very grateful to Professors Nielsen and Penelhum for their efforts, with others, in founding this <span>Journal.</span> But I think that all philosophers should be grateful, not only for their efforts but for all similar below-the-radar efforts that our fellow philosophers around the world make every day. For me this especially includes our 17 Executive Editors, our Editorial Assistant, and the several hundred philosophers who help us each year with referee reports. It is impressive and humbling to see such conscientious effort put into the continued thriving of our community.</p>","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it’s described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery’s psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widespread ‘internalist’ approach to the epistemology of testimony. I then appeal to the same sort of case to argue for an alternative, externalist view.
{"title":"Mental Imagery and the Epistemology of Testimony","authors":"Daniel Munro","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.42","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.42","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it’s described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery’s psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widespread ‘internalist’ approach to the epistemology of testimony. I then appeal to the same sort of case to argue for an alternative, externalist view.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"428 - 449"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46061469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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