Climate change is often described as an existential risk to the human species, but this terminology has generally been avoided in the climate-justice literature in analytic philosophy. I investigate the source of this disconnect and explore the prospects for incorporating the idea of climate change as an existential risk into debates about climate justice. The concept of existential risk does not feature prominently in these discussions, I suggest, because assumptions that structure ‘ideal’ accounts of climate justice ensure that the prospect of climate change as an extinction-level threat does not arise. Given persistent noncompliance with mitigation duties, however, we have reason to revisit these assumptions. I argue that the most promising way for theories of climate justice to account for the significance of existential risk is to look to the practices of protest and resistance in which a concern about extinction or global catastrophe is frequently given expression.
{"title":"Existential Risk, Climate Change, and Nonideal Justice","authors":"Alex McLaughlin","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Climate change is often described as an existential risk to the human species, but this terminology has generally been avoided in the climate-justice literature in analytic philosophy. I investigate the source of this disconnect and explore the prospects for incorporating the idea of climate change as an existential risk into debates about climate justice. The concept of existential risk does not feature prominently in these discussions, I suggest, because assumptions that structure ‘ideal’ accounts of climate justice ensure that the prospect of climate change as an extinction-level threat does not arise. Given persistent noncompliance with mitigation duties, however, we have reason to revisit these assumptions. I argue that the most promising way for theories of climate justice to account for the significance of existential risk is to look to the practices of protest and resistance in which a concern about extinction or global catastrophe is frequently given expression.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140239614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When discussing the extinction of humanity, there does not seem to be any clear agreement about what ‘humanity’ really means. One aim of this paper is to show that it is a more slippery concept than it might at first seem. A second aim is to show the relationship between what constitutes or defines humanity and what gives it value. Often, whether and how we ought to prevent human extinction depends on what we take humanity to mean, which in turn depends on what we value about humans. Finally, I will offer a definition of humanity that I argue offers a plausible account of when we might say humanity has gone extinct, and reflects what we value about humans, and relatedly, what many actually care about in terms of why we should be preserved.
{"title":"‘Humanity’: Constitution, Value, and Extinction","authors":"Elizabeth Finneron-Burns","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When discussing the extinction of humanity, there does not seem to be any clear agreement about what ‘humanity’ really means. One aim of this paper is to show that it is a more slippery concept than it might at first seem. A second aim is to show the relationship between what constitutes or defines humanity and what gives it value. Often, whether and how we ought to prevent human extinction depends on what we take humanity to mean, which in turn depends on what we value about humans. Finally, I will offer a definition of humanity that I argue offers a plausible account of when we might say humanity has gone extinct, and reflects what we value about humans, and relatedly, what many actually care about in terms of why we should be preserved.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140391910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines a recent argument in favour of strong precautionary action—possibly including working to hasten human extinction—on the basis of a decision-theoretic view that accommodates the risk-attitudes of all affected while giving more weight to the more risk-averse attitudes. First, we dispute the need to take into account other people’s attitudes towards risk at all. Second, we argue that a version of the non-identity problem undermines the case for doing so in the context of future people. Lastly, we suggest that we should not work to hasten human extinction, even if significant risk aversion is warranted.
{"title":"Risk, Non-Identity, and Extinction","authors":"Kacper Kowalczyk, Nikhil Venkatesh","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper examines a recent argument in favour of strong precautionary action—possibly including working to hasten human extinction—on the basis of a decision-theoretic view that accommodates the risk-attitudes of all affected while giving more weight to the more risk-averse attitudes. First, we dispute the need to take into account other people’s attitudes towards risk at all. Second, we argue that a version of the non-identity problem undermines the case for doing so in the context of future people. Lastly, we suggest that we should not work to hasten human extinction, even if significant risk aversion is warranted.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140238688","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case.
{"title":"Existential Risk, Astronomical Waste, and the Reasonableness of a Pure Time Preference for Well-Being","authors":"S. J. Beard, Patrick Kaczmarek","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we argue that our moral concern for future well-being should reduce over time due to important practical considerations about how humans interact with spacetime. After surveying several of these considerations (around equality, special duties, existential contingency, and overlapping moral concern) we develop a set of core principles that can both explain their moral significance and highlight why this is inherently bound up with our relationship with spacetime. These relate to the equitable distribution of (1) moral concern in a universe that we can only causally affect in one temporal direction; (2) access to the benefits from using spacetime as a resource; and (3) the burdens of care given (1) and (2). We conclude by considering the practical implications of our argument and find that, while it is often assumed that a preference for present over future well-being weakens the case for existential risk mitigation, this likely is not the case.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140240699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) exists despite no observed evidence, and the risks and benefits of actively searching for ETI (Active SETI) have been debated. Active SETI has been criticized for potentially exposing humanity to existential risk, and a recent game-theoretical model highlights the Hobbesian trap that could occur following contact if mutual distrust leads to mutual destruction. We argue that observing a nearby ETI would suggest the existence of many unobserved ETI. This would expand the game and implies that there may be a mechanism that prevents ETI from attacking us. As a result, the Hobbesian trap would be avoided if both parties assumed the other is not likely to attack.
尽管没有观测到任何证据，但地外智慧生物（ETI）的可能性依然存在，而积极搜寻地外智慧生物（主动 SETI）的风险和益处一直备受争议。有人批评主动 SETI 可能会使人类面临生存风险，最近的一个博弈论模型强调，如果相互不信任导致相互毁灭，接触后可能会出现霍布斯陷阱。我们认为，观测到附近的 ETI 将表明存在许多未被观测到的 ETI。这将扩大博弈的范围，并意味着可能存在一种防止 ETI 攻击我们的机制。因此，如果双方都认为对方不可能发动攻击，就可以避免霍布斯陷阱。
{"title":"Saved by the Dark Forest: How a Multitude of Extraterrestrial Civilizations Can Prevent a Hobbesian Trap","authors":"Karim Jebari, Andrea S Asker","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) exists despite no observed evidence, and the risks and benefits of actively searching for ETI (Active SETI) have been debated. Active SETI has been criticized for potentially exposing humanity to existential risk, and a recent game-theoretical model highlights the Hobbesian trap that could occur following contact if mutual distrust leads to mutual destruction. We argue that observing a nearby ETI would suggest the existence of many unobserved ETI. This would expand the game and implies that there may be a mechanism that prevents ETI from attacking us. As a result, the Hobbesian trap would be avoided if both parties assumed the other is not likely to attack.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140238394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The notion of existential catastrophe is increasingly appealed to in discussion of risk management around emerging technologies, but it is not completely clear what this notion amounts to. Here, I provide an opinionated survey of the space of plausibly useful definitions of existential catastrophe. Inter alia, I discuss: whether to define existential catastrophe in ex post or ex ante terms, whether an ex ante definition should be in terms of loss of expected value or loss of potential, and what kind of probabilities should be involved in any appeal to expected value.
{"title":"Concepts of Existential Catastrophe","authors":"Hilary Greaves","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The notion of existential catastrophe is increasingly appealed to in discussion of risk management around emerging technologies, but it is not completely clear what this notion amounts to. Here, I provide an opinionated survey of the space of plausibly useful definitions of existential catastrophe. Inter alia, I discuss: whether to define existential catastrophe in ex post or ex ante terms, whether an ex ante definition should be in terms of loss of expected value or loss of potential, and what kind of probabilities should be involved in any appeal to expected value.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140238882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Longtermists argue we should devote much of our resources to raising the probability of a long happy future for sentient beings. But most interventions that raise that probability also raise the probability of a long miserable future, even if they raise the latter by a smaller amount. If we choose by maximising expected utility, this isn’t a problem; but, if we use a risk-averse decision rule, it is. I show that, with the same probabilities and utilities, a risk-averse decision theory tells us to hasten human extinction, not delay it. What’s more, I argue that morality requires us to use a risk-averse decision theory. I present this not as an argument for hastening extinction, but as a challenge to longtermism.
{"title":"Should Longtermists Recommend Hastening Extinction Rather Than Delaying It?","authors":"Richard Pettigrew","doi":"10.1093/monist/onae003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Longtermists argue we should devote much of our resources to raising the probability of a long happy future for sentient beings. But most interventions that raise that probability also raise the probability of a long miserable future, even if they raise the latter by a smaller amount. If we choose by maximising expected utility, this isn’t a problem; but, if we use a risk-averse decision rule, it is. I show that, with the same probabilities and utilities, a risk-averse decision theory tells us to hasten human extinction, not delay it. What’s more, I argue that morality requires us to use a risk-averse decision theory. I present this not as an argument for hastening extinction, but as a challenge to longtermism.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140238900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W.E.B. Du Bois regarded social reform as a legitimate object for the scientist. This paper argues that he gave a place to nonepistemic values in scientific reasoning and, to counter the effects of scientific racism, he constructed his approach around the belief that scientists must adopt an assumption or scientific hypothesis that African Americans are human. His engagement in scientific research was a way to reform the society in which he lived, which in turn, led him to defend the faithfulness to fact as his conception of scientific objectivity. This essay examines his sophisticated theory of facts, account of the difference between the natural and human sciences, and the unique instantiation of a pragmatist theory of truth.
{"title":"The Faithfulness to Fact","authors":"Kimberly Ann Harris","doi":"10.1093/monist/onad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onad031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 W.E.B. Du Bois regarded social reform as a legitimate object for the scientist. This paper argues that he gave a place to nonepistemic values in scientific reasoning and, to counter the effects of scientific racism, he constructed his approach around the belief that scientists must adopt an assumption or scientific hypothesis that African Americans are human. His engagement in scientific research was a way to reform the society in which he lived, which in turn, led him to defend the faithfulness to fact as his conception of scientific objectivity. This essay examines his sophisticated theory of facts, account of the difference between the natural and human sciences, and the unique instantiation of a pragmatist theory of truth.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139640279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An underexamined insight of W. E. B. Du Bois’s John Brown is that John Brown worked for much of his life to cultivate democratic relationships with the Black Americans with and for whom he worked. Brown did so through practicing deference and deliberation, and by seeking authorization. However, Brown’s commitment to these practices faltered at a crucial moment in decision making: when he raided Harpers Ferry absent widespread support. Examining this aspect of John Brown brings into relief an overlooked tragic choice Brown made: To act in accordance with his own substantive vision of what justice required, Brown eschewed democratic ideals and practices that grounded the distinctive relations of equality he had cultivated with the Black communities with and for whom he worked.
W. E. B. 杜波依斯的《约翰-布朗》有一个未被充分研究的见解，即约翰-布朗一生中的大部分时间都在努力培养与美国黑人的民主关系，并为他们工作。布朗是通过尊重和深思熟虑以及寻求授权来做到这一点的。然而，布朗对这些做法的承诺在决策的关键时刻出现了动摇：他在没有得到广泛支持的情况下袭击了哈珀斯渡口。研究约翰-布朗的这一方面，就会发现布朗做出了一个被忽视的悲剧性选择：为了按照自己对正义的实质性理解行事，布朗放弃了民主理想和实践，而这些理想和实践正是他与黑人社区以及他为之工作的黑人社区所建立的独特平等关系的基础。
{"title":"You Say I Want a Revolution","authors":"Wendy Salkin","doi":"10.1093/monist/onad029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onad029","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 An underexamined insight of W. E. B. Du Bois’s John Brown is that John Brown worked for much of his life to cultivate democratic relationships with the Black Americans with and for whom he worked. Brown did so through practicing deference and deliberation, and by seeking authorization. However, Brown’s commitment to these practices faltered at a crucial moment in decision making: when he raided Harpers Ferry absent widespread support. Examining this aspect of John Brown brings into relief an overlooked tragic choice Brown made: To act in accordance with his own substantive vision of what justice required, Brown eschewed democratic ideals and practices that grounded the distinctive relations of equality he had cultivated with the Black communities with and for whom he worked.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139636745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I outline a defence of a naive group-level standpoint epistemology. According to this view then under conditions often met in real situations of oppression, it is the majority view on questions of import to those marginalised by oppression that ought to be treated as deference worthy. I further argue that this view is inspired by and coheres well with various doctrines laid out and defended by W.E.B. Du Bois, making this a recognisably Duboisian vision of standpoint epistemology. The central conceptual move is to relate principles of social epistemology under conditions of oppression that were of great interest to Du Bois with the conditions for group accuracy that have been studied by social-choice theorists working on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, as well as contemporary epistemological work on group polarisation. I argue that once these elements are brought together a surprisingly cogent case for deference to the simple majority view of the marginalised can often be made.
我概述了对天真的群体立场认识论的辩护。根据这一观点，在现实压迫环境中经常遇到的情况下，对于那些被压迫边缘化的人来说，在重要问题上，多数人的观点才值得尊重。我还认为，这种观点受到杜波依斯（W.E.B. Du Bois）提出并捍卫的各种理论的启发，并与之保持一致，因此是一种公认的杜波依斯式的立场认识论观点。其核心概念是将杜波依斯非常感兴趣的压迫条件下的社会认识论原则与研究孔多塞陪审团定理的社会选择理论家所研究的群体准确性条件以及当代关于群体极化的认识论工作联系起来。我认为，一旦将这些因素结合在一起，往往就能提出令人惊讶的有力论据，证明边缘化群体应服从简单多数人的观点。
{"title":"Duboisian Leadership through Standpoint Epistemology","authors":"L. Bright","doi":"10.1093/monist/onad032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onad032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I outline a defence of a naive group-level standpoint epistemology. According to this view then under conditions often met in real situations of oppression, it is the majority view on questions of import to those marginalised by oppression that ought to be treated as deference worthy. I further argue that this view is inspired by and coheres well with various doctrines laid out and defended by W.E.B. Du Bois, making this a recognisably Duboisian vision of standpoint epistemology. The central conceptual move is to relate principles of social epistemology under conditions of oppression that were of great interest to Du Bois with the conditions for group accuracy that have been studied by social-choice theorists working on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, as well as contemporary epistemological work on group polarisation. I argue that once these elements are brought together a surprisingly cogent case for deference to the simple majority view of the marginalised can often be made.","PeriodicalId":516548,"journal":{"name":"The Monist","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139632815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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