European Journal of Law and Economics最新文献

This study examines whether independent legal directors have more conservative attitudes toward bank CEO stock option awards compared to other independent directors. We find that the proportion of legal directors among independent directors is negatively associated with CEO stock option awards as a proportion of both total CEO compensation and total CEO stock-based compensation. Moreover, the negative effect of independent legal directorship on stock option awards is moderated by CEO ownership. Our findings indicate that independent legal directors are less willing to compensate bank CEOs with stock option awards than independent non-legal directors. However, their reluctance toward stock option awards is alleviated when bank CEOs are vulnerable to experiencing a greater wealth loss from risk-taking. Overall, we document that independent legal directors intend to constrain excessive bank risk-taking through restricting CEO stock option awards. It is worth exploring effective oversight mechanisms for bank boards to constrain risk-taking, and this study extends this research stream by revealing a specific channel that can facilitate independent directors to play an important role in overseeing bank risk-taking.

In this large-scale empirical study, we examine drivers of compliance with the first filing requirement for the Ultimate Beneficial Owners (UBO) register in Belgium, which results from the implementation of the 4th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive. Our focus on nonprofit organizations (NPOs) is inspired by their strong objection against the UBO regulation and their lower UBO compliance compared to for-profits in Belgium. We show that UBO compliance is significantly improved by the introduction of an administrative monetary fine, and is positively related to reliance on donations and grants, capacity of the organization, and NPO age. Our study implies a meaningful contribution to the scarce literature on nonprofit compliance.

We extend the law and economics analysis of spectrum management by considering the economic case for Indigenous and tribal spectrum sovereignty. We use case studies from the United States, Guatemala, Canada, and New Zealand to show that these movements seek a polycentric system of spectrum management that contrasts with the prevailing monocentric systems of spectrum management in which national governments have the primary authority over spectrum governance. Theories of polycentricity and federalism offer insight into the efficiency of Indigenous and tribal spectrum sovereignty as well as polycentric spectrum sovereignty more generally.

Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously-awarded compensation from managers involved in accounting manipulation or misconduct. In a principal-agent model, we show that strong clawback enforcement tilts managerial compensation towards the short-term but may increase manipulation. In contrast, weak enforcement alleviates the shareholders’ incentives to tilt compensation towards the short-term and reduces manipulation. While weak enforcement and lack of commitment may generate a time inconsistency problem, the clawback adoption decision may foster further governance changes that elicit ex post enforcement. We discuss the regulatory implications of the theory and its consistency with results in empirical studies.

We measure the extent that a prevailing law can affect moral and social norms. We use variations in facemask fines in the UK during the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study, as it presents us with many features of a natural experiment. Our analysis provides two important findings. First, we find that the legal status of a behaviour, that is whether the behaviour is illegal or not, is important in influencing stated compliance and moral and social norms. In contrast we find no evidence that a variation in penalties has any effect on stated compliance or moral or social norms. We consider these results are important for law makers and society, as both moral and social norms are known to be important drivers of social change, and our results show that legality influences both—thus highlighting an endogenous relationship between the law—and moral and social norms.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of Grenelle I and Grenelle II laws on financial performance, social performance, and risk-taking in France. The study is focussed on SBF120 (The SBF120 index consists of the 120 largest capitalizations listed on the French Stock Exchange market (SBF: Société des Bourses Françaises)) firms between 2005 and 2016. It provides the following results: first, it shows that after the introduction of the Grenelle I and II laws, financial performance decreased while corporate risk increased, particularly in low polluting industries. One explanation for this is that Grenelle laws are based on the comply or explain principle which may lead to adaptative and interpretative disclosure strategies. In addition, environmental regulations may involve high costs of compliance. In the short-term, environmental disclosure regulations do not drive businesses to improve their social performance: they have not been able to undertake socially and environmentally responsible projects based on good governance practices. Using the Environmental Policy Stringency EPS index to measure the stringency of environmental policy, we show that international binding laws such as the Paris Agreement, unlike locally binding Grenelle laws, are able to enhance the overall social performance through the environmental, social and governance channels. In the long-term, Grenelle laws show effective results on the environmental performance and the quality of governance which enhance the overall social performance without impairing the financial one. Finally, quantile regression analysis provides evidence that businesses are likely to increase their environmental performance at the expense of low financial and overall social performances.

Abstract

Why did the United States move from having nearly open borders from the 1840s to the 1870s to passing the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the first law in American history to ban people from entering the United States solely based on race? We argue that the standard story of nativist backlash based on wage pressure explains the demand for immigration restrictions, but not their timing or their racial focus. The demand for immigration restrictions was largely inchoate until the political restructuring that followed the Civil War. Finding themselves uncompetitive in much of the country, the Democrats seized on immigration restrictions, most notably in growing California, as a wedge issue. Chinese residents were unable to vote, thus making restrictions on Chinese entry an especially effective strategy in political economy.

Using a representative sample of 391 Serbian accounting practitioners, we explored the association between their perceptions, attitudes, and characteristics and the tax compliance of their small business clients. The majority of the practitioners surveyed believe they have a moderate to substantial impact on their clients’ tax compliance. However, this perceived influence diminishes as the number of clients increases, underscoring the importance of a personal relationship between practitioners and clients. The results also suggest that this influence is linked to the nature of the clients’ requests, the traits of the accounting practitioners, and whether the AP provides intermediation services. Firms led by male practitioners who have a web presence and a thorough understanding of the IFAC Code of Conduct tend to report a stronger impact. Notably, about three-quarters of the practitioners observed some level of non-compliance among their clients. Our multivariate analysis indicates that firms offering client training are less likely to report non-compliance. The study further investigates additional factors that could affect clients’ tax compliance.

Abstract

This article intends to provide a framework to better understand the economic problems and legal challenges resulting from the transition of the European economy to a data economy. We discuss some policy concerns surrounding the data economy, such as concentration in the data economy, anticompetitive business practices in the data economy, access to data and data sharing, data reliability, distributional effects of the data economy, and cybercrime. Moreover, we provide an overview of some important EU legal initiatives and reforms and clarify how the papers in this special issue contribute to assessing these initiatives from an economic point of view.

In 2011, Britain and France introduced affirmative action policies aiming at improving board gender mix in listed companies. While the reforms were similar in terms of target and timing, Britain opted for a ‘soft law’ (comply or explain) approach, while France enacted a mandatory quota. Using difference-in-differences analyses, we examine the differential impact of these two reforms on board composition and on women empowerment within boards. We first show that the quota has been associated with a more rapid adjustment of the gender mix without significant disruptive effects on board composition. However, we report that the quota has induced a more limited access of women to monitoring committees within boards, relative to soft law. As these committees are the most influential, this evidence shows that the quota came at a cost when considering within-board women’s influence.