British Journal for the History of Philosophy最新文献

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Mary Midgley’s Beast and man: the roots of human nature (1978): a re-appraisal 玛丽-米德利的《野兽与人：人性的根源》（1978 年）：重新评价

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-12-11 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2278065

Ellie Robson

Published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《英国哲学史杂志》（2023 年提前出版）

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Locke’s Humean conventionalism 洛克的休谟传统主义

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2268404

Eric Schliesser

This paper shows that Locke anticipates key features of Hume's more celebrated analysis of convention. It does so by developing Lenz's account of Lockean (linguistic) convention and its normativity...

本文表明洛克预见了休谟更著名的惯例分析的关键特征。它通过发展伦茨对洛克(语言学)惯例及其规范性的描述来做到这一点……

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IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2268409

Martin Lenz

Published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《英国哲学史杂志》(2023年印刷前)

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Models of contact: ontological, linguistic, medical, and political 接触模式:本体论的、语言的、医学的和政治的

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2268403

Susan James

Published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《英国哲学史杂志》(2023年印刷前)

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Social minds, social brains 社会的思想，社会的大脑

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2268407

Charles Wolfe

Published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《英国哲学史杂志》(2023年印刷前)

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The social and the medical in Hume 休谟的社会和医学

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2267095

Tamás Demeter

Published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《英国哲学史杂志》(2023年印刷前)

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Divine intersubjectivity? On Lenz on Locke 神圣的主体间性?关于伦茨和洛克

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-27 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2268406

Kathryn Tabb

Published in British Journal for the History of Philosophy (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《英国哲学史杂志》(2023年印刷前)

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Are the later Mohists preference-satisfaction consequentialists? A discussion of Daniel Stephens’ “Later Mohist ethics and philosophical progress in ancient China” 后期墨家是偏好满足后果论者吗？讨论丹尼尔-斯蒂芬斯的 "后期墨家伦理学与中国古代哲学的进步"

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-17 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2272767

Bradford Jean-Hyuk Kim

ABSTRACT The Mohists may have been the first consequentialists on earth. Their most important principles are that right action is what benefits the world and that the underlying outlook for benefiting the world is inclusive care, whereby each person receives equal consideration. The early Mohists are clearly objective-list consequentialists, whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting the most basic goods. Stephens argues that the later Mohists shift to a preference-satisfaction consequentialism whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting what happens to please individual people. Stephens argues that while the direct texts are ambiguous between an objective-list interpretation and a preference-satisfaction interpretation, the latter better explains later Mohist engagement with opponents. I argue that the direct texts actually preclude Stephens’ preference-satisfaction interpretation, which moreover has the later Mohists concede an implausible amount to their opponents.

摘要墨家可能是世界上最早的结果论者。他们最重要的原则是，正确的行为是造福天下的行为，而造福天下的基本观点是包容性关怀，即每个人都得到平等的考虑。早期墨家显然是客观清单结果论者，即造福世界等同于促进最基本的物品。斯蒂芬斯认为，后来的墨家转向了偏好满足的结果论，即造福天下等同于促进个人喜闻乐见的事物。斯蒂芬斯认为，虽然直接文本在客观清单解释和偏好满足解释之间存在歧义，但后者更能解释后来墨家与反对者的交往。我认为，直接文本实际上排除了斯蒂芬斯的偏好-满足解释，而且这种解释让后来的墨家向他们的反对者做出了难以置信的让步。

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Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl’s philosophy 认同、反思情感与美德:胡塞尔哲学中的感伤主义元素

IF 0.6 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2274636

Emanuela Carta

In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his crit...

本文主要探讨胡塞尔对认可行为的分析及其在伦理学中所扮演的角色。我表明，如果我们依靠他的批评，我们可以加深对两者的理解。

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Vitalism and panpsychism in the philosophy of Anne Conway 安妮·康威哲学中的生机论和泛灵论

2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2276719

Olivia Branscum

ABSTRACTAnne Conway (1631–1679) is often described as a vitalist. Scholars typically take this to mean that Conway considers life to be ubiquitous throughout the world. While Conway is indeed a vitalist in this sense, I argue that she is also committed to a stronger view: namely, the panpsychist view that mental capacities are ubiquitous and fundamental in creation. Reading Conway as a panpsychist highlights several aspects of her philosophy that deserve further attention, especially her accounts of emanative causation and universal perfectibility. There are also historical benefits to interpreting Conway as a panpsychist. Through its history, ‘vitalism’ has often been used to describe philosophies that draw a sharp line between living and non-living nature; surely, Conway is not a vitalist in this way. Moreover, some of Conway’s contemporaries (for instance, Ralph Cudworth and Henry More) are sometimes regarded as vitalists, but were not panpsychists. It is important to distinguish between Conway’s vitalism and her version of panpsychism and to add a term like ‘panpsychism’ to the interpretive lexicon. Otherwise, we run the risk of undervaluing Conway’s originality within her own context and beyond.KEYWORDS: Anne Conwayseventeenth-century metaphysicspanpsychismvitalism AcknowledgementsThanks to Christia Mercer, Russell Jones, Martin Montminy, Alison Springle, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and/or conversation regarding several versions of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Nicolson (Conway Letters) offered one of the first modern engagements with Conway’s thought. Contributions from Merchant followed (“The Vitalism of Anne Conway”, “The Vitalism of Van Helmont”), but it was only with the appearance of Hutton’s landmark intellectual biography (Anne Conway) that historians of philosophy began to take significant interest in Conway.2 See, for instance, Borcherding (“Loving the Body”, “Nothing Is Simply One Thing”, “A Most Subtle Matter”), Head (Philosophy of Anne Conway, especially Chapters 2 and 7), Hutton (Anne Conway), Lascano (Metaphysics), McRobert (“Conway’s Vitalism”), Merchant (“The Vitalism of Anne Conway”), Rusu (“Exceptional Vitalism”), and White (Legacy). White’s text recognizes the many meanings of ‘vitalism’ throughout the centuries (see especially Chapter 4). Head describes Conway’s vitalism as a view about the ubiquity of life in creation but offers an alternative account of “life” as “the atemporal or successive existence of a unified system” (Head, Philosophy of Anne Conway, 156).3 This gloss is not a technical analysis of the Greek.4 Many more comprehensive introductions to Conway’s philosophy are available. See, e.g. Broad (Women Philosophers), Hutton (Anne Conway), Lascano (Metaphysics), Mercer (“Conway’s Metaphysics of Sympathy”, “Conway’s Response to Cartesianism”), and Mercer and Branscum (“Anne Conway”).5 I know of one other author – A

康威声称“整个创造总是只有一种物质或实体”，这使得评论家称她为“一元论者”(7.4 [x])。然而，学者们对康威提出的一元论持不同意见。参见，例如，Borcherding(“一个最微妙的问题”)，Gordon-Roth(“什么样的一元论?”)，Grey(“本体论反对”)，Lascano(形而上学)，Mercer(“柏拉图主义在早期现代自然哲学”，“17世纪普遍同情”)，和托马斯(“康威优先一元论”)。其中一个问题与“一元论”有关，这有时意味着在本体论上多个个体共享同一种性质(物质/类型一元论)，有时意味着存在数字上的一个实体(存在/象征性一元论)。我在这里不评论一元论的争论泛心论与最近的哲学辩论有关，但这种观点已经持续了几千年。参见Skrbina(西方的泛灵论)，以了解西方背景下的泛灵论我愿意将某种版本的泛原型心理归因于康威，因为她并没有声称所有生物都具有所有的心理能力。但见下文说明1817世纪的翻译给出了感知形式的“知识”，在阿利格和CC版本中翻译为“感知”。例如，见Loptson, Principles, 108,196.18我相信，完美性要求一些基本的心理能力总是在创造中实现，但由于篇幅的限制，我将不为这一主张辩护。就上帝而言，他的心智能力总是得到充分发挥的“不仅地球和地上的事物可以在时间和它的法则下被理解[即，它们是创造的一部分]，而且太阳、月亮和星星，以及世界上每一个可见的部分以及许多不可见的部分”(5.7 [ii])正如默瑟在莱布尼茨的类似案例中所显示的那样，发散得益于柏拉图主义的传统。参见默瑟(莱布尼茨的《形而上学》，特别是第五章;“柏拉图主义是莱布尼茨哲学的核心”)。参见O 'Neill(“流体物理学”)和Schliesser(“牛顿辐射”)。康威可能对普罗提诺很熟悉(见亨利·莫尔未出版的《原理》序言，以CC印刷)。在那个时期，“斯宾诺莎主义”被理解为无神论的一种一般形式，它摧毁了上帝和创造之间的区别。参见汤姆逊的《思想体》，51 - 53页22。普格列斯(《一元论和个体化》)阐明了这种区别赫顿(安妮·康威，224)提出了不同的看法参见:“如果确定……有另一个爱的原因，……即善良……我回答说:确实应该承认善良是一个伟大的——事实上，最伟大的——爱的原因……然而，这个善良与前面已经提出的原因并没有区别，而是包含在它们之中”(7.3 [v])在拉丁语中，“或”的相关词是非排他性的“水平”:当康威写“vita vel perceptione”时，我们可以把她理解为“生活，或者如果你愿意，也可以是感知”(这两个词可以互换)(Loptson, Principles, 108)拉丁文“sub quo comprehendo capacitatem omnium modorum sentiendi, perceptionisque & cognitiis, nec non amoris”证实了我的解释(Loptson, Principles, 139)。在后面的一段(9.6 [iii])中，康威显然否认了生命和智慧之间的关系;然而，相关的句子在拉丁语中存在语法问题，与文本的其余部分不一致，甚至可能是印刷错误。见即将出版的译本中的说明参见上面的第1节。康威关于生物构成的论述超出了本文的范围。要了解更多关于组合和恒等式的内容，请参阅Thomas(“Conway on identity”)。拉斯卡诺(《形而上学》，94-98)对构成和轮回提供了有用的解释关于“存在的大链”的经典研究，请参见洛夫乔伊(存在的大链)。关于康威的物种概念和她的伦理学之间关系的更多信息，请参见格雷(“物种与善”)“正如上帝对受造物施加的所有惩罚都与他们的罪成一定比例一样，所以他们所有人——即使是最坏的人——都倾向于善良和恢复”(6.10 [iii])关于摩尔最终的二元论和他对机制的看法的变化，见里德(《亨利·摩尔的形而上学》，特别是第7章和第8章)。关于卡德沃思的观点，见艾伦(《心灵、身体和可塑的自然》)。邓肯在《唯物主义》中讨论了这两者，特别是在第3.31章，康威区分了机械运动和生命运动，并指出后者是生物的“适当运动”(9.9 [vii])。她用扔石头的例子来说明“猛烈的”机械运动，并立即将其与“由生物的正常生命和意志产生的任何运动”进行对比，表明即使是石头也有依赖于意志等心理能力的“适当”运动参见Branscum，“物质的‘最高贵的属性’”，特别是第2章。

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