Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2265970
Robert Roreitner
ABSTRACTThe idea that nous comes from without, deriving from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals II.3, became a key element in late ancient and Medieval accounts of human rationality drawing on Aristotle’s De Anima. But two very different understandings of the concept were around (often occurring next to each other): either it was taken to refer to the human capacity for thought and its origin outside the natural ontogenetic process; or it was taken to stand for the most perfect act of thought, existing separately as the supreme divinity, and becoming, hopefully, ours at the very climax of human development. This paper shows how these two influential conceptions derive from the work of the two greatest scholars of Aristotle’s school, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias, respectively. More to the point: it shows that (i) there is an intriguing philosophical story to be told of how the notion developed from one understanding to the other, this being the core of a larger story of nous from without in Western thought; and that (ii) this story sheds new light on what was at stake in the early – genuinely Peripatetic – reception of Aristotle’s account of nous (as contrasted with later, heavily Platonized, interpretations).KEYWORDS: Rationalityontogenyaristotelianismsoulmortality AcknowledgementsAn earlier version of this paper was presented at HU Berlin in July 2022. I am grateful to the audience for helpful comments and a stimulating discussion, especially Lukas Apsel, Malina Buturovic, Stephen Menn, and Zhixi Wang. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of BJHP for many valuable suggestions. The research was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (project No. 22-21829S).Notes1 See Menn, Plato on God.2 See Iuv. 10 472a22–24 and GA II.3 736b27–29, respectively. There is a third use no less puzzling than these two at GA II.6 744b21–22.3 See especially DA 90.19–91.4; and also Philoponus, InDA 518.6–8, 535.4–5.4 See e.g. Connell, “Nous Alone”, 114, 121, 129.5 See Averroes, Long Commentary, 389–91, 399, 432.6 See Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus 2.66–92, 5.386–396. For an overview of Aquinas’ account and its influence, see Haldane and Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment” or Eberl, “Aquinas’ Account”.7 For the nature of Aristotle’s inquiry, see especially the contributions by Falcon, Gotthelf, Lefebvre, and Leunissen in Falcon and Lefebvre, Aristotle’s Generation of Animals.8 The details are disputed. A major question discussed by scholars is how mechanistic or pre-programmed the whole process really is and how sensitive it is to inputs from external and internal environment. For two different approaches, see Connell, “Living Animal from Semen”, and Henry, “Aristotle on Epigenesis”.9 This, of course, does not imply that, say, a human embryo has the same essence as a horse embryo (thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry). Only the former can become a human being and only the latter can become a horse, and this must determine what
{"title":"<i>Nous thurathen</i> : between Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias","authors":"Robert Roreitner","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2265970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2265970","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe idea that nous comes from without, deriving from Aristotle’s Generation of Animals II.3, became a key element in late ancient and Medieval accounts of human rationality drawing on Aristotle’s De Anima. But two very different understandings of the concept were around (often occurring next to each other): either it was taken to refer to the human capacity for thought and its origin outside the natural ontogenetic process; or it was taken to stand for the most perfect act of thought, existing separately as the supreme divinity, and becoming, hopefully, ours at the very climax of human development. This paper shows how these two influential conceptions derive from the work of the two greatest scholars of Aristotle’s school, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias, respectively. More to the point: it shows that (i) there is an intriguing philosophical story to be told of how the notion developed from one understanding to the other, this being the core of a larger story of nous from without in Western thought; and that (ii) this story sheds new light on what was at stake in the early – genuinely Peripatetic – reception of Aristotle’s account of nous (as contrasted with later, heavily Platonized, interpretations).KEYWORDS: Rationalityontogenyaristotelianismsoulmortality AcknowledgementsAn earlier version of this paper was presented at HU Berlin in July 2022. I am grateful to the audience for helpful comments and a stimulating discussion, especially Lukas Apsel, Malina Buturovic, Stephen Menn, and Zhixi Wang. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees of BJHP for many valuable suggestions. The research was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (project No. 22-21829S).Notes1 See Menn, Plato on God.2 See Iuv. 10 472a22–24 and GA II.3 736b27–29, respectively. There is a third use no less puzzling than these two at GA II.6 744b21–22.3 See especially DA 90.19–91.4; and also Philoponus, InDA 518.6–8, 535.4–5.4 See e.g. Connell, “Nous Alone”, 114, 121, 129.5 See Averroes, Long Commentary, 389–91, 399, 432.6 See Aquinas, De Unitate Intellectus 2.66–92, 5.386–396. For an overview of Aquinas’ account and its influence, see Haldane and Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment” or Eberl, “Aquinas’ Account”.7 For the nature of Aristotle’s inquiry, see especially the contributions by Falcon, Gotthelf, Lefebvre, and Leunissen in Falcon and Lefebvre, Aristotle’s Generation of Animals.8 The details are disputed. A major question discussed by scholars is how mechanistic or pre-programmed the whole process really is and how sensitive it is to inputs from external and internal environment. For two different approaches, see Connell, “Living Animal from Semen”, and Henry, “Aristotle on Epigenesis”.9 This, of course, does not imply that, say, a human embryo has the same essence as a horse embryo (thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry). Only the former can become a human being and only the latter can become a horse, and this must determine what","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2272258
Samuel Harrison
This paper argues that the concept of dignity played an important role in the political thought of Edmund Burke. It seeks to show that, in contrast with the egalitarian and individual version of dignity associated with Immanuel Kant, Burke devised a conception of dignity that rested on reverence, grandeur and formality, to be manifested through institutions, customs, and social relations. Burkean dignity was thus closely linked with the ancient constitution. In his thought, dignity played an essential role in maintaining social stability and ensuring wise governance. This conviction informed Burke’s opposition to the French Revolution, which he feared would destroy the conditions necessary for dignity to thrive. Unpicking Burke’s understanding of dignity thus gives us new insights into the intricacies of his political thought and another perspective on his opposition to the French Revolution.
{"title":"The concept of dignity in Edmund Burke’s writings on the French revolution","authors":"Samuel Harrison","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2272258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2272258","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that the concept of dignity played an important role in the political thought of Edmund Burke. It seeks to show that, in contrast with the egalitarian and individual version of dignity associated with Immanuel Kant, Burke devised a conception of dignity that rested on reverence, grandeur and formality, to be manifested through institutions, customs, and social relations. Burkean dignity was thus closely linked with the ancient constitution. In his thought, dignity played an essential role in maintaining social stability and ensuring wise governance. This conviction informed Burke’s opposition to the French Revolution, which he feared would destroy the conditions necessary for dignity to thrive. Unpicking Burke’s understanding of dignity thus gives us new insights into the intricacies of his political thought and another perspective on his opposition to the French Revolution.","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135589381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2261515
Sabina Vaccarino Bremner
ABSTRACTA critical discussion of three recent monographs on Kantian ethics: Jens Timmermann's Kant's Will at the Crossroads, Barbara Herman's The Moral Habitat, and Mark Timmons' Kant's Doctrine of Virtue. I start by laying out some of the main claims of all three works, and then examine some of the main points of contention between them: principally, the issue of moral complexity, the derivation of duties, and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. I conclude with some remarks on how the insights of all three works might be fruitfully combined to advance the current state of thought on the structure and composition of the Kantian moral system, as well as on the sense in which it might be taken to parallel, or otherwise be related to, Kant's theoretical system.KEYWORDS: Kantpractical reasonKantian ethicsmoral psychologymoral duties Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The argument for self-perfection parallels the one for others' happiness: “Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection, which belong to the end of nature with regard to the humanity in our subject; to neglect these would perhaps be consistent with the preservation of humanity, as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end” (4:430). Both arguments thus conclude the insufficiency of a conception of morality in terms merely of limiting conditions.2 “The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane to us; we transform the latter, no doubt always in accordance with analogous laws, but also in accordance with principles that lie higher in reason (and which are every bit as natural to us as those in accordance with which the understanding apprehends empirical nature); in this we feel our freedom from the law of association (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature” (5:314). Compare Kant's positing of a teleological “kingdom of nature” as necessary in order to arrive at the formulation of a kingdom of ends (4:436n).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.
{"title":"Critical discussion of recent work in Kantian ethics: Timmermann, Herman, Timmons","authors":"Sabina Vaccarino Bremner","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2261515","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2261515","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTA critical discussion of three recent monographs on Kantian ethics: Jens Timmermann's Kant's Will at the Crossroads, Barbara Herman's The Moral Habitat, and Mark Timmons' Kant's Doctrine of Virtue. I start by laying out some of the main claims of all three works, and then examine some of the main points of contention between them: principally, the issue of moral complexity, the derivation of duties, and the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. I conclude with some remarks on how the insights of all three works might be fruitfully combined to advance the current state of thought on the structure and composition of the Kantian moral system, as well as on the sense in which it might be taken to parallel, or otherwise be related to, Kant's theoretical system.KEYWORDS: Kantpractical reasonKantian ethicsmoral psychologymoral duties Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The argument for self-perfection parallels the one for others' happiness: “Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection, which belong to the end of nature with regard to the humanity in our subject; to neglect these would perhaps be consistent with the preservation of humanity, as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end” (4:430). Both arguments thus conclude the insufficiency of a conception of morality in terms merely of limiting conditions.2 “The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane to us; we transform the latter, no doubt always in accordance with analogous laws, but also in accordance with principles that lie higher in reason (and which are every bit as natural to us as those in accordance with which the understanding apprehends empirical nature); in this we feel our freedom from the law of association (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature” (5:314). Compare Kant's positing of a teleological “kingdom of nature” as necessary in order to arrive at the formulation of a kingdom of ends (4:436n).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"41 19","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135819724","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2262547
Amber D. Carpenter
ABSTRACTDemocritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with a view that positively implies a concrete mode of practical engagement, and resources for a critical stance. Even if certain atoms end up proven incoherent, there is no danger of slipping into the morally fatal indifference of inadvertent skepticism. For the ethical implications, it matters how one arrives at one’s atomism.KEYWORDS: AtomismDemocritusVasubandhuBuddhistskepticism AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Ugo Zilioni, whose invitation to participate in a conference on atomism first prompted this work; and also the conference participants themselves, particularly David Sedley, whose contributions offered a valuable perspective on Democritus and Vasubandhu. My thanks are also due to Oren Hanner, whose invitation to participate in a conference on skepticism provided the opportunity to investigate the ethical dimensions of atomism which this paper addresses; and again the conference participants themselves, particularly Mark Siderits, were invaluable in sharpening my arguments. Audiences at the Universität Paderborn, Uppsala Universitet, Boston University, and Columbia University were terrific interlocutors, whose questions have helped to focus and clarify the ideas presented here, and Sylvia Berryman and Ugo Zilioni offered helpful comments on the penultimate draft. Nicholas Lua provided invaluable research assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Abbreviationsadv. Math. =Against the ProfessorsAKBh.=Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya [Treasury of Abhidharma, with Commentary]DK=Diels, rev. Kranz, Die Fragmente der VorsokratikerKRS=Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic PhilosophersMN=Majjhima Nikāya [Middle-Length Discourses]MP=Milindapañha [Questions of King Milinda]PTS=Pali Text SocietySN=Saṃyutta Nikāya [Connected Discourses]Notes1 Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 342. The following quotations are from pages 345, 345, and 349 of the same.2 And this is so even if one does not share Barnes’ own dismissive view of the very possibility of a meaningful connection between Democritus’ ethics with his metaphysics (see Presocratic Philosophers, 533–4).3 Aristotle in de caelo Γ4, 303a5 reports that Democritus and Leucippus “say that their primary magnitudes are infinite in number and indivisible in magnitude” (KRS 577).4 Whether atoms have weight is contested. Aristotle attributes weight to the atoms at de gen et corr. A8, 326a9; and Barnes claims “ample evidence” spe
(被构成的关系，被构成的关系，内在的关系)等于是对一种多重性的断言，认为它确实是一种真正的统一体。我认为，拒绝组合并不比坚持一个人不可能是许多人，从而把责任推给任何主张组合原则的人，去解释它如何可能是另一种情况。在这场辩论中，没有直接的论据支持或反对任何这样的原则的有效性:阿毗达摩佛教徒，像西奥多·西德(“反对分身”)将呼吁节俭;他们反对解释力。(在当代话语中，反虚无主义者也可能指出虚无主义者依赖于对“按椅子排列的选民”的吸引力;但Ābhidharmika在这里有更坚实的基础，因为他们不承认简单事物的马车式排列本身最终是真实的)。然而，关于战车部分的一些子集——让我们说，那些对其最终功能至关重要的部分(本质上是亚里士多德的选择)——为什么不是战车的真正本质的考虑，可以在卡彭特，印度佛教哲学，40-3中找到。我的《人与业相守》考虑了少数佛教徒的立场，他们似乎认为有机统一需要一些额外的解释原则;Vasubandhu在他的“论人格的否定”中反对这种佛教的人格主义立场，传统上在Abhidharmakośabhāṣya IX中找到，并且在Kapstein的第14章第一部分中有一个有用的当代翻译，我称之为“关联”，因为有充分的理由对简单地识别它们持谨慎态度——尤其是因为表面的质量并不是区分佛教区别的一方与另一方的恰当方法Vasubandhu的Abhidharmakośabhāṣya的所有翻译都改编自Pruden的翻译，并参考Pradhan的梵语版本进行了修改参见Cox，“从范畴到本体论”，讨论这两者之间的区别(以及它们的对比术语paramārthasat和dravyasat)，以及早期佛教哲学从一个到另一个的演变，以及对它们的合并。Karunadasa的《The dhamadasa The Dhammasangani》描述了经典的《阿毗达摩》(Dhammasangani)如何将samutti阐述为概念性的(paññatti/prajñapti)，以及即使在早期佛教中，终极和传统之间的区别是如何“区分那些真正独立于认知行为而存在的实体类型和那些由于认知行为本身而存在的实体类型”(20)我在《原子与取向》中详细分析了瓦苏班杜的原子论，包括他对接触问题的反驳古德曼的《形而上学宝库》(The Treasury of Metaphysics)沿着这条思路提供了详细的哲学考察，尽管他进一步声称Vasubandhu的“两层”本体论既没有文本依据，也没有论证依据(详见“原子与取向”，注释16和18)。关于Vasubandhu提供的比喻理论，参见Siderits，“佛教还原论”;和Ganeri，古典印度哲学，101-2.43简而言之:简单物不能衰变(因为那意味着部分)，而只能存在或不存在。不存在是不能通过外在的中介创造出来的，所以不存在的原因一定属于简单本身。但是，一个简单的事物不可能逐渐“实现”自身的不同部分或能力，正如它不可能逐渐腐朽一样。因此，这种导致自身毁灭的内在力量必须在原子产生的那一刻充分实现。因此，任何简单物都必须严格地具有短暂的存在它还强调了对隐含在佛法理论中的物质属性形而上学的拒绝(关于这一点，见威廉姆斯的《论阿毗达摩本体论》)，以及佛法更像事件而不是像物质的方式(关于这一点，见沃德的《佛法与数据》，尤其是第275和290页)这里的确切论点是模糊的，二十诗与Abhidharmakośabhāṣya之间的辩证关系是复杂的。但在这里，我们可以把《二十节经文》看作是为了自己的目的而提出的观点，Vasubandhu在Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.46中用自己的声音(显然)表达了这个观点Nāgārjuna质疑这种区分是否能够连贯地做出，认为个性化本身总是依赖于对比的“他者”，并且由于心理活动(见Carpenter，“依赖生起”)。Vasubandhu似乎并不觉得这是个严峻的挑战事实上，德谟克利特将感觉和思想分别视为错误信息和信息的来源，认为身体的存在是理所当然的，毫无疑问的，而且这个身体与其他身体不同。 “在《确证经》中，虽然他曾许诺将保证的力量赋予感官，但他还是谴责了感官，因为他说，‘但我们实际上并没有准确地把握任何东西，而是根据身体的状况和进入和压迫它的事物而变化’”(塞克斯图斯·恩皮利库斯，《数学》)。VII.136 (=DK 68B9) KRS 553的修改翻译当然，除非它导致柏拉图主义——柏拉图主义只是断言，心灵确实给了我们进入非感官现实的途径严格地说，德谟克利特的原子论也是如此，如果它是在一个非怀疑的柏拉图式的方向上，有一个关于可解性和可解性的强有力的描述——本质上是原子论的。(这就是说，德谟克利特必须给他的非私生子的认识方式一些适当的对象来认识)。这当然不是后来的原子论或怀疑论传统，或柏拉图本人所认可的谱系例如，我们可能担心麦克道尔或麦金太尔的观点会把概念的意义和可理解性与我们共同的实践联系起来，从而导致文化相对主义。关于麦克道尔，见他的《德性与理性》和《两种自然主义》;关于麦金太尔，请看《美德之后》，特别是第十四章和第十五章。相对主义的惨淡泥潭的幽灵是佛教内部辩论的一个关键领域，因为某些中观佛教观点似乎无法保留这样一种认识独特的终极现实的前景，因此处于有害的相对主义的危险之中;关于这一点，请参阅蒂勒曼斯的《Mādhyamika佛教能在多大程度上改革传统真理?》根据记录，历史上的普罗泰哥拉的相对主义可能实际上是一种复杂的类型，而不是柏拉图在《泰阿德图》中首先描述的反复无常的个人类型。51参见Vasubandhu的Abhidharmakośabhāṣya的序言和前两节，关于他对这一主张的阐述，我将在“解释还是洞察力?”中讨论我在“理想与伦理形成”中论证了这种非个人的、非世俗的理想的重要性，并在“解释还是洞察?”中探讨了相关的心理学含义见证了许多佛教冥想练习的本质，尤其是各种分析练习。这种冥想练习被认为是必不可少的精神修养，基本上是有益的例如，《Visudhimagga》九章中的佛陀，以及《Bodhicaryāvatāra》六章中的Śāntideva(关于这一点的讨论，见卡彭特的《没有正义的伦理》)“犯罪最小化”是目标吗?如果是这样的话，把个人从他们的社会环境中分离出来，并在内部自主意志的归属上建立责任的实践，真的能减少犯罪吗?请注意，由于这个问题只有在正确把握现实的客观、非实体和过程的本质时才会出现，所以只有当把它解释为“什么对我有益?”不再有意义了这些道德上的优势甚至在人们可能认为的理想主义的“悄悄怀疑主义”中幸存下来。这将是一个更长的故事。但瓦苏班杜自己推动阿毗达摩佛教走向理想主义;然而在他的唯心主义文本《二十诗》中，他提供了第8-10节的一瞥，说明了向成熟的唯心主义的过渡如何保留了道德实践，以及辨别和分析传统现实的优势。此外，Vasubandhu的Yogācāra，无论是在这里，还是在《三十诗》中所阐述的，都保留了最终实在(实现)与传统认识之间的明确区别。确实，保留一个不传统的终极实相是Mādhyamika candrakk ā rti不能原谅Yogācāra佛教的事情。本研究由新加坡教育部提供物质支持，研究资助号为R-607-263-215-121;还有坦普尔顿宗教信托基金，在
{"title":"Ethics of atomism – Democritus, Vasubandhu, and the skepticism that wasn’t","authors":"Amber D. Carpenter","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2262547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2262547","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTDemocritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with a view that positively implies a concrete mode of practical engagement, and resources for a critical stance. Even if certain atoms end up proven incoherent, there is no danger of slipping into the morally fatal indifference of inadvertent skepticism. For the ethical implications, it matters how one arrives at one’s atomism.KEYWORDS: AtomismDemocritusVasubandhuBuddhistskepticism AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Ugo Zilioni, whose invitation to participate in a conference on atomism first prompted this work; and also the conference participants themselves, particularly David Sedley, whose contributions offered a valuable perspective on Democritus and Vasubandhu. My thanks are also due to Oren Hanner, whose invitation to participate in a conference on skepticism provided the opportunity to investigate the ethical dimensions of atomism which this paper addresses; and again the conference participants themselves, particularly Mark Siderits, were invaluable in sharpening my arguments. Audiences at the Universität Paderborn, Uppsala Universitet, Boston University, and Columbia University were terrific interlocutors, whose questions have helped to focus and clarify the ideas presented here, and Sylvia Berryman and Ugo Zilioni offered helpful comments on the penultimate draft. Nicholas Lua provided invaluable research assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Abbreviationsadv. Math. =Against the ProfessorsAKBh.=Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya [Treasury of Abhidharma, with Commentary]DK=Diels, rev. Kranz, Die Fragmente der VorsokratikerKRS=Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, The Presocratic PhilosophersMN=Majjhima Nikāya [Middle-Length Discourses]MP=Milindapañha [Questions of King Milinda]PTS=Pali Text SocietySN=Saṃyutta Nikāya [Connected Discourses]Notes1 Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, 342. The following quotations are from pages 345, 345, and 349 of the same.2 And this is so even if one does not share Barnes’ own dismissive view of the very possibility of a meaningful connection between Democritus’ ethics with his metaphysics (see Presocratic Philosophers, 533–4).3 Aristotle in de caelo Γ4, 303a5 reports that Democritus and Leucippus “say that their primary magnitudes are infinite in number and indivisible in magnitude” (KRS 577).4 Whether atoms have weight is contested. Aristotle attributes weight to the atoms at de gen et corr. A8, 326a9; and Barnes claims “ample evidence” spe","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"75 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136023509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2268125
Patrick Hassan
{"title":"James Sully’s psychological reduction of philosophical pessimism","authors":"Patrick Hassan","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2268125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2268125","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"177 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-20DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2264359
Marie Jayasekera
ABSTRACTThis paper identifies, develops, and argues for an interpretation of Mary Astell’s understanding of self-government. On this interpretation, what is essential to self-government, according to Astell, is an agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning. The paper identifies two aspects of her theory of self-government: an ‘authenticity’ criterion of what makes our motives our own and an account of the capacities required for responsiveness to our own reasoning. The authenticity criterion states that when our motives arise from some external source without validation by our own understanding of the reasons supporting them, then they are not our own. The capacities requisite for responsiveness to our own reasoning are those of examining and evaluating our own motives and of resisting the social pressure to conform to others’ opinions. An upshot of this interpretation of Astell’s theory of self-government is that it reveals her insights into the ways ‘custom’ can undermine an individual’s ability to govern oneself.KEYWORDS: Astellself-governmentcustomfree willliberty AcknowledgementsThanks to Allauren Forbes and Sean Greenberg for detailed comments on an earlier version of the paper, as well as Michaela Manson, Donald Ainslie, Marcy Lascano, Lisa Shapiro, and audience members at the Pacific Northwest – Western Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy and the UCSD Modern Philosophy Graduate Workshop for helpful discussions of earlier versions of the material. Thanks also to anonymous reviewers for this journal for their detailed and constructive suggestions and references to the secondary literature. This paper was supported by funding from The Office of Research and Economic Development at California State University, Long Beach.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The notion of self-government is often referred to as ‘autonomy’ in the present-day literature. Commentators distinguish between various notions of autonomy employed in moral and political philosophy; the target concept of this paper is often referred to as ‘personal autonomy’ or ‘individual autonomy’. I use the term ‘self-government' because we find related notions in Astell's works and to forestall expectations of continuity with the Kantian conception of autonomy.2 I use the following abbreviations of Astell’s works: SP I = A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part 1; SP II = A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II; and CR = The Christian Religion, as Professed by a Daughter of the Church of England. References to SP I and SP II are to page numbers, and references to CR are to section numbers. Unless otherwise noted, emphases in quoted texts are Astell’s own. I present references to Locke’s Essay by book, chapter, and section.3 In so doing, this project complements and builds on other recent discussions of freedom, individual autonomy, and relational autonomy in Astell by Jacqueline Broad (Mary Astell; “Selfhood”; “Merger of Wi
笛卡尔和马勒布兰奇也认为智力是感知或接受思想的能力，但他们并不认为智力具有比较思想的能力(笛卡儿，《哲学著作》第2卷，39;马勒布兰奇，搜索，2)。笛卡尔和马勒布兰奇在意志上的分歧甚至更大:笛卡尔将意志部分定义为“我们做或不做某事的能力(即，肯定或否认，追求或避免)”(笛卡尔，哲学著作第2卷，第40卷)，而马勒布兰奇说意志是“接受倾向”的能力(马勒布兰奇，搜索，第2卷)。参见Broad，“大脑中的印象”，383-5页，讨论阿斯泰尔和马勒布兰奇关于意志和自由的概念之间的相似性关于这个问题的次要文献反映了主要文本缺乏清晰性:有些没有讨论阿斯特尔在自由意志这方面的立场(例如Springborg, Serious Proposal, 28-9)，其他人将她解释为兼容主义者(Broad, Mary Astell, 184)，还有一些人认为她是一个不兼容主义者(Detlefsen，“Custom”，85)Sarah Hutton认为，阿斯特尔在引用的段落中讨论的自由是自由意志的概念(“思想的自由”，135-6)。我偏离赫顿的观点，认为必然性和自由之间的对比不是由决定论和自由意志的概念所阐明的，而是由自治的概念所阐明的。参见本文第2节关于我们对善的感知与上帝对善的决定之间的关系，见注释43杰奎琳·布罗德强调了阿斯特尔拥有的另一种自由意志的概念，她认为马勒布兰奇的自由概念是暂停我们对特定商品的同意的权力。参见她的《大脑的印象》，她比较了阿斯特尔和马勒布兰奇，并论证了马勒布兰奇的观念是阿斯特尔将女性从男性暴政中解放出来的女权主义计划的核心阿斯特尔有两种“正确理性”的含义:一是以正确的方式使用理性，即根据她在《严肃的建议》第二部分中概述的那种笛卡尔启发的原则(例如SP II, 166ff)，另一种是“理性”的特殊概念，她在其他地方称之为“正确理性”(例如SP II, 211;CR, 249;和反思，1706年，序言，15)。Sarah Apetrei认为，阿斯特尔的理性概念可能受到了剑桥柏拉图主义的“正直比”(recta ratio)概念的影响，通过这种观念，人类承担着上帝的形象，并允许与上帝结合以及由此带来的完美(道德上的完美和理解上的完美)的可能性，尽管她不同意一些柏拉图主义者将正确理性与男子气概联系在一起。见《妇女、女权主义和宗教》，96-113页。感谢匿名评论者对这一点的澄清和对Apetrei.13的参考，Astell在《反思》中提出了类似的观点:“心灵是自由的，除了理性之外，没有什么能强迫它，这是最绝对的暴君所无法达到的”(《反思》，56)。这种将真正的自由局限于思想自由(而不是行动自由)的观念限制了她对女权主义目标的看法。见Detlefsen，“Custom”，83-5，关于这一点的有益讨论参见索瓦尔(《阿斯特尔论自由》)关于“真正自由”的另一个方面的讨论:如何将“真正自由”理解为索瓦尔所说的“内部自由”，以减轻外部约束的力量问题可能会出现，对于阿斯特尔来说，什么是“外国”原因，什么是自己之外的原因。在我看来，这个问题与我在3.1节中提到的Astell的动机有关。参见第5.1节。16 .关于阿斯特尔如何设想代理人的自我管理与遵循上帝的命令是相容的在阿斯特尔看来，女性可以用两种主要的“意愿”来代替自己的意愿:上帝的意愿和丈夫的意愿。但是，正如我将讨论的那样，阿斯特尔认为，一个行为人将自己的意志与另一个人的意志保持一致，只要她的行为得到她对自己选择和行动的原因的理解的支持，她就不会放弃她的自治。参见3.1节。第5.1节关于自治和上帝旨意之间的关系，第4节关于婚姻可能削弱女性自治能力的方式参见Buss和Westlund(“个人自主性”，第2节)，他们对所谓的“对推理的反应”的描述，以及Christman的“自主性和个人历史”，这是这种观点的一个例子在讨论我们在阿斯特尔的友谊概念中发现的关系自治方面时，Allauren Forbes指出，阿斯特尔的自我管理需要我所描述的那种意义上的真实，但她没有具体说明阿斯特尔认为是什么使动机成为我们自己的(“关系自治”，497)。 19我在这一节中发展的描述与杰奎琳·布罗德在《遗嘱合并》中对阿斯特尔的自由的描述是一致的:“一个女人是自由的，因为她是一个理性的生物，能够按照理性行使她的意志，并对他人的不合理命令提出异议或作出批判性的判断”(《遗嘱合并》，75页)。我扩展了布罗德的讨论，认为引用的段落(《反思》，56)中的“思想自由”是阿斯特尔对自治的描述的核心要素，并详细说明了相关的能力我想到的是关于个人自主，道德动机和行动哲学的讨论。参见Buss and Westlund，“个人自主”，Rosati，“道德动机”，以及Piñeros Glasscock and Tenenbaum，“行动”参见上面关于阿斯特尔的“正确理性”概念的注释12阿斯特尔关于激情或情感的概念与笛卡尔对灵魂激情的理解相似。我们作为具身生物所拥有的精神状态，激情对我们的保存是有用的，但如果不通过理性加以调节，就会具有破坏性，更糟糕的是，会成为所有奴隶中“最痛苦和最可耻的”原因(CR, 249)。见布罗德，玛丽·阿斯特尔，关于阿斯特尔关于激情及其与美德的关系的观点，84-106页我认为阿斯特尔在这段话中提到的“自然自由”就是她后来在《基督教》中提到的“真正的自由”(CR, 249)，正如我在第一节中讨论的那样，既不是自由意志，也不是行动的自由，而是判断的自由，这使我们能够管理自己事实上，神总是提供他命令背后的理由。人有时要求“盲目服从”、“无理由服从”，与之相反，上帝总是为我们的服从提供理由:“他将律法的良善和合理性摆在我们面前”(Reflections, 75)。即使有一些我们不理解的东西，最终，上帝的本性提供了“这个清晰而充分的理由来建立我们的服从，只有正义，智慧和仁慈的上帝才能享受公正和合适的东西，但这是一个理由，永远不会尊重人类的命令，除非他们能证明自己是正确的，因此也是无可挑剔的”(Reflections, 75)。同样，在《基督教》中，阿斯特尔称那些“没有我们自己的任何规则或判断，由我们的公司或任何假设的人保证强加”的人为“纯粹财产”(CR, 288)在她对良好推理和适当行动(她认为这是良好推理的结果)的讨论中，Astell还强调了涉及审慎推理的能力，包括注意力(SP II, 161 - 3,169)，手段-目的推理，适当权衡我们选择的价值，以及检查我们选择的后果(SP I, 64)。虽然我们对这些能力的适当使用对于正确行动是必要的，但我并不认为它们对于她理解什么是一个自治的主体是必不可少的自欺和傲慢是其他原因:见SP II, 207-8.28见Sowaal(“阿斯特尔的严肃建议”)关于阿斯特尔的官能概念和她的一般心灵哲学的详细描述阿斯特尔的思维规则包括:让我们自己熟悉“问题的状态”(SP II, 176)，对主体和我们在探究中使用的术语有一个明确的概念;只在思路清晰的情况下进行推理;有序地思考，从最简单的事物开始;检查主题的所有部分;等等(SP II, 176-9)。他们显然受到了笛卡儿的《话语与规则》论述以及安托万·阿诺德的《逻辑，或思维的艺术》的影响。关于笛卡尔和新柏拉图主义对阿斯特
{"title":"Mary Astell on self-government and custom","authors":"Marie Jayasekera","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2264359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2264359","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper identifies, develops, and argues for an interpretation of Mary Astell’s understanding of self-government. On this interpretation, what is essential to self-government, according to Astell, is an agent’s responsiveness to her own reasoning. The paper identifies two aspects of her theory of self-government: an ‘authenticity’ criterion of what makes our motives our own and an account of the capacities required for responsiveness to our own reasoning. The authenticity criterion states that when our motives arise from some external source without validation by our own understanding of the reasons supporting them, then they are not our own. The capacities requisite for responsiveness to our own reasoning are those of examining and evaluating our own motives and of resisting the social pressure to conform to others’ opinions. An upshot of this interpretation of Astell’s theory of self-government is that it reveals her insights into the ways ‘custom’ can undermine an individual’s ability to govern oneself.KEYWORDS: Astellself-governmentcustomfree willliberty AcknowledgementsThanks to Allauren Forbes and Sean Greenberg for detailed comments on an earlier version of the paper, as well as Michaela Manson, Donald Ainslie, Marcy Lascano, Lisa Shapiro, and audience members at the Pacific Northwest – Western Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy and the UCSD Modern Philosophy Graduate Workshop for helpful discussions of earlier versions of the material. Thanks also to anonymous reviewers for this journal for their detailed and constructive suggestions and references to the secondary literature. This paper was supported by funding from The Office of Research and Economic Development at California State University, Long Beach.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The notion of self-government is often referred to as ‘autonomy’ in the present-day literature. Commentators distinguish between various notions of autonomy employed in moral and political philosophy; the target concept of this paper is often referred to as ‘personal autonomy’ or ‘individual autonomy’. I use the term ‘self-government' because we find related notions in Astell's works and to forestall expectations of continuity with the Kantian conception of autonomy.2 I use the following abbreviations of Astell’s works: SP I = A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part 1; SP II = A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, Part II; and CR = The Christian Religion, as Professed by a Daughter of the Church of England. References to SP I and SP II are to page numbers, and references to CR are to section numbers. Unless otherwise noted, emphases in quoted texts are Astell’s own. I present references to Locke’s Essay by book, chapter, and section.3 In so doing, this project complements and builds on other recent discussions of freedom, individual autonomy, and relational autonomy in Astell by Jacqueline Broad (Mary Astell; “Selfhood”; “Merger of Wi","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"182 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135570622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2259439
Karl Axelsson
ABSTRACTAt the heart of Michael B. Gill's impressive study of the third Earl of Shaftesbury's theory of beauty is the notion of nature and its moral, aesthetic, and religious ramifications. In this article, I elaborate on one of Gill's primary claims up to a point where I think a weak spot occurs. The claim concerns nature, and the weak spot is the interpretation of Shaftesbury's references to science (natural philosophy). On the whole, Gill holds that Shaftesbury is “no enemy of a rational understanding of nature, no enemy of science” (44). While I agree with the first clause, I find the second problematic. I argue that, for Shaftesbury, a central problem with science is that it disrupts the moral and aesthetic unity of nature, a flaw shared by society's general exploitation of nature and animals.KEYWORDS: Beautyanimalssciencenature Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
{"title":"Shaftesbury on natural beauty, science, and animals <i>A philosophy of beauty: Shaftesbury on nature, virtue, and art</i> , by Michael B. Gill, Princeton & Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2022, pp. 238, £35.00 (hb), ISBN: 978-0691-22661-3.","authors":"Karl Axelsson","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2259439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2259439","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAt the heart of Michael B. Gill's impressive study of the third Earl of Shaftesbury's theory of beauty is the notion of nature and its moral, aesthetic, and religious ramifications. In this article, I elaborate on one of Gill's primary claims up to a point where I think a weak spot occurs. The claim concerns nature, and the weak spot is the interpretation of Shaftesbury's references to science (natural philosophy). On the whole, Gill holds that Shaftesbury is “no enemy of a rational understanding of nature, no enemy of science” (44). While I agree with the first clause, I find the second problematic. I argue that, for Shaftesbury, a central problem with science is that it disrupts the moral and aesthetic unity of nature, a flaw shared by society's general exploitation of nature and animals.KEYWORDS: Beautyanimalssciencenature Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136012746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-09DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2260076
Francesco Gandellini
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsFor useful discussion and comments, I wish to thank Filippo Casati, Denis McManus, Jens Pier, James Clark Ross, and Arturo Vazquez.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the University of Southampton Presidential Scholarship Scheme.
对于有用的讨论和评论，我要感谢Filippo Casati, Denis McManus, Jens Pier, James Clark Ross和Arturo Vazquez。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。本研究由南安普顿大学校长奖学金计划资助。
{"title":"Limits of intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein <b>Limits of intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein</b> , edited by Jens Pier, New York and London, Routledge, 2023, pp. xii + 308, £108.00 (hb), ISBN: 9780367689629","authors":"Francesco Gandellini","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2260076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2260076","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsFor useful discussion and comments, I wish to thank Filippo Casati, Denis McManus, Jens Pier, James Clark Ross, and Arturo Vazquez.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the University of Southampton Presidential Scholarship Scheme.","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"2016 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135142067","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2261504
Diana Quarantotto
ABSTRACTAccording to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover.KEYWORDS: AristotlemetaphysicsPrime Moverunlimited dunamis argument AcknowledgementI am grateful to the anonymous referees for reading the paper and for their useful suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 A partial exposition can be found in De caelo I.7 275b21–23, where Aristotle mentions two parts of the unlimited dunamis argument and refers to its Physics VIII.10 full version (ἐν τοῖς πϵρὶ κινήσϵως).2 The argument concerns the Prime Mover but is clearly extendable to all immovable movers that cause motion for an unlimited time. This is confirmed by the fact that, after summarizing the argument in Metaph. Λ.7 1073a5–11, in Metaph. Λ.8 1073a38 Aristotle attributes the lack of magnitude to all heavenly immovable movers. Of course, the scholars who (like e.g. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, 101–2) think that, when writing the Physics, Aristotle had not yet theorized the existence of a plurality of heavenly immovable movers (and that therefore maintain that passages such as 259b28–31 are later additions) would claim that the target of the unlimited dunamis argument, in its first formulation, is the Prime Mover alone.3 In Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.7 Aristotle understands these three properties (lack of parts, lack of magnitude, and indivisibility) as equivalent to each other, since by “parts” he means the parts into which a magnitude can be divided (for this meaning, see Metaph. Δ.13 1020a7–14, V.25 1023b12–17, Phys. VI.10 240b12–13). Further, when he claims that the mover of an eternal motion lacks parts and magnitude, he means that it is such both by itself and by accident. This is shown by the fact that he conceives the mover as a subject (i.e. the subject of a dunamis, which is the form whereby a mover causes motion: see below note 21) and that one of the hypotheses about the Prime Mover’s position is the geometrical centre of the first sphere (267b6–7), namely a point. This excludes that he understands the lack of magnitude as only per se.4 Against the traditional interpretation, Lang maintains that this argument concerns the position of the primary eternal motion, not that of the first immovable mover (Lang, Aristotle’s Immaterial Mover). For a criticism (successful in my view) of Lang’s proposal, see Judson, Heavenly Motion, 168 note 48.5 Here I focus on modern scholarship. On the Neoplatonic interpretation and use of the unl
【摘要】按照标准观点，无限杜尼米斯论证的作用(物理学VIII.10，形而上学Λ)。[10735 - 11]就是引入第一不动物的一个新性质，即它没有大小。这篇论文对这一观点提出了挑战，认为争论中的论点证明了第一个天球的永恒运动是由一个不可移动的物体引起的，而不是由一个移动的物体引起的。此外，这篇论文表明，至少在物理学中。第八，无限的杜尼米斯论证是原动机不动的主要论证。关键词:亚里士多德形而上学，质点运动，无限杜米斯论证感谢匿名审稿人阅读本文并提出有用的建议。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1在De caelo I.7 275b21-23中可以找到部分阐述，其中亚里士多德提到了无限杜尼米斯论证的两个部分，并参考了其物理VIII.10完整版本(ν το ο ς πϵρ ς κινήσϵως)这个论点与原动机有关，但显然可以推广到所有在无限时间内引起运动的不动的原动机。事实证实了这一点，在总结了Metaph的论点之后。Λ。7 1073a5-11，载于元论。Λ。[1073a38]亚里士多德把大小的缺乏归因于所有天上不可移动的物体。当然，有些学者(如罗斯，亚里士多德的《物理学》，101-2)认为，在写《物理学》时，亚里士多德还没有将多个天上不可移动的物体的存在理论化(因此，他们坚持认为259b28-31等段落是后来添加的)，他们会声称，在第一个表述中，无限杜米斯论证的目标仅仅是原动力在理论物理。VIII.10和Metaph。Λ1:8)亚里士多德认为这三种性质(无部分、无量和不可分)是相互等价的，因为他所说的“部分”是指量可以被分成的部分(关于这个含义，见元图)。Δ。13 1020a7-14, V.25 1023b12-17，物理VI.10 240 b12-13)。此外，当他声称一个永恒运动的推动者缺乏部分和大小时，他的意思是它本身就是如此，也是偶然的。这一点可以从以下事实中得到证明:他把原动机设想为一个主体(即，一个原动机的主体，这是原动机引起运动的形式:见下面注释21)，关于原动机位置的一个假设是第一个球体的几何中心(267b6-7)，即一个点。这就排除了他仅仅从本质上理解量级的缺乏与传统的解释相反，Lang坚持认为这一论点关注的是原始永恒运动的位置，而不是第一个不可移动的移动者的位置(Lang，亚里士多德的《非物质移动者》)。关于对朗的建议的批评(在我看来是成功的)，见贾德森，《天上的运动》，168注释48.5。关于新柏拉图主义对无限杜尼米斯论证的解释和使用，见Sorabji，《无限的力量》。正如他的文章标题所示，索姆森将原动力的位置的论证包括在他认为的一些“亚里士多德物理学末尾的错位段落”中(索姆森，错位的段落)参见贾德森，《天体运动》，169-71，和亚里士多德。《形而上学书》Λ， 193-4，他坚持认为无限的杜米米论证与原动机的不动性是不相容的，因为它要求原动机通过消耗和损失能量(即杜米米)来引起运动——这意味着它是变化的(即它不是不动的)。我将在《物理学》注释51.8中回到贾德森解释的这一点。亚里士多德提出了两个论证来证明并非所有的推动者都在运动:第一个是在256a4-b3处(所谓的“无限回归论证”)，第二个是在256b3-257a27处。然后是物理课。他主张存在一种持续无限时间的数值上的单一运动。他还说，这种运动是由一个永恒的不动的动者引起的，但没有为后一种说法提供任何论据——这表明他隐含地将其建立在两个物理学的结果之上。VIII.5 arguments.9关于不动的动者与被动者之间的区别，以及不动的动者与诸如热之类的情感之间的区别，见《生成与腐化》第7章。关于上文提到的《动态的动物》段落，见格列高利奇《起源》第425页。当然，正如《论动物的流动》中的城市比喻所表明的，灵魂的点状性质与它是整个被赋予灵魂的身体的形式这一事实是完全相容的参见上面的注释3.12物理学。VIII.7 260 a20-21。关于这一点，请参见下面第2节Metaph的情况。Λ更复杂，我将不在这里介绍。 【摘要】按照标准观点，无限杜尼米斯论证的作用(物理学VIII.10，形而上学Λ)。[10735 - 11]就是引入第一不动物的一个新性质，即它没有大小。这篇论文对这一观点提出了挑战，认为争论中的论点证明了第一个天球的永恒运动是由一个不可移动的物体引起的，而不是由一个移动的物体引起的。此外，这篇论文表明，至少在物理学中。第八，无限的杜尼米斯论证是原动机不动的主要论证。关键词:亚里士多德形而上学，质点运动，无限杜米斯论证感谢匿名审稿人阅读本文并提出有用的建议。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1在De caelo I.7 275b21-23中可以找到部分阐述，其中亚里士多德提到了无限杜尼米斯论证的两个部分，并参考了其物理VIII.10完整版本(ν το ο ς πϵρ ς κινήσϵως)这个论点与原动机有关，但显然可以推广到所有在无限时间内引起运动的不动的原动机。事实证实了这一点，在总结了Metaph的论点之后。Λ。7 1073a5-11，载于元论。Λ。[1073a38]亚里士多德把大小的缺乏归因于所有天上不可移动的物体。当然，有些学者(如罗斯，亚里士多德的《物理学》，101-2)认为，在写《物理学》时，亚里士多德还没有将多个天上不可移动的物体的存在理论化(因此，他们坚持认为259b28-31等段落是后来添加的)，他们会声称，在第一个表述中，无限杜米斯论证的目标仅仅是原动力在理论物理。VIII.10和Metaph。Λ1:8)亚里士多德认为这三种性质(无部分、无量和不可分)是相互等价的，因为他所说的“部分”是指量可以被分成的部分(关于这个含义，见元图)。Δ。13 1020a7-14, V.25 1023b12-17，物理VI.10 240 b12-13)。此外，当他声称一个永恒运动的推动者缺乏部分和大小时，他的意思是它本身就是如此，也是偶然的。这一点可以从以下事实中得到证明:他把原动机设想为一个主体(即，一个原动机的主体，这是原动机引起运动的形式:见下面注释21)，关于原动机位置的一个假设是第一个球体的几何中心(267b6-7)，即一个点。这就排除了他仅仅从本质上理解量级的缺乏与传统的解释相反，Lang坚持认为这一论点关注的是原始永恒运动的位置，而不是第一个不可移动的移动者的位置(Lang，亚里士多德的《非物质移动者》)。关于对朗的建议的批评(在我看来是成功的)，见贾德森，《天上的运动》，168注释48.5。关于新柏拉图主义对无限杜尼米斯论证的解释和使用，见Sorabji，《无限的力量》。正如他的文章标题所示，索姆森将原动力的位置的论证包括在他认为的一些“亚里士多德物理学末尾的错位段落”中(索姆森，错位的段落)参见贾德森，《天体运动》，169-71，和亚里士多德。《形而上学书》Λ， 193-4，他坚持认为无限的杜米米论证与原动机的不动性是不相容的，因为它要求原动机通过消耗和损失能量(即杜米米)来引起运动——这意味着它是变化的(即它不是不动的)。我将在《物理学》注释51.8中回到贾德森解释的这一点。亚里士多德提出了两个论证来证明并非所有的推动者都在运动:第一个是在256a4-b3处(所谓的“无限回归论证”)，第二
{"title":"Aristotle’s unlimited <i>dunamis</i> argument: an unrecognized proof of the immobility of the prime mover","authors":"Diana Quarantotto","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2261504","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2261504","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTAccording to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover.KEYWORDS: AristotlemetaphysicsPrime Moverunlimited dunamis argument AcknowledgementI am grateful to the anonymous referees for reading the paper and for their useful suggestions.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 A partial exposition can be found in De caelo I.7 275b21–23, where Aristotle mentions two parts of the unlimited dunamis argument and refers to its Physics VIII.10 full version (ἐν τοῖς πϵρὶ κινήσϵως).2 The argument concerns the Prime Mover but is clearly extendable to all immovable movers that cause motion for an unlimited time. This is confirmed by the fact that, after summarizing the argument in Metaph. Λ.7 1073a5–11, in Metaph. Λ.8 1073a38 Aristotle attributes the lack of magnitude to all heavenly immovable movers. Of course, the scholars who (like e.g. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics, 101–2) think that, when writing the Physics, Aristotle had not yet theorized the existence of a plurality of heavenly immovable movers (and that therefore maintain that passages such as 259b28–31 are later additions) would claim that the target of the unlimited dunamis argument, in its first formulation, is the Prime Mover alone.3 In Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.7 Aristotle understands these three properties (lack of parts, lack of magnitude, and indivisibility) as equivalent to each other, since by “parts” he means the parts into which a magnitude can be divided (for this meaning, see Metaph. Δ.13 1020a7–14, V.25 1023b12–17, Phys. VI.10 240b12–13). Further, when he claims that the mover of an eternal motion lacks parts and magnitude, he means that it is such both by itself and by accident. This is shown by the fact that he conceives the mover as a subject (i.e. the subject of a dunamis, which is the form whereby a mover causes motion: see below note 21) and that one of the hypotheses about the Prime Mover’s position is the geometrical centre of the first sphere (267b6–7), namely a point. This excludes that he understands the lack of magnitude as only per se.4 Against the traditional interpretation, Lang maintains that this argument concerns the position of the primary eternal motion, not that of the first immovable mover (Lang, Aristotle’s Immaterial Mover). For a criticism (successful in my view) of Lang’s proposal, see Judson, Heavenly Motion, 168 note 48.5 Here I focus on modern scholarship. On the Neoplatonic interpretation and use of the unl","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134975379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2023.2259432
Emily Kress
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsThanks to Sukaina Hirji for reading a draft of this review.Notes1 See also Nielsen, “Private Parts of Animals” (378), developing Witt, “Form, Normativity, and Gender”.2 I agree with Gelber that we need a distinction between being “defective with respect to the ability to concoct” and “being defective results of the generative process” (“Females in Aristotle’s Embryology”, 175); my question is (in the first instance) about the latter.3 As Charles (“Aristotle on Agency”, n. 24) notes; see Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (24n14: “[t]he other conditional capacities it possesses, e.g. to ψ if partially impeded, will be realisations of the same capacity under differing circumstances”) and Kress, “Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation” (185–6). See also Makin, Aristotle: Metaphysics Book θ, on views that “identif[y] the content of a capacity with what its bearer does under ideal circumstances” (105; see 122 on De Caelo).4 One thus might resist by arguing that to fully concoct is to hit a ‘threshold’ – but then we need a further account of the relevant standard for (further) perfection, if it does not come from the capacity and is yet a standard for the process and not its result (see n. 2).5 Hirj: “the art of shoemaking has, internal to it, a certain kind of normative standard: its fullest expression is not just in producing shoes, but in produing [sic] excellent shoes” (“External Goods”, 47). When a shoemaker “produces a mediocre shoe, even if it is the best shoe she could produce given the limited materials available”, she “falls short” (47).
{"title":"Aristotle on sexual difference: metaphysics, biology, politics <b>Aristotle on sexual difference: metaphysics, biology, politics</b> , by Marguerite Deslauriers, New York, Oxford University Press, 2022, pp. xvi + 354, $110.00 (hb), ISBN: 978-0-19-760618-6","authors":"Emily Kress","doi":"10.1080/09608788.2023.2259432","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2259432","url":null,"abstract":"Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size AcknowledgementsThanks to Sukaina Hirji for reading a draft of this review.Notes1 See also Nielsen, “Private Parts of Animals” (378), developing Witt, “Form, Normativity, and Gender”.2 I agree with Gelber that we need a distinction between being “defective with respect to the ability to concoct” and “being defective results of the generative process” (“Females in Aristotle’s Embryology”, 175); my question is (in the first instance) about the latter.3 As Charles (“Aristotle on Agency”, n. 24) notes; see Charles, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (24n14: “[t]he other conditional capacities it possesses, e.g. to ψ if partially impeded, will be realisations of the same capacity under differing circumstances”) and Kress, “Aristotle on Spontaneous Generation” (185–6). See also Makin, Aristotle: Metaphysics Book θ, on views that “identif[y] the content of a capacity with what its bearer does under ideal circumstances” (105; see 122 on De Caelo).4 One thus might resist by arguing that to fully concoct is to hit a ‘threshold’ – but then we need a further account of the relevant standard for (further) perfection, if it does not come from the capacity and is yet a standard for the process and not its result (see n. 2).5 Hirj: “the art of shoemaking has, internal to it, a certain kind of normative standard: its fullest expression is not just in producing shoes, but in produing [sic] excellent shoes” (“External Goods”, 47). When a shoemaker “produces a mediocre shoe, even if it is the best shoe she could produce given the limited materials available”, she “falls short” (47).","PeriodicalId":51792,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the History of Philosophy","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135386400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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