Pub Date : 2022-12-06DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060002
James T. Hall
{"title":"Christopher Freiman, Why It’s OK to Ignore Politics","authors":"James T. Hall","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43368171","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-06DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060003
Theresa Lopez
{"title":"S. Matthew Liao (ed.), Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of Morality","authors":"Theresa Lopez","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41944952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-25DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223791
M. Giavazzi
It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is the one that should be followed or enacted. Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms.
{"title":"The Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters: Towards an Assertion-Based Account","authors":"M. Giavazzi","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223791","url":null,"abstract":"It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities.\u0000In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is the one that should be followed or enacted.\u0000Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44631542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-16DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223786
Mario I. Juarez-Garcia, A. Schaefer
Several political philosophers have recently pointed out that current electoral democracies fail to facilitate accurate and reliable feedback on the performance of public officials. Rather than rejecting democracy as a hopeless ideal, we defend an institutional reform called Service Responsibility, which introduces a superior incentive structure that better aligns the interests of citizens and public officials. Service Responsibility requires increasing or decreasing the income of public officials insofar as they succeed or fail to achieve democratically chosen goals. Later, we consider an alternative institutional scheme, recently proposed by Claudio López-Guerra: Piloting Responsibility. According to this alternative proposal, public officials must utilize a public provider whenever they seek out a basic service. We show that Piloting Responsibility fails to realize this ideal by generating a perverse incentive structure for public officials. We conclude that Service Responsibility outperforms both the status quo and Piloting Responsibility as an institutional scheme for ensuring competent governance and public justification.
{"title":"Public Servants","authors":"Mario I. Juarez-Garcia, A. Schaefer","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223786","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Several political philosophers have recently pointed out that current electoral democracies fail to facilitate accurate and reliable feedback on the performance of public officials. Rather than rejecting democracy as a hopeless ideal, we defend an institutional reform called Service Responsibility, which introduces a superior incentive structure that better aligns the interests of citizens and public officials. Service Responsibility requires increasing or decreasing the income of public officials insofar as they succeed or fail to achieve democratically chosen goals. Later, we consider an alternative institutional scheme, recently proposed by Claudio López-Guerra: Piloting Responsibility. According to this alternative proposal, public officials must utilize a public provider whenever they seek out a basic service. We show that Piloting Responsibility fails to realize this ideal by generating a perverse incentive structure for public officials. We conclude that Service Responsibility outperforms both the status quo and Piloting Responsibility as an institutional scheme for ensuring competent governance and public justification.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47875081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-01DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223972
Amy Berg
It seems as though we have a duty to read the news – that we’re doing something wrong when we refuse to pay attention to what’s going on in the world. But why? I argue that some plausible justifications for a duty to read the news fail to fully explain this duty: it cannot be justified only by reference to its consequences, or as a duty of democratic citizenship, or as a self-regarding duty. It can, however, be justified on the grounds that we have a positive, imperfect duty of respect for strangers, even when our actions don’t affect them directly. Reading the news is a key way, sometimes the only way, that we can respect those who are strangers to us. I close by considering some of the implications and limitations of this duty.
{"title":"Is There a Duty to Read the News?","authors":"Amy Berg","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223972","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000It seems as though we have a duty to read the news – that we’re doing something wrong when we refuse to pay attention to what’s going on in the world. But why? I argue that some plausible justifications for a duty to read the news fail to fully explain this duty: it cannot be justified only by reference to its consequences, or as a duty of democratic citizenship, or as a self-regarding duty. It can, however, be justified on the grounds that we have a positive, imperfect duty of respect for strangers, even when our actions don’t affect them directly. Reading the news is a key way, sometimes the only way, that we can respect those who are strangers to us. I close by considering some of the implications and limitations of this duty.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44722026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19050002
Ilya Zrudlo
{"title":"Catherine A. Darnell and Kristján Kristjánsson (eds.), Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice: Are Virtues Local or Universal?","authors":"Ilya Zrudlo","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19050002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19050002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45629590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19050004
Paul T. Wilford, Nathan Davis
{"title":"Lise van Boxel, Warspeak: Nietzsche’s Victory over Nihilism","authors":"Paul T. Wilford, Nathan Davis","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19050004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19050004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45099410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19050003
Hrishikesh Joshi
{"title":"Aaron Smuts, Welfare, Meaning, and Worth","authors":"Hrishikesh Joshi","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19050003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19050003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44688504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19050001
I. Kidd
{"title":"R. K. DeYoung, Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and Their Remedies","authors":"I. Kidd","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19050001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19050001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42336579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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