East Asia最新文献

As part of a larger study, this paper presents findings from my exploration of discourses about China-US geopolitics through popular discussions on Chinese international students (CIS) who are attending American universities during the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. The study seeks to advance scholarship for international students attending American colleges, with particular implications for Chinese students, as agents of geopolitical relations. In doing so, it investigates (a) how these students are represented in American media and (b) the criticality of international geopolitics in the mobility of international students. The findings reveal that American popular media sources assume a tone when writing about CIS that may stem from a deeper anti-Chinese sentiment that exists in the US. They also suggest that American institutions of higher education, and American companies that employ CIS after graduation, treat these students as imported subjects/objects that support America's intellectual and economic advancement. In doing so, the media perpetuates narratives of geopolitical tensions between the United States and China, while representing CIS as unwitting agents of those tensions. The study seeks to advance scholarship on international students attending US colleges, particularly those from China, during an era of rising populism and right-wing movements in the US coupled with rapidly deteriorating US-China relations.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12140-023-09409-5.

The article explores connectivity from the prism of multilateral development banks. It recognises that theorising on connectivity is increasing, but as connectivity agency is less addressed, it aims to contribute to discussions on who the agents of connectivity are and how they contribute thereto. By analysing the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) respectively, the article sets forth a three-dimensional agency: strategic, developmental and financial. This is in line with the multi-layered nature of the banks, which reflects the broader member states and key state interests. Next to their role as banks, they contribute to the understanding of development, in addition to which they represent key shareholder interests. The banks are both to be seen as nodes of connectivity and as active agents in realising connectivity for others.

This short introduction to the Special Issue entitled "Theory and Practice of Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific - Spheres, Logics, and Regional Dynamics" serves four objectives. It first briefly outlines the rationale for theoretical and empirical engagement with the concept of connectivity, which has become a ubiquitous term in the policy parlance of key global actors in recent years. The introduction then provides a short leader on the connectivity initiatives of key players, specifically China, the USA, Japan, the European Union, and Russia, with a particular focus on the Indo-Pacific space. Third, the seven articles that comprise the Special Issue are summarised. The contributions include a theoretically and conceptually oriented lead article, which introduces an analytical framework for the study of connectivity, and six more empirically motivated contributions that draw upon the said framework. Finally, key takeaways arising from the articles with respect to a broader research agenda on connectivity are discussed.

Russia's foreign policy concept, last updated in 2023, envisioned economic and political cooperation with countries of the Asia-Pacific as important for advancing Russia's agenda as a global power and emphasised the need to improve connectivity across Eurasia. This article applies a novel theoretical framework for analysing Russia's approach to connectivity in Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Drawing from policy documents and secondary sources, the article identifies three different geographical spaces targeted by Russian connectivity policy: East of the Russian Federation, post-Soviet Central Asia, and Greater Eurasia. It is argued that the attempts to improve the cooperative connectivity of the Russian Far East have been half-hearted. In contrast, the attempt to retain and rebuild connectivity within the post-Soviet space has followed the logics of competition, containment, and coercion. Moreover, by promoting the Greater Eurasian Partnership, Russia has sought to keep status equality with China against the backdrop of the latter's Belt and Road Initiative. The article maintains that Russia is a connectivity actor of its own right, even if there is a major gap between its connectivity strategy and its implementation. It further suggests that the war in Ukraine has accelerated the trend towards coercion and disconnectivity.

This article explores how the USA and Japan have aimed to advance connectivity and infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific, implicitly or explicitly in response to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both actors' vision, strategies, and policies have been rolled out under the banner of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP). The article first frames connectivity and the FOIP construct in the context of regional order and great-power relations in the Indo-Pacific. It then provides an in-depth assessment of the different initiatives by the USA and Japan, scrutinizing their progress on the ground, shortcomings, and relevant interlinkages. After an analysis of the logics that inform these connectivity initiatives, the article offers three key axioms and assesses implications for order more broadly. First, the West must fix the gap that often exists between rhetoric and capabilities in the sphere of infrastructure investments. Second, Western actors, including the USA and Japan, need to be clear about objectives. Namely, they must decide whether the aim of connectivity is to compete directly with China or to focus on complementarities and comparative advantages. Third, the USA and Japan need to prioritize connections and spheres of connectivity that are deemed strategically central, at the expense of others. More generally, given the connective logics that key actors currently harness, a fracturing of the region into one of the different orders comprising competing yet overlapping connections beckons.

IR literature has become inundated with different descriptions for the future of international order. The coming age is purportedly marked by China's ascendancy, American decline, a leaderless "no-one's world", or multiple competing modernities. Yet the global fight against climate change or shared COVID-19 strategies convey a different image of the world's predicament. The situation appears paradoxical: increasingly tense great-power relations are mixed with ever-strengthening interdependencies. This article contributes to these debates by exploring how global orders as well as regionalism today are increasingly defined by various types of connective functional links between intentional actors at various levels of social organisation. To enable a nuanced analysis, the article introduces an analytical framework composed of six connectivity logics, namely cooperation, copying, cushioning, contestation, containment, and coercion. These play out differently within material, economic, institutional, knowledge, people-to-people, and security spheres. The utility of this article's approach is demonstrated through empirical examples related to the policies of key actors in the Indo-Pacific region.

After World War II, Japan became a major recipient of foreign aid from the USA. As Japan's economy improved in the 1960s, it played a significant role as a global aid donor in world politics through its Official Development Assistance (ODA). This commitment continued into the 1990s when Japan, as one of the leading proponents of the concept of human security, began providing humanitarian aid to more countries across the globe. To better understand the notion of human security in international politics, this paper examines Japan's endorsement of the concept in its foreign policy strategy. This paper provides an overview and critical assessment of Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the state of Sabah in East Malaysia from 2000 to 2021. This paper argues that different contexts and circumstances in the state of Sabah require further study, especially for understanding Japan's focus and concern in the area of basic human security needs, as enshrined in the GGP philosophy. Despite Japan's GGP objective as part of its foreign policy to promote human development, the execution of its foreign aid in Sabah does have issues. This paper concludes that the implementation of Japan's GGP necessitates greater inclusion, particularly for other vulnerable groups and underdeveloped areas in Sabah. Despite Japan's GGP objective as part of its foreign policy to promote human development, the execution of its foreign aid in Sabah does have issues. This paper concludes that the implementation of Japan's GGP necessitates greater inclusion, particularly for other vulnerable groups and underdeveloped areas in Sabah.