This presentation considers the aims of critical tax studies and offers three suggestions. First, critical tax papers too often fixate on taxes as both the problem and the solution. In many cases, in particular when progressivity is the aim, public spending is the better policy lever. Second, one should not concede that taxation imposes an inexorable tradeoff between efficiency and equity goals. This again understates the importance of the spending side of things. Taxes are a necessary cost of funding spending, and spending in turn, by reaching places where markets are incomplete, can have efficiency payoffs greater than the deadweight loss of taxation. That is, even a leaky bucket can extinguish a fire. To this end, recent research has pointed to the role of well-designed government spending in encouraging an “inclusive economy,” in which growth is both faster and more broadly shared than would otherwise be the case. Finally, the presentation urges that more work be done on the rhetoric of public finance economics. Both the structure and the vocabulary of standard presentations contained unexamined biases that color the outcomes of policy debates.
{"title":"Critical Tax Thinking","authors":"Edward D. Kleinbard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3373965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3373965","url":null,"abstract":"This presentation considers the aims of critical tax studies and offers three suggestions. First, critical tax papers too often fixate on taxes as both the problem and the solution. In many cases, in particular when progressivity is the aim, public spending is the better policy lever. Second, one should not concede that taxation imposes an inexorable tradeoff between efficiency and equity goals. This again understates the importance of the spending side of things. Taxes are a necessary cost of funding spending, and spending in turn, by reaching places where markets are incomplete, can have efficiency payoffs greater than the deadweight loss of taxation. That is, even a leaky bucket can extinguish a fire. To this end, recent research has pointed to the role of well-designed government spending in encouraging an “inclusive economy,” in which growth is both faster and more broadly shared than would otherwise be the case. Finally, the presentation urges that more work be done on the rhetoric of public finance economics. Both the structure and the vocabulary of standard presentations contained unexamined biases that color the outcomes of policy debates.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78488386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Devereux, A. Auerbach, M. Keen, P. Oosterhuis, W. Schoen, J. Vella
This chapter sets out our first detailed reform proposal: the Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPAI). This is one of a family of schemes based on separating multinational profit into ‘routine’ and ‘residual’ profit, a distinction that exists under the current system. The RPAI allocates the right to tax routine profit to the country where functions and activities take place. It allocates the right to tax residual profit to the market, or destination, country where sales are made to third parties. We evaluate the RPAI against our five criteria. We conclude that while it is far from perfect, it performs well against these criteria. Its superior performance stems primarily from allocating taxing rights for residual profit to the destination country, where there is a relatively immobile third party purchaser of goods and services sold by the company.
{"title":"Residual Profit Allocation by Income","authors":"M. Devereux, A. Auerbach, M. Keen, P. Oosterhuis, W. Schoen, J. Vella","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3358291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3358291","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter sets out our first detailed reform proposal: the Residual Profit Allocation by Income (RPAI). This is one of a family of schemes based on separating multinational profit into ‘routine’ and ‘residual’ profit, a distinction that exists under the current system. The RPAI allocates the right to tax routine profit to the country where functions and activities take place. It allocates the right to tax residual profit to the market, or destination, country where sales are made to third parties. We evaluate the RPAI against our five criteria. We conclude that while it is far from perfect, it performs well against these criteria. Its superior performance stems primarily from allocating taxing rights for residual profit to the destination country, where there is a relatively immobile third party purchaser of goods and services sold by the company.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77964680","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Today’s tax code contains a dizzying array of loss-limiting provisions, serving a wide range of purposes. Some are normative, such as the ban on deducting personal losses, but the vast majority are designed to prevent taxpayers from manipulating the tax rules to gain advantages tax authorities did not intend. These anti-abuse provisions can add significant complexity to the law and are often over- or under-inclusive, sometimes both at the same time. Most articles considering loss limiting provisions focus on only one or two provisions in isolation. This article takes a more comprehensive approach with two key goals. The first is to describe and categorize the different provisions to identify common abuses, key features of the tax law that create the conditions for abuse, and the different techniques used to prevent abuse. The second is to consider and suggest potential changes to these provisions to reduce complexity and improve their efficacy.
{"title":"Lost in Translation","authors":"A. Chodorow","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv1q16rrn.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1q16rrn.6","url":null,"abstract":"Today’s tax code contains a dizzying array of loss-limiting provisions, serving a wide range of purposes. Some are normative, such as the ban on deducting personal losses, but the vast majority are designed to prevent taxpayers from manipulating the tax rules to gain advantages tax authorities did not intend. These anti-abuse provisions can add significant complexity to the law and are often over- or under-inclusive, sometimes both at the same time. Most articles considering loss limiting provisions focus on only one or two provisions in isolation. This article takes a more comprehensive approach with two key goals. The first is to describe and categorize the different provisions to identify common abuses, key features of the tax law that create the conditions for abuse, and the different techniques used to prevent abuse. The second is to consider and suggest potential changes to these provisions to reduce complexity and improve their efficacy.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78778007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This comment was filed in response to the G20/OECD Inclusive Forum’s Public Consultation Document on Addressing the Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy. The comment supports a re-alignment of the division of corporate income between source and residence countries that is not restricted to digitalized businesses. The comment seeks to contribute to the discussion by outlining a framework for taxing a nonresident taxpayer that is “heavily involved in the economic life of a jurisdiction without a significant physical presence” and includes description of a methodology for attributing income to a non-physical permanent establishment using existing income tax principles.
{"title":"Comment on Selected Aspects of Proposals in Public Consultation Document on Addressing the Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy","authors":"Stephen E. Shay","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3349186","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3349186","url":null,"abstract":"This comment was filed in response to the G20/OECD Inclusive Forum’s Public Consultation Document on Addressing the Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy. The comment supports a re-alignment of the division of corporate income between source and residence countries that is not restricted to digitalized businesses. The comment seeks to contribute to the discussion by outlining a framework for taxing a nonresident taxpayer that is “heavily involved in the economic life of a jurisdiction without a significant physical presence” and includes description of a methodology for attributing income to a non-physical permanent establishment using existing income tax principles.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87563689","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The need for a global response to the challenges presented by the digitalisation of the economy has been magnified due to various unilateral "interim" measures that countries have begun to adopt. This is because these unilateral measures could fall outside the scope of tax treaties, and result in harmful double taxation. The OECD's public consultation document proposes to design such a global response by amending the existing nexus and profit allocation rules. The terms “nexus rules” and “profit allocation” can be viewed from two perspectives: a. tax claims made by countries under their internal tax laws; and b. restrictions imposed on these claims by tax treaties. It is generally acknowledged that countries, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to claim taxing rights in any manner as they may deem fit, although their ability to enforce them may be limited in the case of cross-border scenarios. Given the abundance of ways in which countries may seek to tax their residents and non-residents’ income (whether it emanates from their participation in the digital economy or otherwise), the ends of harmonisation and certainty seem best served through the medium of income tax treaties. This contribution reviews the proposals made in the public consultation document from the perspective of tax treaties.
{"title":"Re: Public Consultation Document: Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the Economy (13 February-6 March, 2019)","authors":"Dhruv Sanghavi, Julia Uchańska, Pál Sóvág","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3349119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3349119","url":null,"abstract":"The need for a global response to the challenges presented by the digitalisation of the economy has been magnified due to various unilateral \"interim\" measures that countries have begun to adopt. This is because these unilateral measures could fall outside the scope of tax treaties, and result in harmful double taxation. The OECD's public consultation document proposes to design such a global response by amending the existing nexus and profit allocation rules. \u0000 \u0000The terms “nexus rules” and “profit allocation” can be viewed from two perspectives: a. tax claims made by countries under their internal tax laws; and b. restrictions imposed on these claims by tax treaties. It is generally acknowledged that countries, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to claim taxing rights in any manner as they may deem fit, although their ability to enforce them may be limited in the case of cross-border scenarios. Given the abundance of ways in which countries may seek to tax their residents and non-residents’ income (whether it emanates from their participation in the digital economy or otherwise), the ends of harmonisation and certainty seem best served through the medium of income tax treaties. \u0000 \u0000This contribution reviews the proposals made in the public consultation document from the perspective of tax treaties.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77511678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the tax treatment of intangibles in Canada and recent developments internationally. It suggests that the special features of intangibles and the rapid rise of intangibles as value-drivers in the global economy may render existing tax rules inadequate in defining Canada’s tax base and/or competing for investment in research and development in Canada. Recent developments at the international level (such as the BEPS Project) and national level (such as US 2018 tax reform and changes in Japan, UK and China to implement BEPS recommendations) may point to some directions for Canada to consider.
{"title":"Taxation of Intangibles","authors":"Jinyan Li, Angelo Nikolakakis, N. Bao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3664024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3664024","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the tax treatment of intangibles in Canada and recent developments internationally. It suggests that the special features of intangibles and the rapid rise of intangibles as value-drivers in the global economy may render existing tax rules inadequate in defining Canada’s tax base and/or competing for investment in research and development in Canada. Recent developments at the international level (such as the BEPS Project) and national level (such as US 2018 tax reform and changes in Japan, UK and China to implement BEPS recommendations) may point to some directions for Canada to consider.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72505809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How can Congress’ codifying the taxpayer bill of rights make a meaningful difference for tax administration? This is a question that will likely confront academics, policymakers and judges in the next few years. In late 2015, Congress codified the rights that the Internal Revenue Service administratively adopted in 2014, explicitly requiring that the Commissioner ensure that IRS employees receive training and act in accord with them. A recent article by Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein refers to the codification of TBOR having the power to “transform the tax practice and the relationship between taxpayers and the IRS.” Yet the statute itself is silent on the practical effect of IRS violations of any of the rights and fails to include a specific remedy or enforcement mechanism when the IRS acts inconsistently with or violates those rights. In Facebook v IRS, a federal district court concluded that at least with respect to one of the enumerated taxpayer rights (the right to appeal a decision in an independent forum), the right is not enforceable by taxpayers. This development highlights a central weakness in the current law, namely that there is no formal way to ensure that IRS employees act consistently with or even consider taxpayer rights. In this essay I propose a way to change this shortcoming. I argue that we should focus on rulemaking as a way to operationalize taxpayer rights. Congress should explicitly require the IRS to consider the impact of guidance on taxpayer rights prior to promulgating regulations and other guidance. In so doing, Congress should rely on and expand the role of the office within the IRS that is deeply associated with the increased importance of taxpayer rights, the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS).
{"title":"Giving Taxpayer Rights a Seat at the Table","authors":"Leslie M. Book","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3331332","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3331332","url":null,"abstract":"How can Congress’ codifying the taxpayer bill of rights make a meaningful difference for tax administration? This is a question that will likely confront academics, policymakers and judges in the next few years. In late 2015, Congress codified the rights that the Internal Revenue Service administratively adopted in 2014, explicitly requiring that the Commissioner ensure that IRS employees receive training and act in accord with them. A recent article by Professors Alice Abreu and Richard Greenstein refers to the codification of TBOR having the power to “transform the tax practice and the relationship between taxpayers and the IRS.” Yet the statute itself is silent on the practical effect of IRS violations of any of the rights and fails to include a specific remedy or enforcement mechanism when the IRS acts inconsistently with or violates those rights. In Facebook v IRS, a federal district court concluded that at least with respect to one of the enumerated taxpayer rights (the right to appeal a decision in an independent forum), the right is not enforceable by taxpayers. This development highlights a central weakness in the current law, namely that there is no formal way to ensure that IRS employees act consistently with or even consider taxpayer rights. In this essay I propose a way to change this shortcoming. I argue that we should focus on rulemaking as a way to operationalize taxpayer rights. Congress should explicitly require the IRS to consider the impact of guidance on taxpayer rights prior to promulgating regulations and other guidance. In so doing, Congress should rely on and expand the role of the office within the IRS that is deeply associated with the increased importance of taxpayer rights, the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS).","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84456706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to recent research’s prediction, global GDP could be up to 14% higher in 2030 as a result of various artificial intelligence (AI) applications, which is the equivalent of an additional $15.7 trillion. It makes AI oriented sectors the biggest commercial opportunity in the currently supersonic fast changing economy. This contribution, perhaps surprisingly, does not aim to propose how to tax profits generated by AI industries. The author rather takes an attempt to depict a potential of AI technologies to be applied to tax law. Let us see if AI can be happily married with tax law in order to get the best of both worlds.
{"title":"The Marriage of Artificial Intelligence and Tax Law: Past, Present, and Future","authors":"Błażej Kuźniacki","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3323867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3323867","url":null,"abstract":"According to recent research’s prediction, global GDP could be up to 14% higher in 2030 as a result of various artificial intelligence (AI) applications, which is the equivalent of an additional $15.7 trillion. It makes AI oriented sectors the biggest commercial opportunity in the currently supersonic fast changing economy. This contribution, perhaps surprisingly, does not aim to propose how to tax profits generated by AI industries. The author rather takes an attempt to depict a potential of AI technologies to be applied to tax law. Let us see if AI can be happily married with tax law in order to get the best of both worlds.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82764970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The legacies of Margaret Thatcher and Barack Obama are alike intertwined with failed per capita taxes: Thatcher’s infamous local government poll tax and the individual mandate tax at the heart of Obama’s signature health care reform. Examining these two taxes together reveals that—despite the pronounced differences between the two political leaders—both taxes were conceived, enacted, met with virulent popular opposition, and ultimately repealed under remarkably parallel processes. Both taxes arose out of essentially the same economic idea, and in fact, this animating idea originated from the same small network of think-tank economists in both cases. Crucially, economic theory served as both the technical basis and the moral justification for the taxes. The Thatcher poll tax was morally justified as necessary to increase local government “accountability,” defined economically such that an accountable government is one where all citizens equally bear the full marginal cost of local government spending increases. Likewise, the moral basis of the individual mandate tax was “responsibility,” defined in economic terms such that a responsible person is one who bears the marginal cost imposed on society by their decision not to purchase health insurance. Neither Thatcher nor Obama conceived of or initially supported their respective per capita taxes, which instead arose from small, relatively isolated groups, heavily influenced by academic economists. Accordingly, the taxes were designed to fit abstract economic theories crafted by experts, with little regard for popular opinion or practical and historical experience. Not surprisingly, the taxes proved highly unpopular and hard to implement, imposing heavy political costs on Thatcher, Obama, and their respective parties. Despite the intense opposition from the populace, the major opposition parties initially either supported or at least accepted the taxes, only opposing them after popular anger became undeniable. The real fault lines that emerged were between the establishment political class and the majority of the electorate. This division was characterized by a preference for expert administration based on science—especially neoliberal economic theory—on the one hand, and a preference for popular sovereignty informed by traditional notions of fairness on the other. Popular perceptions of unfairness were amplified by the regressive nature of the taxes, and I argue that regressivity was a logical consequence of the economic theories undergirding the taxes.
{"title":"The Parallel Head Taxes of Margaret Thatcher and Barack Obama: Economics As Morality and Its Populist Rejection","authors":"Joshua Cutler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3321244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3321244","url":null,"abstract":"The legacies of Margaret Thatcher and Barack Obama are alike intertwined with failed per capita taxes: Thatcher’s infamous local government poll tax and the individual mandate tax at the heart of Obama’s signature health care reform. Examining these two taxes together reveals that—despite the pronounced differences between the two political leaders—both taxes were conceived, enacted, met with virulent popular opposition, and ultimately repealed under remarkably parallel processes. Both taxes arose out of essentially the same economic idea, and in fact, this animating idea originated from the same small network of think-tank economists in both cases. Crucially, economic theory served as both the technical basis and the moral justification for the taxes. The Thatcher poll tax was morally justified as necessary to increase local government “accountability,” defined economically such that an accountable government is one where all citizens equally bear the full marginal cost of local government spending increases. Likewise, the moral basis of the individual mandate tax was “responsibility,” defined in economic terms such that a responsible person is one who bears the marginal cost imposed on society by their decision not to purchase health insurance. \u0000 \u0000Neither Thatcher nor Obama conceived of or initially supported their respective per capita taxes, which instead arose from small, relatively isolated groups, heavily influenced by academic economists. Accordingly, the taxes were designed to fit abstract economic theories crafted by experts, with little regard for popular opinion or practical and historical experience. Not surprisingly, the taxes proved highly unpopular and hard to implement, imposing heavy political costs on Thatcher, Obama, and their respective parties. Despite the intense opposition from the populace, the major opposition parties initially either supported or at least accepted the taxes, only opposing them after popular anger became undeniable. The real fault lines that emerged were between the establishment political class and the majority of the electorate. This division was characterized by a preference for expert administration based on science—especially neoliberal economic theory—on the one hand, and a preference for popular sovereignty informed by traditional notions of fairness on the other. Popular perceptions of unfairness were amplified by the regressive nature of the taxes, and I argue that regressivity was a logical consequence of the economic theories undergirding the taxes.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78412068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cross-border workers fall within a broader category of non-residents as they maintain their original tax residence while often earning income from both the source state and the residence state. The ...
跨境工人属于更广泛的非居民类别，因为他们保持原来的税收居住地，同时经常从来源国和居住国获得收入。…
{"title":"Compensation Regimes – An Innovative Tax Treaty Provision When Applied To Cross-Border Regions","authors":"Yvette Lind","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3779138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3779138","url":null,"abstract":"Cross-border workers fall within a broader category of non-residents as they maintain their original tax residence while often earning income from both the source state and the residence state. The ...","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76975841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：