HEYTHROP JOURNAL最新文献

While the philosophical study of shame has gained popularity, its application in the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible remains in its early stages. This paper delves into an analysis of shaming and unreasonable shame in the Book of Job, particularly in chapter 19. Through an examination of the Hebrew text and drawing on contemporary philosophical definitions of shame and shaming, I argue that Job perceives his friends, God, and the community to be employing shaming tactics against him, attempting to induce feelings of shame, a sentiment Job considers unjustified. In his case, shame is deemed unreasonable because Job has not violated any cherished values that would warrant such an emotion. Additionally, I demonstrate that while Job senses God shaming him, the biblical character acknowledges that his deity is the sole entity aware of his innocence—God's eyes perceive accurately, in contrast to humans', which only assess outward appearances. The role of God as the perfect witness to Job's life is fulfilled in the epilogue of the book, where Yahweh vindicates Job from the shame he has endured by publicly denouncing the serious faults of his friends.

Eschatological beliefs have matured alongside both biblical composition and Christian history. This evolution can be traced using cultural evolutionary studies. The process reflects attempts to adapt to new conditions and challenges—sometimes giving place to more focused views, but also sometimes to failures and dysfunctional forms or fruitless variations. It becomes a theological duty to assess this evolution better. The key element is the reception of these eschatological beliefs, to discern what expressions of them are more helpful in encouraging Christian fidelity, coping with distress, and engaging with individual and societal challenges. In this article, we outline a research programme that links eschatology to anthropology, and that tries to analyse beliefs according to state-of-the-art methods, such as evolutionary cultural studies and research on the believing process. We also contribute a case study based on the concept of hell to test the proposed approach.

One of William Lane Craig's key arguments for the finitude of the past is the Successive Addition Argument (SAA). Malpass (2021) has recently developed a novel challenge to the SAA, utilising a thought experiment from the work of Fred Dretske, which is meant to show that it is possible to count to infinity, to argue that there is a counterexample to the SAA's second premise. In this paper, I contend that the Malpass-Dretske counterexample should not worry advocates of the SAA. First, I argue that one objection Malpass considers—the Potential Infinite Objection—reveals an interesting fact: the SAA's second premise is unnecessarily strong and can be weakened whilst still yielding the same conclusion. Second, I show how another one of the objections considered by Malpass—the Accumulation Objection—is successful, provided some clarification to the SAA's premises. The upshot of both analyses is that we generate two ‘new’ Successive Addition arguments that not only move the dialectic forward, but shed light on deeper assumptions and motivating intuitions concerning the Kalām.

The Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci's teaching on the goodness of human nature in The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven represents the fruit of the first encounter between Catholicism and Confucianism. This article will consider the Thomistic and neo-Confucian sources in Ricci's enunciation of the Catholic doctrine on the goodness of human nature in this Chinese catechism. It will illustrate that Ricci developed his teaching, which is fundamentally Thomistic, with the help of terminology borrowed from the Chinese philosophical tradition. His distinction between the good of nature and the good of virtue leads to prioritising the cultivation of human nature. Ricci's teaching reflects the early modern Jesuits’ appreciation of human freedom. It also displays a Catholic reaction to the sixteenth-century neo-Confucian intellectual trend that ignored the importance of moral cultivation.

Centring on human perception, attunement to others, and a transcendent conception of the good, Iris Murdoch's intervention in moral philosophy remains an insightful and evocative source for ethical theory. Discerning some pervasive dualisms that hamper its coherence and development, I suggest that her work finds a generative conversation partner in the contemporary metaphysician, William Desmond. Desmond's thought offers promising avenues to overcome these dualisms by repositioning the source and nature of value and by theorising an anti-reductive, relational ontology. Staging a constructive encounter between these two thinkers that preserves Murdoch's distinct prioritisation of attention and individuality within a Desmond-inspired metaphysics, I present a synthetic ethical approach that promotes the ideal of attending to an other—in the givenness of its particularity, manifold surplus, and constitutive relationality—as good in itself.