Theory in Biosciences最新文献

The main thesis developed in this article is that the key feature of biological life is the a biological process can control and regulate other processes, and it maintains that ability over time. This control can happen hierarchically and/or reciprocally, and it takes place in three-dimensional space. This implies that the information that a biological process has to utilize is only about the control, but not about the content of those processes. Those other processes can be vastly more complex that the controlling process itself, and in fact necessarily so. In particular, each biological process draws upon the complexity of its environment.

Disagreement over whether life is inevitable when the conditions can support life remains unresolved, but calculations show that self-organization can arise naturally from purely random effects. Closure to efficient causation, or the need for all specific catalysts used by an organism to be produced internally, implies that a true model of an organism cannot exist, though this does not exclude the possibility that some characteristics can be simulated. Such simulations indicate that there is a limit to how small a self-organizing system can be: much smaller than a bacterial cell, but around the size of a typical virus particle. All current theories of life incorporate, at least implicitly, the idea of catalysis, but they largely ignore the need for metabolic regulation.

Most mathematical modeling in biology relies either implicitly or explicitly on the epistemology of physics. The underlying conception is that the historicity of biological objects would not matter to understand a situation here and now, or, at least, historicity would not impact the method of modeling. We analyze that it is not the case with concrete examples. Historicity forces a conceptual reconfiguration where equations no longer play a central role. We argue that all observations depend on objects defined by their historical origin instead of their relations as in physics. Therefore, we propose that biological variations and historicity come first, and regularities are constraints with limited validity in biology. Their proper theoretical and empirical use requires specific rationales.

We present in vivo observations of chicken embryo development which show that the early chicken embryo presents a principal structure made out of concentric rings and a secondary structure composed of radial sectors. During development, physical forces deform the main rings into axially directed, antero-posterior tubes, while the sectors roll up to form cylinders that are perpendicular to the antero-posterior axis. As a consequence, the basic structure of the chicken embryo is a series of encased antero-posterior tubes (gut, neural tube, body envelope, amnion, chorion) decorated with smaller orifices (ear duct, eye stalk, nasal duct, gills, mouth) forming at right angles to the main body axis. We argue that the second-order divisions reflect the early pattern of cell cleavage, and that the transformation of radial and orthoradial lines into a body with sensory organs is a generic biophysical mechanism more general than the chicken embryo.

Contemporary scientific knowledge is built on both methodological and epistemological reductionism. The discovery of the limitations of the reductionist paradigm in the mathematical treatment of certain physical phenomena originated the notion of complexity, both as a pattern and process. After clarifying some very general terms and ideas on biological evolution and biological complexity, the article will tackle to seek to summarize the debate on biological complexity and discuss the difference between complexities of living and inert matter. Some examples of the major successes of mathematics applied to biological problems will follow; the notion of an intrinsic limitation in the application of mathematics to biological complexity as a global, relational, and historical phenomenon at the individual and species level will also be advanced.