This letter replies to the letter “Colonial and Neocolonial Barriers to Companion Digital Humans in Africa,” by Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues, in the same, May-June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report.
This letter replies to the letter “Colonial and Neocolonial Barriers to Companion Digital Humans in Africa,” by Luís Cordeiro-Rodrigues, in the same, May-June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report.
This letter responds to the letter “The Open Donor View and Procreative Beneficence,” by Daniel Groll, in the same, May-June 2024, issue of the Hastings Center Report.
This commentary responds to Moti Gorin's article “What Is the Aim of Pediatric ‘Gender-Affirming’ Care?” We argue that Gorin's case against pediatric gender-affirming care rests upon numerous false conceptual binaries: female/male, public/private, objective/subjective, and medically necessary/elective. Drawing on feminist bioethics, we show how such dichotomous thinking is both inaccurate and marginalizing of gender minorities.
This letter responds to the article “What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?,” by Abigail Levin, in the March-April 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report.
The original “Dutch Protocol”—the treatment model comprised of puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgery—was intended to improve the mental and physical health of pediatric patients experiencing distress over their sexed bodies. Consequently, both researchers and clinicians have couched eligibility for treatment and measures of treatment efficacy in terms of the interventions’ effects on outcomes such as gender dysphoria, depression, anxiety, and suicide. However, recent systematic reviews have concluded that the scientific evidence supporting these interventions is uncertain, leading to significant international differences in what treatments are offered to youth. Against this backdrop, a different argumentative approach has emerged in support of gender-affirming care. This approach appeals not to reductions in patient morbidity or mortality but to patient autonomy, where medical intervention is pursued as a means to the satisfaction of a patient's “embodiment goals.” In this article, I raise objections to autonomy-based justifications for pediatric gender-affirming care, concluding that these arguments misunderstand the place of autonomy in clinical decision-making and, consequently, put patients at risk of medical harm.
In 1971, two years before Roe v. Wade affirmed federal protection for abortion, Judith Jarvis Thomson attempted to demonstrate the wrongs of forced gestation through analogy: you awake to find that the world's most esteemed violinist is wholly, physically dependent on you for life support. Here, the authors suggest that Thomson's intuition, that there is a relevant similarity between providing living kidney support and forced gestation, is realized in the contemporary practice of living organ donation. After detailing the robust analogy between living kidney donation and gestation, we turn to current ethical guidelines incorporated in the United Network for Organ Sharing's requirements for legally authorized organ donation and transplantation. We conclude that if, as we—and Thomson—suggest, organ donation and gestation are relevantly similar, then the ethical framework supporting donation may aid in articulating ethical grounds that will be compelling in informing the legal grounds for a defense of abortion.
The privacy of the dead is an interesting area of concern for bioethicists. There is a legal doctrine that the dead can't have privacy rights, but also a body of contrary law ascribing privacy rights to the deceased and kin in relation to the deceased. As women's abortion privacy is under assault by American courts and legislatures, the implications of ascribing privacy rights to embryos and fetuses is more important than ever. Caution is called for in this domain.
This commentary responds to the article “What Is the Aim of Pediatric ‘Gender-Affirming’ Care?,” by Moti Gorin, in the same issue of the journal. Gender-affirming care is often treated as exceptional and subject to heightened scrutiny. This exceptionalization results in its being held to stricter evidentiary standards than other forms of medical interventions are. But values and value judgments are inextricable from the practice of evidence-based medicine. For gender-affirming care, values shape what counts as “strong” evidence, whether the legitimacy of transgender identity is assumed versus treated as something to be investigated, how to characterize the testimonial accounts of trans and gender-nonconforming patients, and more. We argue that these kinds of questions are part of the practice of medicine, not exceptional to transgender people and gender-affirming care. However, litigation of evidence for gender-affirming care in state and national policy underscores the moral urgency of thinking carefully about what values ought to guide evidence.
What ethically justifies the provision of invasive and irreversible treatments to minors? In this commentary, I examine this question in response to Moti Gorin's article “What Is the Aim of Pediatric ‘Gender-Affirming’ Care?,” which critiques autonomy-based arguments for justification of gender-affirming care in minors. Minors generally lack sufficient autonomy to make significant medical decisions or major life decisions. For this reason, parents are generally their decision-makers, working with medical professionals to choose treatments that serve the best interests of the minor. Medical care in minors is justified by beneficence, not autonomy, and this should be no different for gender-affirming care. This severely undermines autonomy-based arguments for provision of gender-affirming care to minors. Given the lack of conclusive evidence for benefit, the nature of the treatment, and the fact that gender dysphoria in minors resolves spontaneously in most cases, there is presently insufficient justification for provision of such care to minors.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：