Hastings Center Report最新文献

This letter responds to the essay “Digital Humans to Combat Loneliness and Social Isolation: Ethics Concerns and Policy Recommendation,” by Nancy S. Jecker, Robert Sparrow, Zohar Lederman, and Anita Ho, in the January-February 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs vs. Jackson Women's Health Organization, a growing web of state laws restricts access to abortion. Here we consider how, ethically, doctors should respond when terminating a pregnancy is clinically indicated but state law imposes restrictions on doing so. We offer a typology of cases in which the dilemma emerges and a brief sketch of the current state of legal prohibitions against providing such care. We examine the issue from the standpoints of conscience, professional ethics, and civil disobedience and conclude that it is almost always morally permissible and praiseworthy to break the law and that, in a subset of cases, it is morally obligatory to do so. We further argue that health care institutions that employ or credential physicians to provide reproductive health care have an ethical duty to provide a basic suite of practical supports for them as they work to ethically resolve the dilemmas before them.

I consider the question of what moral obligations prospective parents owe to their future children. It is taken as an almost axiomatic premise of a wide range of philosophical arguments that prospective parents have a moral obligation to take such steps as ensuring their own financial stability or waiting until they are emotionally mature before conceiving. This is because it is assumed that parents have a moral obligation to lay the groundwork for their children's lives to go well. While at first glance such a premise seems benign, I will argue that when it is applied to arguments in assisted reproductive technology, as it is in Julian Savulescu's procreative beneficence argument or as it is in Daniel Groll's recent argument for open gamete donation, we see problems with this premise. Problems in Groll's argument also become apparent when it is scrutinized in connection with this premise.

Although the field of surgical ethics focuses primarily on informed consent, surgical decision-making, and research ethics, some surgeons have started to consider ethical questions regarding justice and solidarity with poor and minoritized populations. To date, those calling for social justice in surgical care have emphasized increased diversity within the ranks of the surgical profession. This article, in contrast, foregrounds the agency of those most affected by injustice by bringing to bear an ethic of accompaniment. The ethic of accompaniment is born from a theological tradition that has motivated work to improve health outcomes in those at the margins through its emphasis on listening, solidarity against systemic drivers of disease, and proximity to individuals and communities. Through a review of surgical ethics and exploration of a central patient case, we argue for applying an ethic of accompaniment to the care of surgical patients and their communities.

In response to the increasing number of mentally ill people experiencing homelessness, some policy-makers have called for the expanded use of involuntary commitment, even for individuals who are not engaging in behaviors that are immediately life-threatening. Yet there is no evidence that involuntary commitment offers long-term benefits, and significant reasons to believe that expanding the practice will cause harm. In addition, these proposals ignore research showing that most people with mental illness have the capacity to make medical decisions for themselves. Rather than expanding the use of involuntary commitment, policy-makers should support approaches proven to decrease the prevalence of homelessness, such as supportive housing. In addition, states should reevaluate their commitment standards for persons who pose no risk of harm to others. One promising approach is Northern Ireland's Mental Health Capacity Act of 2016, which establishes a uniform standard for imposing nonconsensual health care interventions, without any distinction between mental illnesses and other conditions in which capacity might be compromised.

The standard of care in the United States favors stabilizing any adult who arrives in an emergency department after a failed suicide attempt, even if he appears decisionally capacitated and refuses life-sustaining treatment. I challenge this ubiquitous practice. Emergency clinicians generally have a moral obligation to err on the side of stabilizing even suicide attempters who refuse such interventions. This obligation reflects the fact that it is typically infeasible to determine these patients’ level of decisional capacitation—among other relevant information—in this unique setting. Nevertheless, I argue, stabilizing suicide attempters over their objection sometimes violates a basic yet insufficiently appreciated right of theirs—the right against bodily invasion. In such cases, it is at least prima facie wrong to stabilize a patient who wants to die even if they lack a contrary advance directive or medical order and suffer from no terminal physical illness.

The authors respond to a letter by Mitchell Berger in the March-April 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report concerning their essay “Securing the Trustworthiness of the FDA to Build Public Trust in Vaccines.”

On the cover: Embrace by Charlotte Evans, 2020, gouache on paper

Private Collection ©Charlotte Evans. All rights reserved 2024/Bridgeman Images