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Privacy Policies across the Ages: Content of Privacy Policies 1996–2021 不同年龄的隐私政策:1996-2021年隐私政策的内容
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-05-13 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3590152
Isabel Wagner

It is well known that most users do not read privacy policies but almost always tick the box to agree with them. While the length and readability of privacy policies have been well studied and many approaches for policy analysis based on natural language processing have been proposed, existing studies are limited in their depth and scope, often focusing on a small number of data practices at single point in time. In this article, we fill this gap by analyzing the 25-year history of privacy policies using machine learning and natural language processing and presenting a comprehensive analysis of policy contents. Specifically, we collect a large-scale longitudinal corpus of privacy policies from 1996 to 2021 and analyze their content in terms of the data practices they describe, the rights they grant to users, and the rights they reserve for their organizations. We pay particular attention to changes in response to recent privacy regulations such as the GDPR and CCPA. We observe some positive changes, such as reductions in data collection post-GDPR, but also a range of concerning data practices, such as widespread implicit data collection for which users have no meaningful choices or access rights. Our work is an important step toward making privacy policies machine readable on the user side, which would help users match their privacy preferences against the policies offered by web services.

众所周知,大多数用户不阅读隐私政策,但几乎总是在方框上打勾表示同意。虽然隐私政策的长度和可读性已经得到了很好的研究,并且提出了许多基于自然语言处理的政策分析方法,但现有的研究在深度和范围上都是有限的,往往集中在单个时间点的少量数据实践上。在本文中,我们通过使用机器学习和自然语言处理分析隐私政策25年的历史,并对政策内容进行全面分析,填补了这一空白。具体来说,我们收集了1996年至2021年的大规模纵向隐私政策语料库,并从它们描述的数据实践、它们授予用户的权利以及它们为其组织保留的权利等方面分析了它们的内容。我们特别关注近期隐私法规(如GDPR和CCPA)的变化。我们观察到一些积极的变化,例如gdpr后数据收集的减少,但也有一系列相关的数据实践,例如广泛的隐性数据收集,用户没有有意义的选择或访问权。我们的工作是使隐私策略在用户端机器可读的重要一步,这将帮助用户将他们的隐私偏好与web服务提供的策略相匹配。
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引用次数: 0
PrivExtractor: Toward Redressing the Imbalance of Understanding between Virtual Assistant Users and Vendors PrivExtractor:解决虚拟助手用户和供应商之间理解的不平衡
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-05-13 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3588770
Tom Bolton, Tooska Dargahi, Sana Belguith, Carsten Maple

The use of voice-controlled virtual assistants (VAs) is significant, and user numbers increase every year. Extensive use of VAs has provided the large, cash-rich technology companies who sell them with another way of consuming users’ data, providing a lucrative revenue stream. Whilst these companies are legally obliged to treat users’ information “fairly and responsibly,” artificial intelligence techniques used to process data have become incredibly sophisticated, leading to users’ concerns that a lack of clarity is making it hard to understand the nature and scope of data collection and use.

There has been little work undertaken on a self-contained user awareness tool targeting VAs. PrivExtractor, a novel web-based awareness dashboard for VA users, intends to redress this imbalance of understanding between the data “processors” and the user. It aims to achieve this using the four largest VA vendors as a case study and providing a comparison function that examines the four companies’ privacy practices and their compliance with data protection law.

As a result of this research, we conclude that the companies studied are largely compliant with the law, as expected. However, the user remains disadvantaged due to the ineffectiveness of current data regulation that does not oblige the companies to fully and transparently disclose how and when they use, share, or profit from the data. Furthermore, the software tool developed during the research is, we believe, the first that is capable of a comparative analysis of VA privacy with a visual demonstration to increase ease of understanding for the user.

语音控制虚拟助手(VAs)的使用非常重要,用户数量每年都在增加。VAs的广泛使用,为那些现金充裕的大型科技公司提供了另一种消费用户数据的方式,提供了一种利润丰厚的收入来源。虽然这些公司在法律上有义务“公平和负责任地”对待用户的信息,但用于处理数据的人工智能技术已经变得非常复杂,导致用户担心缺乏明确性使其难以理解数据收集和使用的性质和范围。在针对虚拟助理的独立用户意识工具方面开展的工作很少。PrivExtractor是一款针对VA用户的新型基于网络的感知仪表板,旨在纠正数据“处理器”和用户之间的这种理解失衡。为了实现这一目标,它将四家最大的虚拟服务供应商作为案例研究,并提供一个比较功能,检查这四家公司的隐私实践及其对数据保护法的遵守情况。根据这项研究,我们得出的结论是,所研究的公司在很大程度上遵守了法律,正如预期的那样。然而,由于当前数据监管的无效,用户仍然处于不利地位,这些监管并未要求公司充分透明地披露他们如何以及何时使用、分享或从数据中获利。此外,我们认为,在研究期间开发的软件工具是第一个能够通过可视化演示对VA隐私进行比较分析的软件工具,以增加用户的理解难度。
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引用次数: 0
Energy Efficient and Secure Neural Network–based Disease Detection Framework for Mobile Healthcare Network 基于节能和安全神经网络的移动医疗网络疾病检测框架
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-15 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3585536
Sona Alex, Dhanaraj K. J., Deepthi P. P.

Adopting mobile healthcare network (MHN) services such as disease detection is fraught with concerns about the security and privacy of the entities involved and the resource restrictions at the Internet of Things (IoT) nodes. Hence, the essential requirements for disease detection services are to (i) produce accurate and fast disease detection without jeopardizing the privacy of health clouds and medical users and (ii) reduce the computational and transmission overhead (energy consumption) of the IoT devices while maintaining the privacy. For privacy preservation of widely used neural network– (NN) based disease detection, existing literature suggests either computationally heavy public key fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), or secure multiparty computation, with a large number of interactions. Hence, the existing privacy-preserving NN schemes are energy consuming and not suitable for resource-constrained IoT nodes in MHN. This work proposes a lightweight, fully homomorphic, symmetric key FHE scheme (SkFhe) to address the issues involved in implementing privacy-preserving NN. Based on SkFhe, widely used non-linear activation functions ReLU and Leaky ReLU are implemented over the encrypted domain. Furthermore, based on the proposed privacy-preserving linear transformation and non-linear activation functions, an energy-efficient, accurate, and privacy-preserving NN is proposed. The proposed scheme guarantees privacy preservation of the health cloud’s NN model and medical user’s data. The experimental analysis demonstrates that the proposed solution dramatically reduces the overhead in communication and computation at the user side compared to the existing schemes. Moreover, the improved energy efficiency at the user is accomplished with reduced diagnosis time without sacrificing classification accuracy.

采用移动医疗网络(MHN)服务(如疾病检测)充满了对相关实体的安全性和隐私性以及物联网(IoT)节点资源限制的担忧。因此,疾病检测服务的本质要求是:(1)在不损害健康云和医疗用户隐私的情况下,进行准确、快速的疾病检测;(2)在保持隐私的同时,减少物联网设备的计算和传输开销(能耗)。对于广泛应用的基于神经网络(NN)的疾病检测的隐私保护,现有文献建议采用计算量大的公钥全同态加密(FHE)或具有大量交互的安全多方计算。因此,现有的隐私保护NN方案能耗大,不适合MHN中资源受限的物联网节点。这项工作提出了一个轻量级的、完全同态的、对称的密钥FHE方案(skfthe)来解决实现隐私保护神经网络所涉及的问题。基于skfthe,在加密域上实现了广泛使用的非线性激活函数ReLU和Leaky ReLU。在此基础上,基于所提出的保护隐私的线性变换和非线性激活函数,提出了一种节能、准确、保护隐私的神经网络。该方案保证了健康云的神经网络模型和医疗用户数据的隐私保护。实验分析表明,与现有方案相比,该方案显著降低了用户端的通信和计算开销。此外,在不牺牲分类精度的情况下,在减少诊断时间的情况下,提高了用户的能源效率。
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引用次数: 0
VulANalyzeR: Explainable Binary Vulnerability Detection with Multi-task Learning and Attentional Graph Convolution 基于多任务学习和注意图卷积的可解释二进制漏洞检测
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3585386
Litao Li, Steven H. H. Ding, Yuan Tian, Benjamin C. M. Fung, Philippe Charland, Weihan Ou, Leo Song, Congwei Chen

Software vulnerabilities have been posing tremendous reliability threats to the general public as well as critical infrastructures, and there have been many studies aiming to detect and mitigate software defects at the binary level. Most of the standard practices leverage both static and dynamic analysis, which have several drawbacks like heavy manual workload and high complexity. Existing deep learning-based solutions not only suffer to capture the complex relationships among different variables from raw binary code but also lack the explainability required for humans to verify, evaluate, and patch the detected bugs.

We propose VulANalyzeR, a deep learning-based model, for automated binary vulnerability detection, Common Weakness Enumeration-type classification, and root cause analysis to enhance safety and security. VulANalyzeR features sequential and topological learning through recurrent units and graph convolution to simulate how a program is executed. The attention mechanism is integrated throughout the model, which shows how different instructions and the corresponding states contribute to the final classification. It also classifies the specific vulnerability type through multi-task learning as this not only provides further explanation but also allows faster patching for zero-day vulnerabilities. We show that VulANalyzeR achieves better performance for vulnerability detection over the state-of-the-art baselines. Additionally, a Common Vulnerability Exposure dataset is used to evaluate real complex vulnerabilities. We conduct case studies to show that VulANalyzeR is able to accurately identify the instructions and basic blocks that cause the vulnerability even without given any prior knowledge related to the locations during the training phase.

软件漏洞已经对公众和关键基础设施造成了巨大的可靠性威胁,并且已经有许多研究旨在二进制级别检测和减轻软件缺陷。大多数标准实践都利用静态和动态分析,它们有一些缺点,比如繁重的手工工作负载和高复杂性。现有的基于深度学习的解决方案不仅难以从原始二进制代码中捕获不同变量之间的复杂关系,而且缺乏人类验证、评估和修补检测到的错误所需的可解释性。我们提出了基于深度学习的VulANalyzeR模型,用于自动二进制漏洞检测、常见弱点枚举类型分类和根本原因分析,以增强安全性和安全性。VulANalyzeR通过循环单元和图卷积进行顺序和拓扑学习,以模拟程序的执行方式。注意机制贯穿整个模型,显示了不同的指令和相应的状态对最终分类的贡献。它还通过多任务学习对特定的漏洞类型进行分类,因为这不仅提供了进一步的解释,而且还允许更快地修补零日漏洞。我们展示了VulANalyzeR在最先进的基线上实现了更好的漏洞检测性能。此外,通用漏洞暴露数据集用于评估真实的复杂漏洞。我们进行案例研究,以表明VulANalyzeR能够准确地识别导致漏洞的指令和基本块,即使在训练阶段没有给出任何与位置相关的先验知识。
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引用次数: 0
Stateful Protocol Composition in Isabelle/HOL Isabelle/HOL中的有状态协议组合
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3577020
Andreas V. Hess, Sebastian A. MÖdersheim, Achim D. Brucker

Communication networks like the Internet form a large distributed system where a huge number of components run in parallel, such as security protocols and distributed web applications. For what concerns security, it is obviously infeasible to verify them all at once as one monolithic entity; rather, one has to verify individual components in isolation.

While many typical components like TLS have been studied intensively, there exists much less research on analyzing and ensuring the security of the composition of security protocols. This is a problem since the composition of systems that are secure in isolation can easily be insecure. The main goal of compositionality is thus a theorem of the form: given a set of components that are already proved secure in isolation and that satisfy a number of easy-to-check conditions, then also their parallel composition is secure. Said conditions should of course also be realistic in practice, or better yet, already be satisfied for many existing components. Another benefit of compositionality is that when one would like to exchange a component with another one, all that is needed is the proof that the new component is secure in isolation and satisfies the composition conditions—without having to re-prove anything about the other components.

This article has three contributions over previous work in parallel compositionality. First, we extend the compositionality paradigm to stateful systems: while previous approaches work only for simple protocols that only have a local session state, our result supports participants who maintain long-term databases that can be sharedamong several protocols. This includes a paradigm for declassification of shared secrets. This result is in fact so general that it also covers many forms of sequential composition as a special case of stateful parallel composition. Second, our compositionality result is formalized and proved in Isabelle/HOL, providing a strong correctness guarantee of our proofs. This also means that one can prove, without gaps, the security of an entire system in Isabelle/HOL, namely the security of components in isolation and the composition conditions, and thus derive the security of the entire system as an Isabelle theorem. For the components one can also make use of our tool PSPSP that can perform automatic proofs for many stateful protocols. Third, for the compositionality conditions we have also implemented an automated check procedure in Isabelle.

像Internet这样的通信网络形成了一个大型分布式系统,其中大量组件并行运行,例如安全协议和分布式web应用程序。出于安全考虑,将它们作为一个整体同时进行验证显然是不可行的;相反,必须孤立地验证各个组件。虽然人们对TLS等许多典型组件进行了深入的研究,但对安全协议组成的安全性分析和保证的研究却很少。这是一个问题,因为孤立安全的系统组成很容易不安全。因此,组合性的主要目标是这样一个定理:给定一组已经被证明是隔离安全的组件,并且满足许多易于检查的条件,那么它们的并行组合也是安全的。当然,上述条件在实践中也应该是现实的,或者更好的是,已经满足了许多现有组件。组合性的另一个好处是,当想要与另一个组件交换一个组件时,所需要做的就是证明新组件是安全隔离的,并且满足组合条件,而不必重新证明其他组件的任何内容。本文在平行组合性方面比以前的工作有三个贡献。首先,我们将组合性范式扩展到有状态系统:虽然以前的方法只适用于只有本地会话状态的简单协议,但我们的结果支持维护可以在多个协议之间共享的长期数据库的参与者。这包括一个解密共享机密的范例。事实上,这个结果是如此普遍,以至于它也涵盖了许多形式的顺序组合,作为有状态并行组合的特殊情况。其次,我们的组合性结果在Isabelle/HOL中得到形式化证明,为我们的证明提供了强有力的正确性保证。这也意味着可以无缺口地证明整个系统在Isabelle/HOL中的安全性,即孤立组件和组合条件的安全性,从而导出整个系统的安全性作为Isabelle定理。对于组件,还可以使用我们的工具PSPSP,它可以对许多有状态协议执行自动证明。第三,对于组合性条件,我们还在Isabelle中实现了一个自动检查过程。
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引用次数: 0
SoK: Human-centered Phishing Susceptibility SoK:以人为中心的网络钓鱼敏感性
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3575797
Sijie Zhuo, Robert Biddle, Yun Sing Koh, Danielle Lottridge, Giovanni Russello

Phishing is recognized as a serious threat to organizations and individuals. While there have been significant technical advances in blocking phishing attacks, end-users remain the last line of defence after phishing emails reach their email inboxes. Most of the existing literature on this subject has focused on the technical aspects related to phishing. The factors that cause humans to be susceptible to phishing attacks are still not well-understood. To fill this gap, we reviewed the available literature and systematically categorized the phishing susceptibility variables studied. We classify variables based on their temporal scope, which led us to propose a three-stage Phishing Susceptibility Model (PSM) for explaining how humans are vulnerable to phishing attacks. This model reveals several research gaps that need to be addressed to understand and improve protection against phishing susceptibility. Our review also systematizes existing studies by their sample size and generalizability and further suggests a practical impact assessment of the value of studying variables: Some more easily lead to improvements than others. We believe that this article can provide guidelines for future phishing susceptibility research to improve experiment design and the quality of findings.

网络钓鱼被认为是对组织和个人的严重威胁。虽然在阻止网络钓鱼攻击方面已经取得了重大的技术进步,但在网络钓鱼邮件到达最终用户的电子邮件收件箱后,最终用户仍然是最后一道防线。关于这个主题的大多数现有文献都集中在与网络钓鱼相关的技术方面。导致人类容易受到网络钓鱼攻击的因素仍然没有得到很好的理解。为了填补这一空白,我们回顾了现有的文献,并系统地分类了所研究的网络钓鱼易感性变量。我们根据变量的时间范围对其进行分类,这使得我们提出了一个三阶段的网络钓鱼敏感性模型(PSM)来解释人类如何容易受到网络钓鱼攻击。该模型揭示了需要解决的几个研究空白,以了解和提高对网络钓鱼易感性的保护。我们的综述还通过样本量和概括性对现有研究进行了系统化,并进一步建议对研究变量的价值进行实际影响评估:一些变量比其他变量更容易导致改进。我们相信本文可以为未来的网络钓鱼敏感性研究提供指导,以改进实验设计和结果质量。
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引用次数: 0
The Multi-User Constrained Pseudorandom Function Security of Generalized GGM Trees for MPC and Hierarchical Wallets 广义GGM树的多用户约束伪随机函数安全性研究
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-14 DOI: 10.1145/3592608
Chun Guo, Xiao Wang, Xiang Xie, Yu Yu
Multi-user (mu) security considers large-scale attackers that, given access to a number of cryptosystem instances, attempt to compromise at least one of them. We initiate the study of mu security of the so-called GGM tree that stems from the pseudorandom generator to pseudorandom function transformation of Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali, with a goal to provide references for its recently popularized use in applied cryptography. We propose a generalized model for GGM trees and analyze its mu prefix-constrained pseudorandom function security in the random oracle model. Our model allows to derive concrete bounds and improvements for various protocols, and we showcase on the Bitcoin-Improvement-Proposal standard Bip32 hierarchical wallets and function secret sharing protocols. In both scenarios, we propose improvements with better performance and concrete security bounds at the same time. Compared with the state-of-the-art designs, our SHACAL3- and Keccak-p-based Bip32 variants reduce the communication cost of MPC-based implementations by 73.3% to 93.8%, whereas our AES-based function secret sharing substantially improves mu security while reducing computations by 50%.
多用户(mu)安全性考虑的是大规模攻击者,在给定对多个密码系统实例的访问权限后,试图破坏其中至少一个。本文对Goldreich、Goldwasser、Micali等人的伪随机生成器到伪随机函数变换的所谓GGM树的mu安全性进行了初步研究,旨在为其在应用密码学中的普及应用提供参考。提出了一种广义的GGM树模型,并在随机oracle模型中分析了其mu前缀约束伪随机函数的安全性。我们的模型允许推导出各种协议的具体界限和改进,我们展示了比特币改进建议标准Bip32分层钱包和功能秘密共享协议。在这两种情况下,我们同时提出了性能更好和具体安全边界的改进。与最先进的设计相比,我们基于shaal3和keccak -p的Bip32变体将基于mpc的实现的通信成本降低了73.3%至93.8%,而我们基于aes的功能秘密共享大大提高了mu安全性,同时减少了50%的计算量。
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引用次数: 0
A Vulnerability Assessment Framework for Privacy-preserving Record Linkage 一种用于隐私保护记录链接的漏洞评估框架
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-03 DOI: 10.1145/3589641
Anushka Vidanage, P. Christen, Thilina Ranbaduge, R. Schnell
The linkage of records to identify common entities across multiple data sources has gained increasing interest over the last few decades. In the absence of unique entity identifiers, quasi-identifying attributes such as personal names and addresses are generally used to link records. Due to privacy concerns that arise when such sensitive information is used, privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL) methods have been proposed to link records without revealing any sensitive or confidential information about these records. Popular PPRL methods such as Bloom filter encoding, however, are known to be susceptible to various privacy attacks. Therefore, a systematic analysis of the privacy risks associated with sensitive databases as well as PPRL methods used in linkage projects is of great importance. In this article we present a novel framework to assess the vulnerabilities of sensitive databases and existing PPRL encoding methods. We discuss five types of vulnerabilities: frequency, length, co-occurrence, similarity, and similarity neighborhood, of both plaintext and encoded values that an adversary can exploit in order to reidentify sensitive plaintext values from encoded data. In an experimental evaluation we assess the vulnerabilities of two databases using five existing PPRL encoding methods. This evaluation shows that our proposed framework can be used in real-world linkage applications to assess the vulnerabilities associated with sensitive databases to be linked, as well as with PPRL encoding methods.
在过去几十年中,将记录链接起来以识别多个数据源中的共同实体越来越引起人们的兴趣。在缺乏唯一实体标识符的情况下,通常使用个人姓名和地址等准标识属性来链接记录。由于使用此类敏感信息时会出现隐私问题,已提出隐私保护记录链接(PPRL)方法来链接记录,而不会泄露有关这些记录的任何敏感或机密信息。然而,众所周知,流行的PPRL方法(如Bloom过滤器编码)容易受到各种隐私攻击。因此,系统分析敏感数据库的隐私风险以及链接项目中使用的PPRL方法非常重要。在本文中,我们提出了一个新的框架来评估敏感数据库的漏洞和现有的PPRL编码方法。我们讨论了五种类型的漏洞:明文和编码值的频率、长度、共现性、相似性和相似邻域,对手可以利用这些漏洞从编码数据中重新识别敏感明文值。在一项实验评估中,我们使用五种现有的PPRL编码方法评估了两个数据库的漏洞。该评估表明,我们提出的框架可用于现实世界的链接应用程序,以评估与要链接的敏感数据库以及PPRL编码方法相关的漏洞。
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引用次数: 1
Privacy Policies across the Ages: Content of Privacy Policies 1996–2021 不同年龄的隐私政策:1996-2021年隐私政策的内容
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-04-01 DOI: 10.1145/3590152
Isabel Wagner
It is well known that most users do not read privacy policies but almost always tick the box to agree with them. While the length and readability of privacy policies have been well studied and many approaches for policy analysis based on natural language processing have been proposed, existing studies are limited in their depth and scope, often focusing on a small number of data practices at single point in time. In this article, we fill this gap by analyzing the 25-year history of privacy policies using machine learning and natural language processing and presenting a comprehensive analysis of policy contents. Specifically, we collect a large-scale longitudinal corpus of privacy policies from 1996 to 2021 and analyze their content in terms of the data practices they describe, the rights they grant to users, and the rights they reserve for their organizations. We pay particular attention to changes in response to recent privacy regulations such as the GDPR and CCPA. We observe some positive changes, such as reductions in data collection post-GDPR, but also a range of concerning data practices, such as widespread implicit data collection for which users have no meaningful choices or access rights. Our work is an important step toward making privacy policies machine readable on the user side, which would help users match their privacy preferences against the policies offered by web services.
众所周知,大多数用户不阅读隐私政策,但几乎总是勾选方框表示同意。虽然隐私政策的长度和可读性已经得到了很好的研究,并提出了许多基于自然语言处理的政策分析方法,但现有的研究在深度和范围上都是有限的,通常只关注单个时间点的少量数据实践。在本文中,我们通过分析使用机器学习和自然语言处理的隐私政策25年的历史,并对政策内容进行全面分析,填补了这一空白。具体而言,我们收集了1996年至2021年的大规模纵向隐私政策语料库,并根据其描述的数据实践、授予用户的权利以及为其组织保留的权利来分析其内容。我们特别关注最近隐私法规(如GDPR和CCPA)的变化。我们观察到了一些积极的变化,例如GDPR后数据收集的减少,但也观察到了一系列令人担忧的数据做法,例如广泛的隐性数据收集,用户对此没有任何有意义的选择或访问权。我们的工作是使隐私政策在用户端具有机器可读性的重要一步,这将帮助用户将他们的隐私偏好与网络服务提供的政策相匹配。
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引用次数: 6
Mechanized Proofs of Adversarial Complexity and Application to Universal Composability 对抗性复杂性的机械化证明及其在普遍可组合性中的应用
IF 2.3 4区 计算机科学 Q1 Computer Science Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI: 10.1145/3589962
Manuel Barbosa, Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, Adrien Koutsos, Pierre-Yves Strub
In this work, we enhance the EasyCrypt proof assistant to reason about the computational complexity of adversaries. The key technical tool is a Hoare logic for reasoning about computational complexity (execution time and oracle calls) of adversarial computations. Our Hoare logic is built on top of the module system used by EasyCrypt for modeling adversaries. We prove that our logic is sound w.r.t. the semantics of EasyCrypt programs—we also provide full semantics for the EasyCrypt module system, which was lacking previously. We showcase (for the first time in EasyCrypt and in other computer-aided cryptographic tools) how our approach can express precise relationships between the probability of adversarial success and their execution time. In particular, we can quantify existentially over adversaries in a complexity class and express general composition statements in simulation-based frameworks. Moreover, such statements can be composed to derive standard concrete security bounds for cryptographic constructions whose security is proved in a modular way. As a main benefit of our approach, we revisit security proofs of some well-known cryptographic constructions and present a new formalization of universal composability.
在这项工作中,我们增强了EasyCrypt证明助手来推断对手的计算复杂性。关键的技术工具是用于对抗性计算的计算复杂性(执行时间和oracle调用)推理的Hoare逻辑。我们的Hoare逻辑建立在EasyCrypt用于对对手建模的模块系统之上。我们证明了我们的逻辑除了EasyCrypt程序的语义之外是合理的——我们还为EasyCrypt模块系统提供了以前所缺乏的完整语义。我们(首次在EasyCrypt和其他计算机辅助加密工具中)展示了我们的方法如何表达对抗性成功概率与其执行时间之间的精确关系。特别是,我们可以在复杂性类中对对手进行存在性量化,并在基于模拟的框架中表达通用组合语句。此外,还可以将这些语句组合起来,以导出以模块化方式证明其安全性的加密结构的标准具体安全界。作为我们的方法的主要优点,我们重新审视了一些著名的加密结构的安全性证明,并提出了通用可组合性的新形式化。
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引用次数: 1
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ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security
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