Pub Date : 2022-04-04eCollection Date: 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsac005
Alexander Bernier, Fruzsina Molnár-Gábor, Bartha Maria Knoppers
As the adoption of digital health accelerates health research increasingly relies on large quantities of biomedical data. Research institutions scattered across a large number of jurisdictions collaborate in producing and analyzing biomedical big data. National data protection legislation, for its part, grows increasingly complex and localized. To respond to heterogeneous legal requirements arising in numerous jurisdictions, decentralized health consortia must develop scalable organizational and 6 technological arrangements that enable data flows across jurisdictional boundaries. In this article, proposals are made to enable health sector organisations to align established biomedical ethics process and data analysis practices to shifting data protection norms through both public law co-regulation, private law tools, and design-oriented approaches.
{"title":"The international data governance landscape.","authors":"Alexander Bernier, Fruzsina Molnár-Gábor, Bartha Maria Knoppers","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsac005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsac005","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>As the adoption of digital health accelerates health research increasingly relies on large quantities of biomedical data. Research institutions scattered across a large number of jurisdictions collaborate in producing and analyzing biomedical big data. National data protection legislation, for its part, grows increasingly complex and localized. To respond to heterogeneous legal requirements arising in numerous jurisdictions, decentralized health consortia must develop scalable organizational and 6 technological arrangements that enable data flows across jurisdictional boundaries. In this article, proposals are made to enable health sector organisations to align established biomedical ethics process and data analysis practices to shifting data protection norms through both public law co-regulation, private law tools, and design-oriented approaches.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"9 1","pages":"lsac005"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8977111/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140913320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Junying Zhao, Firat Demir, Pallab K. Ghosh, Austin Earley, Myongjin Kim
Abstract As of Aug. 2, 2021, 1693 injury claims associated with COVID-19 medical countermeasures have been filed in the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP), of which 686 claims were related to COVID-19 vaccines and urgently needed compensation decisions. However, from an economic and public policy perspective, we find that the CICP design has unintended consequences: locating CICP in the executive agency DHHS potentially creates a conflict of interest, and not permitting judicial review generates a lack of checks and balances, both of which could jeopardize justice. These fundamental problems would subsequently weaken four key performance indicators of CICP compared with its judicial counterpart in the Court of Federal Claims. CICP lacks accountability, transparency, and cost-effectiveness efficiency, with 94% of its total costs spent on administration rather than compensation. CICP’s ability to compensate is also questionable. If COVID-19 claims were compensated at its historical rate, CICP would face around $21.16 million in compensation outlays and $317.94 million in total outlays, 72.1 times its current balance. To ensure just compensation for injured petitioners during COVID-19 and future public health emergencies, we recommend Congress (1) initiate a major reform by relocating CICP from DHHS to the Claims Court or (2) keep CICP within DHHS and make incremental changes by permitting judicial review of DHHS administrative adjudication of CICP claims. We further recommend Congress audit and adjust budgets for CICP and DHHS promptly propose an injury table for COVID-19 claims. This is the first study that contributes an economic perspective to the limited literature on CICP and also provides unique and rich economic data.
{"title":"Reforming the countermeasures injury compensation program for COVID-19 and beyond: An economic perspective","authors":"Junying Zhao, Firat Demir, Pallab K. Ghosh, Austin Earley, Myongjin Kim","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsac008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsac008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As of Aug. 2, 2021, 1693 injury claims associated with COVID-19 medical countermeasures have been filed in the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program (CICP), of which 686 claims were related to COVID-19 vaccines and urgently needed compensation decisions. However, from an economic and public policy perspective, we find that the CICP design has unintended consequences: locating CICP in the executive agency DHHS potentially creates a conflict of interest, and not permitting judicial review generates a lack of checks and balances, both of which could jeopardize justice. These fundamental problems would subsequently weaken four key performance indicators of CICP compared with its judicial counterpart in the Court of Federal Claims. CICP lacks accountability, transparency, and cost-effectiveness efficiency, with 94% of its total costs spent on administration rather than compensation. CICP’s ability to compensate is also questionable. If COVID-19 claims were compensated at its historical rate, CICP would face around $21.16 million in compensation outlays and $317.94 million in total outlays, 72.1 times its current balance. To ensure just compensation for injured petitioners during COVID-19 and future public health emergencies, we recommend Congress (1) initiate a major reform by relocating CICP from DHHS to the Claims Court or (2) keep CICP within DHHS and make incremental changes by permitting judicial review of DHHS administrative adjudication of CICP claims. We further recommend Congress audit and adjust budgets for CICP and DHHS promptly propose an injury table for COVID-19 claims. This is the first study that contributes an economic perspective to the limited literature on CICP and also provides unique and rich economic data.","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2022-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61110320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Miranda Mourby, Jessica Bell, Michael Morrison, Alex Faulkner, Phoebe Li, Edison Bicudo, Andrew Webster, Jane Kaye
Biomodifying technologies-such as gene editing, induced pluripotent stem cells, and bioprinting-are being developed for a wide range of applications, from pest control to lab-grown meat. In medicine, regulators have responded to the challenge of evaluating modified 'natural' material as a therapeutic 'product' by introducing more flexible assessment schemes. Attempts have also been made to engage stakeholders across the globe on the acceptable parameters for these technologies, particularly in the case of gene editing. Regulatory flexibility and stakeholder engagement are important, but a broader perspective is also needed to respond to the potential disruption of biomodification. Our case-study technologies problematize basic ideas-such as 'nature', 'product', and 'donation'-that underpin the legal categories used to regulate biotechnology. Where such foundational concepts are rendered uncertain, a socially responsive and sustainable solution would involve exploring evolutions in these concepts across different societies. We suggest that the global observatory model is a good starting point for this 'Adaptive Societal Governance' approach, in which a self-organizing network of scholars and interested parties could carry out the multi-modal (meta)analyses needed to understand societal constructions of ideas inherent to our understanding of 'life'.
{"title":"Biomodifying the 'natural': from Adaptive Regulation to Adaptive Societal Governance.","authors":"Miranda Mourby, Jessica Bell, Michael Morrison, Alex Faulkner, Phoebe Li, Edison Bicudo, Andrew Webster, Jane Kaye","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsac018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsac018","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Biomodifying technologies-such as gene editing, induced pluripotent stem cells, and bioprinting-are being developed for a wide range of applications, from pest control to lab-grown meat. In medicine, regulators have responded to the challenge of evaluating modified 'natural' material as a therapeutic 'product' by introducing more flexible assessment schemes. Attempts have also been made to engage stakeholders across the globe on the acceptable parameters for these technologies, particularly in the case of gene editing. Regulatory flexibility and stakeholder engagement are important, but a broader perspective is also needed to respond to the potential disruption of biomodification. Our case-study technologies problematize basic ideas-such as 'nature', 'product', and 'donation'-that underpin the legal categories used to regulate biotechnology. Where such foundational concepts are rendered uncertain, a socially responsive and sustainable solution would involve exploring evolutions in these concepts across different societies. We suggest that the global observatory model is a good starting point for this 'Adaptive Societal Governance' approach, in which a self-organizing network of scholars and interested parties could carry out the multi-modal (meta)analyses needed to understand societal constructions of ideas inherent to our understanding of 'life'.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"9 1","pages":"lsac018"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9250279/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10848316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"OUP accepted manuscript","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsac006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsac006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"59 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61110168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract For the past 50 years, abortion opponents have fought for the power to ban abortion without little attention to how things might change when they won. The battle to make abortion illegal has been predicated on three nebulous assumptions about how abortion bans work. First, supporters believe banning abortion will deter it. Second, they hope bans will send a message about abortion—specifically, that abortion is immoral. And third, they expect bans to be competently implemented and enforced. Drawing on empirical work from within and outside of the U.S., this Article offers an evidence-based assessment of each of these assumptions. Part One examines the question of deterrence by exploring findings from countries with relatively high and relatively low abortion rates. After explaining why restrictive abortion laws alone do not reduce aggregate abortion rates, I consider the matter of individual deterrence. By identifying those most likely to be deterred by U.S. abortion bans, I illustrate how abortion bans intersect with structural inequalities to disproportionately impact poor women of color and their children. Part Two tests the idea that abortion bans send a message. I consider the bans’ meaning in context with U.S. laws and policies affecting families, exposing the difference between laws discouraging abortion, and those encouraging childbirth. Then, drawing from literature on the expressive function of the law, I assess the limits on the message-sending capacity of abortion bans in a society divided over abortion and over its commitment to children living in poverty. Part Three turns to the expectation that abortion bans will be competently enforced, noting the legitimacy struggles arising from law enforcement patterns, along with the administrative challenges inherent in overseeing the various exceptions to abortion bans. This article concludes by considering why the consequences and limitations of abortion bans should matter to supporters and opponents, alike.
{"title":"What will and won’t happen when abortion is banned","authors":"M. Oberman","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsac011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsac011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For the past 50 years, abortion opponents have fought for the power to ban abortion without little attention to how things might change when they won. The battle to make abortion illegal has been predicated on three nebulous assumptions about how abortion bans work. First, supporters believe banning abortion will deter it. Second, they hope bans will send a message about abortion—specifically, that abortion is immoral. And third, they expect bans to be competently implemented and enforced. Drawing on empirical work from within and outside of the U.S., this Article offers an evidence-based assessment of each of these assumptions. Part One examines the question of deterrence by exploring findings from countries with relatively high and relatively low abortion rates. After explaining why restrictive abortion laws alone do not reduce aggregate abortion rates, I consider the matter of individual deterrence. By identifying those most likely to be deterred by U.S. abortion bans, I illustrate how abortion bans intersect with structural inequalities to disproportionately impact poor women of color and their children. Part Two tests the idea that abortion bans send a message. I consider the bans’ meaning in context with U.S. laws and policies affecting families, exposing the difference between laws discouraging abortion, and those encouraging childbirth. Then, drawing from literature on the expressive function of the law, I assess the limits on the message-sending capacity of abortion bans in a society divided over abortion and over its commitment to children living in poverty. Part Three turns to the expectation that abortion bans will be competently enforced, noting the legitimacy struggles arising from law enforcement patterns, along with the administrative challenges inherent in overseeing the various exceptions to abortion bans. This article concludes by considering why the consequences and limitations of abortion bans should matter to supporters and opponents, alike.","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44223544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-24eCollection Date: 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsab031
Andreas Panagopoulos, Katerina Sideri
Abstract The prospect theory of patents views patents as a tool for the development and commercialization of inventions. Prospect patents rely on broad control of technology so that rivalry between competing products is diminished thus avoiding waste of common-pool resources. The theory has been widely criticized but in this article we argue that it does not address the realities of an economy where many innovations are created by universities. Although university patents on inventions such as new gene-editing tools fit squarely in the definition of prospect patents, they may still allow rivalry to resurface at the commercialization stage. This rivalry is not between competing firms; it is between competing visions of the prospect: ‘the university’s vision versus the licensees.’ We use as a case study the CRISPR-Cas9 technology invented by universities and commercialized by licensees. We employ patent landscape analysis showing that CRISPR-Cas9’s prospects comply with the characteristics of prospect patents and, above all, diminish rivalry at the commercialization stage. As the lack of competition leads to excessive treatment prices, tensions arise because the licensee understands CRISPR-Cas9 as a revenue-generating prospect, whereas the university views it as a technology requiring broad distribution. Such discerning visions can breed rivalry between licensor and licensee despite broad patent rights. In addressing this we turn to the literature on semi-commons, which implies an environment where private rights of exclusion such as prospect patents work with ethical licenses and a domain of resources open for reuse to foster innovation. We argue that in this environment, universities can emerge as important actors in the regulatory enterprise through additional ex post licensing. To this end, we propose a market-based solution in the form of a license allowing for patent re-licensing if the licensee fails to address a predefined demand for the final product.
{"title":"Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment.","authors":"Andreas Panagopoulos, Katerina Sideri","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsab031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The prospect theory of patents views patents as a tool for the development and commercialization of inventions. Prospect patents rely on broad control of technology so that rivalry between competing products is diminished thus avoiding waste of common-pool resources. The theory has been widely criticized but in this article we argue that it does not address the realities of an economy where many innovations are created by universities. Although university patents on inventions such as new gene-editing tools fit squarely in the definition of prospect patents, they may still allow rivalry to resurface at the commercialization stage. This rivalry is not between competing firms; it is between competing visions of the prospect: ‘the university’s vision versus the licensees.’ We use as a case study the CRISPR-Cas9 technology invented by universities and commercialized by licensees. We employ patent landscape analysis showing that CRISPR-Cas9’s prospects comply with the characteristics of prospect patents and, above all, diminish rivalry at the commercialization stage. As the lack of competition leads to excessive treatment prices, tensions arise because the licensee understands CRISPR-Cas9 as a revenue-generating prospect, whereas the university views it as a technology requiring broad distribution. Such discerning visions can breed rivalry between licensor and licensee despite broad patent rights. In addressing this we turn to the literature on semi-commons, which implies an environment where private rights of exclusion such as prospect patents work with ethical licenses and a domain of resources open for reuse to foster innovation. We argue that in this environment, universities can emerge as important actors in the regulatory enterprise through additional ex post licensing. To this end, we propose a market-based solution in the form of a license allowing for patent re-licensing if the licensee fails to address a predefined demand for the final product.","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"8 2","pages":"lsab031"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/82/b3/lsab031.PMC8545401.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39564893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-23eCollection Date: 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsab032
Joseph Liss, David Peloquin, Mark Barnes, Barbara E Bierer
The Courts of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in its July 2020 Schrems II decision that, in order for entities in other countries to import personal data from the European Economic Area (EEA), the importer must be able to provide data protections 'essentially equivalent' to those the EEA offers under its General Data Protection Regulation. The CJEU expressed particular concern that United States' national security intelligence gathering laws prevent U.S.-based entities from providing such protections. This decision has sharply limited the sharing of clinical research data from the EEA to the United States. After describing the pertinent aspects of the Schrems II decision, this article evaluates U.S. national security intelligence gathering frameworks, including Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Executive Order 12333. The article then leverages recent draft guidance from the European Data Protection Board to explain how entities may be able to adopt widely used contractual and technical measures, such as data pseudonymization, to provide 'essentially equivalent' protections in the clinical research context.
{"title":"Demystifying <i>Schrems II</i> for the cross-border transfer of clinical research data.","authors":"Joseph Liss, David Peloquin, Mark Barnes, Barbara E Bierer","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsab032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab032","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Courts of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in its July 2020 <i>Schrems II</i> decision that, in order for entities in other countries to import personal data from the European Economic Area (EEA), the importer must be able to provide data protections 'essentially equivalent' to those the EEA offers under its General Data Protection Regulation. The CJEU expressed particular concern that United States' national security intelligence gathering laws prevent U.S.-based entities from providing such protections. This decision has sharply limited the sharing of clinical research data from the EEA to the United States. After describing the pertinent aspects of the <i>Schrems II</i> decision, this article evaluates U.S. national security intelligence gathering frameworks, including Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Executive Order 12333. The article then leverages recent draft guidance from the European Data Protection Board to explain how entities may be able to adopt widely used contractual and technical measures, such as data pseudonymization, to provide 'essentially equivalent' protections in the clinical research context.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"8 2","pages":"lsab032"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8541704/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39570004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01eCollection Date: 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsab023
Kathleen Liddell, David A Simon, Anneke Lucassen
This article answers two questions from the perspective of United Kingdom law and policy: (i) is health information property? and (ii) should it be? We argue that special features of health information make it unsuitable for conferral of property rights without an extensive system of data-specific rules, like those that govern intellectual property. Additionally, we argue that even if an extensive set of rules were developed, the advantages of a property framework to govern health information would be slight: propertization is unlikely to enhance patient self-determination, increase market efficiency, provide patients a foothold in the data economy, clarify legal uses of information, or encourage data-driven innovation. The better approach is to rely less, not more, on property. We recommend a regulatory model with four signature features: (i) substantial protection for personal health data similar to the GDPR with transparent limits on how, when, and by whom patient data can be accessed, used, and transmitted; (ii) input from relevant stakeholders; (iii) interoperability; and (iv) greater research into a health-data service, rather than goods, model.
{"title":"Patient data ownership: who owns your health?","authors":"Kathleen Liddell, David A Simon, Anneke Lucassen","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsab023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab023","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article answers two questions from the perspective of United Kingdom law and policy: (i) is health information property? and (ii) should it be? We argue that special features of health information make it unsuitable for conferral of property rights without an extensive system of data-specific rules, like those that govern intellectual property. Additionally, we argue that even if an extensive set of rules were developed, the advantages of a property framework to govern health information would be slight: propertization is unlikely to enhance patient self-determination, increase market efficiency, provide patients a foothold in the data economy, clarify legal uses of information, or encourage data-driven innovation. The better approach is to rely less, not more, on property. We recommend a regulatory model with four signature features: (i) substantial protection for personal health data similar to the GDPR with transparent limits on how, when, and by whom patient data can be accessed, used, and transmitted; (ii) input from relevant stakeholders; (iii) interoperability; and (iv) greater research into a health-data service, rather than goods, model.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"8 2","pages":"lsab023"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8487665/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39487852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-06eCollection Date: 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsab028
Kyle J McKibbin, Bradley A Malin, Ellen Wright Clayton
Biomedical researchers collect large amounts of personal data about individuals, which are frequently shared with repositories and an array of users. Typically, research data holders implement measures to protect participants' identities and unique attributes from unauthorized disclosure. These measures, however, can be less effective if people disclose their participation in a research study, which they may do for many reasons. Even so, the people who provide these data for research often understandably expect that their privacy will be protected. We discuss the particular challenges posed by self-disclosure and identify various steps that researchers should take to protect data in these cases to protect both the individuals and the research enterprise.
{"title":"Protecting research data of publicly revealing participants.","authors":"Kyle J McKibbin, Bradley A Malin, Ellen Wright Clayton","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsab028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab028","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Biomedical researchers collect large amounts of personal data about individuals, which are frequently shared with repositories and an array of users. Typically, research data holders implement measures to protect participants' identities and unique attributes from unauthorized disclosure. These measures, however, can be less effective if people disclose their participation in a research study, which they may do for many reasons. Even so, the people who provide these data for research often understandably expect that their privacy will be protected. We discuss the particular challenges posed by self-disclosure and identify various steps that researchers should take to protect data in these cases to protect both the individuals and the research enterprise.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"8 2","pages":"lsab028"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://ftp.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub/pmc/oa_pdf/b7/c6/lsab028.PMC8421013.pdf","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39409535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-06eCollection Date: 2021-07-01DOI: 10.1093/jlb/lsab029
Katharina Ó Cathaoir
This article seeks to bring the invisible child of personalized medicine out from the shadows through legal analysis and empirical data. It uses Denmark as a case to argue that existing policies, laws and practices on personalized medicine neglect the legal and ethical issues specific to children. The article investigates Danish laws and practices in clinical genetics and describes how the law neglects children's right to self-determination in three ways. Firstly, while child participation is provided for by law, no guidelines have been created to operationalize this norm. Secondly, children's right not to know is inadequately reflected in current policies. Thirdly, the storage of information from prenatal genetic sequencing raises important issues that are in need of reflection. Several recommendations are made, including for strengthening children's participation and limiting parents' access to secondary findings where they relate to untreatable or unpreventable conditions. It furthermore recognizes, however, that children's self-determination in some circumstances should be viewed relationally due to the interconnected nature of genetics.
{"title":"The invisible child of personalized medicine.","authors":"Katharina Ó Cathaoir","doi":"10.1093/jlb/lsab029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab029","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article seeks to bring the invisible child of personalized medicine out from the shadows through legal analysis and empirical data. It uses Denmark as a case to argue that existing policies, laws and practices on personalized medicine neglect the legal and ethical issues specific to children. The article investigates Danish laws and practices in clinical genetics and describes how the law neglects children's right to self-determination in three ways. Firstly, while child participation is provided for by law, no guidelines have been created to operationalize this norm. Secondly, children's right not to know is inadequately reflected in current policies. Thirdly, the storage of information from prenatal genetic sequencing raises important issues that are in need of reflection. Several recommendations are made, including for strengthening children's participation and limiting parents' access to secondary findings where they relate to untreatable or unpreventable conditions. It furthermore recognizes, however, that children's self-determination in some circumstances should be viewed relationally due to the interconnected nature of genetics.</p>","PeriodicalId":56266,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and the Biosciences","volume":"8 2","pages":"lsab029"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8421035/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"39428353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}