History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences最新文献

This article explores how environmental valuation and knowledge production shape Swedish marine and water management through the case of the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management (SwAM). Tasked with conserving, restoring, and sustainably using aquatic resources following an Ecosystem Approach (EA), SwAM navigates complex interactions between these processes and the generation of actionable knowledge. Drawing on perspectives from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Environmental Ethics, the article explores how SwAM constructs, translates, and operationalizes values in its management strategy and associated action plans, with empirical focus on three cases: seals as obstacles in professional fisheries, the socio-economic value of recreational fishing and tourism, and the prospective value of aquaculture. The analysis shows that SwAM's interpretation of the EA renders ecological value inseparable from economic benefit, as ecological functions are translated into measurable, often monetary indicators in the pursuit of 'balance'. Scientific knowledge becomes a prerequisite for valuation but is shaped by a governance logic that prioritizes quantification, standardization, and economic utility. Rather than enabling a plurality of environmental values, this logic tends to privilege those that can be expressed in instrumental and monetizable terms. This raises critical questions about whether the notion of ecological balance, central to the EA, can be realized within a framework that equates environmental worth with economic outcomes. A shift toward non-anthropocentric governance would require not only rethinking valuation practices but also developing epistemologies capable of recognizing non-instrumental dimensions of nature's value.

In modern English, common sense refers to an intuitive capacity to grasp self-evident truths and make judgments that require no special training or expertise. Although often treated as universal and ahistorical, its standing as an epistemic authority, especially within the sciences, has been contested, revised, and reconfigured over the past two centuries. Yet scientists' assumptions about the reliability of common sense typically remain implicit, embedded in a normative background that is rarely examined but quietly guides scientific thought. This paper examines how different attitudes toward common sense are reflected in the aesthetic choices and visual references scientists use. Through three case studies-Ernst Haeckel, Conrad Waddington, and Ginsburg & Jablonka-we demonstrate how their respective views, firmly rooted in their historical context, are made accessible through their aesthetic choices. Examining these choices reveals that scientific images, particularly those with artistic qualities, do more than depict scientific knowledge; they reflect underlying normative commitments, shaping what is seen as intelligible and scientifically meaningful. They are sites where scientific sensibilities and epistemic commitments become visible and available for critique. Drawing on Kant's notion of sensus communis, we suggest that aesthetic judgments, particularly of scientific representations, provide a reflective standpoint from which such implicit commitments can be evaluated.

Outlining the Apgar Score's use throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, I propose that the historical abuse of this score for newborn wellness does not only come from the obviously white-centered assessment criteria for "color" established in the 1950s. The more concerning aspect of the Score is its potential interpretation as measuring one unitary construct which captures both the past asphyxiated condition and future health risks of individual infants (a problem that has been noted for decades in professional guidance documents). My novel contribution is to use the history of the Apgar Score's use and misuse to demonstrate why racial inequities in medicine pose a problem for two frameworks in philosophy of measurement when applied to patient outcome measures. I ultimately argue that the case of the Apgar Score shows how both dominant frameworks in philosophy of measurement, that of coordination (within the representational theory of measurement) and that of psychometric validity, fail to help us fully comprehend the challenge of clinical measuring with indices. Both frameworks expect that, at some point, the process of coordination or validation of an instrument will end. An expanded and historically-informed framework is warranted for understanding how patient outcome measures are validated (and re-validated) over time, which can include the social and institutional forces which render an index relevant, biased, or questionable for different aims.

Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890-1962) was a pioneer of evolutionary biology who founded modern statistics. He has often been associated with a gene-centric conception of natural selection, but he did not discount the importance of factors operating at other levels. In the later chapters of his 1930 book, The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, Fisher proposed a mechanism to explain how a human civilization of any ethnicity could rise or fall. In contemporary terms, he did this by applying a concept of group selection, also known as "multi-level selection 1", in which supra-individual collectives impart consistent population structure over time to reproductive entities therein. Fisher believed that socioeconomic factors, operating above the individual level, could bias reproductive patterns and thereby have a causal influence on human social complexity. "Multi-level selection 2" is another kind of group selection which asserts heritable features to units above the level of the individual, and Fisher regarded "sexuality itself" as one such example. Fisher held some inaccurate views about human diversity, but appreciating how his argument foreshadows current multi-level selection theory does not require agreement with his mistakes. The chapters concerning human civilization in The Genetical Theory were not a polemic against non-Europeans, but reflected an understanding of multi-level selection and its effects on evolution as a whole.

The marine phycosphere is a microscale mucosal region of microbiomes surrounding a phytoplankton cell. The phycosphere (analogous to the terrestrial rhizosphere) is where microbial interactions navigate the biochemistry of the sea. The study of this microsphere deals with the causal relation enigma between two spatiotemporal scales: the micro-communal interactions and the macro-level of the biogeochemical cycles (Stocker, Science, 338(6107), 628-633, 2012); Segev et al., eLife, 5, e17473, 2016; Seymour et al., Nature Microbiology 2, Article 17065, 2017). This study of communities and ecosystems looks at metabolic interactions and interdependence relations, not focusing on biodiversity as the object of study. Following marine microbial ecology, an epistemic view of interactions and inter-communal relations seems to take the bulk of consideration. In this paper, I ask what it is about the sea that promotes an interactionist epistemic framework that is different than other fields in microbial ecology. Using Helen Longino's interactionist ontology (2020, 2021), I ask whether the sea presents a unique epistemic framework focusing on understanding interactions and interdependence. I look into the insights marine environmental studies may provide to the methodological and conceptual challenges in understanding microbial ecological stability and life cycles. By paralleling marine and soil microbial ecology, I highlight the distinct features of the water column that offer a unique epistemic and methodological framework focused on interactions and interdependence. Exploring microbial ecology at sea, I detail its epistemic advantages in shaping an interactionist theoretical and conceptual framework.

Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. In recent years, Quayshawn Spencer has offered one of the most elaborate versions of that view, but his theory faces several problems (Spencer in Philos Stud 159:181-204, 2012; Spencer in J Philos 111:1-23, 2014; Spencer in 52:46-55, 2015; Spencer in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019a; Hochman in J Philos 110:331-351, 2013; Glasgow et al. in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Jackson in Philos Theory Pract Biol 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630 ; Winsberg in Biol Philos 37:46, 2022; Msimang in Philos Pap 51:115-145, 2022; Kalewold in Metaphysics of race, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2024; Berenstain forthcoming). In this paper, I raise another problem for Spencer's BRR, arguing that his theory does not fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. Spencer's BRR involves significant epistemic and ethical risks, and these risks indirectly impact Spencer's metaphysical conclusions. I rely on the "science and values" literature to show this and engage with STS and anthropology literature (Douglas in Inductive risk and values in science, 2000. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c ; Douglas in Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; Brown in Philos Sci 80:829-839, 2013; Brown in Current controversies in values and science, Routledge, Milton Park, 2017; Biddle and Kukla Explor Induc Risk Case Stud Values Sci 1:215-238, 2017; Elliot and Richards in Exploring inductive risk: case studies of values in science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017). This analysis raises broader questions about the relationship between values, social responsibility, and metaphysics. Previous criticisms of Spencer's BRR have barely touched on those questions. Hence, by critically discussing problems with Spencer's already troubled view, my main goal is to open the debate for such important questions.