{"title":"Free Trade and Economic Efficiency:A Political Economy Analysis of International Trade","authors":"峰 赵, 荣盛 钟","doi":"10.26599/peo.2022.9310101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26599/peo.2022.9310101","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 当前逆全球化思潮的兴起使传统国际贸易理论面临挑战,也提出了从理论上反思贸易和经济效率的关系的必要。基于马克思主义政治经济学劳动价值论和生产价格理论,本文在两国两部门的线性生产框架下分析了贸易分工和社会效率的问题。研究表明,在资本主导的国际自由贸易中,资本的逐利运动在一定程度上会推动社会生产力的提高,但有时资本运动会面临“均衡困境”,造成社会生产力无法充分发展、经济效率低下的情况,需要一个能够充分协调各方利益的机构进行干预和调节。这为国家对国际贸易活动的干预和调节提供了一个理论根据。\u0000","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"98 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83540902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Analysis of the Consistency of Raising Labor Income Share and Raising Economic Growth Rate: Based on Marx's Social Reproduction Formula","authors":"为群 陶","doi":"10.26599/peo.2022.9310104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26599/peo.2022.9310104","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 文章批驳了西方经济学中劳动收入份额、资本收入份额理论,运用马克思社会再生产公式进行劳动收入份额、资本收入份额的规范研究。通过廓清社会再生产中的劳动收入份额、资本收入份额,文章阐明了两大部类的资本有机构成、两大部类比例、全社会的剩余价值积累率是影响劳动收入份额、资本收入份额的三大因素。以资本积累作为连接劳动收入份额、资本收入份额与经济增长的链环,文章给出经济增长率和劳动收入份额、资本收入份额之间的关系式,并据此探析和检验了:提高劳动收入份额、经济增长率具有一致性;生产资料优先增长可以作为提高劳动收入份额、经济增长率的共同路径。文章最后借助马克思《资本论》中一例,对提高劳动收入份额、经济增长率具有一致性作出计算验证。\u0000","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85190891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explains why banks derive a benefit from being highly interconnected. We show that when banks are protected by government guarantees, they can significantly increase their expected returns by channeling funds through the interbank market before these funds are invested in real assets. If banks that are protected by implicit or explicit government guarantees act as intermediaries between other banks and real investments, there is the possibility that these intermediary banks will be rescued by their governments if the real assets fail. This additional hedge increases the likelihood that banks and their creditors are repaid relative to a direct investment in those same real assets. We show that this incentive to exploit the government guarantees of other banks leads to long intermediation chains and a degree of interconnectedness that is above the welfare-optimal level, which justifies regulatory intervention. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.
{"title":"Interbank Networks and Backdoor Bailouts: Benefiting from other Banks' Government Guarantees","authors":"T. Eisert, Christian Eufinger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1976383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1976383","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explains why banks derive a benefit from being highly interconnected. We show that when banks are protected by government guarantees, they can significantly increase their expected returns by channeling funds through the interbank market before these funds are invested in real assets. If banks that are protected by implicit or explicit government guarantees act as intermediaries between other banks and real investments, there is the possibility that these intermediary banks will be rescued by their governments if the real assets fail. This additional hedge increases the likelihood that banks and their creditors are repaid relative to a direct investment in those same real assets. We show that this incentive to exploit the government guarantees of other banks leads to long intermediation chains and a degree of interconnectedness that is above the welfare-optimal level, which justifies regulatory intervention. This paper was accepted by Amit Seru, finance.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"166 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80460883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A theory is introduced to systematically explain autocracies’ diverse experiences with taxation. State power relative to citizens’ capacity for violence determines the limit of taxation, the highest tax rate that citizens will tolerate and pay. Rulers can spend resources on coercion to increase state power. The coercion and taxation levels that they choose to maximize net revenue vary with social and economic conditions leading to various state types: strong, weak, collapsing and benevolent featuring respectively tax tyranny, tax incompetency, tax-induced violence and tax harmony. The theory informs important policy issues.
{"title":"Taxation in Autocracies: When Is Super-Encompassing Interest Preserved?","authors":"Yijiang Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2052597","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2052597","url":null,"abstract":"A theory is introduced to systematically explain autocracies’ diverse experiences with taxation. State power relative to citizens’ capacity for violence determines the limit of taxation, the highest tax rate that citizens will tolerate and pay. Rulers can spend resources on coercion to increase state power. The coercion and taxation levels that they choose to maximize net revenue vary with social and economic conditions leading to various state types: strong, weak, collapsing and benevolent featuring respectively tax tyranny, tax incompetency, tax-induced violence and tax harmony. The theory informs important policy issues.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88098576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that the regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts.
{"title":"Lobbying and Uniform Disclosure Regulation","authors":"Henry L. Friedman, M. Heinle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2106788","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2106788","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commitment to uniformity is socially desirable when firms are sufficiently homogeneous or the costs of lobbying to society are large. We show that the regulatory intensity for a given firm can be increasing or decreasing in the degree of uniformity, even though uniformity always reduces lobbying. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of standard-setting institutions and their effects on corporate governance and lobbying efforts.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90818990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2010, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan formed the Eurasian Customs Union and imposed the Russian tariff as the common external tariff of the Customs Union. In 2015 they formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) designed to promote the free flow of goods, services, labor and capital, as Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic joined. Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan all had to approximately double their average external tariff to implement the common external tariff. Russia has benefited from additional exports under the protection of the higher tariffs. Estimates reveal that the tariff changes resulted in substantial transfers from Kazakhstan to Russia (with similar impacts expected for Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic) as importers in Kazakhstan now purchase lower quality or higher priced Russian imports that are protected under the tariff umbrella of the common external tariff. Transfers from the Central Asian countries to Russia were the reason the predecessor to the EAEU (known as EurAsEC) failed, so this bodes badly for the ultimate success of the EAEU. But Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization will substantially lower the common external tariff and reduce the transfers to Russia. Further, unlike EurAsEC, the EAEU aims to employ “deep integration,�? e.g., to reduce non-tariff barriers and improve trade facilitation, create a single market, reduce trade distorting agricultural subsidies and harmonize some regulations. Estimates show that if substantial progress could be made in trade facilitation and reducing non-tariff barriers, this could make the Customs Union positive for Kazakhstan and other potential Central Asian members. And the right to work for migrants may dominate these issues for Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic. Unfortunately, as of early 2016, the EAEU has not improved trade facilitation or reduced non-tariff barriers. To effectively implement the objectives of the EAEU, however, Russia will need to take the lead in ceding real authority to the Eurasian Commission and press for reforms, including those that reduce the substantial internal non-tariff barriers.
{"title":"The Eurasian Economic Union among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic: Can It Succeed Where Its Predecessor Failed?","authors":"David G. Tarr","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2185517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2185517","url":null,"abstract":"In 2010, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan formed the Eurasian Customs Union and imposed the Russian tariff as the common external tariff of the Customs Union. In 2015 they formed the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) designed to promote the free flow of goods, services, labor and capital, as Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic joined. Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan all had to approximately double their average external tariff to implement the common external tariff. Russia has benefited from additional exports under the protection of the higher tariffs. Estimates reveal that the tariff changes resulted in substantial transfers from Kazakhstan to Russia (with similar impacts expected for Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic) as importers in Kazakhstan now purchase lower quality or higher priced Russian imports that are protected under the tariff umbrella of the common external tariff. Transfers from the Central Asian countries to Russia were the reason the predecessor to the EAEU (known as EurAsEC) failed, so this bodes badly for the ultimate success of the EAEU. But Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization will substantially lower the common external tariff and reduce the transfers to Russia. Further, unlike EurAsEC, the EAEU aims to employ “deep integration,�? e.g., to reduce non-tariff barriers and improve trade facilitation, create a single market, reduce trade distorting agricultural subsidies and harmonize some regulations. Estimates show that if substantial progress could be made in trade facilitation and reducing non-tariff barriers, this could make the Customs Union positive for Kazakhstan and other potential Central Asian members. And the right to work for migrants may dominate these issues for Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic. Unfortunately, as of early 2016, the EAEU has not improved trade facilitation or reduced non-tariff barriers. To effectively implement the objectives of the EAEU, however, Russia will need to take the lead in ceding real authority to the Eurasian Commission and press for reforms, including those that reduce the substantial internal non-tariff barriers.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87304991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) news-based measure to capture economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in the United States, we find that EPU positively forecasts log excess market returns. A one-standard deviation increase in EPU is associated with a 1.5% increase in forecasted 3-month abnormal returns (6.1% annualized). Furthermore, innovations in EPU earn a significant negative risk premium in the Fama French 25 size-momentum portfolios. Among the Fama French 25 portfolios formed on size and momentum returns, the portfolio with the greatest EPU beta underperforms the portfolio with the lowest EPU beta by 5.53% per annum, controlling for exposure to the Carhart four factors as well as implied and realized volatility. These findings suggest that EPU is an economically important risk factor for equities.
使用Baker, Bloom, and Davis(2013)基于新闻的度量来捕捉美国的经济政策不确定性(EPU)，我们发现EPU积极预测log超额市场回报。EPU每增加一个标准差，预测3个月异常收益就会增加1.5%(折合成年率为6.1%)。此外，EPU的创新在Fama French 25个规模动量投资组合中获得了显著的负风险溢价。在Fama French 25个基于规模和动量回报的投资组合中，在控制了Carhart四因素以及隐含和实现波动率的影响后，EPU β最高的投资组合的年表现比EPU β最低的投资组合低5.53%。这些发现表明，EPU是股票的一个重要经济风险因素。
{"title":"The Asset Pricing Implications of Government Economic Policy Uncertainty","authors":"Jonathan Brogaard, Andrew Detzel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2075375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2075375","url":null,"abstract":"Using the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) news-based measure to capture economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in the United States, we find that EPU positively forecasts log excess market returns. A one-standard deviation increase in EPU is associated with a 1.5% increase in forecasted 3-month abnormal returns (6.1% annualized). Furthermore, innovations in EPU earn a significant negative risk premium in the Fama French 25 size-momentum portfolios. Among the Fama French 25 portfolios formed on size and momentum returns, the portfolio with the greatest EPU beta underperforms the portfolio with the lowest EPU beta by 5.53% per annum, controlling for exposure to the Carhart four factors as well as implied and realized volatility. These findings suggest that EPU is an economically important risk factor for equities.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"70 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77063602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. In this paper, we show that the share of FRMs is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize. Our analysis exploits plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government-backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods when private securitization markets are well-functioning.
{"title":"Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage","authors":"A. Fuster, J. Vickery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2198392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2198392","url":null,"abstract":"Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. In this paper, we show that the share of FRMs is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize. Our analysis exploits plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government-backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods when private securitization markets are well-functioning.","PeriodicalId":70912,"journal":{"name":"政治经济学季刊","volume":"57 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88935261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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