Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...最新文献
In ASIACCS 2010, Chen, Charlemagne, Guan, Hu and Chen proposed an interesting construction of identity-based encryption based on DHIES, whose key extraction algorithm makes use of the multivariate quadratic equation. They proved that their scheme is selective-ID secure against chosen ciphertext attack, i.e. secure in the sense of IND-sID-CCA. Unfortunately, in this paper, we demonstrate that Chen et al.'s scheme is insecure in the sense of IND-sID-CCA by showing that the private key extraction algorithm of their scheme can be exploited to apply XL algorithm, which is to solve the multivariate quadratic (MQ) problem (under certain conditions).
{"title":"On the security of the identity-based encryption based on DHIES from ASIACCS 2010","authors":"W. Susilo, J. Baek","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966962","url":null,"abstract":"In ASIACCS 2010, Chen, Charlemagne, Guan, Hu and Chen proposed an interesting construction of identity-based encryption based on DHIES, whose key extraction algorithm makes use of the multivariate quadratic equation. They proved that their scheme is selective-ID secure against chosen ciphertext attack, i.e. secure in the sense of IND-sID-CCA. Unfortunately, in this paper, we demonstrate that Chen et al.'s scheme is insecure in the sense of IND-sID-CCA by showing that the private key extraction algorithm of their scheme can be exploited to apply XL algorithm, which is to solve the multivariate quadratic (MQ) problem (under certain conditions).","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89787199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although various past efforts have been made to characterize and detect guessing attacks, there is no consensus on the definition of guessing attacks. Such a lack of generic definition makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the resilience of security protocols to guessing attacks. To overcome this hurdle, we seek a new definition in this paper to fully characterize the attacker's guessing capabilities (i.e., guessability). This provides a general framework to reason about guessing attacks in a symbolic setting, independent of specific intruder models. We show how the framework can be used to analyze both passive and active guessing attacks.
{"title":"Rethinking about guessing attacks","authors":"Zhiwei Li, Weichao Wang","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966954","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966954","url":null,"abstract":"Although various past efforts have been made to characterize and detect guessing attacks, there is no consensus on the definition of guessing attacks. Such a lack of generic definition makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the resilience of security protocols to guessing attacks.\u0000 To overcome this hurdle, we seek a new definition in this paper to fully characterize the attacker's guessing capabilities (i.e., guessability). This provides a general framework to reason about guessing attacks in a symbolic setting, independent of specific intruder models. We show how the framework can be used to analyze both passive and active guessing attacks.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74823550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act inspired research on long-term high-integrity retention of business records, leveraging the immutability guarantees that WORM storage servers offer for files. In this paper, we present the transaction log on WORM (TLOW) approach for supporting long-term immutability for relational tuples. TLOW stores the transaction log on WORM and uses an audit helper (AH) add-on to continuously perform audit-related activities without compromising transaction performance or audit trustworthiness. TLOW imposes only 1-11% runtime overhead on TPC-C transactions, much less than previously proposed approaches, and does not require DBMS kernel changes. TLOW audits are extremely fast, e.g., two hours to audit a year of continuous TPC-C activity, versus 10 days for previously proposed approaches. This opens up the possibility of real-time internal audits that can detect fraudulent activity before its effects propagate throughout an enterprise. We also provide a proof of correctness for TLOW, which exposes a subtle threat that affects the correctness of previously proposed approaches.
{"title":"Efficient audit-based compliance for relational data retention","authors":"Ragib Hasan, M. Winslett","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966944","url":null,"abstract":"The Sarbanes-Oxley Act inspired research on long-term high-integrity retention of business records, leveraging the immutability guarantees that WORM storage servers offer for files. In this paper, we present the transaction log on WORM (TLOW) approach for supporting long-term immutability for relational tuples. TLOW stores the transaction log on WORM and uses an audit helper (AH) add-on to continuously perform audit-related activities without compromising transaction performance or audit trustworthiness. TLOW imposes only 1-11% runtime overhead on TPC-C transactions, much less than previously proposed approaches, and does not require DBMS kernel changes. TLOW audits are extremely fast, e.g., two hours to audit a year of continuous TPC-C activity, versus 10 days for previously proposed approaches. This opens up the possibility of real-time internal audits that can detect fraudulent activity before its effects propagate throughout an enterprise. We also provide a proof of correctness for TLOW, which exposes a subtle threat that affects the correctness of previously proposed approaches.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79159709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Network scanning reveals valuable information of accessible hosts over the Internet and their offered network services, which allows significant narrowing of potential targets to attack. Addressing and balancing a set of sometimes competing desirable properties is required to make network scanning detection more appealing in practice: 1) fast detection of scanning activity to enable prompt response by intrusion detection and prevention systems; 2) acceptable rate of false alarms, keeping in mind that false alarms may lead to legitimate traffic being penalized; 3) high detection rate with the ability to detect stealthy scanners; 4) efficient use of monitoring system resources; and 5) immunity to evasion. In this paper, we present a scanning detection algorithm designed to accommodate all of these goals. LQS is a fast, accurate, and light-weight scan detection algorithm that leverages the key properties of the monitored network environment as variables that affect how the scanning detection algorithm operates. We also present what is, to our knowledge, the first automated way to estimate a reference baseline in the absence of ground truth, for use as an evaluation methodology for scan detection. Using network traces from two sites, we evaluate LQS and compare its scan detection results with those obtained by the state-of-the-art TRW algorithm. Our empirical analysis shows significant improvements over TRW in all of these properties.
{"title":"Network scan detection with LQS: a lightweight, quick and stateful algorithm","authors":"Mansour Alsaleh, P. V. Oorschot","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966928","url":null,"abstract":"Network scanning reveals valuable information of accessible hosts over the Internet and their offered network services, which allows significant narrowing of potential targets to attack. Addressing and balancing a set of sometimes competing desirable properties is required to make network scanning detection more appealing in practice: 1) fast detection of scanning activity to enable prompt response by intrusion detection and prevention systems; 2) acceptable rate of false alarms, keeping in mind that false alarms may lead to legitimate traffic being penalized; 3) high detection rate with the ability to detect stealthy scanners; 4) efficient use of monitoring system resources; and 5) immunity to evasion. In this paper, we present a scanning detection algorithm designed to accommodate all of these goals. LQS is a fast, accurate, and light-weight scan detection algorithm that leverages the key properties of the monitored network environment as variables that affect how the scanning detection algorithm operates. We also present what is, to our knowledge, the first automated way to estimate a reference baseline in the absence of ground truth, for use as an evaluation methodology for scan detection. Using network traces from two sites, we evaluate LQS and compare its scan detection results with those obtained by the state-of-the-art TRW algorithm. Our empirical analysis shows significant improvements over TRW in all of these properties.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80838777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Linear cryptanalysis is a general form of cryptanalysis based on identifying the linear approximations of a cipher. It is one of the two most widely used attacks on block ciphers. In order to resist the differential cryptanalysis, the S-box with large output bit number is applied in block cipher, for example CAST-128 and CAST-256 use the 8 × 32 S-boxes. In addition, the S-boxes are often constructed based on bent functions to resist the linear cryptanalysis and the S-boxes are non-surjective mapping. Therefore, for the large non-surjective S-box, to identify the best linear approximation with zero input mask and nonzero output mask is difficult due to the unaccepted computation time. In this paper, we will give an efficient computing method to find such best linear approximations for the non-surjective large S-boxes using parallel computation in practical time. This computing method can help to estimate the resistant property for some kind of linear cryptanalysis of block ciphers with this kind of S-box.
{"title":"How to search linear approximation for large non-surjective S-box","authors":"Yue Sun, Meiqin Wang, Qiumei Sun","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966979","url":null,"abstract":"Linear cryptanalysis is a general form of cryptanalysis based on identifying the linear approximations of a cipher. It is one of the two most widely used attacks on block ciphers. In order to resist the differential cryptanalysis, the S-box with large output bit number is applied in block cipher, for example CAST-128 and CAST-256 use the 8 × 32 S-boxes. In addition, the S-boxes are often constructed based on bent functions to resist the linear cryptanalysis and the S-boxes are non-surjective mapping. Therefore, for the large non-surjective S-box, to identify the best linear approximation with zero input mask and nonzero output mask is difficult due to the unaccepted computation time. In this paper, we will give an efficient computing method to find such best linear approximations for the non-surjective large S-boxes using parallel computation in practical time. This computing method can help to estimate the resistant property for some kind of linear cryptanalysis of block ciphers with this kind of S-box.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81740198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many common protocols: TCP, IPSec, etc., are vulnerable to denial of service attacks, where adversaries maliciously consume significant resources of honest principals, leading to resource exhaustion. We propose a set of cost-based rules that formalize DoS attacks by resource exhaustion and can automate their detection. Our classification separates excessive but legal protocol use (e.g., flooding) from illegal protocol manipulation that causes participants to waste computation time without reaching the protocol goals. We also distinguish simple intruder intervention leading to wasteful execution from DoS attacks proper, which can be repeatedly initiated. Our rules can highlight attacks that are undetectable by the targeted honest agents, or by all protocol participants. We have successfully tested an implementation of the methodology in a validation platform on relevant protocol examples, in what to the best of our knowledge is the first formal automated analysis of DoS attacks.
{"title":"Formal modelling and automatic detection of resource exhaustion attacks","authors":"B. Groza, M. Minea","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966955","url":null,"abstract":"Many common protocols: TCP, IPSec, etc., are vulnerable to denial of service attacks, where adversaries maliciously consume significant resources of honest principals, leading to resource exhaustion. We propose a set of cost-based rules that formalize DoS attacks by resource exhaustion and can automate their detection. Our classification separates excessive but legal protocol use (e.g., flooding) from illegal protocol manipulation that causes participants to waste computation time without reaching the protocol goals. We also distinguish simple intruder intervention leading to wasteful execution from DoS attacks proper, which can be repeatedly initiated. Our rules can highlight attacks that are undetectable by the targeted honest agents, or by all protocol participants. We have successfully tested an implementation of the methodology in a validation platform on relevant protocol examples, in what to the best of our knowledge is the first formal automated analysis of DoS attacks.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85381349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Gradual authentication is a principle proposed by Meadows as a way to tackle denial-of-service attacks on network protocols by gradually increasing the confidence in clients before the server commits resources. In this paper, we propose an efficient method that allows a defending server to authenticate its clients gradually with the help of some fast-to-verify measures. Our method integrates hash-based client puzzles along with a special class of digital signatures supporting fast verification. Our hash-based client puzzle provides finer granularity of difficulty and is proven secure in the puzzle difficulty model of Chen et al. (2009). We integrate this with the fast-verification digital signature scheme proposed by Bernstein (2000, 2008). These schemes can be up to 20 times faster for client authentication compared to RSA-based schemes. Our experimental results show that, in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, fast verification digital signatures can provide a 7% increase in connections per second compared to RSA signatures, and our integration of client puzzles with client authentication imposes no performance penalty on the server since puzzle verification is a part of signature verification.
{"title":"An integrated approach to cryptographic mitigation of denial-of-service attacks","authors":"Jothi Rangasamy, D. Stebila, C. Boyd, J. G. Nieto","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966929","url":null,"abstract":"Gradual authentication is a principle proposed by Meadows as a way to tackle denial-of-service attacks on network protocols by gradually increasing the confidence in clients before the server commits resources. In this paper, we propose an efficient method that allows a defending server to authenticate its clients gradually with the help of some fast-to-verify measures. Our method integrates hash-based client puzzles along with a special class of digital signatures supporting fast verification. Our hash-based client puzzle provides finer granularity of difficulty and is proven secure in the puzzle difficulty model of Chen et al. (2009). We integrate this with the fast-verification digital signature scheme proposed by Bernstein (2000, 2008). These schemes can be up to 20 times faster for client authentication compared to RSA-based schemes. Our experimental results show that, in the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, fast verification digital signatures can provide a 7% increase in connections per second compared to RSA signatures, and our integration of client puzzles with client authentication imposes no performance penalty on the server since puzzle verification is a part of signature verification.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88068180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cryptographers have proposed the notion of read-once keys (ROKs) as a beneficial tool for a number of applications, such as delegation of authority. The premise of ROKs is that the key is destroyed by the process of reading it, thus preventing subsequent accesses. While the idea and the applications are well-understood, the consensus among cryptographers is that ROKs cannot be produced by algorithmic processes alone. Rather, a trusted hardware mechanism is needed to support the destruction of the key. In this work, we propose one such approach for using a hardware design to generate ROKs. Our approach is an application of physically unclonable functions (PUFs). PUFs use the intrinsic differences in hardware behavior to produce a random function that is unique to that hardware instance. Our design consists of incorporating the PUF in a feedback loop to make reading the key multiple times physically impossible.
{"title":"PUF ROKs: a hardware approach to read-once keys","authors":"Michael S. Kirkpatrick, Sam Kerr, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966934","url":null,"abstract":"Cryptographers have proposed the notion of read-once keys (ROKs) as a beneficial tool for a number of applications, such as delegation of authority. The premise of ROKs is that the key is destroyed by the process of reading it, thus preventing subsequent accesses. While the idea and the applications are well-understood, the consensus among cryptographers is that ROKs cannot be produced by algorithmic processes alone. Rather, a trusted hardware mechanism is needed to support the destruction of the key. In this work, we propose one such approach for using a hardware design to generate ROKs. Our approach is an application of physically unclonable functions (PUFs). PUFs use the intrinsic differences in hardware behavior to produce a random function that is unique to that hardware instance. Our design consists of incorporating the PUF in a feedback loop to make reading the key multiple times physically impossible.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90464734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cheng-Kang Chu, W. Zhu, Sherman S. M. Chow, Jianying Zhou, R. Deng
In an end-to-end encryption model for a wireless sensor network (WSN), the network control center preloads encryption and decryption keys to the sensor nodes and the subscribers respectively, such that a subscriber can use a mobile device in the deployment field to decrypt the sensed data encrypted by the more resource-constrained sensor nodes. This paper proposes SMS-SED, a provably secure yet practically efficient key assignment system featuring a discrete time-based access control, to better support a business model where the sensors deployer rents the WSN to customers who desires a higher flexibility beyond subscribing to strictly consecutive periods. In SMS-SED, a node or a mobile device stores a secret key of size independent of the total number of sensor nodes and time periods. We evaluated the feasibility of deploying 2000 nodes for 4096 time periods at 1024-bit of security as a case study, studied the trade off of increasing the storage requirement of a node to significantly reduce its computation time, and provided formal security argument in the random oracle model.
{"title":"Secure mobile subscription of sensor-encrypted data","authors":"Cheng-Kang Chu, W. Zhu, Sherman S. M. Chow, Jianying Zhou, R. Deng","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966943","url":null,"abstract":"In an end-to-end encryption model for a wireless sensor network (WSN), the network control center preloads encryption and decryption keys to the sensor nodes and the subscribers respectively, such that a subscriber can use a mobile device in the deployment field to decrypt the sensed data encrypted by the more resource-constrained sensor nodes. This paper proposes SMS-SED, a provably secure yet practically efficient key assignment system featuring a discrete time-based access control, to better support a business model where the sensors deployer rents the WSN to customers who desires a higher flexibility beyond subscribing to strictly consecutive periods. In SMS-SED, a node or a mobile device stores a secret key of size independent of the total number of sensor nodes and time periods. We evaluated the feasibility of deploying 2000 nodes for 4096 time periods at 1024-bit of security as a case study, studied the trade off of increasing the storage requirement of a node to significantly reduce its computation time, and provided formal security argument in the random oracle model.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90958245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Automated techniques for the security analysis of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) access control policies are crucial for their design and maintenance. The definition of administrative domains by means of attributes attached to users makes the RBAC model easier to use in real scenarios but complicates the development of security analysis techniques, that should be able to modularly reason about a wide range of attribute domains. In this paper, we describe an automated symbolic security analysis technique for administrative attribute-based RBAC policies. A class of formulae of first-order logic is used as an adequate symbolic representation for the policies and their administrative actions. State-of-the-art automated theorem proving techniques are used (off-the-shelf) to mechanize the security analysis procedure. Besides discussing the assumptions for the effectiveness and termination of the procedure, we demonstrate its efficiency through an extensive empirical evaluation.
{"title":"Efficient symbolic automated analysis of administrative attribute-based RBAC-policies","authors":"Francesco Alberti, A. Armando, Silvio Ranise","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966935","url":null,"abstract":"Automated techniques for the security analysis of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) access control policies are crucial for their design and maintenance. The definition of administrative domains by means of attributes attached to users makes the RBAC model easier to use in real scenarios but complicates the development of security analysis techniques, that should be able to modularly reason about a wide range of attribute domains. In this paper, we describe an automated symbolic security analysis technique for administrative attribute-based RBAC policies. A class of formulae of first-order logic is used as an adequate symbolic representation for the policies and their administrative actions. State-of-the-art automated theorem proving techniques are used (off-the-shelf) to mechanize the security analysis procedure. Besides discussing the assumptions for the effectiveness and termination of the procedure, we demonstrate its efficiency through an extensive empirical evaluation.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90384470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...
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