Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...最新文献
In this paper we propose a new biometric measure to authenticate the user of a smartphone: the movement the user performs when answering (or placing) a phone call. The biometric measure leverages features that are becoming commodities in new smartphones, i.e. accelerometer and orientation sensors. We argue that this new biometric measure has a unique feature. That is, it allows a transparent authentication (not requiring an additional specific interaction for this) to check that the user that is answering (or placing) a phone call is the one authorized to do that. At the same time, this biometric measure can also be used as a non transparent authentication method, e.g. the user may need to move the phone as if answering a call, in order to unlock the phone to get access to SMSs or emails. As a consequence of being a biometric measure, an adversary that spies on the movement (e.g. captures it with a camera) and tries to replicate it, will not be granted access to the phone. We prototyped our solution and conducted several experiments to assess its feasibility. Results show that the method is effective, and the performance is comparable to that of other transparent authentication methods, like face or voice recognition.
{"title":"Mind how you answer me!: transparently authenticating the user of a smartphone when answering or placing a call","authors":"M. Conti, Irina Zachia-Zlatea, B. Crispo","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966945","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we propose a new biometric measure to authenticate the user of a smartphone: the movement the user performs when answering (or placing) a phone call. The biometric measure leverages features that are becoming commodities in new smartphones, i.e. accelerometer and orientation sensors. We argue that this new biometric measure has a unique feature. That is, it allows a transparent authentication (not requiring an additional specific interaction for this) to check that the user that is answering (or placing) a phone call is the one authorized to do that. At the same time, this biometric measure can also be used as a non transparent authentication method, e.g. the user may need to move the phone as if answering a call, in order to unlock the phone to get access to SMSs or emails. As a consequence of being a biometric measure, an adversary that spies on the movement (e.g. captures it with a camera) and tries to replicate it, will not be granted access to the phone.\u0000 We prototyped our solution and conducted several experiments to assess its feasibility. Results show that the method is effective, and the performance is comparable to that of other transparent authentication methods, like face or voice recognition.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"13 1","pages":"249-259"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79915059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Data represent an extremely important asset for any organization. Confidential data such as military secrets or intellectual property must never be disclosed outside the organization. Therefore, one of the most severe threats in the case of cyber-insider attacks is the loss of confidential data due to exfiltration. A malicious insider who has the proper credentials to access the organization databases may, over time, send data outside the organization network through a variety of channels, such as email, crafted HTTP requests that encapsulate data, etc. Existing security tools for detection of cyber-attacks focus on protecting the boundary between the organization and the outside world. Numerous network-level intrusion detection systems (IDS) exist, which monitor the traffic pattern and attempt to infer anomalous behavior. While such tools may be effective in protecting against external attacks, they are less suitable when the data exfiltration is performed by an insider who has the proper credentials and authorization to access resources within the organization. In this paper, we argue that DBMS-layer detection and prevention systems are the best alternative to defend against data exfiltration because: (1) DBMS access is performed through a standard, unique language (SQL) with well-understood semantics; (2) monitoring the potential disclosure of confidential data is more effective if done as close as possible to the data source; and (3) the DBMS layer already has in place a thorough mechanism for enforcing access control based on subject credentials. By analyzing the pattern of interaction between subjects and the DBMS, it is possible to detect anomalous activity that is indicative of early signs of exfiltration. In the paper, we outline a taxonomy of cyber-insider dimensions of activities that are indicative of data exfiltration, and we discuss a high-level architecture and mechanisms for early detection of exfiltration by insiders. We also outline a virtualization-based mechanism that prevents insiders from exfiltrating data, even in the case when they manage to gain control over the network. The protection mechanism relies on explicit authorization of data transfers that cross the organizational boundary.
{"title":"Towards mechanisms for detection and prevention of data exfiltration by insiders: keynote talk paper","authors":"E. Bertino, Gabriel Ghinita","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966916","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966916","url":null,"abstract":"Data represent an extremely important asset for any organization. Confidential data such as military secrets or intellectual property must never be disclosed outside the organization. Therefore, one of the most severe threats in the case of cyber-insider attacks is the loss of confidential data due to exfiltration. A malicious insider who has the proper credentials to access the organization databases may, over time, send data outside the organization network through a variety of channels, such as email, crafted HTTP requests that encapsulate data, etc. Existing security tools for detection of cyber-attacks focus on protecting the boundary between the organization and the outside world. Numerous network-level intrusion detection systems (IDS) exist, which monitor the traffic pattern and attempt to infer anomalous behavior. While such tools may be effective in protecting against external attacks, they are less suitable when the data exfiltration is performed by an insider who has the proper credentials and authorization to access resources within the organization. In this paper, we argue that DBMS-layer detection and prevention systems are the best alternative to defend against data exfiltration because: (1) DBMS access is performed through a standard, unique language (SQL) with well-understood semantics; (2) monitoring the potential disclosure of confidential data is more effective if done as close as possible to the data source; and (3) the DBMS layer already has in place a thorough mechanism for enforcing access control based on subject credentials. By analyzing the pattern of interaction between subjects and the DBMS, it is possible to detect anomalous activity that is indicative of early signs of exfiltration. In the paper, we outline a taxonomy of cyber-insider dimensions of activities that are indicative of data exfiltration, and we discuss a high-level architecture and mechanisms for early detection of exfiltration by insiders. We also outline a virtualization-based mechanism that prevents insiders from exfiltrating data, even in the case when they manage to gain control over the network. The protection mechanism relies on explicit authorization of data transfers that cross the organizational boundary.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"16 1","pages":"10-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78823217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Wiesmaier, M. Horsch, Johannes Braun, Franziskus Kiefer, D. Hühnlein, Falko Strenzke, J. Buchmann
Many future electronic identity cards will be equipped with a contact-less interface. Analysts expect that a significant proportion of future mobile phones support Near Field Communication (NFC) technology. Thus, it is a reasonable approach to use the cell phone as mobile smart card terminal, which in particular supports the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol to ensure user consent and to protect the wireless interface between the mobile phone and the smart card. While there are efficient PACE implementations for smart cards, there does not seem to be an efficient and platform independent solution for mobile terminals. Therefore we provide a new implementation using the Java Micro Edition (Java ME), which is supported by almost all modern mobile phones. However, the benchmarks of our first, straightforward PACE implementation on an NFC-enabled mobile phone have shown that improvement is needed. In order to reach a user friendly performance we implemented an optimized version, which, as of now, is restricted to optimizations which can be realized using features of existing Java ME libraries. In the work at hand we present a review of the relevant algorithms and provide benchmarks of the corresponding arithmetic functions in different Java ME libraries. We discuss the different optimization approaches, introduce our optimized PACE implementation, and provide timings for a desktop PC and a mobile phone in comparison to the straightforward version. Finally, we investigate potential side channel attacks on the optimized implementation.
{"title":"An efficient mobile PACE implementation","authors":"A. Wiesmaier, M. Horsch, Johannes Braun, Franziskus Kiefer, D. Hühnlein, Falko Strenzke, J. Buchmann","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966936","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966936","url":null,"abstract":"Many future electronic identity cards will be equipped with a contact-less interface. Analysts expect that a significant proportion of future mobile phones support Near Field Communication (NFC) technology. Thus, it is a reasonable approach to use the cell phone as mobile smart card terminal, which in particular supports the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol to ensure user consent and to protect the wireless interface between the mobile phone and the smart card. While there are efficient PACE implementations for smart cards, there does not seem to be an efficient and platform independent solution for mobile terminals. Therefore we provide a new implementation using the Java Micro Edition (Java ME), which is supported by almost all modern mobile phones. However, the benchmarks of our first, straightforward PACE implementation on an NFC-enabled mobile phone have shown that improvement is needed. In order to reach a user friendly performance we implemented an optimized version, which, as of now, is restricted to optimizations which can be realized using features of existing Java ME libraries.\u0000 In the work at hand we present a review of the relevant algorithms and provide benchmarks of the corresponding arithmetic functions in different Java ME libraries. We discuss the different optimization approaches, introduce our optimized PACE implementation, and provide timings for a desktop PC and a mobile phone in comparison to the straightforward version. Finally, we investigate potential side channel attacks on the optimized implementation.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"54 1","pages":"176-185"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75488117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Return-oriented programming is an effective code-reuse attack in which short code sequences ending in a ret instruction are found within existing binaries and executed in arbitrary order by taking control of the stack. This allows for Turing-complete behavior in the target program without the need for injecting attack code, thus significantly negating current code injection defense efforts (e.g., W⊕X). On the other hand, its inherent characteristics, such as the reliance on the stack and the consecutive execution of return-oriented gadgets, have prompted a variety of defenses to detect or prevent it from happening. In this paper, we introduce a new class of code-reuse attack, called jump-oriented programming. This new attack eliminates the reliance on the stack and ret instructions (including ret-like instructions such as pop+jmp) seen in return-oriented programming without sacrificing expressive power. This attack still builds and chains functional gadgets, each performing certain primitive operations, except these gadgets end in an indirect branch rather than ret. Without the convenience of using ret to unify them, the attack relies on a dispatcher gadget to dispatch and execute the functional gadgets. We have successfully identified the availability of these jump-oriented gadgets in the GNU libc library. Our experience with an example shellcode attack demonstrates the practicality and effectiveness of this technique.
{"title":"Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack","authors":"T. Bletsch, Xuxian Jiang, V. Freeh, Zhenkai Liang","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966919","url":null,"abstract":"Return-oriented programming is an effective code-reuse attack in which short code sequences ending in a ret instruction are found within existing binaries and executed in arbitrary order by taking control of the stack. This allows for Turing-complete behavior in the target program without the need for injecting attack code, thus significantly negating current code injection defense efforts (e.g., W⊕X). On the other hand, its inherent characteristics, such as the reliance on the stack and the consecutive execution of return-oriented gadgets, have prompted a variety of defenses to detect or prevent it from happening.\u0000 In this paper, we introduce a new class of code-reuse attack, called jump-oriented programming. This new attack eliminates the reliance on the stack and ret instructions (including ret-like instructions such as pop+jmp) seen in return-oriented programming without sacrificing expressive power. This attack still builds and chains functional gadgets, each performing certain primitive operations, except these gadgets end in an indirect branch rather than ret. Without the convenience of using ret to unify them, the attack relies on a dispatcher gadget to dispatch and execute the functional gadgets. We have successfully identified the availability of these jump-oriented gadgets in the GNU libc library. Our experience with an example shellcode attack demonstrates the practicality and effectiveness of this technique.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"10 1","pages":"30-40"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79037620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Cárdenas, Saurabh Amin, Zong-Syun Lin, Yu-Lun Huang, Chi-Yen Huang, S. Sastry
In the last years there has been an increasing interest in the security of process control and SCADA systems. Furthermore, recent computer attacks such as the Stuxnet worm, have shown there are parties with the motivation and resources to effectively attack control systems. While previous work has proposed new security mechanisms for control systems, few of them have explored new and fundamentally different research problems for securing control systems when compared to securing traditional information technology (IT) systems. In particular, the sophistication of new malware attacking control systems--malware including zero-days attacks, rootkits created for control systems, and software signed by trusted certificate authorities--has shown that it is very difficult to prevent and detect these attacks based solely on IT system information. In this paper we show how, by incorporating knowledge of the physical system under control, we are able to detect computer attacks that change the behavior of the targeted control system. By using knowledge of the physical system we are able to focus on the final objective of the attack, and not on the particular mechanisms of how vulnerabilities are exploited, and how the attack is hidden. We analyze the security and safety of our mechanisms by exploring the effects of stealthy attacks, and by ensuring that automatic attack-response mechanisms will not drive the system to an unsafe state. A secondary goal of this paper is to initiate the discussion between control and security practitioners--two areas that have had little interaction in the past. We believe that control engineers can leverage security engineering to design--based on a combination of their best practices--control algorithms that go beyond safety and fault tolerance, and include considerations to survive targeted attacks.
{"title":"Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response","authors":"A. Cárdenas, Saurabh Amin, Zong-Syun Lin, Yu-Lun Huang, Chi-Yen Huang, S. Sastry","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966959","url":null,"abstract":"In the last years there has been an increasing interest in the security of process control and SCADA systems. Furthermore, recent computer attacks such as the Stuxnet worm, have shown there are parties with the motivation and resources to effectively attack control systems.\u0000 While previous work has proposed new security mechanisms for control systems, few of them have explored new and fundamentally different research problems for securing control systems when compared to securing traditional information technology (IT) systems. In particular, the sophistication of new malware attacking control systems--malware including zero-days attacks, rootkits created for control systems, and software signed by trusted certificate authorities--has shown that it is very difficult to prevent and detect these attacks based solely on IT system information.\u0000 In this paper we show how, by incorporating knowledge of the physical system under control, we are able to detect computer attacks that change the behavior of the targeted control system. By using knowledge of the physical system we are able to focus on the final objective of the attack, and not on the particular mechanisms of how vulnerabilities are exploited, and how the attack is hidden. We analyze the security and safety of our mechanisms by exploring the effects of stealthy attacks, and by ensuring that automatic attack-response mechanisms will not drive the system to an unsafe state.\u0000 A secondary goal of this paper is to initiate the discussion between control and security practitioners--two areas that have had little interaction in the past. We believe that control engineers can leverage security engineering to design--based on a combination of their best practices--control algorithms that go beyond safety and fault tolerance, and include considerations to survive targeted attacks.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"49 1","pages":"355-366"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80317723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an emerging type of network which enables vehicles on roads to inter-communicate for driving safety. The basic idea is to allow arbitrary vehicles to broadcast ad hoc messages (e.g. traffic accidents) to other vehicles. However, this raises the concern of security and privacy. Messages should be signed and verified before they are trusted while the real identity of vehicles should not be revealed, but traceable by authorized party. Existing solutions either rely too heavily on a tamper-proof hardware device, or do not have an effective message verification scheme. In this paper, we propose a multiple level authentication scheme which still makes use of tamper-proof devices but the strong assumption that a long-term system master secret is preloaded into all tamper-proof devices is removed. Instead the master secret can be updated if needed to increase the security level. On the other hand, messages sent by vehicles are classified into two types - regular messages and urgent messages. Regular messages can be verified by neighboring vehicles by means of Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) while urgent messages can only be verified with the aid of RSUs nearby by means of a conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme.
{"title":"MLAS: multiple level authentication scheme for VANETs","authors":"T. W. Chim, S. Yiu, L. Hui, V. Li","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966982","url":null,"abstract":"The vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an emerging type of network which enables vehicles on roads to inter-communicate for driving safety. The basic idea is to allow arbitrary vehicles to broadcast ad hoc messages (e.g. traffic accidents) to other vehicles. However, this raises the concern of security and privacy. Messages should be signed and verified before they are trusted while the real identity of vehicles should not be revealed, but traceable by authorized party. Existing solutions either rely too heavily on a tamper-proof hardware device, or do not have an effective message verification scheme. In this paper, we propose a multiple level authentication scheme which still makes use of tamper-proof devices but the strong assumption that a long-term system master secret is preloaded into all tamper-proof devices is removed. Instead the master secret can be updated if needed to increase the security level. On the other hand, messages sent by vehicles are classified into two types - regular messages and urgent messages. Regular messages can be verified by neighboring vehicles by means of Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) while urgent messages can only be verified with the aid of RSUs nearby by means of a conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"28 1","pages":"471-475"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82920134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In order to construct a CCA-secure (i.e. secure against chosen ciphertext attack) public key encryption scheme using the usual KEM/DEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism/Data Encapsulation Mechanism) framework, one needs KEM and DEM schemes, both of which are CCA-secure. A CCA-secure DEM scheme can be constructed in a various way, but in order to construct a hybrid scheme producing ciphertexts of compact size, the DEM scheme needs to be a length-preserving symmetric cipher. However, it has been pointed out in the recent literature that the length-preserving symmetric cipher is in fact fairly expensive to realize because one needs strong PRP (pseudo random permutation) which is complex. As alternatives to the KEM/DEM framework for constructing compact hybrid encryption have been introduced in the public key (non identity-based) setting. In this paper, as contributions to this line of research, we construct hybrid identity-based encryption schemes which produce compact ciphertexts while providing both efficiency and strong security without resorting to the strong length-preserving symmetric cipher. In particular, all of the proposed schemes incur only one group element ciphertext expansion (defined as the size of the ciphertext minus the size of the plaintext message) and do not depend on the strong PRP. We provide security analysis of our schemes against chosen ciphertext attack under the well-known computational assumptions, in the random oracle model. We believe that our schemes are suitable for implementing on small devices.
{"title":"Compact identity-based encryption without strong symmetric cipher","authors":"J. Baek, Jianying Zhou","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966923","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966923","url":null,"abstract":"In order to construct a CCA-secure (i.e. secure against chosen ciphertext attack) public key encryption scheme using the usual KEM/DEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism/Data Encapsulation Mechanism) framework, one needs KEM and DEM schemes, both of which are CCA-secure. A CCA-secure DEM scheme can be constructed in a various way, but in order to construct a hybrid scheme producing ciphertexts of compact size, the DEM scheme needs to be a length-preserving symmetric cipher. However, it has been pointed out in the recent literature that the length-preserving symmetric cipher is in fact fairly expensive to realize because one needs strong PRP (pseudo random permutation) which is complex. As alternatives to the KEM/DEM framework for constructing compact hybrid encryption have been introduced in the public key (non identity-based) setting. In this paper, as contributions to this line of research, we construct hybrid identity-based encryption schemes which produce compact ciphertexts while providing both efficiency and strong security without resorting to the strong length-preserving symmetric cipher. In particular, all of the proposed schemes incur only one group element ciphertext expansion (defined as the size of the ciphertext minus the size of the plaintext message) and do not depend on the strong PRP. We provide security analysis of our schemes against chosen ciphertext attack under the well-known computational assumptions, in the random oracle model. We believe that our schemes are suitable for implementing on small devices.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"2 1","pages":"61-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84969320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Quantitative information-flow analysis (QIF) determines the amount of information that a program leaks about its secret inputs. For this, QIF requires an assumption about the distribution of the secret inputs. Existing techniques either consider the worst-case over a (sub-)set of all input distributions and thereby over-approximate the amount of leaked information; or they are tailored to reasoning about uniformly distributed inputs and are hence not directly applicable to non-uniform use-cases; or they deal with explicitly represented distributions, for which suitable abstraction techniques are only now emerging. In this paper we propose a novel approach for a precise QIF with respect to non-uniform input distributions: We present a reduction technique that transforms the problem of QIF w.r.t. non-uniform distributions into the problem of QIF for the uniform case. This reduction enables us to directly apply existing techniques for uniform QIF to the non-uniform case. We furthermore show that quantitative information flow is robust with respect to variations of the input distribution. This result allows us to perform QIF based on approximate input distributions, which can significantly simplify the analysis. Finally, we perform a case study where we illustrate our techniques by using them to analyze an integrity check on non-uniformly distributed PINs, as they are used for banking.
{"title":"Non-uniform distributions in quantitative information-flow","authors":"M. Backes, Matthias Berg, Boris Köpf","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966960","url":null,"abstract":"Quantitative information-flow analysis (QIF) determines the amount of information that a program leaks about its secret inputs. For this, QIF requires an assumption about the distribution of the secret inputs. Existing techniques either consider the worst-case over a (sub-)set of all input distributions and thereby over-approximate the amount of leaked information; or they are tailored to reasoning about uniformly distributed inputs and are hence not directly applicable to non-uniform use-cases; or they deal with explicitly represented distributions, for which suitable abstraction techniques are only now emerging. In this paper we propose a novel approach for a precise QIF with respect to non-uniform input distributions: We present a reduction technique that transforms the problem of QIF w.r.t. non-uniform distributions into the problem of QIF for the uniform case. This reduction enables us to directly apply existing techniques for uniform QIF to the non-uniform case. We furthermore show that quantitative information flow is robust with respect to variations of the input distribution. This result allows us to perform QIF based on approximate input distributions, which can significantly simplify the analysis. Finally, we perform a case study where we illustrate our techniques by using them to analyze an integrity check on non-uniformly distributed PINs, as they are used for banking.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"57 1","pages":"367-375"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88984241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A method of creating tamper resistant software that is resistant to unauthorized modification is proposed. It utilizes a primitive that combines self-modifying based instruction camouflage and self integrity verification, and a method to construct a structure in which the multiple primitives are interlocked each other. Tamper resistant software created by the proposed method contains multiple camouflaged instructions in the object program, so that it is difficult for attacker to correctly understand the content of processing using static analysis. When attacker tries to do dynamic analysis, anti-debugging techniques prevent the attempt. The tamper resistant software, at runtime, continuously executes detecting and preventing dynamic analysis, verifying its integrity, and self-modifying itself in such a way that target of self-modifying is dynamically determined according to result of self integrity verification. If unauthorized modification is detected, then it self-modifies a part of instruction which is different from the part of camouflaged instruction to be self-modified, and executes different instructions from its original. As a result, it generates a series of unpredictable abnormal self destructive behaviors such as error or termination, so that attacker's analysis and modification are strongly disturbed. Cost of analysis is increased as the numbers of self integrity verification and instruction camouflage are increased, hence, the tamper resistance can be strengthened quantitatively.
{"title":"Self destructive tamper response for software protection","authors":"Kazuomi Oishi, Tsutomu Matsumoto","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966985","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966985","url":null,"abstract":"A method of creating tamper resistant software that is resistant to unauthorized modification is proposed. It utilizes a primitive that combines self-modifying based instruction camouflage and self integrity verification, and a method to construct a structure in which the multiple primitives are interlocked each other. Tamper resistant software created by the proposed method contains multiple camouflaged instructions in the object program, so that it is difficult for attacker to correctly understand the content of processing using static analysis. When attacker tries to do dynamic analysis, anti-debugging techniques prevent the attempt. The tamper resistant software, at runtime, continuously executes detecting and preventing dynamic analysis, verifying its integrity, and self-modifying itself in such a way that target of self-modifying is dynamically determined according to result of self integrity verification. If unauthorized modification is detected, then it self-modifies a part of instruction which is different from the part of camouflaged instruction to be self-modified, and executes different instructions from its original. As a result, it generates a series of unpredictable abnormal self destructive behaviors such as error or termination, so that attacker's analysis and modification are strongly disturbed. Cost of analysis is increased as the numbers of self integrity verification and instruction camouflage are increased, hence, the tamper resistance can be strengthened quantitatively.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"27 1","pages":"490-496"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86658557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We present a new notion, Self-certified Ring Signature (SCRS), to provide an alternative solution to the certificate management problem in ring signatures and eliminate private key escrow problem in identity based ring signatures. Our scheme captures all features of ring signatures and exhibits the advantages such as low storage, communication and computation cost. The main contribution of this paper is a precise definition of self-certified ring signatures along with a concrete construction. We also provide a security model of SCRS and a security proof of our scheme.
{"title":"Self-certified ring signatures","authors":"Nan Li, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, F. Guo","doi":"10.1145/1966913.1966966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1966913.1966966","url":null,"abstract":"We present a new notion, Self-certified Ring Signature (SCRS), to provide an alternative solution to the certificate management problem in ring signatures and eliminate private key escrow problem in identity based ring signatures. Our scheme captures all features of ring signatures and exhibits the advantages such as low storage, communication and computation cost. The main contribution of this paper is a precise definition of self-certified ring signatures along with a concrete construction. We also provide a security model of SCRS and a security proof of our scheme.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...","volume":"50 1","pages":"396-400"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86144566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (17th : 2022 : Nagasaki-shi, Japan ; ...
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