Future trustworthy computer systems should provide built-in support for at least the cornerstone security properties of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Access control can help significantly towards achieving this. However, in today's computing landscape, traditional access control implemented only in software may be either insufficient or non-optimal. We discuss some of these situations. Furthermore, fine-grained access control and usage control mechanisms implemented in software are themselves subject to attack, and may impose heavy performance overheads. Can new hardware architecture improve the security achievable by software mechanisms for access control and usage control? If so, what types of hardware support are most useful while retaining the flexibility of software protection mechanisms? What can software do, to help hardware achieve the best results? With the trend towards Cloud Computing, we discuss how new hardware architectural features for cloud servers can help protect the confidentiality and integrity of a cloud customer's code and data in his leased Virtual Machines -- even when the powerful underlying hypervisor may be compromised. This uses a new, non-bypassable form of hardware access control. Without requiring new hardware, we can also leverage the hardware trend towards manycore chips, and the already available hardware virtualization features, to enhance Cloud Security -- but with a few restrictions and some new software support. In general, we would like to motivate collaborations between the software security and the hardware architecture communities to explore software-hardware co-design for security. What comes beyond access control in cloud computing and mobile computing ecosystems? The goal is to design future trustworthy systems that provide security protections, at the levels needed, when needed, even with malware in the system.
{"title":"Hardware-enhanced access control for cloud computing","authors":"R. Lee","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295138","url":null,"abstract":"Future trustworthy computer systems should provide built-in support for at least the cornerstone security properties of confidentiality, integrity and availability. Access control can help significantly towards achieving this. However, in today's computing landscape, traditional access control implemented only in software may be either insufficient or non-optimal. We discuss some of these situations. Furthermore, fine-grained access control and usage control mechanisms implemented in software are themselves subject to attack, and may impose heavy performance overheads. Can new hardware architecture improve the security achievable by software mechanisms for access control and usage control? If so, what types of hardware support are most useful while retaining the flexibility of software protection mechanisms? What can software do, to help hardware achieve the best results?\u0000 With the trend towards Cloud Computing, we discuss how new hardware architectural features for cloud servers can help protect the confidentiality and integrity of a cloud customer's code and data in his leased Virtual Machines -- even when the powerful underlying hypervisor may be compromised. This uses a new, non-bypassable form of hardware access control. Without requiring new hardware, we can also leverage the hardware trend towards manycore chips, and the already available hardware virtualization features, to enhance Cloud Security -- but with a few restrictions and some new software support.\u0000 In general, we would like to motivate collaborations between the software security and the hardware architecture communities to explore software-hardware co-design for security. What comes beyond access control in cloud computing and mobile computing ecosystems? The goal is to design future trustworthy systems that provide security protections, at the levels needed, when needed, even with malware in the system.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"15 1","pages":"1-2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81603150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Insider Attacks are one of the most dangerous threats organizations face today. An insider attack occurs when a person authorized to perform certain actions in an organization decides to abuse the trust, and harm the organization. These attacks may negatively impact the reputation of the organization, its productivity, and may produce losses in revenue and clients. Avoiding insider attacks is a daunting task. While it is necessary to provide privileges to employees so they can perform their jobs efficiently, providing too many privileges may backfire when users accidentally or intentionally abuse their privileges. Hence, finding a middle ground, where the necessary privileges are provided and malicious usage are avoided, is necessary. In this paper, we propose a framework that extends the role-based access control (RBAC) model by incorporating a risk assessment process, and the trust the system has on its users. Our framework adapts to suspicious changes in users' behavior by removing privileges when users' trust falls below a certain threshold. This threshold is computed based on a risk assessment process that includes the risk due to inference of unauthorized information. We use a Coloured-Petri net to detect inferences. We also redefine the existing role activation problem, and propose an algorithm that reduces the risk exposure. We present experimental evaluation to validate our work.
{"title":"A trust-and-risk aware RBAC framework: tackling insider threat","authors":"N. Baracaldo, J. Joshi","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295168","url":null,"abstract":"Insider Attacks are one of the most dangerous threats organizations face today. An insider attack occurs when a person authorized to perform certain actions in an organization decides to abuse the trust, and harm the organization. These attacks may negatively impact the reputation of the organization, its productivity, and may produce losses in revenue and clients. Avoiding insider attacks is a daunting task. While it is necessary to provide privileges to employees so they can perform their jobs efficiently, providing too many privileges may backfire when users accidentally or intentionally abuse their privileges. Hence, finding a middle ground, where the necessary privileges are provided and malicious usage are avoided, is necessary. In this paper, we propose a framework that extends the role-based access control (RBAC) model by incorporating a risk assessment process, and the trust the system has on its users. Our framework adapts to suspicious changes in users' behavior by removing privileges when users' trust falls below a certain threshold. This threshold is computed based on a risk assessment process that includes the risk due to inference of unauthorized information. We use a Coloured-Petri net to detect inferences. We also redefine the existing role activation problem, and propose an algorithm that reduces the risk exposure. We present experimental evaluation to validate our work.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"5 1","pages":"167-176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81899942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Integrated role-based access control (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC) is emerging as a promising paradigm. This paper proposes a framework that uses attribute-based policies to create a more traditional RBAC model. RBAC has been widely used, but has weaknesses: it is labor-intensive and time-consuming to build a model instance, and a pure RBAC system lacks flexibility to efficiently adapt to changing users, objects, and security policies. Particularly, it is impractical to manually make (and maintain) user to role assignments and role to permission assignments in industrial context characterized by a large number of users and/or security objects. ABAC has features complimentary to RBAC, and merging RBAC and ABAC has become an important research topic. This paper proposes a new approach to integrating ABAC with RBAC, by modeling RBAC in two levels. The aboveground level is a standard RBAC model extended with "environment". This level retains the simplicity of RBAC, supporting RBAC model verification/review. The "underground" level is used to represent security knowledge in terms of attribute-based policies, which automatically create the simple RBAC model in the aboveground level. These attribute-based policies bring to RBAC the advantages of ABAC: they are easy to build and easy to adapt to changes. Using this framework, we tackle the problem of permission assignment for large scale applications. This model is motivated by the characteristics and requirements of industrial control systems, and reflects in part certain approaches and practices common in the industry.
{"title":"A framework integrating attribute-based policies into role-based access control","authors":"Jingwei Huang, D. Nicol, R. Bobba, J. Huh","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295170","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295170","url":null,"abstract":"Integrated role-based access control (RBAC) and attribute-based access control (ABAC) is emerging as a promising paradigm. This paper proposes a framework that uses attribute-based policies to create a more traditional RBAC model. RBAC has been widely used, but has weaknesses: it is labor-intensive and time-consuming to build a model instance, and a pure RBAC system lacks flexibility to efficiently adapt to changing users, objects, and security policies. Particularly, it is impractical to manually make (and maintain) user to role assignments and role to permission assignments in industrial context characterized by a large number of users and/or security objects. ABAC has features complimentary to RBAC, and merging RBAC and ABAC has become an important research topic. This paper proposes a new approach to integrating ABAC with RBAC, by modeling RBAC in two levels. The aboveground level is a standard RBAC model extended with \"environment\". This level retains the simplicity of RBAC, supporting RBAC model verification/review. The \"underground\" level is used to represent security knowledge in terms of attribute-based policies, which automatically create the simple RBAC model in the aboveground level. These attribute-based policies bring to RBAC the advantages of ABAC: they are easy to build and easy to adapt to changes. Using this framework, we tackle the problem of permission assignment for large scale applications. This model is motivated by the characteristics and requirements of industrial control systems, and reflects in part certain approaches and practices common in the industry.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"2 1","pages":"187-196"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79437184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ongoing authorization leap from rights to attributes offers numerous compelling benefits. Decisions about user, subject, object and context attributes can be made relatively independently and with suitable decentralization appropriate for each attribute. Policies can be formulated by security architects to translate from attributes to rights. Dynamic elements can be built into these policies so the outcomes of access control decisions automatically adapt to changing local and global circumstances. On the benefits side this leap is a maturation of authorization matching the needs of emerging cyber technologies and systems. On the risks side devolving attribute management may lead to attributes of questionable provenance and value, with attendant possibility of new channels for social engineering and malware attacks. We argue that the potential benefits will lead to pervasive deployment of attribute-based access control (ABAC), and more generally attribute-based security. The cyber security research community has a responsibility to develop models, theories and systems which enable safe and chaos-free deployment of ABAC. This is the current grand challenge for access control researchers.
{"title":"The authorization leap from rights to attributes: maturation or chaos?","authors":"R. Sandhu","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295150","url":null,"abstract":"The ongoing authorization leap from rights to attributes offers numerous compelling benefits. Decisions about user, subject, object and context attributes can be made relatively independently and with suitable decentralization appropriate for each attribute. Policies can be formulated by security architects to translate from attributes to rights. Dynamic elements can be built into these policies so the outcomes of access control decisions automatically adapt to changing local and global circumstances. On the benefits side this leap is a maturation of authorization matching the needs of emerging cyber technologies and systems. On the risks side devolving attribute management may lead to attributes of questionable provenance and value, with attendant possibility of new channels for social engineering and malware attacks. We argue that the potential benefits will lead to pervasive deployment of attribute-based access control (ABAC), and more generally attribute-based security. The cyber security research community has a responsibility to develop models, theories and systems which enable safe and chaos-free deployment of ABAC. This is the current grand challenge for access control researchers.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"1 1","pages":"69-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78623401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In earlier work [1] we had looked at implementing the Microsoft STRIDE methodology in the context of evaluating security properties of FMC/TAM architectural diagrams. However, a major drawback of this approach is that it requires significant manual work to assess all reported potential threats, as well as identify concrete follow-ups. Equally, it is not possible to analyse an architecture from the perspective of the primary assets that require protection. This led us to two questions: a) whether using interaction information in architecture diagrams, supported by additional security semantics, can reduce the scope of analysis as well as partly automate it; b) whether using asset-centric and attacker-centric perspectives can complement the software-centric perspective of STRIDE and thus add value to the current threat model.
{"title":"Automating architectural security analysis","authors":"A. Schaad, Alexandr Garaga","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295162","url":null,"abstract":"In earlier work [1] we had looked at implementing the Microsoft STRIDE methodology in the context of evaluating security properties of FMC/TAM architectural diagrams. However, a major drawback of this approach is that it requires significant manual work to assess all reported potential threats, as well as identify concrete follow-ups. Equally, it is not possible to analyse an architecture from the perspective of the primary assets that require protection. This led us to two questions:\u0000 a) whether using interaction information in architecture diagrams, supported by additional security semantics, can reduce the scope of analysis as well as partly automate it;\u0000 b) whether using asset-centric and attacker-centric perspectives can complement the software-centric perspective of STRIDE and thus add value to the current threat model.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"15 1","pages":"131-132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85604348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Role-based access control (RBAC) offers significant advantages over lower-level access control policy representations, such as access control lists (ACLs). However, the effort required for a large organization to migrate from ACLs to RBAC can be a significant obstacle to adoption of RBAC. Role mining algorithms partially automate the construction of an RBAC policy from an ACL policy and possibly other information, such as user attributes. These algorithms can significantly reduce the cost of migration to RBAC. This paper proposes new algorithms for role mining. The algorithms can easily be used to optimize a variety of policy quality metrics, including metrics based on policy size, metrics based on interpretability of the roles with respect to user attribute data, and compound metrics that consider size and interpretability. The algorithms all begin with a phase that constructs a set of candidate roles. We consider two strategies for the second phase: start with an empty policy and repeatedly add candidate roles, or start with the entire set of candidate roles and repeatedly remove roles. In experiments with publicly available access control policies, we find that the elimination approach produces better results, and that, for a policy quality metric that reflects size and interpretability, our elimination algorithm achieves significantly better results than previous work.
{"title":"Algorithms for mining meaningful roles","authors":"Zhongyuan Xu, S. Stoller","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295146","url":null,"abstract":"Role-based access control (RBAC) offers significant advantages over lower-level access control policy representations, such as access control lists (ACLs). However, the effort required for a large organization to migrate from ACLs to RBAC can be a significant obstacle to adoption of RBAC. Role mining algorithms partially automate the construction of an RBAC policy from an ACL policy and possibly other information, such as user attributes. These algorithms can significantly reduce the cost of migration to RBAC.\u0000 This paper proposes new algorithms for role mining. The algorithms can easily be used to optimize a variety of policy quality metrics, including metrics based on policy size, metrics based on interpretability of the roles with respect to user attribute data, and compound metrics that consider size and interpretability. The algorithms all begin with a phase that constructs a set of candidate roles. We consider two strategies for the second phase: start with an empty policy and repeatedly add candidate roles, or start with the entire set of candidate roles and repeatedly remove roles. In experiments with publicly available access control policies, we find that the elimination approach produces better results, and that, for a policy quality metric that reflects size and interpretability, our elimination algorithm achieves significantly better results than previous work.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"17 1","pages":"57-66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87890224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ability to seamlessly scale on demand has made Content-Based Publish-Subscribe (CBPS) systems the choice of distributing messages/documents produced by Content Publishers to many Subscribers through Content Brokers. Most of the current systems assume that Content Brokers are trusted for the confidentiality of the data published by Content Publishers and the privacy of the subscriptions, which specify their interests, made by Subscribers. However, with the increased use of technologies, such as service oriented architectures and cloud computing, essentially outsourcing the broker functionality to third-party providers, one can no longer assume the trust relationship to hold. The problem of providing privacy/confidentiality in CBPS systems is challenging, since the solution to the problem should allow Content Brokers to make routing decisions based on the content without revealing the content to them. The previous work attempted to solve this problem was not fully successful. The problem may appear unsolvable since it involves conflicting goals, but in this paper, we propose a novel approach to preserve the privacy of the subscriptions made by Subscribers and confidentiality of the data published by Content Publishers using cryptographic techniques when third-party Content Brokers are utilized to make routing decisions based on the content. Our protocols are expressive to support any type of subscriptions and designed to work efficiently. We distribute the work such that the load on Content Brokers, where the bottleneck is in a CBPS system, is minimized. We extend a popular CBPS system using our protocols to implement a privacy preserving CBPS system.
{"title":"Efficient privacy preserving content based publish subscribe systems","authors":"Mohamed Nabeel, Ning Shang, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295164","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to seamlessly scale on demand has made Content-Based Publish-Subscribe (CBPS) systems the choice of distributing messages/documents produced by Content Publishers to many Subscribers through Content Brokers. Most of the current systems assume that Content Brokers are trusted for the confidentiality of the data published by Content Publishers and the privacy of the subscriptions, which specify their interests, made by Subscribers. However, with the increased use of technologies, such as service oriented architectures and cloud computing, essentially outsourcing the broker functionality to third-party providers, one can no longer assume the trust relationship to hold. The problem of providing privacy/confidentiality in CBPS systems is challenging, since the solution to the problem should allow Content Brokers to make routing decisions based on the content without revealing the content to them. The previous work attempted to solve this problem was not fully successful. The problem may appear unsolvable since it involves conflicting goals, but in this paper, we propose a novel approach to preserve the privacy of the subscriptions made by Subscribers and confidentiality of the data published by Content Publishers using cryptographic techniques when third-party Content Brokers are utilized to make routing decisions based on the content. Our protocols are expressive to support any type of subscriptions and designed to work efficiently. We distribute the work such that the load on Content Brokers, where the bottleneck is in a CBPS system, is minimized. We extend a popular CBPS system using our protocols to implement a privacy preserving CBPS system.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"147 1","pages":"133-144"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86650687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rafae Bhatti, R. LaSalle, Robert Bird, T. Grance, E. Bertino
This panel will discuss the interplay between key emerging security trends centered around big data analytics and security. With the explosion of big data and advent of cloud computing, data analytics has not only become prevalent but also a critical business need. Internet applications today consume vast amounts of data collected from heterogeneous big data repositories and provide meaningful insights from it. These include applications for business forecasting, investment and finance, healthcare and well-being, science and hi-tech, to name a few. Security and operational intelligence is one of the critical areas where big data analytics is expected to play a crucial role. Security analytics in a big data environment presents a unique set of challenges, not properly addressed by the existing security incident and event monitoring (or SIEM) systems that typically work with a limited set of traditional data sources (firewall, IDS, etc.) in an enterprise network. A big data environment presents both a great opportunity and a challenge due to the explosion and heterogeneity of the potential data sources that extend the boundary of analytics to social networks, real time streams and other forms of highly contextual data that is characterized by high volume and speed. In addition to meeting infrastructure challenges, there remain additional unaddressed issues, including but not limited to development of self-evolving threat ontologies, integrated network and application layer analytics, and detection of "low and slow" attacks. At the same time, security analytics requires a high degree of data assurance, where assurance implies that the data be trustworthy as well as managed in a privacy preserving manner. Our panelists represent individuals from industry, academia, and government who are at the forefront of big data security analytics. They will provide insights into these unique challenges, survey the emerging trends, and lay out a vision for future.
{"title":"Emerging trends around big data analytics and security: panel","authors":"Rafae Bhatti, R. LaSalle, Robert Bird, T. Grance, E. Bertino","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295148","url":null,"abstract":"This panel will discuss the interplay between key emerging security trends centered around big data analytics and security. With the explosion of big data and advent of cloud computing, data analytics has not only become prevalent but also a critical business need. Internet applications today consume vast amounts of data collected from heterogeneous big data repositories and provide meaningful insights from it. These include applications for business forecasting, investment and finance, healthcare and well-being, science and hi-tech, to name a few. Security and operational intelligence is one of the critical areas where big data analytics is expected to play a crucial role. Security analytics in a big data environment presents a unique set of challenges, not properly addressed by the existing security incident and event monitoring (or SIEM) systems that typically work with a limited set of traditional data sources (firewall, IDS, etc.) in an enterprise network. A big data environment presents both a great opportunity and a challenge due to the explosion and heterogeneity of the potential data sources that extend the boundary of analytics to social networks, real time streams and other forms of highly contextual data that is characterized by high volume and speed. In addition to meeting infrastructure challenges, there remain additional unaddressed issues, including but not limited to development of self-evolving threat ontologies, integrated network and application layer analytics, and detection of \"low and slow\" attacks. At the same time, security analytics requires a high degree of data assurance, where assurance implies that the data be trustworthy as well as managed in a privacy preserving manner. Our panelists represent individuals from industry, academia, and government who are at the forefront of big data security analytics. They will provide insights into these unique challenges, survey the emerging trends, and lay out a vision for future.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"23 1","pages":"67-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83980035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce two approaches for improving privacy policy management in online social networks. First, we introduce a mechanism using proven clustering techniques that assists users in grouping their friends for group based policy management approaches. Second, we introduce a policy management approach that leverages a user's memory and opinion of their friends to set policies for other similar friends. We refer to this new approach as Same-As Policy Management. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our policy management improvements, we implemented a prototype Facebook application and conducted an extensive user study. Leveraging proven clustering techniques, we demonstrated a 23% reduction in friend grouping time. In addition, we demonstrated considerable reductions in policy authoring time using Same-As Policy Management over traditional group based policy management approaches. Finally, we presented user perceptions of both improvements, which are very encouraging.
{"title":"Policy-by-example for online social networks","authors":"Gorrell P. Cheek, Mohamed Shehab","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295142","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce two approaches for improving privacy policy management in online social networks. First, we introduce a mechanism using proven clustering techniques that assists users in grouping their friends for group based policy management approaches. Second, we introduce a policy management approach that leverages a user's memory and opinion of their friends to set policies for other similar friends. We refer to this new approach as Same-As Policy Management. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our policy management improvements, we implemented a prototype Facebook application and conducted an extensive user study. Leveraging proven clustering techniques, we demonstrated a 23% reduction in friend grouping time. In addition, we demonstrated considerable reductions in policy authoring time using Same-As Policy Management over traditional group based policy management approaches. Finally, we presented user perceptions of both improvements, which are very encouraging.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"16 12","pages":"23-32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91495554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emre Uzun, V. Atluri, S. Sural, Jaideep Vaidya, G. Parlato, A. L. Ferrara, P. Madhusudan
Today, Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is the de facto model used for advanced access control, and is widely deployed in diverse enterprises of all sizes. Several extensions to the authorization as well as the administrative models for RBAC have been adopted in recent years. In this paper, we consider the temporal extension of RBAC (TRBAC), and develop safety analysis techniques for it. Safety analysis is essential for understanding the implications of security policies both at the stage of specification and modification. Towards this end, in this paper, we first define an administrative model for TRBAC. Our strategy for performing safety analysis is to appropriately decompose the TRBAC analysis problem into multiple subproblems similar to RBAC. Along with making the analysis simpler, this enables us to leverage and adapt existing analysis techniques developed for traditional RBAC. We have adapted and experimented with employing two state of the art analysis approaches developed for RBAC as well as tools developed for software testing. Our results show that our approach is both feasible and flexible.
{"title":"Analyzing temporal role based access control models","authors":"Emre Uzun, V. Atluri, S. Sural, Jaideep Vaidya, G. Parlato, A. L. Ferrara, P. Madhusudan","doi":"10.1145/2295136.2295169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2295136.2295169","url":null,"abstract":"Today, Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is the de facto model used for advanced access control, and is widely deployed in diverse enterprises of all sizes. Several extensions to the authorization as well as the administrative models for RBAC have been adopted in recent years. In this paper, we consider the temporal extension of RBAC (TRBAC), and develop safety analysis techniques for it. Safety analysis is essential for understanding the implications of security policies both at the stage of specification and modification. Towards this end, in this paper, we first define an administrative model for TRBAC. Our strategy for performing safety analysis is to appropriately decompose the TRBAC analysis problem into multiple subproblems similar to RBAC. Along with making the analysis simpler, this enables us to leverage and adapt existing analysis techniques developed for traditional RBAC. We have adapted and experimented with employing two state of the art analysis approaches developed for RBAC as well as tools developed for software testing. Our results show that our approach is both feasible and flexible.","PeriodicalId":74509,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ... ACM symposium on access control models and technologies. ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies","volume":"28 1","pages":"177-186"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81868867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}