If you are a law student concerned and unsure about what happens after graduation, and still trying to sort your preferred professional role, this article is designed to help you do homework on both yourself and the legal profession so that you can enhance your opportunity to find the right professional role. The premise of the article is that a career in law is something for which you can and should prepare, just as you prepare for oral argument in court by writing a well-researched and thorough legal brief. The article is based on a course offered by the author at Suffolk University Law School in which students examine themselves and opportunities within the profession to find a career that fits them, and how they might make it a reality.
{"title":"Planning for Law as a Career and an Enterprise","authors":"R. Baker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2271200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2271200","url":null,"abstract":"If you are a law student concerned and unsure about what happens after graduation, and still trying to sort your preferred professional role, this article is designed to help you do homework on both yourself and the legal profession so that you can enhance your opportunity to find the right professional role. The premise of the article is that a career in law is something for which you can and should prepare, just as you prepare for oral argument in court by writing a well-researched and thorough legal brief. The article is based on a course offered by the author at Suffolk University Law School in which students examine themselves and opportunities within the profession to find a career that fits them, and how they might make it a reality.","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68048415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Campaign finance law presents quite a puzzle: it is an area of federal policy very closely tied to the interests of incumbents in the political branches, and yet it is controlled to a great extent by unelected federal court judges. While we tend to assume that First Amendment considerations drive judicial review here, scholars have yet to account for political leaders’ decisions to establish federal court jurisdiction in the first place, allowing lawsuits that either challenge or enforce the law. Can it be that Congress went to great lengths to write statutes regulating the use of money in elections, but had nothing to say about how and to what extent courts would review the law? This article examines the role of political leaders in judicializing campaign finance policy. In a survey of nearly a century of law, and in a close analysis of the legislative record, I make a number of surprising findings. I discover that there has been great variation in judicial review over this history and that it correlates directly with the choices activists and political leaders have made to mobilize legal institutions in the making of campaign finance policy. Moreover, I find that political leaders have maintained the upper hand in this: where the efforts of independent policy activists ran counter to their interests (as they did for a brief period prior to Watergate), legislators quickly changed jurisdiction rules to foreclose the groups’ access to federal courts. But, even as they restricted public interest litigation in the field, legislators actually moved to judicialize the policy still more – and continued to do so even after the Supreme Court substantially altered the law with its Buckley v. Valeo ruling. In fact, from 1974 onward, the judiciary’s power to interpret, enforce and, ultimately, remake policy has been deliberately delegated to it by Congress. This history reveals that campaign finance reform has long been a process of making law with lawsuits, where courts enjoy significant discretion to revise policy not primarily because of their own activism, but because political leaders have given them the job.
{"title":"Making Law with Lawsuits: Understanding Judicial Review in Campaign Finance Policy","authors":"R. Curry","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2109364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2109364","url":null,"abstract":"Campaign finance law presents quite a puzzle: it is an area of federal policy very closely tied to the interests of incumbents in the political branches, and yet it is controlled to a great extent by unelected federal court judges. While we tend to assume that First Amendment considerations drive judicial review here, scholars have yet to account for political leaders’ decisions to establish federal court jurisdiction in the first place, allowing lawsuits that either challenge or enforce the law. Can it be that Congress went to great lengths to write statutes regulating the use of money in elections, but had nothing to say about how and to what extent courts would review the law? This article examines the role of political leaders in judicializing campaign finance policy. In a survey of nearly a century of law, and in a close analysis of the legislative record, I make a number of surprising findings. I discover that there has been great variation in judicial review over this history and that it correlates directly with the choices activists and political leaders have made to mobilize legal institutions in the making of campaign finance policy. Moreover, I find that political leaders have maintained the upper hand in this: where the efforts of independent policy activists ran counter to their interests (as they did for a brief period prior to Watergate), legislators quickly changed jurisdiction rules to foreclose the groups’ access to federal courts. But, even as they restricted public interest litigation in the field, legislators actually moved to judicialize the policy still more – and continued to do so even after the Supreme Court substantially altered the law with its Buckley v. Valeo ruling. In fact, from 1974 onward, the judiciary’s power to interpret, enforce and, ultimately, remake policy has been deliberately delegated to it by Congress. This history reveals that campaign finance reform has long been a process of making law with lawsuits, where courts enjoy significant discretion to revise policy not primarily because of their own activism, but because political leaders have given them the job.","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"46 1","pages":"389"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67915349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay was part of a symposium on the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise and revisits Fried’s theory in light of two developments in the private law scholarship: the rise of corrective justice and civil recourse theories. The structural features that motivate these theories – the bilateralism of damages and the private standing of plaintiffs – are both elements of the law of contracts that Contract as Promise sets out to explain. I begin with the issue of bilateralism. Remedies – in particular the defense of expectation damages – occupy much of Fried’s attention in Contract as Promise, and he insists that this particular remedial response flows from a commitment to promissory morality. I am skeptical of this claim and seek to show the implausibility of grounding compensatory damages in a duty to keep a promise. Rather, to explain this feature of contract law the duty to keep a promise must be joined with principles of corrective justice. I next turn to the issue of private standing. First, I seek to demonstrate that our plaintiff-centered system of contract law is a genuine puzzle. We cannot dismiss the issue of private standing as a pragmatic and ad hoc response to problems of enforcement. Rather, I argue that a better candidate can be found in the work of civil recourse theorists who seek to elucidate the value of victims in a liberal society holding wrongdoers accountable for their wrongs. Finally, I address some of the problems associated with the arguments presented in this essay. How exactly do promissory morality, corrective justice, and civil recourse relate to one another? My conclusion is that at best there is an uneasy and ill-defined relationship between these different goals. On the other hand, I hope to show that promissory theories of contract nevertheless must take the issue of private law seriously. The bilateral structure of liability and the system of private standing are major institutional features whose existence must be acknowledged and accounted for in future efforts to defend a promissory vision of contract.
{"title":"Promise and Private Law","authors":"Nathan B. Oman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1907142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1907142","url":null,"abstract":"This essay was part of a symposium on the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise and revisits Fried’s theory in light of two developments in the private law scholarship: the rise of corrective justice and civil recourse theories. The structural features that motivate these theories – the bilateralism of damages and the private standing of plaintiffs – are both elements of the law of contracts that Contract as Promise sets out to explain. I begin with the issue of bilateralism. Remedies – in particular the defense of expectation damages – occupy much of Fried’s attention in Contract as Promise, and he insists that this particular remedial response flows from a commitment to promissory morality. I am skeptical of this claim and seek to show the implausibility of grounding compensatory damages in a duty to keep a promise. Rather, to explain this feature of contract law the duty to keep a promise must be joined with principles of corrective justice. I next turn to the issue of private standing. First, I seek to demonstrate that our plaintiff-centered system of contract law is a genuine puzzle. We cannot dismiss the issue of private standing as a pragmatic and ad hoc response to problems of enforcement. Rather, I argue that a better candidate can be found in the work of civil recourse theorists who seek to elucidate the value of victims in a liberal society holding wrongdoers accountable for their wrongs. Finally, I address some of the problems associated with the arguments presented in this essay. How exactly do promissory morality, corrective justice, and civil recourse relate to one another? My conclusion is that at best there is an uneasy and ill-defined relationship between these different goals. On the other hand, I hope to show that promissory theories of contract nevertheless must take the issue of private law seriously. The bilateral structure of liability and the system of private standing are major institutional features whose existence must be acknowledged and accounted for in future efforts to defend a promissory vision of contract.","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"45 1","pages":"935"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67777821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper, roughly belonging to the comparative public law field, investigates the concrete links, formal, quasi-formal and substantial interactions, functional and organic compenetrations occurring amongst legal and political actors in the Chinese Party-State System.The legal position enjoyed by the ubiquitous Communist Party within the political-legal system of the PRC. A description is provided on how the status of the Party and the Socialist System - the protecting and enveloping skull within which the Party-brain operates - has been modified and re-engineered, and sometimes formalized throughout a broad set of norms (constitutions, political documents, system-laws, ordinary laws, administrative regulations, case law) since the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and particularly during the Deng, Jiang and Hu eras.The political-legal means used by the Party to operate as an organism innervating its parent-body i.e. the PRC institutional system. Attention is focused both on the statutory well-known organs that constitute the Party apparatus and on the less known and often neglected chains of transmission and ad hoc organisms a structures (Leading Small Groups, organic committees, Party groups, the nomenklatura etc) operating as traits d’union between Party, State (People’s assemblies, government/executive, military & security forces, judiciary), civil society and businesses, and carrying the Party’s will and impulse to the peripheral layers of the System.Party’s Legal Creativity. In discussing the greater Rule of Law topic, the question of how laws themselves are created and by whom is often forgotten. While looking at this issue and considering that in the CPC-ruled Socialist Legal System State rules are created according to CPC rule development, the question then becomes whether a new legal category is needed to conceptualize CPC regulations. The CPC has a complex corpus of internal rules, and the production of party norms and regulations comes through the CPC Interim Regulations on the Procedure for Establishing Internal Party Regulations, an internal legislation law established in 1990, about 10 years prior to the national Legislation Law. As the normative framework for Inner Party Rule of Law existed prior to State Rule of Law, there is indeed a need of conceptualization of CPC rules, and a possible complement to the notion of binding ‘normative’ rules of State would be to consider their alter ego, the soft CPC rules, as ‘nomopoietic’, or rule-creating rules for the State.
{"title":"The Communist Party & the Law: An Outline of Formal and Less Formal Linkages between the Ruling Party and the Other Legal Institutions in the People's Republic of China","authors":"Manuél E. Delmestro","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1405003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1405003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper, roughly belonging to the comparative public law field, investigates the concrete links, formal, quasi-formal and substantial interactions, functional and organic compenetrations occurring amongst legal and political actors in the Chinese Party-State System.The legal position enjoyed by the ubiquitous Communist Party within the political-legal system of the PRC. A description is provided on how the status of the Party and the Socialist System - the protecting and enveloping skull within which the Party-brain operates - has been modified and re-engineered, and sometimes formalized throughout a broad set of norms (constitutions, political documents, system-laws, ordinary laws, administrative regulations, case law) since the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and particularly during the Deng, Jiang and Hu eras.The political-legal means used by the Party to operate as an organism innervating its parent-body i.e. the PRC institutional system. Attention is focused both on the statutory well-known organs that constitute the Party apparatus and on the less known and often neglected chains of transmission and ad hoc organisms a structures (Leading Small Groups, organic committees, Party groups, the nomenklatura etc) operating as traits d’union between Party, State (People’s assemblies, government/executive, military & security forces, judiciary), civil society and businesses, and carrying the Party’s will and impulse to the peripheral layers of the System.Party’s Legal Creativity. In discussing the greater Rule of Law topic, the question of how laws themselves are created and by whom is often forgotten. While looking at this issue and considering that in the CPC-ruled Socialist Legal System State rules are created according to CPC rule development, the question then becomes whether a new legal category is needed to conceptualize CPC regulations. The CPC has a complex corpus of internal rules, and the production of party norms and regulations comes through the CPC Interim Regulations on the Procedure for Establishing Internal Party Regulations, an internal legislation law established in 1990, about 10 years prior to the national Legislation Law. As the normative framework for Inner Party Rule of Law existed prior to State Rule of Law, there is indeed a need of conceptualization of CPC rules, and a possible complement to the notion of binding ‘normative’ rules of State would be to consider their alter ego, the soft CPC rules, as ‘nomopoietic’, or rule-creating rules for the State.","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"43 1","pages":"681"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68175763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this Article is to articulate appropriate legal doctrine to govern the problem of false statements of fact by law enforcement officers in warrant affidavits. This Article addresses the issue in the context of actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress such Fourth Amendment violations. This perspective promises to be interesting and unique for two reasons. First, the fact that the guilty are ordinarily the direct beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment has long been a matter of grave concern. In contrast, rarely, if ever, will anyone except an innocent victim of a search based on a perjured warrant affidavit be able to maintain a successful action asserting this particular Fourth Amendment violation. Second, a police officer who files a false affidavit in support of a warrant application, unlike any other defendant in a § 1983 case, is not entitled to the protection of any of the immunity doctrines which protect police officers in most cases from legal liability.
{"title":"Bearing False Witness: Perjured Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment","authors":"S. Gard","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.946476","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.946476","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this Article is to articulate appropriate legal doctrine to govern the problem of false statements of fact by law enforcement officers in warrant affidavits. This Article addresses the issue in the context of actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress such Fourth Amendment violations. This perspective promises to be interesting and unique for two reasons. First, the fact that the guilty are ordinarily the direct beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment has long been a matter of grave concern. In contrast, rarely, if ever, will anyone except an innocent victim of a search based on a perjured warrant affidavit be able to maintain a successful action asserting this particular Fourth Amendment violation. Second, a police officer who files a false affidavit in support of a warrant application, unlike any other defendant in a § 1983 case, is not entitled to the protection of any of the immunity doctrines which protect police officers in most cases from legal liability.","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"41 1","pages":"445"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67902862","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A precarious balancing act--the role of the FDA as protector of public health and industry wealth.","authors":"Alison R McCabe","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":" ","pages":"787-819"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25868738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Protectionism and freedom of contract: the erosion of female autonomy in surrogacy decisions.","authors":"Jessica H Munyon","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"36 3","pages":"717-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24835054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Whatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret."(1) "Safeguards to privacy in individual health care information are imperative to preserve the health care delivery relationship and the integrity of the patient record."(2) As early as the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., Hippocrates contemplated the importance of medical information to the care and treatment of patients. His oath suggests that privacy of a patient's medical information creates the foundation upon which a patient reposes trust in his or her physician. While defining the earliest version of the physician-patient privilege, the oath does not envision the extent of modern day access to healthcare information. A patient's relationship with the modern healthcare delivery system often includes a team of physicians, nurses, and other clinical support personnel. This relationship extends beyond direct caregivers and may include healthcare administrators, payor organizations, and persons unfamiliar with a patient's identity, such as researchers and public health officials. Accessing a patient's medical information links these participants to the patient's healthcare delivery relationship. The Hippocratic Oath does not contemplate such broad access, nor does it contemplate the emerging privacy crisis resulting from the application of computer technology to medical record storage and retrieval. The combination of broad access, individual privacy rights, and computer technology requires a rethinking of measures designed to protect the realities of the modern medical information society.
{"title":"The need to know versus the right to know: privacy of patient medical data in an information-based society.","authors":"R E Harris","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>\"Whatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret.\"(1) \"Safeguards to privacy in individual health care information are imperative to preserve the health care delivery relationship and the integrity of the patient record.\"(2) As early as the fourth and fifth centuries B.C., Hippocrates contemplated the importance of medical information to the care and treatment of patients. His oath suggests that privacy of a patient's medical information creates the foundation upon which a patient reposes trust in his or her physician. While defining the earliest version of the physician-patient privilege, the oath does not envision the extent of modern day access to healthcare information. A patient's relationship with the modern healthcare delivery system often includes a team of physicians, nurses, and other clinical support personnel. This relationship extends beyond direct caregivers and may include healthcare administrators, payor organizations, and persons unfamiliar with a patient's identity, such as researchers and public health officials. Accessing a patient's medical information links these participants to the patient's healthcare delivery relationship. The Hippocratic Oath does not contemplate such broad access, nor does it contemplate the emerging privacy crisis resulting from the application of computer technology to medical record storage and retrieval. The combination of broad access, individual privacy rights, and computer technology requires a rethinking of measures designed to protect the realities of the modern medical information society.</p>","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"30 4","pages":"1183-218"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25236841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1993-01-01DOI: 10.1163/9789004301788_006
J. Bleich
If there is to be any meaningful discussion concerning public policy, it must begin with the most basic moral value—truth. So fundamental is truth that no moral system, and indeed no cognitive discipline, would be conceivable without the basic premise that truth be assumed as a meta-principle. The term “truth” is used in this context, not in the sense of truth-telling, but in the sense of truth-recognition. Every moral system that recognizes that, under certain conditions, communication of a falsehood is not only devoid of odium but constitutes a moral imperative. A maniac wishes to know which button, when depressed, will release a nuclear device. In that case, the morally mandated response is self-evident; in other situations the same clarity may not obtain. Truth-telling in the physician-patient relationship is a case in point. Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, it is usually the physician who advocates full disclosure, while the ethicist may be quite prepared to clothe the lie with moral sanction. Although communication of a falsehood to another individual may be justifiable or even commendable at times, self-deception ought never be condoned. Consequently, recognition and acknowledgment of factual verities must constitute the first step in the formulation of public policy. Organ transplants and fetal tissue research designed to preserve human life are themselves entirely unobjectionable. Yet each involves an ancillary issue posing a significant moral problem which, in current debate, has become obfuscated by confusion with regard to matters that are entirely factual in nature.
{"title":"Moral debate and semantic sleight of hand.","authors":"J. Bleich","doi":"10.1163/9789004301788_006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004301788_006","url":null,"abstract":"If there is to be any meaningful discussion concerning public policy, it must begin with the most basic moral value—truth. So fundamental is truth that no moral system, and indeed no cognitive discipline, would be conceivable without the basic premise that truth be assumed as a meta-principle. The term “truth” is used in this context, not in the sense of truth-telling, but in the sense of truth-recognition. Every moral system that recognizes that, under certain conditions, communication of a falsehood is not only devoid of odium but constitutes a moral imperative. A maniac wishes to know which button, when depressed, will release a nuclear device. In that case, the morally mandated response is self-evident; in other situations the same clarity may not obtain. Truth-telling in the physician-patient relationship is a case in point. Curiously, or perhaps not so curiously, it is usually the physician who advocates full disclosure, while the ethicist may be quite prepared to clothe the lie with moral sanction. Although communication of a falsehood to another individual may be justifiable or even commendable at times, self-deception ought never be condoned. Consequently, recognition and acknowledgment of factual verities must constitute the first step in the formulation of public policy. Organ transplants and fetal tissue research designed to preserve human life are themselves entirely unobjectionable. Yet each involves an ancillary issue posing a significant moral problem which, in current debate, has become obfuscated by confusion with regard to matters that are entirely factual in nature.","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"27 4 1","pages":"1173-93"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1993-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64523687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Donohue lecture series: \"Roe v. Wade: past and future\".","authors":"S Weddington","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82862,"journal":{"name":"Suffolk University law review","volume":"24 3","pages":"601-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25215515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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