Author(s): Feldman, Torrey M. | Abstract: May 14, 2018 is among the most significant days in modern American sports history. No one earned a gold medal or played a championship game. There was no World Cup or National Series title on the line. Instead, with just a keystroke, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) unconstitutional, thereby legalizing sports betting across the country. In the two years following the decision, dozens of states have established sports betting operations. For professional sports athletes and their agents, this new era brings with it questions of how state laws regarding the right of publicity will interact with laws governing sports betting operations. Complicating this question is well-established precedent governing fantasy sports and the online platforms that profit off of the name, image, and likeness of professional athletes. Against this backdrop, female professional athletes continue to earn significantly lower salaries than their male counterparts. This Article examines the gender wage gap in professional soccer and basketball, and explains the significance and history of PASPA. It then reviews the case law regarding professional athletes and their right of publicity claims. It concludes by suggesting that some female professional athletes may narrow the gender wage gap by asserting their right of publicity on sports-betting platforms.
{"title":"Bet You Didn’t Know She Could Get Paid For That: Using Sports Betting and the Right of Publicity To Address the Gender Wage Gap in Professional Sports","authors":"Torrey M. Feldman","doi":"10.5070/L3272051565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3272051565","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Feldman, Torrey M. | Abstract: May 14, 2018 is among the most significant days in modern American sports history. No one earned a gold medal or played a championship game. There was no World Cup or National Series title on the line. Instead, with just a keystroke, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) unconstitutional, thereby legalizing sports betting across the country. In the two years following the decision, dozens of states have established sports betting operations. For professional sports athletes and their agents, this new era brings with it questions of how state laws regarding the right of publicity will interact with laws governing sports betting operations. Complicating this question is well-established precedent governing fantasy sports and the online platforms that profit off of the name, image, and likeness of professional athletes. Against this backdrop, female professional athletes continue to earn significantly lower salaries than their male counterparts. This Article examines the gender wage gap in professional soccer and basketball, and explains the significance and history of PASPA. It then reviews the case law regarding professional athletes and their right of publicity claims. It concludes by suggesting that some female professional athletes may narrow the gender wage gap by asserting their right of publicity on sports-betting platforms.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Arsiniega, Brittany | Abstract: This Article reviews research and theory in the field of gender in the legal profession using a framework developed by feminist theorist Barbara Risman. Risman asserts that gender is a social structure, “an entity in and of itself,” which operates on the individual, interactional, and institutional levels. Using Risman’s tripartite framework, I explore two prominent questions in the gender and legal professions literature: (1) Why do men and women advance differently in their careers? and (2) Are women more or less satisfied with their legal careers than men? In doing so, I demonstrate that the vast majority of theories of gender inequality in the legal profession, and the research methods undertaken to test them, focus on individual and institutional analysis to the exclusion of interactional analysis.I further highlight a lack of research focusing on the ways in which gender is embedded in interactions between female lawyers and those who shape their career choices: partners, friends, mentors, and colleagues. I argue that existing research reifies Big Law partnership by using such positions as the measuring stick against which all other legal positions are valued. I further argue that current studies unintentionally perpetuate gender stereotypes by conceiving of gender inequality as a women-only issue. Work-life balance is conflated with having children such that the notion of having a life outside of work is itself now gendered. I call for a renewed study of the interaction between gender and other intersectional identities like race and class, given the unique set of challenges faced by female attorneys who are also racial minorities and/or live on less than a Big Law salary. I further offer policy recommendations, including government- or firm-sponsored childcare and gender-related legal education for law students and lawyers.
{"title":"Beyond Big Law: Toward a More Inclusive Study of Gender in the Legal Profession","authors":"Brittany Arsiniega","doi":"10.5070/L3272051562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3272051562","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Arsiniega, Brittany | Abstract: This Article reviews research and theory in the field of gender in the legal profession using a framework developed by feminist theorist Barbara Risman. Risman asserts that gender is a social structure, “an entity in and of itself,” which operates on the individual, interactional, and institutional levels. Using Risman’s tripartite framework, I explore two prominent questions in the gender and legal professions literature: (1) Why do men and women advance differently in their careers? and (2) Are women more or less satisfied with their legal careers than men? In doing so, I demonstrate that the vast majority of theories of gender inequality in the legal profession, and the research methods undertaken to test them, focus on individual and institutional analysis to the exclusion of interactional analysis.I further highlight a lack of research focusing on the ways in which gender is embedded in interactions between female lawyers and those who shape their career choices: partners, friends, mentors, and colleagues. I argue that existing research reifies Big Law partnership by using such positions as the measuring stick against which all other legal positions are valued. I further argue that current studies unintentionally perpetuate gender stereotypes by conceiving of gender inequality as a women-only issue. Work-life balance is conflated with having children such that the notion of having a life outside of work is itself now gendered. I call for a renewed study of the interaction between gender and other intersectional identities like race and class, given the unique set of challenges faced by female attorneys who are also racial minorities and/or live on less than a Big Law salary. I further offer policy recommendations, including government- or firm-sponsored childcare and gender-related legal education for law students and lawyers.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753834","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Ostrowsky, Jon | Abstract: Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court sanctioned compulsory sterilization in Buck v. Bell, echoing eugenicists and reasoning that “[i]t is better for all the world . . . [if] society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” In addition to this eugenics-based rationale, compulsory sterilization in the early twentieth century also sought to punish and stigmatize LGBTQ persons, who were called “sexual deviants.” Today, at least fourteen states and one territory continue to—in effect—involuntarily sterilize transgender individuals. In these states, transgender individuals must undergo sex-reassignment surgery before they can correct the gender on their birth certificates. This Article argues that like many of America’s early sterilization laws targeting LGBTQ individuals, today’s surgical requirement laws seek to advance three forms of animus that are separate from eugenics. First, these laws seek to deny transgenderism. Second, these laws seek to punish or stigmatize perceived deviance. Third, the laws impose a view of heteronormative sexual ethics, which seeks to define what sexual conduct is tolerable in society. As transgender rights advocates mount a new wave of legal challenges, they should challenge laws requiring surgery to change one’s gender on a government-issued birth certificate. Such laws violate the fundamental right of bodily autonomy to choose and refuse medical treatment because they are not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Instead, surgical requirement laws advance animus against transgender persons. These laws also echo the historical animus against LGBTQ individuals that motivated compulsory sterilization during the Buck era in the early twentieth century. Thus, litigation challenging surgical requirement laws presents an opportunity for the Court to definitively overturn Buck.
摘要:近一个世纪前，美国最高法院在巴克诉贝尔案(Buck v. Bell)中批准了强制绝育，呼应了优生学家的观点，理由是“这对全世界都更好……”(如果)社会能够阻止那些明显不适合的人继续他们的行为。”除了这种基于优生学的理由之外，20世纪初的强制绝育也试图惩罚和污名化LGBTQ人群，他们被称为“性变态者”。今天，至少有14个州和一个地区继续——实际上——非自愿地对变性人进行绝育。在这些州，变性人必须先接受变性手术，才能修改出生证明上的性别。本文认为，就像美国许多针对LGBTQ个体的早期绝育法一样，今天的手术要求法试图推进三种与优生学不同的男性意向。首先，这些法律试图否认跨性别主义。其次，这些法律试图惩罚或污名化察觉到的越轨行为。第三，法律强加了一种异性恋规范的性伦理观，它试图定义社会上可以容忍的性行为。随着跨性别权利倡导者发起新一轮法律挑战，他们应该挑战要求通过手术改变政府签发的出生证明上性别的法律。这些法律违反了选择和拒绝医疗的身体自主权的基本权利，因为它们不是狭隘地针对令人信服的国家利益而制定的。相反，手术要求法助长了对变性人的敌意。这些法律也呼应了历史上对LGBTQ个人的敌意，这种敌意促使了20世纪初巴克时代的强制绝育。因此，诉讼挑战手术要求法提供了一个机会，为法院明确推翻巴克。
{"title":"Birth Certificate Gender Corrections: The Recurring Animus of Compulsory Sterilization Targeting Transgender Individuals","authors":"J. Ostrowsky","doi":"10.5070/L3272051566","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3272051566","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Ostrowsky, Jon | Abstract: Nearly a century ago, the Supreme Court sanctioned compulsory sterilization in Buck v. Bell, echoing eugenicists and reasoning that “[i]t is better for all the world . . . [if] society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” In addition to this eugenics-based rationale, compulsory sterilization in the early twentieth century also sought to punish and stigmatize LGBTQ persons, who were called “sexual deviants.” Today, at least fourteen states and one territory continue to—in effect—involuntarily sterilize transgender individuals. In these states, transgender individuals must undergo sex-reassignment surgery before they can correct the gender on their birth certificates. This Article argues that like many of America’s early sterilization laws targeting LGBTQ individuals, today’s surgical requirement laws seek to advance three forms of animus that are separate from eugenics. First, these laws seek to deny transgenderism. Second, these laws seek to punish or stigmatize perceived deviance. Third, the laws impose a view of heteronormative sexual ethics, which seeks to define what sexual conduct is tolerable in society. As transgender rights advocates mount a new wave of legal challenges, they should challenge laws requiring surgery to change one’s gender on a government-issued birth certificate. Such laws violate the fundamental right of bodily autonomy to choose and refuse medical treatment because they are not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Instead, surgical requirement laws advance animus against transgender persons. These laws also echo the historical animus against LGBTQ individuals that motivated compulsory sterilization during the Buck era in the early twentieth century. Thus, litigation challenging surgical requirement laws presents an opportunity for the Court to definitively overturn Buck.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Zhang, Yiran | Abstract: Lawsuits about groom-to-bride marriage payments are arriving in Chinese courts, challenging traditional ideas about marriage formation. Through the lens of case files, I examine the dissolution of marriages (or quasimarital relationships) formed by marriage payment agreements and analyze the anticommodification views expressed by feminists and legal scholars. In these cases, judges wrestle with two competing considerations: their own antimarriage payment and pro-groom views on one hand and the litigants’ economic conception of marriage on the other. The former urges judges to rule for the grooms, and the latter for the brides. In balancing these two considerations, judges generally order a partial or full repayment of the payment when the relationship dissolves. I also examine feminist concerns of voluntariness and fairness in the commodification of sexuality. The current theoretical and judicial frameworks do not account for the divergent power dynamics in individual cases; as a result, the case rulings do not respond appropriately to brides and grooms with differing degrees of agency. These blind spots may have unintended consequences, including inflating prices and reinforcing gender-based asymmetries. In this Article, I argue that judges should rely on economic analysis rather than moral judgment to better account for the actual dynamics of marriage payment arrangements. Framing my analysis is a transactional conception of marriage and an economic approach to family, both of which have the potential to further our understanding of marriage and to advance gender equality.
{"title":"Marriage and Money Entangled: Commodification, Agency, and Economic Analysis in Chinese Marriage Payment Lawsuits","authors":"Yiran Zhang","doi":"10.5070/L3272051563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3272051563","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Zhang, Yiran | Abstract: Lawsuits about groom-to-bride marriage payments are arriving in Chinese courts, challenging traditional ideas about marriage formation. Through the lens of case files, I examine the dissolution of marriages (or quasimarital relationships) formed by marriage payment agreements and analyze the anticommodification views expressed by feminists and legal scholars. In these cases, judges wrestle with two competing considerations: their own antimarriage payment and pro-groom views on one hand and the litigants’ economic conception of marriage on the other. The former urges judges to rule for the grooms, and the latter for the brides. In balancing these two considerations, judges generally order a partial or full repayment of the payment when the relationship dissolves. I also examine feminist concerns of voluntariness and fairness in the commodification of sexuality. The current theoretical and judicial frameworks do not account for the divergent power dynamics in individual cases; as a result, the case rulings do not respond appropriately to brides and grooms with differing degrees of agency. These blind spots may have unintended consequences, including inflating prices and reinforcing gender-based asymmetries. In this Article, I argue that judges should rely on economic analysis rather than moral judgment to better account for the actual dynamics of marriage payment arrangements. Framing my analysis is a transactional conception of marriage and an economic approach to family, both of which have the potential to further our understanding of marriage and to advance gender equality.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Lintner, Ezra Graham | Abstract: The last decade has been monumental in the fight for transgender rights, including a growing recognition of transgender identity. This shift has also created space for those with nuanced gender identities—such as those who are nonbinary—to join the conversation. Individuals who identify as nonbinary do not identify as “male” or “female,” but rather as both, neither, or something altogether separate. Nonbinary people use often use alternative pronouns, such as “they/them/theirs,” to refer to themselves. While these pronouns are increasingly being accepted into the lexicon of American English, the legal field is far behind in its acceptance and use of nonbinary pronouns.Although the law has made great strides in recognizing nonbinary identity within the last five years, the legal field cannot support the progress of transgender rights until regularly utilizes nonbinary pronouns, such as “they/them/theirs,” in law school classrooms, legal academic writing, and legal practice. Furthermore, the legal field’s failure to recognize such pronouns is a form of oppressive silencing that serves to uphold a false gender binary while also delegitimizing nonbinary identity. Critical Race Theory provides a generalizable framework for better understanding this silencing so that transgender rights activists and scholars can effectively resist it. Specifically, the scholars behind Critical Race Theory had to break the oppressive silencing forced upon them by white academia in order for the ideas, theories, writing, and scholarship of legal scholars of color to be respected in legal academia. As such, transgender rights activists and scholars can benefit from studying and employing the tactics they used to challenge their silencing.
{"title":"To Each Their Own: Using Nonbinary Pronouns to Break Silence in the Legal Field","authors":"E. Lintner","doi":"10.5070/L3272051564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3272051564","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Lintner, Ezra Graham | Abstract: The last decade has been monumental in the fight for transgender rights, including a growing recognition of transgender identity. This shift has also created space for those with nuanced gender identities—such as those who are nonbinary—to join the conversation. Individuals who identify as nonbinary do not identify as “male” or “female,” but rather as both, neither, or something altogether separate. Nonbinary people use often use alternative pronouns, such as “they/them/theirs,” to refer to themselves. While these pronouns are increasingly being accepted into the lexicon of American English, the legal field is far behind in its acceptance and use of nonbinary pronouns.Although the law has made great strides in recognizing nonbinary identity within the last five years, the legal field cannot support the progress of transgender rights until regularly utilizes nonbinary pronouns, such as “they/them/theirs,” in law school classrooms, legal academic writing, and legal practice. Furthermore, the legal field’s failure to recognize such pronouns is a form of oppressive silencing that serves to uphold a false gender binary while also delegitimizing nonbinary identity. Critical Race Theory provides a generalizable framework for better understanding this silencing so that transgender rights activists and scholars can effectively resist it. Specifically, the scholars behind Critical Race Theory had to break the oppressive silencing forced upon them by white academia in order for the ideas, theories, writing, and scholarship of legal scholars of color to be respected in legal academia. As such, transgender rights activists and scholars can benefit from studying and employing the tactics they used to challenge their silencing.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753566","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Markham Cameron, Julia | Abstract: Breast cancer awareness campaigns—widespread, largescale efforts focusing on general “awareness” of the breast cancer, rather than the dissemination of information on detection and treatment—are common sights in the American public and private spheres. From NFL players donning pink socks to crafters selling “I love boobies!” t-shirts online, breast cancer-branded events and products have become an essential marketing tool to reach women, signal corporate virtue in a palatable, nonaggressive manner. Even the federal government is party to the trend: in 1998, the U.S. Congress authorized the sale of the Breast Cancer Research Stamp (BCRS) by the U.S. Postal Service to raise awareness and research funds for breast cancer. The BCRS has been available ever since.This Article posits that the BCRS is more an attempt by the federal government to capitalize on the goodwill and consumer engagement generated by breast cancer awareness marketing in the private sector, and less a good-faith attempt to treat, cure, or prevent breast cancer among Americans. The Article addresses three questions: (1) how does the BCRS reflect a private sector trend of embracing breast cancer cause marketing?; (2) why does Congress continually reauthorize the BCRS, even as other semipostal stamps lapse?; and (3) why has Congress chosen to raise money for breast cancer research through the BCRS? In answering these questions, I argue that the true legislative motivations behind the BCRS are to generate goodwill amongst voters, promote small-government values, and align with breast cancer awareness causes without compromising other political positions. I conclude that the BCRS exemplifies how Congress has eschewed expert opinion and instead adopted private sector marketing strategies when passing legislation.
{"title":"Painting the Capitol Pink: The Breast Cancer Research Stamp and the Dangers of Congressional Cause Marketing","authors":"Julia Markham Cameron","doi":"10.5070/L3271047871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3271047871","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Markham Cameron, Julia | Abstract: Breast cancer awareness campaigns—widespread, largescale efforts focusing on general “awareness” of the breast cancer, rather than the dissemination of information on detection and treatment—are common sights in the American public and private spheres. From NFL players donning pink socks to crafters selling “I love boobies!” t-shirts online, breast cancer-branded events and products have become an essential marketing tool to reach women, signal corporate virtue in a palatable, nonaggressive manner. Even the federal government is party to the trend: in 1998, the U.S. Congress authorized the sale of the Breast Cancer Research Stamp (BCRS) by the U.S. Postal Service to raise awareness and research funds for breast cancer. The BCRS has been available ever since.This Article posits that the BCRS is more an attempt by the federal government to capitalize on the goodwill and consumer engagement generated by breast cancer awareness marketing in the private sector, and less a good-faith attempt to treat, cure, or prevent breast cancer among Americans. The Article addresses three questions: (1) how does the BCRS reflect a private sector trend of embracing breast cancer cause marketing?; (2) why does Congress continually reauthorize the BCRS, even as other semipostal stamps lapse?; and (3) why has Congress chosen to raise money for breast cancer research through the BCRS? In answering these questions, I argue that the true legislative motivations behind the BCRS are to generate goodwill amongst voters, promote small-government values, and align with breast cancer awareness causes without compromising other political positions. I conclude that the BCRS exemplifies how Congress has eschewed expert opinion and instead adopted private sector marketing strategies when passing legislation.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Kaminer, Debbie N. | Abstract: The United States Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Altitude Express v. Zarda, a case that addresses whether Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex” prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. Relying on three related lines of reasoning, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that it did. First, sexual orientation discrimination would not have occurred “but for” the employee’s sex; second, sexual orientation discrimination relies on the sex-stereotype that individuals should be attracted to individuals of the opposite sex; and third, sexual orientation discrimination is a form of prohibited associational discrimination. This Article opines that the strongest and most compelling of these three arguments is sex stereotyping since gays and lesbians fail to conform to the ultimate stereotype that real men are sexually attracted to women and real women are sexually attracted to men. This stereotype is a means of maintaining anachronistic and outdated gender roles for men and women.
{"title":"Sex: Sexual Orientation, Sex Stereotyping, and Title VII","authors":"D. Kaminer","doi":"10.5070/L3271047870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3271047870","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Kaminer, Debbie N. | Abstract: The United States Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Altitude Express v. Zarda, a case that addresses whether Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination “on the basis of sex” prohibits sexual orientation discrimination. Relying on three related lines of reasoning, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that it did. First, sexual orientation discrimination would not have occurred “but for” the employee’s sex; second, sexual orientation discrimination relies on the sex-stereotype that individuals should be attracted to individuals of the opposite sex; and third, sexual orientation discrimination is a form of prohibited associational discrimination. This Article opines that the strongest and most compelling of these three arguments is sex stereotyping since gays and lesbians fail to conform to the ultimate stereotype that real men are sexually attracted to women and real women are sexually attracted to men. This stereotype is a means of maintaining anachronistic and outdated gender roles for men and women.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Defunding the Police","authors":"A. Anonymous","doi":"10.5070/L3272051567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3272051567","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Behmanesh, Jessica | Abstract: The following short story is in dedication to all the women who have been denied an education because of their gender.
摘要:以下是一个短篇故事，献给所有因为性别而被剥夺受教育权利的女性。
{"title":"The Story of Homa","authors":"Jessica Behmanesh","doi":"10.5070/L3271047874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3271047874","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Behmanesh, Jessica | Abstract: The following short story is in dedication to all the women who have been denied an education because of their gender.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Roth, Elizabeth | Abstract: Editors’ NoteThis essay reviews the Congressional debate surrounding the addition of the term “sex” to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We included this essay because it serves as a reminder that the narratives we construct regarding legal and legislative history are often at risk of oversimplification. As the Justices of the Supreme Court deliberate and consider recent oral arguments regarding whether the term “sex” extends legal protections to persons on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, the Congressional Record from February 8, 1964 suggests one lesson: There are limits to relying on historical dialogues that exclude or mock marginalized voices. That is, if many of the proclaimed supporters of an amendment advancing women’s equality supported it solely to undermine the passage of civil rights legislation, how instructive can it be to speculate about what they intended by the term “sex”? While this essay does not answer this question, it suggests that the sincere supporters of the amendment—and even those opposed to it on the grounds it would impede passage of the legislation—were fundamentally concerned with advancing equality for any and all groups who had faced discrimination.
{"title":"Women’s Afternoon: What the Congressional Record Can—and Cannot—Tell us about the Meaning of “Sex” Under Title VII","authors":"Elizabeth Roth","doi":"10.5070/L3271047873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3271047873","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Roth, Elizabeth | Abstract: Editors’ NoteThis essay reviews the Congressional debate surrounding the addition of the term “sex” to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We included this essay because it serves as a reminder that the narratives we construct regarding legal and legislative history are often at risk of oversimplification. As the Justices of the Supreme Court deliberate and consider recent oral arguments regarding whether the term “sex” extends legal protections to persons on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, the Congressional Record from February 8, 1964 suggests one lesson: There are limits to relying on historical dialogues that exclude or mock marginalized voices. That is, if many of the proclaimed supporters of an amendment advancing women’s equality supported it solely to undermine the passage of civil rights legislation, how instructive can it be to speculate about what they intended by the term “sex”? While this essay does not answer this question, it suggests that the sincere supporters of the amendment—and even those opposed to it on the grounds it would impede passage of the legislation—were fundamentally concerned with advancing equality for any and all groups who had faced discrimination.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753118","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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