This essay offers a critique -- inspired by feminism(s) -- of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), a case which ruled that restrictions on direct expenditures of funds from corporate treasuries to support or oppose candidates for political office were unconstitutional restrictions on corporations' rights of free speech. In response, the essay proposes a two-pronged feminist attack against Citizens United. The first prong is to acknowledge the dangers facing women and other disadvantaged groups which emerge due to corporate privatization of the public sphere and to argue, as an antidote, for a robustly construed public domain. Whereas early feminists identified as a threat to women the divide between public and private, Citizens United underscores a newer threat -- namely the elimination of that divide. The second prong is to deploy feminism's well known rejection of abstraction in favour of context. This approach helps demonstrate how Citizens United propels its pro-corporate outcome by erasing context and instead deploying a strategy of denying tremendously significant legal distinctions -- most crucially between living human beings and artificial legal entities.
这篇文章在女权主义的启发下，对联合公民诉联邦选举委员会(Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310(2010))一案进行了批判。该案裁定，限制从公司国库直接支出资金来支持或反对竞选政治职位的候选人，是对公司言论自由权利的违宪限制。作为回应，这篇文章提出了两方面的女权主义攻击公民联合。第一种方法是承认由于公共领域的公司私有化而出现的妇女和其他处境不利群体所面临的危险，并作为一种解药，主张建立一个强有力的公共领域。早期的女权主义者认为公共和私人之间的鸿沟是对女性的一种威胁，而联合公民则强调了一种新的威胁——即消除这种鸿沟。第二种方法是利用女权主义众所周知的反对抽象的观点，支持上下文。这种方法有助于展示Citizens United如何通过消除背景，转而采用否认极其重要的法律区别(最关键的是活人和人工法律实体之间的区别)的策略，来推动其有利于企业的结果。
{"title":"\"Can You Hear me Now...Good!\" Feminism(s), the Public/Private Divide, and Citizens United v. FEC","authors":"Ronnie Cohen, S. O'byrne","doi":"10.5070/L3201018046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3201018046","url":null,"abstract":"This essay offers a critique -- inspired by feminism(s) -- of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), a case which ruled that restrictions on direct expenditures of funds from corporate treasuries to support or oppose candidates for political office were unconstitutional restrictions on corporations' rights of free speech. In response, the essay proposes a two-pronged feminist attack against Citizens United. The first prong is to acknowledge the dangers facing women and other disadvantaged groups which emerge due to corporate privatization of the public sphere and to argue, as an antidote, for a robustly construed public domain. Whereas early feminists identified as a threat to women the divide between public and private, Citizens United underscores a newer threat -- namely the elimination of that divide. The second prong is to deploy feminism's well known rejection of abstraction in favour of context. This approach helps demonstrate how Citizens United propels its pro-corporate outcome by erasing context and instead deploying a strategy of denying tremendously significant legal distinctions -- most crucially between living human beings and artificial legal entities.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-10-08DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511609800.030
Wendy C. Gerzog
In 1981, Congress enacted the qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) provisions that allow an estate and gift tax marital deduction for the full value of the underlying property where a spouse receives only a qualifying income interest for life and where the executor of the estate or the donor spouse makes a timely election. The article reviews the history of the marital deduction and its evolved rationale, explains and analyzes the current QTIP provisions together with their supposed comity with the decision to adopt the marital unit as the proper unit of transfer taxation, illustrates how the QTIP demeans women, and proposes that Congress repeal the QTIP provisions.
{"title":"The Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women - eScholarship","authors":"Wendy C. Gerzog","doi":"10.1017/CBO9780511609800.030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609800.030","url":null,"abstract":"In 1981, Congress enacted the qualified terminable interest property (QTIP) provisions that allow an estate and gift tax marital deduction for the full value of the underlying property where a spouse receives only a qualifying income interest for life and where the executor of the estate or the donor spouse makes a timely election. The article reviews the history of the marital deduction and its evolved rationale, explains and analyzes the current QTIP provisions together with their supposed comity with the decision to adopt the marital unit as the proper unit of transfer taxation, illustrates how the QTIP demeans women, and proposes that Congress repeal the QTIP provisions.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/CBO9780511609800.030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"57078708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2008-03-24DOI: 10.4324/9781315857534-24
Kristin Kalsem, Verna L. Williams
For the past three years, women leaders from national groups, grassroots organizations, academia and beyond have gathered to address dissonance in the women's movement, particularly dissatisfaction with the movement's emphasis on women privileged on account of their race, class, or sexuality. At these meetings of the New Women's Movement Initiative (NWMI), advocates who no longer want to do feminism have articulated a desire for social justice feminism. This article analyzes what such a shift might mean for feminist practice and legal theory. Drawing on history, specifically the work of the women behind the Brandeis brief in the Muller v. Oregon workers' hours' restriction case and the National Women's Conference of 1977, this article takes initial steps at broadly defining social justice feminism as that which is productive, constructive, and healing. Moving from practice to theory, it suggests a new way of articulating and understanding the feminist work that is being done in this current stage of feminist jurisprudence, after the path-breaking interventions of anti-essentialism and intersectionality. This article also sets forth certain methodological tools for doing social justice feminism and then uses them to examine the recent Supreme Court case, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, a case upholding the lack of wage protections for certain domestic workers. With this article, we hope to advance the conversation that has already begun, both in the world of practice as evidenced by the work of the NWMI, as well as the world of feminist legal theory. Social justice brings to feminism a particular emphasis on fairness and transformation; it is a modification that signals change. At this critical time, with efforts to exacerbate the divides of race and gender, social justice feminism provides a new paradigm for talking about and examining these and other issues that threaten movements dedicated to dismantling oppression and bettering people's lives.
{"title":"Social Justice Feminism","authors":"Kristin Kalsem, Verna L. Williams","doi":"10.4324/9781315857534-24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315857534-24","url":null,"abstract":"For the past three years, women leaders from national groups, grassroots organizations, academia and beyond have gathered to address dissonance in the women's movement, particularly dissatisfaction with the movement's emphasis on women privileged on account of their race, class, or sexuality. At these meetings of the New Women's Movement Initiative (NWMI), advocates who no longer want to do feminism have articulated a desire for social justice feminism. This article analyzes what such a shift might mean for feminist practice and legal theory. Drawing on history, specifically the work of the women behind the Brandeis brief in the Muller v. Oregon workers' hours' restriction case and the National Women's Conference of 1977, this article takes initial steps at broadly defining social justice feminism as that which is productive, constructive, and healing. Moving from practice to theory, it suggests a new way of articulating and understanding the feminist work that is being done in this current stage of feminist jurisprudence, after the path-breaking interventions of anti-essentialism and intersectionality. This article also sets forth certain methodological tools for doing social justice feminism and then uses them to examine the recent Supreme Court case, Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, a case upholding the lack of wage protections for certain domestic workers. With this article, we hope to advance the conversation that has already begun, both in the world of practice as evidenced by the work of the NWMI, as well as the world of feminist legal theory. Social justice brings to feminism a particular emphasis on fairness and transformation; it is a modification that signals change. At this critical time, with efforts to exacerbate the divides of race and gender, social justice feminism provides a new paradigm for talking about and examining these and other issues that threaten movements dedicated to dismantling oppression and bettering people's lives.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"72 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70456601","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article considers the statutes and judicial decisions that extend the use of the delayed discovery rule to adult survivors of child sexual abuse. Use of the rule in such cases has been criticized as opening the door to suits founded on the scientifically-controversial notion of repression, but increasingly the rule has been used in cases where the victim always remembered the abuse but did not connect it with her symptoms. Given this extension of the rule's use, this article explores the rationale for restricting it only to cases involving victims of sexual abuse. The article argues that while child sexual abuse is often regarded as "unique" and "different," and thereby warranting "exceptional" legal treatment, using the rule only in sexual abuse cases reinforces a cultural narrative linking child sexual abuse to a wide range of psychopathological symptoms while underestimating, if not totally ignoring, the malign consequences other forms of abuse and neglect have on children's development. This article examines the strengths and weakness of the justifications that have been implicitly and explicitly advanced for the "exceptionalism" surrounding child sexual abuse in use of the discovery rule and traces it to the social movement on behalf of adult survivors of child sexual abuse. Deeper roots lie in the broad cultural 1. B.A. University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Comparative Literature and Literary Theory, University of Pennsylvania, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2003. Assistant Professor, Yale University 1987-1995; Bunting Institute-Children's Hospital Fellow in Domestic Violence, 1995-1996; Visiting Professor, Gender Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin, 1997-1999. UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:145 identification of childhood with sexual innocence and in the close connection that has historically been made between inappropriate sexual activity in childhood and physical and mental deviations in adulthood. Based on evidence indicating that other forms of child maltreatment may have detrimental consequences to children comparable to those arising from child sexual abuse, this Article proposes that the discovery rule would also be suitable for cases involving child physical abuse. 2
{"title":"Child Sexual Abuse, the Delayed Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-Survivors of Child Abuse","authors":"Elizabeth A. Wilson","doi":"10.5070/L3122017762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L3122017762","url":null,"abstract":"This Article considers the statutes and judicial decisions that extend the use of the delayed discovery rule to adult survivors of child sexual abuse. Use of the rule in such cases has been criticized as opening the door to suits founded on the scientifically-controversial notion of repression, but increasingly the rule has been used in cases where the victim always remembered the abuse but did not connect it with her symptoms. Given this extension of the rule's use, this article explores the rationale for restricting it only to cases involving victims of sexual abuse. The article argues that while child sexual abuse is often regarded as \"unique\" and \"different,\" and thereby warranting \"exceptional\" legal treatment, using the rule only in sexual abuse cases reinforces a cultural narrative linking child sexual abuse to a wide range of psychopathological symptoms while underestimating, if not totally ignoring, the malign consequences other forms of abuse and neglect have on children's development. This article examines the strengths and weakness of the justifications that have been implicitly and explicitly advanced for the \"exceptionalism\" surrounding child sexual abuse in use of the discovery rule and traces it to the social movement on behalf of adult survivors of child sexual abuse. Deeper roots lie in the broad cultural 1. B.A. University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Comparative Literature and Literary Theory, University of Pennsylvania, 1988; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2003. Assistant Professor, Yale University 1987-1995; Bunting Institute-Children's Hospital Fellow in Domestic Violence, 1995-1996; Visiting Professor, Gender Studies, Humboldt University, Berlin, 1997-1999. UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:145 identification of childhood with sexual innocence and in the close connection that has historically been made between inappropriate sexual activity in childhood and physical and mental deviations in adulthood. Based on evidence indicating that other forms of child maltreatment may have detrimental consequences to children comparable to those arising from child sexual abuse, this Article proposes that the discovery rule would also be suitable for cases involving child physical abuse. 2","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Emergency contraceptive pills ("ECPs"), a form of contraception which has a 75% chance of preventing pregnancy when taken within 72 hours after unprotected intercourse, are currently available only by prescription. Increasing access to ECPs will help to reduce unintended pregnancies and abortions and will help to provide women with an extra level of control over their reproductive futures. Private access initiatives, while helpful, are insufficient to address the access problem; federal level solutions are unlikely to be implemented soon. Thus, this Article proposes that all states adopt the Washington model for dependent pharmacist prescribers, whereby state law enables physicians to create collaborative agreements with pharmacists, pursuant to which the physician can effectively delegate to a pharmacist in a retail setting the power to prescribe ECPs. Dependent pharmacist prescribing of ECPs increases access to contraception, increases patient satisfaction and decreasing cost, while preserving patient safety through screening mechanisms and the good safety profile of ECPs. A state-by-state analysis of pharmacy law reveals that while there is a national trend expanding the scope of pharmacy practice, states vary widely in the amount of prescribing power allowed to pharmacists. However, dependent pharmacist prescribing of ECPs is currently feasible in a few states and close in a number of others, and implementation of dependent pharmacist prescribing in some states may lead to greater nationwide acceptance of both dependent pharmacist prescribing and of ECPs.
{"title":"Increasing access to emergency contraceptive pills through state law enabled dependent pharmacist prescribers.","authors":"H M Field","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Emergency contraceptive pills (\"ECPs\"), a form of contraception which has a 75% chance of preventing pregnancy when taken within 72 hours after unprotected intercourse, are currently available only by prescription. Increasing access to ECPs will help to reduce unintended pregnancies and abortions and will help to provide women with an extra level of control over their reproductive futures. Private access initiatives, while helpful, are insufficient to address the access problem; federal level solutions are unlikely to be implemented soon. Thus, this Article proposes that all states adopt the Washington model for dependent pharmacist prescribers, whereby state law enables physicians to create collaborative agreements with pharmacists, pursuant to which the physician can effectively delegate to a pharmacist in a retail setting the power to prescribe ECPs. Dependent pharmacist prescribing of ECPs increases access to contraception, increases patient satisfaction and decreasing cost, while preserving patient safety through screening mechanisms and the good safety profile of ECPs. A state-by-state analysis of pharmacy law reveals that while there is a national trend expanding the scope of pharmacy practice, states vary widely in the amount of prescribing power allowed to pharmacists. However, dependent pharmacist prescribing of ECPs is currently feasible in a few states and close in a number of others, and implementation of dependent pharmacist prescribing in some states may lead to greater nationwide acceptance of both dependent pharmacist prescribing and of ECPs.</p>","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"11 1","pages":"141-253"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25679446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this Article, Annalise Acorn examines the unique features of discrimination against women in academia, a work-place that is primarily concerned with the cultural production of intellectual cachet and scholarly authority. Acorn argues that one's scholarly authority is an end product of collaboration by all members of academia, students, and colleagues alike, who make deeply private and at times arbitrary choices whether to withhold or extend participation and assistance in the creation of the intellectual aura. Acorn then ex-plores ways in which this collective practice of the creation of intellectual cachet works to discriminate against women in academia.
{"title":"Discrimination in Academia and the Cultural Production of Intellectual Cachet","authors":"A. Acorn","doi":"10.7939/R3125QQ58","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7939/R3125QQ58","url":null,"abstract":"In this Article, Annalise Acorn examines the unique features of discrimination against women in academia, a work-place that is primarily concerned with the cultural production of intellectual cachet and scholarly authority. Acorn argues that one's scholarly authority is an end product of collaboration by all members of academia, students, and colleagues alike, who make deeply private and at times arbitrary choices whether to withhold or extend participation and assistance in the creation of the intellectual aura. Acorn then ex-plores ways in which this collective practice of the creation of intellectual cachet works to discriminate against women in academia.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71369302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this Comment, Sandra Cavazos argues, based solely on California state law, that California courts should recognize samesex marriages contracted outside of California. Essentially, her Comment serves as a "legal primer" for both lawyers and lay persons interested in finding out what will happen when same-sex couples married elsewhere seek to validate their marriages within California. After briefly describing recent efforts to legalize same-sex marriage and the negative federal and state responses to these efforts, Cavazos explains that California's general rule has always been that a marriage valid where contracted is valid in California. However, she notes that California courts have incorporated a public policy exception into this general rule. Under this public policy exception, only marriages which do not harm the state's public policies are recognized as valid. Cavazos then argues that the increasing acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex relationships in California, along with the scientific evidence that these relationships do not harm the state's interest in procreation or * B.A., Harvard University, 1992; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1998. The author wishes to thank UCLA School of Law Professors Grace G. Blumberg and Frances A. Olsen for their valuable time, the entire staff of the UCLA Women's Law Journal (and in particular Justine Meyers, Debby Cleaves, and Courtney Powers) for their patience and thoughtful assistance, Larry Goldblum and Alonzo Cavazos, for generously sharing their ideas and insights, and Sara Martinez for providing both "spousal support" and internet research assistance in regular doses, as needed by the
{"title":"Harmful to None: Why California Should Recognize Out-Of-State Same-Sex Marriages under Its Current Marital Choice of Law Rule","authors":"Sandra Cavazos","doi":"10.5070/L391017708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L391017708","url":null,"abstract":"In this Comment, Sandra Cavazos argues, based solely on California state law, that California courts should recognize samesex marriages contracted outside of California. Essentially, her Comment serves as a \"legal primer\" for both lawyers and lay persons interested in finding out what will happen when same-sex couples married elsewhere seek to validate their marriages within California. After briefly describing recent efforts to legalize same-sex marriage and the negative federal and state responses to these efforts, Cavazos explains that California's general rule has always been that a marriage valid where contracted is valid in California. However, she notes that California courts have incorporated a public policy exception into this general rule. Under this public policy exception, only marriages which do not harm the state's public policies are recognized as valid. Cavazos then argues that the increasing acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex relationships in California, along with the scientific evidence that these relationships do not harm the state's interest in procreation or * B.A., Harvard University, 1992; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1998. The author wishes to thank UCLA School of Law Professors Grace G. Blumberg and Frances A. Olsen for their valuable time, the entire staff of the UCLA Women's Law Journal (and in particular Justine Meyers, Debby Cleaves, and Courtney Powers) for their patience and thoughtful assistance, Larry Goldblum and Alonzo Cavazos, for generously sharing their ideas and insights, and Sara Martinez for providing both \"spousal support\" and internet research assistance in regular doses, as needed by the","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70754143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Against the backdrop of high-profile advancements and expanded opportunities for women, Professor Cheryl Preston examines the implicit messages conveyed by prevalent and seemingly innocuous images in advertisements. Preston draws upon her five-year study of fashion magazines, exploring how advertisers use a variety of photography techniques (e.g. fragmentation; fungibility; gilded and contrived perfection; depiction as dolls, animals, or objects; contortion; and various plays on vulnerability) to depict as desirable women who are vulnerable, available, and insignificant. Preston asserts that these images contribute to a cultural climate that supports violence, proffering a normative view of women that in turn influences the negative treatment of women. Preston also argues that the assumptions underlying these advertising images serve as counteragents to the laws promulgated to provide greater gender equality. She concludes that legal proceedings and pro* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. This article and a series of related articles are the results of years of concentrated study in advertising, gender, and image. I wish to thank all those who have assisted, including several students who have chosen to graduate and go on with their lives notwithstanding my continued need for their help. These include Sherrine Walker, Eric Hinton, Christopher Wall, Margaret Lindsay, and several years of students registered in my feminist legal theory seminars. I also thank my current students who have helped with research, Gunda Jarvis, Stephanie Wallace, Patty Muh, Nicole Thomas, Mathew D. McGhie, and E. Dean Stout. I am especially indebted to my colleagues in law and in media studies departments who have given suggestions on earlier drafts, Joanne Valenti, Brett G. Scharffs, James R. Rasband, J. Clifton Fleming, Jean W. Burns, Kif Augustine-Adams, and the participants in the faculty research brown-bag series at BYU. 2 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 posed legislation should be refined in light of these powerful negative media images, programs that encourage the self-esteem and empowerment of girls and women should be supported, consumers should send the requisite message to manufacturers by resisting their products, and destructive images of women should be transformed.
{"title":"Significant Bits and Pieces: Learning from Fashion Magazines about Violence against Women","authors":"Cheryl B. Preston","doi":"10.5070/L391017713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L391017713","url":null,"abstract":"Against the backdrop of high-profile advancements and expanded opportunities for women, Professor Cheryl Preston examines the implicit messages conveyed by prevalent and seemingly innocuous images in advertisements. Preston draws upon her five-year study of fashion magazines, exploring how advertisers use a variety of photography techniques (e.g. fragmentation; fungibility; gilded and contrived perfection; depiction as dolls, animals, or objects; contortion; and various plays on vulnerability) to depict as desirable women who are vulnerable, available, and insignificant. Preston asserts that these images contribute to a cultural climate that supports violence, proffering a normative view of women that in turn influences the negative treatment of women. Preston also argues that the assumptions underlying these advertising images serve as counteragents to the laws promulgated to provide greater gender equality. She concludes that legal proceedings and pro* Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. This article and a series of related articles are the results of years of concentrated study in advertising, gender, and image. I wish to thank all those who have assisted, including several students who have chosen to graduate and go on with their lives notwithstanding my continued need for their help. These include Sherrine Walker, Eric Hinton, Christopher Wall, Margaret Lindsay, and several years of students registered in my feminist legal theory seminars. I also thank my current students who have helped with research, Gunda Jarvis, Stephanie Wallace, Patty Muh, Nicole Thomas, Mathew D. McGhie, and E. Dean Stout. I am especially indebted to my colleagues in law and in media studies departments who have given suggestions on earlier drafts, Joanne Valenti, Brett G. Scharffs, James R. Rasband, J. Clifton Fleming, Jean W. Burns, Kif Augustine-Adams, and the participants in the faculty research brown-bag series at BYU. 2 UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1 posed legislation should be refined in light of these powerful negative media images, programs that encourage the self-esteem and empowerment of girls and women should be supported, consumers should send the requisite message to manufacturers by resisting their products, and destructive images of women should be transformed.","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70754264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relationship between society, medicine, and the law is multi-faceted and complex. This Article examines the process of, and the influences on, the construction of fetal personhood in the legal discourses in American and Commonwealth case law and statutes. It demonstrates how the physical and visual separation of the fetus, as made possible by medical advances, has influenced the development of legal doctrine relating to the rights of the fetus.
{"title":"Technology and the legal discourse of fetal autonomy.","authors":"C Morris","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The relationship between society, medicine, and the law is multi-faceted and complex. This Article examines the process of, and the influences on, the construction of fetal personhood in the legal discourses in American and Commonwealth case law and statutes. It demonstrates how the physical and visual separation of the fetus, as made possible by medical advances, has influenced the development of legal doctrine relating to the rights of the fetus.</p>","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"8 1","pages":"47-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25679445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Practical Guide for Women Entering the Legal Profession in the 90s","authors":"Wendy C. Munger","doi":"10.5070/L361017648","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5070/L361017648","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83388,"journal":{"name":"UCLA women's law journal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70753657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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