Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.55.4.deprogramming
Joe Hillman
As autonomous vehicles become more commonplace and roads become safer, this new technology provides an opportunity for courts to reconsider the constitutional rationale of modern search and seizure law. The Supreme Court should allow drivers to use evidence of police officer conduct relative to their vehicle’s technological capabilities to argue that a traffic stop was pretextual, meaning they were stopped for reasons other than their supposed violation. Additionally, the Court should expand the exclusionary rule to forbid the use of evidence extracted after a pretextual stop. The Court should retain some exceptions to the expanded exclusionary rule, such as when there is a major public safety concern. In the semi-autonomous world, the Court has the opportunity to adopt a more expansive vision of Fourth Amendment protections and, in doing so, help remedy the issue of racial profiling in traffic stops.
{"title":"Deprogramming Bias: Expanding the Exclusionary Rule to Pretextual Traffic Stop Using Data from Autonomous Vehicle and Drive-Assistance Technology","authors":"Joe Hillman","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.4.deprogramming","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.4.deprogramming","url":null,"abstract":"As autonomous vehicles become more commonplace and roads become safer, this new technology provides an opportunity for courts to reconsider the constitutional rationale of modern search and seizure law. The Supreme Court should allow drivers to use evidence of police officer conduct relative to their vehicle’s technological capabilities to argue that a traffic stop was pretextual, meaning they were stopped for reasons other than their supposed violation. Additionally, the Court should expand the exclusionary rule to forbid the use of evidence extracted after a pretextual stop. The Court should retain some exceptions to the expanded exclusionary rule, such as when there is a major public safety concern. In the semi-autonomous world, the Court has the opportunity to adopt a more expansive vision of Fourth Amendment protections and, in doing so, help remedy the issue of racial profiling in traffic stops.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72482858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.55.4.officer
Bryan Borodkin
This Note analyzes the current state of civil law surrounding police use of excessive force, highlighting the evolution of the “objective reasonableness” test employed in civil police use of force lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Note also discusses the role that social movements and surveillance technologies have played in furthering police accountability and shifting public opinion surrounding police use of force. After detailing this social and technological context, this Note addresses the numerous problems presented by the “objective reasonableness” test employed within civil police use of force cases, analyzing this problematic test from the perspective of both the public and the police. This Note coins the term “officer-created jeopardy liability loophole” and explains how, under the current test, officer-defendants can escape § 1983 liability when they deliberately or recklessly escalate a situation or create the need for force in the first place. To close this liability loophole and resolve other problems presented by the current “objective reasonableness” test, this Note proposes a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, in which a § 1983 plaintiff can present evidence to establish a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy which, if not sufficiently rebutted by an officer-defendant, presumes the officer-defendant’s use of force unreasonable and in violation of § 1983.
{"title":"Officer-Created Jeopardy and Reasonableness Reform: Rebuttable Presumption of Unreasonableness Within 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Police Use of Force Claims","authors":"Bryan Borodkin","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.4.officer","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.4.officer","url":null,"abstract":"This Note analyzes the current state of civil law surrounding police use of excessive force, highlighting the evolution of the “objective reasonableness” test employed in civil police use of force lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Note also discusses the role that social movements and surveillance technologies have played in furthering police accountability and shifting public opinion surrounding police use of force. After detailing this social and technological context, this Note addresses the numerous problems presented by the “objective reasonableness” test employed within civil police use of force cases, analyzing this problematic test from the perspective of both the public and the police. This Note coins the term “officer-created jeopardy liability loophole” and explains how, under the current test, officer-defendants can escape § 1983 liability when they deliberately or recklessly escalate a situation or create the need for force in the first place. To close this liability loophole and resolve other problems presented by the current “objective reasonableness” test, this Note proposes a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, in which a § 1983 plaintiff can present evidence to establish a prima facie case of officer-created jeopardy which, if not sufficiently rebutted by an officer-defendant, presumes the officer-defendant’s use of force unreasonable and in violation of § 1983.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"132 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74203937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.56.1.driving
Alissa Del Riego
Why have federal courts overwhelmingly appointed white men to represent diverse consumer classes? Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires courts to appoint the attorneys “best able to represent the interests of class members” to serve as class counsel. But courts’ recurrent conclusion that white men best fit the federally mandated job description not only gives the appearance of discrimination, but harms class members that suffer from outcomes plagued by groupthink and cognitive biases. This Article sets out to uncover why white male repeat players continue to dominate class counsel appointments and proposes a practical and immediately implementable solution for the judiciary to improve class counsel diversity. The Article examines all class action auto defect multidistrict litigation suits. By focusing on this subset of cases that span across five decades, it observes potential tendencies of certain courts (i.e., white, Republican-appointed, and female courts) to appoint white men and identifies different processes and criteria courts have implemented and considered that have resulted in the appointment of more female and minority attorneys. The Article finds, however, that the gender and racial gaps remain stark, largely because courts understandably place an almost dispositive value on attorneys’ prior experience serving as class counsel, a role white men have traditionally monopolized. It proposes a way to resolve this Catch-22 problem—a two-tier joint appointment structure that collectively evaluates the experience and diversity of counsel and removes the insurmountable entry barriers to the plaintiffs’ counsel class action bar.
{"title":"Driving Diverse Representation of Diverse Classes","authors":"Alissa Del Riego","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.56.1.driving","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.56.1.driving","url":null,"abstract":"Why have federal courts overwhelmingly appointed white men to represent diverse consumer classes? Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires courts to appoint the attorneys “best able to represent the interests of class members” to serve as class counsel. But courts’ recurrent conclusion that white men best fit the federally mandated job description not only gives the appearance of discrimination, but harms class members that suffer from outcomes plagued by groupthink and cognitive biases. This Article sets out to uncover why white male repeat players continue to dominate class counsel appointments and proposes a practical and immediately implementable solution for the judiciary to improve class counsel diversity. The Article examines all class action auto defect multidistrict litigation suits. By focusing on this subset of cases that span across five decades, it observes potential tendencies of certain courts (i.e., white, Republican-appointed, and female courts) to appoint white men and identifies different processes and criteria courts have implemented and considered that have resulted in the appointment of more female and minority attorneys. The Article finds, however, that the gender and racial gaps remain stark, largely because courts understandably place an almost dispositive value on attorneys’ prior experience serving as class counsel, a role white men have traditionally monopolized. It proposes a way to resolve this Catch-22 problem—a two-tier joint appointment structure that collectively evaluates the experience and diversity of counsel and removes the insurmountable entry barriers to the plaintiffs’ counsel class action bar.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73232007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.55.3.another
Claire Mena
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The understanding of these words seems to shift as new technologies emerge. As law enforcement’s arsenal of surveillance techniques has grown to include GPS tracking, cell phones, and cell site location information (CSLI), the Supreme Court has applied Fourth Amendment protections to these modern tools. Law enforcement continues to use one pervasive surveillance technique without limitations: the routine collection of DNA. In 2013, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King held that law enforcement may routinely collect DNA upon arrest for a serious crime. This Note discusses the routine collection of DNA and how it ought to be situated within evolving Fourth Amendment doctrine. Given the nature of DNA and growing DNA databases, law enforcement use of DNA—like its use of other surveillance technologies—should be limited by the Fourth Amendment. DNA collection may not fit neatly within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but neither did cell phones, GPS tracking devices, or CSLI when the Court chose to include them under such protections.
第四修正案保护“人民的人身、房屋、文件和财产不受无理搜查和扣押的权利”。随着新技术的出现，对这些词的理解似乎也在发生变化。由于执法部门的监视技术已经发展到包括GPS跟踪，手机和手机站点位置信息(CSLI)，最高法院已经将第四修正案的保护应用于这些现代工具。执法部门继续无限制地使用一种无处不在的监视技术:常规的DNA收集。2013年，最高法院在马里兰州诉金案(Maryland v. King)中裁定，执法部门可以在因严重犯罪而被捕时定期收集DNA。本文讨论了DNA的常规收集，以及如何将其置于不断发展的第四修正案原则之中。鉴于DNA的性质和不断增长的DNA数据库，执法部门对DNA的使用——就像对其他监控技术的使用一样——应该受到第四修正案的限制。DNA收集可能不完全符合第四修正案的法理，但当法院选择将手机、GPS跟踪设备或CSLI纳入此类保护时，它们也不符合。
{"title":"Another Katz Moment?: Privacy, Property, and a DNA Database","authors":"Claire Mena","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.3.another","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.3.another","url":null,"abstract":"The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The understanding of these words seems to shift as new technologies emerge. As law enforcement’s arsenal of surveillance techniques has grown to include GPS tracking, cell phones, and cell site location information (CSLI), the Supreme Court has applied Fourth Amendment protections to these modern tools. Law enforcement continues to use one pervasive surveillance technique without limitations: the routine collection of DNA. In 2013, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. King held that law enforcement may routinely collect DNA upon arrest for a serious crime. This Note discusses the routine collection of DNA and how it ought to be situated within evolving Fourth Amendment doctrine. Given the nature of DNA and growing DNA databases, law enforcement use of DNA—like its use of other surveillance technologies—should be limited by the Fourth Amendment. DNA collection may not fit neatly within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but neither did cell phones, GPS tracking devices, or CSLI when the Court chose to include them under such protections.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79581323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.56.1.liability
Dana S Florczak
Title VII is meant to protect employees from discrimination and has historically been a crucial tool for creating social change in the workplace. But when considering modern-day workplace discrimination wrought by “toxic workplace cultures” defined herein, Title VII’s frameworks for confronting systemic discrimination prove outdated and ineffective. This Note proposes the codification of a new theory of discrimination under Title VII targeting toxic workplace cultures, with substantive and procedural elements working in tandem to better enable plaintiffs to collectively bring actions to hold employers accountable for fostering discriminatory environments. Part I defines toxic workplace cultures and walks through case studies of such cultures in action. Part II explains the existing frameworks of Title VII and why they do not provide recourse for victims of toxic workplace cultures. Part III proposes a solution through codifying a new cause of action for toxic workplace cultures under the statute and offers a brief case study highlighting a potential outcome were this proposal to be implemented.
{"title":"Liability for Toxic Workplace Cultures","authors":"Dana S Florczak","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.56.1.liability","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.56.1.liability","url":null,"abstract":"Title VII is meant to protect employees from discrimination and has historically been a crucial tool for creating social change in the workplace. But when considering modern-day workplace discrimination wrought by “toxic workplace cultures” defined herein, Title VII’s frameworks for confronting systemic discrimination prove outdated and ineffective. This Note proposes the codification of a new theory of discrimination under Title VII targeting toxic workplace cultures, with substantive and procedural elements working in tandem to better enable plaintiffs to collectively bring actions to hold employers accountable for fostering discriminatory environments. Part I defines toxic workplace cultures and walks through case studies of such cultures in action. Part II explains the existing frameworks of Title VII and why they do not provide recourse for victims of toxic workplace cultures. Part III proposes a solution through codifying a new cause of action for toxic workplace cultures under the statute and offers a brief case study highlighting a potential outcome were this proposal to be implemented.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"44 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89727809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ShotSpotter technology is a rapid identification and response system used in ninety American cities that is designed to detect gunshots and dispatch police. ShotSpotter is one of many powerful surveillance tools used by local police departments to purportedly help fight crime, but they often do so at the expense of infringing upon privacy rights and civil liberties. This Article expands the conversation about ShotSpotter technology considerably by examining the adjacent Fourth Amendment issues emanating from its use. For example, law enforcement increasingly relies on ShotSpotter to create reasonable suspicion where it does not exist. In practice, the use of ShotSpotter increases the frequency of police interactions, which also increases the risk of Black Americans becoming the victims of police brutality or harassment. Such racialized policing facilitates the status quo of violence and bias against Black Americans. This Article uses recent cases from the D.C., the Fourth, and Seventh Circuits as a foundation to argue that officers arriving on the scene to investigate a gunshot sound they were alerted of via ShotSpotter technology should not be allowed to use the gunshot sound as the basis of reasonable suspicion and subsequent search and seizure. At the heart of this Article is the argument that the use of ShotSpotter technology is unconstitutional under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond because it is not used for a specific law enforcement purpose beyond preventing crime generally. Under the reasoning and result of Edmond, law enforcement is prohibited from using ShotSpotters unless officers have reasons for individualized suspicion. Spending more money on ineffective ShotSpotters placed in “high crime” neighborhoods across America is not the answer to reducing gun violence. As seen with Oakland’s successful Ceasefire program, there are innovative ways to simultaneously build trust in communities and curb gun violence. Indeed, properly designed group violence reduction strategies will foster and maintain dignity for participants in a program tailored to saves lives and promote community healing.
{"title":"“Bang!”: ShotSpotter Gunshot Detection Technology, Predictive Policing, and Measuring Terry’s Reach","authors":"H. Gee","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.4.bang","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.4.bang","url":null,"abstract":"ShotSpotter technology is a rapid identification and response system used in ninety American cities that is designed to detect gunshots and dispatch police. ShotSpotter is one of many powerful surveillance tools used by local police departments to purportedly help fight crime, but they often do so at the expense of infringing upon privacy rights and civil liberties. This Article expands the conversation about ShotSpotter technology considerably by examining the adjacent Fourth Amendment issues emanating from its use. For example, law enforcement increasingly relies on ShotSpotter to create reasonable suspicion where it does not exist. In practice, the use of ShotSpotter increases the frequency of police interactions, which also increases the risk of Black Americans becoming the victims of police brutality or harassment. Such racialized policing facilitates the status quo of violence and bias against Black Americans. This Article uses recent cases from the D.C., the Fourth, and Seventh Circuits as a foundation to argue that officers arriving on the scene to investigate a gunshot sound they were alerted of via ShotSpotter technology should not be allowed to use the gunshot sound as the basis of reasonable suspicion and subsequent search and seizure. At the heart of this Article is the argument that the use of ShotSpotter technology is unconstitutional under City of Indianapolis v. Edmond because it is not used for a specific law enforcement purpose beyond preventing crime generally. Under the reasoning and result of Edmond, law enforcement is prohibited from using ShotSpotters unless officers have reasons for individualized suspicion. Spending more money on ineffective ShotSpotters placed in “high crime” neighborhoods across America is not the answer to reducing gun violence. As seen with Oakland’s successful Ceasefire program, there are innovative ways to simultaneously build trust in communities and curb gun violence. Indeed, properly designed group violence reduction strategies will foster and maintain dignity for participants in a program tailored to saves lives and promote community healing.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"52 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87140246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.55.3.second
Richard Zhao
The United States is the only country in the world that sentences children to die in prison. This practice, known as juvenile life without parole (JLWOP), is condemned by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yet twenty-five states still permit the sentence, and Michigan houses one of the nation’s largest JLWOP populations. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ban on some forms of JLWOP, more must be done to further limit the use of this sentence. The current JLWOP sentencing scheme is untenable, imposes a significant financial burden on taxpayers, and perpetuates racial inequality. This Note explores these reasons for eliminating the practice and ultimately urges Michigan to follow other states in enacting a categorical ban on JLWOP, either through judicial decision or legislative action.
{"title":"Second Chances: Why Michigan Should Categorically Prohibit the Sentence of Juvenile Life Without Parole","authors":"Richard Zhao","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.3.second","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.3.second","url":null,"abstract":"The United States is the only country in the world that sentences children to die in prison. This practice, known as juvenile life without parole (JLWOP), is condemned by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yet twenty-five states still permit the sentence, and Michigan houses one of the nation’s largest JLWOP populations. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ban on some forms of JLWOP, more must be done to further limit the use of this sentence. The current JLWOP sentencing scheme is untenable, imposes a significant financial burden on taxpayers, and perpetuates racial inequality. This Note explores these reasons for eliminating the practice and ultimately urges Michigan to follow other states in enacting a categorical ban on JLWOP, either through judicial decision or legislative action.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73063917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.55.3.examining
S. Devito, K. Hample, Erin Lain
The legal profession is among the least diverse in the United States. Given continuing issues of systemic racism, the central position that the justice system occupies in society, and the vital role that lawyers play in that system, it is incumbent upon legal professionals to identify and remedy the causes of this lack of diversity. This Article seeks to understand how the bar examination—the final hurdle to entering the profession— contributes to this dearth of diversity. Using publicly available data, we analyze whether the ethnic makeup of a law school’s entering class correlates to the school’s first-time bar passage rates on the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE). We find that higher proportions of Black and Hispanic students in a law school’s entering class are associated with lower first-time bar passage rates for that school in its reported UBE jurisdictions three years later. This effect persists after controlling for other potentially causal factors like undergraduate grade-point average (UGPA), law school admission test (LSAT) score, geographic region, or law school tier. Moreover, the results are statistically robust at a p-value of 0.01 (indicating just a 1% chance that the results are due to random variation in the data). Because these are school-level results, they may not fully account for relevant factors identifiable only in student-level data. As a result, we argue that follow-up study using data relating to individual students is necessary to fully understand why the UBE produces racially and ethnically disparate results.
{"title":"Examining the Bar Exam: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Bias in the Uniform Bar Examination","authors":"S. Devito, K. Hample, Erin Lain","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.3.examining","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.3.examining","url":null,"abstract":"The legal profession is among the least diverse in the United States. Given continuing issues of systemic racism, the central position that the justice system occupies in society, and the vital role that lawyers play in that system, it is incumbent upon legal professionals to identify and remedy the causes of this lack of diversity. This Article seeks to understand how the bar examination—the final hurdle to entering the profession— contributes to this dearth of diversity. Using publicly available data, we analyze whether the ethnic makeup of a law school’s entering class correlates to the school’s first-time bar passage rates on the Uniform Bar Examination (UBE). We find that higher proportions of Black and Hispanic students in a law school’s entering class are associated with lower first-time bar passage rates for that school in its reported UBE jurisdictions three years later. This effect persists after controlling for other potentially causal factors like undergraduate grade-point average (UGPA), law school admission test (LSAT) score, geographic region, or law school tier. Moreover, the results are statistically robust at a p-value of 0.01 (indicating just a 1% chance that the results are due to random variation in the data). Because these are school-level results, they may not fully account for relevant factors identifiable only in student-level data. As a result, we argue that follow-up study using data relating to individual students is necessary to fully understand why the UBE produces racially and ethnically disparate results.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82835578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.36646/mjlr.55.3.corporations
Wentong Zheng
The growing trend of corporations imposing restrictions on suppliers, contractors, and customers beyond the requirements of existing laws requires rethinking the nature and impact of corporations’ private regulatory power. This trend, which this Article refers to as “Corporations as Private Regulators” (CPR), represents a paradigmatic shift in how corporations participate in the making of public policies. This Article conceptualizes the corporate CPR power as the exercise of a right of refusal to deal with counterparties. This right of refusal could be theorized as a new form of property right, whose allocation has important implications for both rights and wealth. The Article further explores the possible legal responses to CPR under various approaches, including the status quo approach, the ad hoc approach, the antitrust approach, the general CPR law approach, the property approach, and the constitutional approach. Finally, the Article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the theoretical and practical implications, of each approach. The insights garnered through these inquiries lay the foundation for systematically tackling the CPR power.
{"title":"Corporations as Private Regulators","authors":"Wentong Zheng","doi":"10.36646/mjlr.55.3.corporations","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36646/mjlr.55.3.corporations","url":null,"abstract":"The growing trend of corporations imposing restrictions on suppliers, contractors, and customers beyond the requirements of existing laws requires rethinking the nature and impact of corporations’ private regulatory power. This trend, which this Article refers to as “Corporations as Private Regulators” (CPR), represents a paradigmatic shift in how corporations participate in the making of public policies. This Article conceptualizes the corporate CPR power as the exercise of a right of refusal to deal with counterparties. This right of refusal could be theorized as a new form of property right, whose allocation has important implications for both rights and wealth. The Article further explores the possible legal responses to CPR under various approaches, including the status quo approach, the ad hoc approach, the antitrust approach, the general CPR law approach, the property approach, and the constitutional approach. Finally, the Article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the theoretical and practical implications, of each approach. The insights garnered through these inquiries lay the foundation for systematically tackling the CPR power.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"274 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90780265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article advances a proposal for market-based formulary apportionment.
本文提出了一种基于市场的定额分配方案。
{"title":"Slicing the Shadow: A Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation","authors":"R. Avi-Yonah","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3920267","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3920267","url":null,"abstract":"This article advances a proposal for market-based formulary apportionment.","PeriodicalId":83420,"journal":{"name":"University of Michigan journal of law reform. University of Michigan. Law School","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82429263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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