Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203469682.ch7
Y. Benkler
John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape the oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional forms in modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern state. One might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”1 The Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that assumed that if only the state were to back off markets will take care of it all, but also a left-anchored critique of the state as a critical site of protecting the power and privilege of elites, insistence that individual self-actualization demanded a state contained within narrow boundaries, and a deep skepticism of all forms of authority, as Fred Turner showed in From Counterculture to Cyberculture.2 Selling Wine Without Bottles is not against markets or payment as such, but rather a resistance to the totalizing vision of commodity exchange as all there is. In this, for me a telling passage was:
约翰·佩里·巴洛(John Perry Barlow)的两篇文章捕捉到了一种渴望，即摆脱现代性中两种最重要的制度形式——国家和市场社会——的压迫。《网络空间独立宣言》明确反对现代国家。有人可能会说:“好吧，但除了卫生、医药、教育、葡萄酒、公共秩序、灌溉、道路、淡水系统和公共卫生之外，罗马人为我们做过什么?”“1《宣言》不仅反映了一种自由主义乌托邦，认为只要国家退出市场就能解决一切问题，而且还反映了一种左派对国家的批判，认为国家是保护精英权力和特权的关键场所，坚持个人自我实现需要一个被限制在狭窄边界内的国家，以及对所有形式的权威的深刻怀疑。正如弗雷德·特纳在《从反主流文化到网络文化》一书中所表明的那样。2无瓶卖酒并不反对市场或支付，而是反对商品交换的整体愿景。对我来说，其中有一段话很能说明问题:
{"title":"A Political Economy of Utopia","authors":"Y. Benkler","doi":"10.4324/9780203469682.ch7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203469682.ch7","url":null,"abstract":"John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape the oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional forms in modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern state. One might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”1 The Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that assumed that if only the state were to back off markets will take care of it all, but also a left-anchored critique of the state as a critical site of protecting the power and privilege of elites, insistence that individual self-actualization demanded a state contained within narrow boundaries, and a deep skepticism of all forms of authority, as Fred Turner showed in From Counterculture to Cyberculture.2 Selling Wine Without Bottles is not against markets or payment as such, but rather a resistance to the totalizing vision of commodity exchange as all there is. In this, for me a telling passage was:","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"1 1","pages":"78-84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77373033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-02-15DOI: 10.5771/9783845289304-21
Sara Sun Beale, Peter G. Berris
The Internet of Things (IoT) is here and growing rapidly as consumers eagerly adopt internet-enabled devices for their utility, features, and convenience. But this dramatic expansion also exacerbates two underlying dangers in the IoT. First, hackers in the IoT may attempt to gain control of internet-enabled devices, causing negative consequences in the physical world. Given that objects with internet connectivity range from household appliances and automobiles to major infrastructure components, this danger is potentially severe. Indeed, in the last few years, hackers have gained control of cars, trains, and dams, and some experts think that even commercial airplanes could be at risk. Second, IoT devices pose an enormous risk to the stability of the internet itself, as they are vulnerable to being hacked and recruited into botnets used for attacks on the digital world. Recent attacks on major websites including Netflix and Twitter exemplify this danger. This article surveys these dangers, summarizes some of their main causes, and then analyzes the extent to which current laws like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act punish hacking in the IoT. The article finds that although hacking in the IoT is likely illegal, the current legal regime punishes hacking after the fact and therefore lacks the prospective force needed to fully temper the risks posed by the IoT. Therefore, other solutions are needed to address the perilousness of the IoT in its current form. After a discussion of the practical and legal barriers to investigating and prosecuting hacking, we turn to the merits and pitfalls of hacking back from legal, practical, and ethical perspectives. We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of two possible solutions — regulation and the standards approach.
{"title":"Hacking the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Dangers, and Legal Responses","authors":"Sara Sun Beale, Peter G. Berris","doi":"10.5771/9783845289304-21","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845289304-21","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet of Things (IoT) is here and growing rapidly as consumers eagerly adopt internet-enabled devices for their utility, features, and convenience. But this dramatic expansion also exacerbates two underlying dangers in the IoT. First, hackers in the IoT may attempt to gain control of internet-enabled devices, causing negative consequences in the physical world. Given that objects with internet connectivity range from household appliances and automobiles to major infrastructure components, this danger is potentially severe. Indeed, in the last few years, hackers have gained control of cars, trains, and dams, and some experts think that even commercial airplanes could be at risk. Second, IoT devices pose an enormous risk to the stability of the internet itself, as they are vulnerable to being hacked and recruited into botnets used for attacks on the digital world. Recent attacks on major websites including Netflix and Twitter exemplify this danger. This article surveys these dangers, summarizes some of their main causes, and then analyzes the extent to which current laws like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act punish hacking in the IoT. The article finds that although hacking in the IoT is likely illegal, the current legal regime punishes hacking after the fact and therefore lacks the prospective force needed to fully temper the risks posed by the IoT. Therefore, other solutions are needed to address the perilousness of the IoT in its current form. After a discussion of the practical and legal barriers to investigating and prosecuting hacking, we turn to the merits and pitfalls of hacking back from legal, practical, and ethical perspectives. We then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of two possible solutions — regulation and the standards approach.","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"6 1","pages":"161-204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78846662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Algorithms, particularly of the machine learning (ML) variety, are increasingly important to individuals' lives, but have caused a range of concerns evolving mainly around unfairness, discrimination and opacity. Transparency in the form of a "right to an explanation" has emerged as a compellingly attractive remedy since it intuitively presents as a means to "open the black box", hence allowing individual challenge and redress, as well as potential to instil accountability to the public in ML systems. In the general furore over algorithmic bias and other issues laid out in section 2, any remedy in a storm has looked attractive. However, we argue that a right to an explanation in the GDPR is unlikely to be a complete remedy to algorithmic harms, particularly in some of the core "algorithmic war stories" that have shaped recent attitudes in this domain. We present several reasons for this conclusion. First (section 3), the law is restrictive on when any explanation-related right can be triggered, and in many places is unclear, or even seems paradoxical. Second (section 4), even were some of these restrictions to be navigated, the way that explanations are conceived of legally — as "meaningful information about the logic of processing" — is unlikely to be provided by the kind of ML "explanations" computer scientists have been developing. ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation sought, the multi-dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an explanation. However “subject-centric" explanations (SCEs), which restrict explanations to particular regions of a model around a query, show promise for interactive exploration, as do pedagogical rather than decompositional explanations in dodging developers' worries of IP or trade secrets disclosure. As an interim conclusion then, while convinced that recent research in ML explanations shows promise, we fear that the search for a "right to an explanation" in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new kind of "transparency fallacy". However, in our final sections, we argue that other parts of the GDPR related (i) to other individual rights including the right to erasure ("right to be forgotten") and the right to data portability and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and privacy seals, may have the seeds we can use to build a more responsible, explicable and user-friendly algorithmic society.
{"title":"Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'Right to an Explanation' Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For","authors":"L. Edwards, Michael Veale","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2972855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2972855","url":null,"abstract":"Algorithms, particularly of the machine learning (ML) variety, are increasingly important to individuals' lives, but have caused a range of concerns evolving mainly around unfairness, discrimination and opacity. Transparency in the form of a \"right to an explanation\" has emerged as a compellingly attractive remedy since it intuitively presents as a means to \"open the black box\", hence allowing individual challenge and redress, as well as potential to instil accountability to the public in ML systems. In the general furore over algorithmic bias and other issues laid out in section 2, any remedy in a storm has looked attractive. However, we argue that a right to an explanation in the GDPR is unlikely to be a complete remedy to algorithmic harms, particularly in some of the core \"algorithmic war stories\" that have shaped recent attitudes in this domain. We present several reasons for this conclusion. First (section 3), the law is restrictive on when any explanation-related right can be triggered, and in many places is unclear, or even seems paradoxical. Second (section 4), even were some of these restrictions to be navigated, the way that explanations are conceived of legally — as \"meaningful information about the logic of processing\" — is unlikely to be provided by the kind of ML \"explanations\" computer scientists have been developing. ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation sought, the multi-dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an explanation. However “subject-centric\" explanations (SCEs), which restrict explanations to particular regions of a model around a query, show promise for interactive exploration, as do pedagogical rather than decompositional explanations in dodging developers' worries of IP or trade secrets disclosure. As an interim conclusion then, while convinced that recent research in ML explanations shows promise, we fear that the search for a \"right to an explanation\" in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new kind of \"transparency fallacy\". However, in our final sections, we argue that other parts of the GDPR related (i) to other individual rights including the right to erasure (\"right to be forgotten\") and the right to data portability and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and privacy seals, may have the seeds we can use to build a more responsible, explicable and user-friendly algorithmic society.","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"59 1","pages":"18-84"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89052420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is currently a conflict between laws and the market in their treatment of email. Laws mandate that emails are not protected as property unless copyrightable or protected by another legal mechanism. But the market suggests that emails are user-owned property without further qualification. Moreover, the nature of email is treated slightly differently between the U.S. and U.K. legal regimes. While the current legal regimes applicable to email in the U.K. and U.S. are reasonable, legal harmonization within these systems, and with the service provider market, should be achieved.
{"title":"Legal Nature of Emails: A Comparative Perspective","authors":"Edina Harbinja","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2742231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2742231","url":null,"abstract":"There is currently a conflict between laws and the market in their treatment of email. Laws mandate that emails are not protected as property unless copyrightable or protected by another legal mechanism. But the market suggests that emails are user-owned property without further qualification. Moreover, the nature of email is treated slightly differently between the U.S. and U.K. legal regimes. While the current legal regimes applicable to email in the U.K. and U.S. are reasonable, legal harmonization within these systems, and with the service provider market, should be achieved.","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"2015 1","pages":"227-255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87843905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Pinguelo, D. Thaw
In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) to provide additional protections for individuals’ private communications content held in electronic storage by third parties. Acting out of direct concern for the implications of the Third-Party Records Doctrine — a judicially created doctrine that generally eliminates Fourth Amendment protections for information entrusted to third parties — Congress sought to tailor the SCA to electronic communications sent via and stored by third parties. Yet, because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the technology of 1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA consistently with regard to similar private content sent using different technologies. This Article argues that Congress should revisit the SCA and adopt a single, technology-neutral standard of protection for private communications content held by third-party service providers. Furthermore, it suggests that Congress specifically intended to limit the scope of the Third-Party Records Doctrine by creating greater protections via the SCA, and thus courts interpreting existing law should afford protection to new technologies such as social media communications consistent with that intent based on individuals’ expressed privacy preferences.
{"title":"Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications Act","authors":"Christopher J. Borchert, Fernando M. Pinguelo, D. Thaw","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2306839","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2306839","url":null,"abstract":"In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) to provide additional protections for individuals’ private communications content held in electronic storage by third parties. Acting out of direct concern for the implications of the Third-Party Records Doctrine — a judicially created doctrine that generally eliminates Fourth Amendment protections for information entrusted to third parties — Congress sought to tailor the SCA to electronic communications sent via and stored by third parties. Yet, because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the technology of 1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA consistently with regard to similar private content sent using different technologies. This Article argues that Congress should revisit the SCA and adopt a single, technology-neutral standard of protection for private communications content held by third-party service providers. Furthermore, it suggests that Congress specifically intended to limit the scope of the Third-Party Records Doctrine by creating greater protections via the SCA, and thus courts interpreting existing law should afford protection to new technologies such as social media communications consistent with that intent based on individuals’ expressed privacy preferences.","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"44 1","pages":"36-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83237239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On November 30, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. on the question, “Are human genes patentable?” For over 150 years Supreme Court decisions have excluded from the federal patent power laws of nature and physical phenomena. The words "invention," "new" and "useful" in §101 are consistent with these exclusions from the federal patent power, so they are not the result of a judicially active court limiting the will of Congress. The conclusions of Judges Lourie and Moore in Myriad Genetics that the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 constitute patentable subject matter disregard the Supreme Court's decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers on products derived from nature. “Isolation” is not an inventive step to change an unpatentable physical phenomenon into patentable subject matter. Turning to claim 2, even if the isolated cDNA segments do not under Chakrabarty and Funk Brother constitute a patentable product, under Prometheus the isolated cDNA segments capture an unpatentable law of nature - the genetic code. Since no inventive step has been added to the genetic code in claim 2, the cDNA of claim 2 constitutes unpatentable subject matter under Prometheus. The Federal Circuit’s disregard in Myriad Genetics of the laws of nature threatens to eviscerate the public domain of basic scientific knowledge.
{"title":"After Prometheus, Are Human Genes Patentable Subject Matter?","authors":"Douglas L. Rogers","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2191523","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2191523","url":null,"abstract":"On November 30, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. on the question, “Are human genes patentable?” For over 150 years Supreme Court decisions have excluded from the federal patent power laws of nature and physical phenomena. The words \"invention,\" \"new\" and \"useful\" in §101 are consistent with these exclusions from the federal patent power, so they are not the result of a judicially active court limiting the will of Congress. The conclusions of Judges Lourie and Moore in Myriad Genetics that the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 constitute patentable subject matter disregard the Supreme Court's decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers on products derived from nature. “Isolation” is not an inventive step to change an unpatentable physical phenomenon into patentable subject matter. Turning to claim 2, even if the isolated cDNA segments do not under Chakrabarty and Funk Brother constitute a patentable product, under Prometheus the isolated cDNA segments capture an unpatentable law of nature - the genetic code. Since no inventive step has been added to the genetic code in claim 2, the cDNA of claim 2 constitutes unpatentable subject matter under Prometheus. The Federal Circuit’s disregard in Myriad Genetics of the laws of nature threatens to eviscerate the public domain of basic scientific knowledge.","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"40 1","pages":"434-508"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73252384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Interest","authors":"J. Boyle","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3084088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3084088","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":"51 1","pages":"30-64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90533288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current doctrine of informed consent falls far short of its potential to serve as a valuable safeguard for human research subjects. Instead of providing a channel of communication between physician and subject, informed consent is a lifeless entity responsible for a large portion of the misunderstanding existing between these parties. Acknowledging risk perception principles may help transform the informed consent process into an effective communication of health risks.
{"title":"Reviving informed consent: using risk perception in clinical trials.","authors":"Dana Ziker","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The current doctrine of informed consent falls far short of its potential to serve as a valuable safeguard for human research subjects. Instead of providing a channel of communication between physician and subject, informed consent is a lifeless entity responsible for a large portion of the misunderstanding existing between these parties. Acknowledging risk perception principles may help transform the informed consent process into an effective communication of health risks.</p>","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":" ","pages":"E1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24955623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Foes of the United States have demonstrated their ability to strike at the heart of this country. Fear of renewed attacks and a desire for greater national security have now prompted many to call for improvements in the national personal identification system. In particular, the possibility of a national identification card containing the carrier's DNA information is being seriously considered. However, this raises difficult questions. Would such a card system, and the extraction of individuals' DNA it entails, violate the 4th Amendment of the Constitution? This article will shows that such a card system could in fact be found to be constitutional under the law of privacy as it stands today.
{"title":"The case for national DNA identification cards.","authors":"Ben Quarmby","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Foes of the United States have demonstrated their ability to strike at the heart of this country. Fear of renewed attacks and a desire for greater national security have now prompted many to call for improvements in the national personal identification system. In particular, the possibility of a national identification card containing the carrier's DNA information is being seriously considered. However, this raises difficult questions. Would such a card system, and the extraction of individuals' DNA it entails, violate the 4th Amendment of the Constitution? This article will shows that such a card system could in fact be found to be constitutional under the law of privacy as it stands today.</p>","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":" ","pages":"E1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24955619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This iBrief discusses some of the social, ethical and legal considerations surrounding the use of unimplanted, in vitro embryos in stem cell research. It proposes that a new ethical standard be elucidated for these embryos. The iBrief gives an overview of two proposals for such a standard at opposite ends of the spectrum: treating the in vitro embryo as a legal person versus treating it as mere property. It argues against both approaches. The former can have undesirable social implications including undue interference with female reproductive autonomy, while the latter would objectify potential human life and reproductive potential. The iBrief proposes an intermediate approach that treats the embryo as a special entity. It warns against a model whereby the respect accorded to embryos is made dependent on the attainment of various qualitative or developmental criteria. The complexities surrounding human life, it argues, are too uncertain. What is certain is the embryo's unique potential for human life, at any developmental stage. This, the iBrief proposes, should be the sole criterion for an embryo's special status, a status that should be confined within constitutional limits.
{"title":"Defining a new ethical standard for human in vitro embryos in the context of stem cell research.","authors":"Sina A Muscati","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This iBrief discusses some of the social, ethical and legal considerations surrounding the use of unimplanted, in vitro embryos in stem cell research. It proposes that a new ethical standard be elucidated for these embryos. The iBrief gives an overview of two proposals for such a standard at opposite ends of the spectrum: treating the in vitro embryo as a legal person versus treating it as mere property. It argues against both approaches. The former can have undesirable social implications including undue interference with female reproductive autonomy, while the latter would objectify potential human life and reproductive potential. The iBrief proposes an intermediate approach that treats the embryo as a special entity. It warns against a model whereby the respect accorded to embryos is made dependent on the attainment of various qualitative or developmental criteria. The complexities surrounding human life, it argues, are too uncertain. What is certain is the embryo's unique potential for human life, at any developmental stage. This, the iBrief proposes, should be the sole criterion for an embryo's special status, a status that should be confined within constitutional limits.</p>","PeriodicalId":87176,"journal":{"name":"Duke law and technology review","volume":" ","pages":"E1"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"24955618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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