Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3333483
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Pub Date : 2023-12-13DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3333481
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Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3274227
Jacob Mays
Inefficient coordination between decentralized generation investment and centralized transmission planning is a significant barrier to achieving rapid decarbonization in liberalized electricity markets. While the optimal configuration of the transmission grid depends on the relative social costs of competing technologies, existing processes have not led to transmission expansion consistent with declines in the cost of wind and solar combined with increased estimates of the social costs of traditional thermal resources. This paper describes the negative feedback loop preventing efficient interconnection of new resources in U.S. markets, its connection to conceptual flaws in current resource adequacy constructs, and the ways in which it protects incumbent generators. To help resolve these issues, the paper recommends a shift to a “connect and manage” approach and outlines a straw proposal for a new financial right connected with transmission service. From a generator perspective, the effect of the proposed reforms is to trade highly uncertain network upgrade and congestion costs for a fixed interconnection fee. From a transmission planning perspective, the goal is to improve the quality of information about new generation included in forward-looking planning processes. Simulation on a stylized two-node system demonstrates the potential of the approach to facilitate a transition to clean technologies.
{"title":"Generator Interconnection, Network Expansion, and Energy Transition","authors":"Jacob Mays","doi":"10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3274227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3274227","url":null,"abstract":"Inefficient coordination between decentralized generation investment and centralized transmission planning is a significant barrier to achieving rapid decarbonization in liberalized electricity markets. While the optimal configuration of the transmission grid depends on the relative social costs of competing technologies, existing processes have not led to transmission expansion consistent with declines in the cost of wind and solar combined with increased estimates of the social costs of traditional thermal resources. This paper describes the negative feedback loop preventing efficient interconnection of new resources in U.S. markets, its connection to conceptual flaws in current resource adequacy constructs, and the ways in which it protects incumbent generators. To help resolve these issues, the paper recommends a shift to a “connect and manage” approach and outlines a straw proposal for a new financial right connected with transmission service. From a generator perspective, the effect of the proposed reforms is to trade highly uncertain network upgrade and congestion costs for a fixed interconnection fee. From a transmission planning perspective, the goal is to improve the quality of information about new generation included in forward-looking planning processes. Simulation on a stylized two-node system demonstrates the potential of the approach to facilitate a transition to clean technologies.","PeriodicalId":100639,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Energy Markets, Policy and Regulation","volume":"1 4","pages":"410-419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138633884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-01DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3338568
Sofia Taylor;Aditya Rangarajan;Noah Rhodes;Jonathan Snodgrass;Bernard C. Lesieutre;Line A. Roald
This paper presents the California Test System (CATS), a synthetic transmission grid in California that can be used by the public for power systems policy research without revealing any critical energy information. The proposed synthetic grid combines publicly available geographic data of California's electric infrastructure, such as the actual locations of transmission corridors, with invented topology and transmission line parameters that are “realistic but not real”. The result is a power grid test system that is suitable for power flow and policy analyses with geo-referenced applications, including studies related to weather, topography, and socio-economic considerations. The methods used to develop and evaluate the CATS grid are documented in detail in this report.
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Pub Date : 2023-10-27DOI: 10.1109/TEMPR.2023.3327903
Mohamed Awadalla;François Bouffard
The daily operation of real-world power systems and their underlying markets relies on the timely solution of the unit commitment problem. However, given its computational complexity, several optimization-based methods have been proposed to lighten its problem formulation by removing redundant line flow constraints. These approaches often ignore the spatial couplings of renewable generation and demand, which have an inherent impact of market outcomes. Moreover, the elimination procedures primarily focus on the feasible region and exclude how the problem's objective function plays a role here. To address these pitfalls, we move to rule out redundant